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1. Introduction
This Special Issue contributes to the debate that land grabbing should be discussed as commons
grabbing. But it also goes a step further. It poses this question: does commons grabbing also removes
local people’s capacity for resilience in the Global South, especially in Africa and if so how does
that process unfold? The contributions share a focus on how the development of state institutions
(formal laws and regulations for agrarian development and compensation) and voluntary corporate
social responsibility (CSR) initiatives by investors have enabled the grabbing process of not just
removing land but land and land-related common-pool resources formally previously governed by
local common property institutions. The papers look at how state institutions (specifically state
property of resources and their subsequent privatization) and CSR programs are used for development
strategies by state actors and companies to legitimate their investments (Anseeuw et al 2012 [1], Lavers
2012 [2], Schoeneveld and Zoomers 2015 [3]).
Furthermore, the contributions in this Special Issue analyze the embedding of these strategies
into neoliberal ideology of economic development (Escobar 1995 [4], Haller 2013 [5]). This ideology
defines development as an economic progress of individual efforts adapted to the market to eradicate
poverty and promote individual development. Such a view negates processes of power asymmetries
and calls for remedies that are often externally defined. In addition, these remedies are often based on
notions of private property and economic achievements with low level but nevertheless existing state
interference (see Fletcher 2010 [6]). Therefore, state actors still profit from these policies, often without
involving local actors and groups apart from local elites. State actors and investors also promote
ideologies of modernity based on discourses of market-oriented economic development including
green development based on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (see Haller et al 2018 [7],
Haller et al 2019 [8]).
In order shed more light on these dynamics, this Special Issue proposes to take a fresh look
at James Ferguson’s Anti-Politics Machines (1994 [9], 2006 [10]) that serves to uncover the hidden
power asymmetries of actors and political basis of state-driven development strategies in the age of
neoliberalism. The papers therefore analyze development discourses and CSR-policies in agrarian
as well as green infrastructure-related investments and how these hide power differences. We argue
that the various discourses of development further legitimize the institutional change from common
to state and private property of land and land-related common-pool resources (Haller ed 2010 [11]),
which is the basis of commons grabbing (Haller 2019 [12], Haller this volume [13]).
Moreover, this collection of papers stresses the fact that investments and neoliberal developments
affect not just ‘wastelands’, but land-related common-pool resources of cultural landscape ecosystems,
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previously governed by common property institutions. In addition, the authors illustrate the way
institutional change leads to legal and institutional pluralism, and how companies and local as well
as state elites select from this institutional pluralism (a process labelled as institution shopping,
see Toulmin 2008 [14], Haller 2016 [15], 2019 [12]) depending on their bargaining power and for their
own interest to enable and legitimate the grabbing processes.
As a general conclusion—and in answering the question posed by the title of the Special
Issue—the research presented here suggests that investments using institutional pluralism related to
development, not only lead to commons grabbing, but also to “resilience grabbing”: CSR programs
and compensations in the form of financial payments or employment do not cover local people’s
loss of common-pool resources for subsistence and cash. In particular, women and minorities are
often not able to get access to the few jobs available and to compensations, which are often low and
unequally distributed (Marfurt et al 2016 [16], Haller et al 2019 [8]). In the cases where women do get
access to jobs, these are badly paid, of short duration and compete with other duties of reproductive
work (see Ngutu et al, this volume). This means that access to the commons, which enhanced local
resilience in times of crisis in the past, is no longer available, while at the same time the promises of
work and access to compensation and development programs are not kept by states and investors.
As a consequence, marginal local people are under conditions of commons grabbing more vulnerable
to environmental disturbances and less resilient than they were before.
Finally, the contributions of this Special Issue also present local perceptions and related responses of
commoners to the grabbing-process, go beyond resistance, acquaintance and incorporation (see Hall et al
2015 [17]). They include further strategies ranging from weapons of the weak (Scott 1987 [18]) to options
of mobilization (labelled as politics machines, see Niederberger et al 2016 [19]), containing also institution
shopping from below (on customary and human rights laws and regulations, see Marfurt 2019 [20]) and
bottom-up institution building processes to reclaim the commons and its new participatory governance
(see constitutionality approach by Haller, Acciaioli and Rist 2016 [21], Haller, Belsky and Rist 2018 [22]).
The papers of this Special Issue were written by 22 authors from nine university institutes from
five countries (Switzerland, Kenya, Cambodia, New Zealand and Bolivia) covering case studies from
Kenya, Tanzania, Morocco, Bolivia, Ecuador, Cambodia. The Special issue is organized in the following
way: After the first paper serving as theoretical introductory, the following papers are presented under
three main topics such as (a) property transformations and resilience, (b) agricultural neoliberal order
and notions of green development and (c) green investments and Anti-Politics Machines:
In the introductory paper [13] theoretical reflections are proposed from a social anthropology
perspective that uses a combined New Institutional and Political Ecology approach (NIPE). It looks
historically at empirical data from research on African floodplains (Haller ed 2010 [11]). The paper shows
that pre-colonial notions of land were embedded into local ontologies and epistemologies, in which
land included land-related common-pool resources governed by common property institutions in
relation to a non-human and spiritual world. This view also integrated reciprocal access arrangements
between different groups that contributed to their resilience. This meaning of land was undermined
and defragmented during colonial and post-colonial times, changing, the commons into state and also
private property. As a result, this process also contributed to multiple forms of resource regulations for
several separated sectors for state administration (agriculture, wildlife, fisheries, water, conservation
etc.) of previously inclusively managed cultural landscapes. These new different meanings of land
related to institutional pluralism are vital to understand how access to land and related resources is
organized in today’s neoliberal order following the states debt crisis. Therefore, the paper discusses
who has the power to select property rights and resource management institutions and how this
selection (institution shopping) can be legitimated by multiple discourses. These include several
forms of green economic and sustainable development anti-politics machines used by state elites and
investors as well as by local elites to justify investments. Importantly, the paper outlines theoretically
how commons grabbing leads to resilience grabbing. Finally, this introduction also proposes that all
2
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local actors should be much more involved in developing coping strategies enhancing resilience based
on their knowledge and experience.
These theoretical reflections can be used to help to analyze the institutional issue regarding land
and resource management that arise in the other papers in this Special Issue, which are introduced
below under three broad topics:
2. Property Transformations and Resilience
The first three papers provide examples of changes in property rights over time from common to
state and private property of the neoliberal order. Furthermore, they describe institutional pluralism
and the effect this had on livelihoods and resilience. Because property rights have changed substantially
in the past, less powerful local actors find less options to recover from environmental or other stress
factors. Such historical processes indicate that the grabbing of the commons during colonial times
and the plurality of rights for more powerful external actors has reduced local peoples’ resilience
historically and pose challenges for coping strategies:
Edwin Ameso et al [23] show in their paper based on anthropological research data how local
Maasai groups in Northern Kenya have lost large amounts of common land and related pastures and
wetlands during colonial as well as postcolonial times. As a result, their mobility as an important aspect
of their resilience capacity is badly affected. Therefore, they have tried to diversify their strategies in
order to cope with these changes and in order to sustain pastoralism. Maasai are currently combining
property institutions and trying to promote holistic management of pasture and the watersheds,
leading to a better co-management of resources. However, they are still facing challenges in order to
regain resilience with regard to climate and market changes.
Sochanny Hak, John MacAndrew and Andreas Neef [24] examine land grabs in Cambodia in
indigenous people’s areas over the last decade. They argue that because of these indigenous people
lost their commons in the name of national economic development. They illustrate this process of
commons grabbing by using the example of two indigenous communities indicating how the titling
processes have failed to provide indigenous villagers with effective legal mechanisms to counteract the
grabbing process. In addition, the dependency on cash crops and to the loss of communal forests has
contributed to loss of livelihood resilience that is also based on the low bargaining power of local actors.
The issue of asymmetric bargaining power is also the topic of the paper of Jemaiyo Chabeda-Barthe
and Tobias Haller [25] who discuss how the minority of the original hunter-gatherer group of the
Ogiek in Kenya has lost large tracts of common property of their cultural landscape since colonial
times. After independence they have tried to enhance their resilience by focusing on apiculture in
an area called Mau Forest. Under the new wave of neoliberal land reform in the country, the Ogiek
have handed out land to other allied ethnic groups such as the Kalenjin to prevent encroachment from
other powerful ethnic groups such as the immigrant Kikuyu using private property rights of land and
powerful state relations. This case also shows how all actors use strategies of institution shopping but
that the way to be able to do this relies on historically developed power relations.
3. Agricultural Neoliberal Order and Notions of Green Development
The next three papers deal with the neoliberal order of agro-industrial capitalist systems and
conservation schemes, which shape institutional contexts and resilience of local actors.
Mariah Ngutu et al [26] discuss in their contribution how the agro-industrial food system in
Laikipia, Kenya represented by an UK-export oriented commercial horticultural company is driven by
a neoliberal privatization of land and resource policies, feeding the European demand for vegetables.
This process shapes the access to short-term livelihoods options by offering women poorly paid jobs
and increasing their workload as this adds to their domestic and subsistence duties. Furthermore,
the actors of the agro-industrial food system have more bargaining power than local peasants to select
and transform institutionalized access to former common-pool resources. This undermines local food
systems such as agro-pastoralism and small holder agriculture vital for local livelihoods and food
3
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security. Therefore, the livelihood resilience of local actors is undermined, increasing the potential for
conflicts across the different food systems.
Horacio Augstburger, Fabian Käser and Stephan Rist [27] introduce a comparative dimension in
their paper, in which they study the similarities and differences between the Laikipia area in Kenya (as
the previous paper) and the agro-industrial area in Bolivian Lowlands. They analyse the capacity of
several locally occurring food systems to enhance sustainable farm-based agroecosystem services and
how they affect the sustainable management of common-pool resources. The authors show that in both
countries regional and agro-industrial food systems, embedded in a market oriented neoliberal order,
are less socio-ecologically sound than local, indigenous and alternative food systems. The former two
have negative impacts on agroecosystems, undermining common property and cultural landscapes.
They grab the commons and reduce the resilience capacity of the indigenous and alternative systems.
Strengthening local, indigenous and alternative food systems and their common property institutions
is proposed as a key strategy to promote sustainable farm-based agroecosystems.
Lisa Alvarado [28] illustrates how strategies to support local common property systems is
undermined in the context of neoliberal conservation. She outlines that in the Ecuadorian Amazon
region of Ecuador, protected areas have been established as a response to the expansion of the
agricultural frontier based on the neoliberal rule in the country since 1979. She focuses on the protected
area of the Reserva de Producción Faunística Cuyabeno, that was previously managed as commons by
local indigenous groups of the Siona. Before the establishment of the conservation area, the arrival of
several waves of colonizers had already severely compromised traditional institutions of common
property. Resource use limitations by the introduction of the protected areas have been the last of these
grabbing attempts. This green grabbing now forces the Siona people to legitimize their existence in the
park, if they want to stay in their ancestral territory. They argue against the green grabbing, especially
based on the negative impact of tourism in the park and by trying to shop institutions based on their
(reconstructed) indigenous identity that is protected by international conventions.
4. Green investments and Anti-Politics Machines
The issue of green grabbing, however in another forms, is the focus of the last three papers,
illustrating the environmental turn used by powerful actors of states and companies. These investments
show classic forms of commons and resilience grabbing but are embedded in strategies of social and
ecological corporate responsibility schemes (CSRs), masking the grabbing process and the undermining
of the resilience of marginal groups and women.
Gargule Achiba’s [29] paper shows a classical conflict of an internationally-celebrated green
investment in a wind park in Northern Kenya. It explains the way land is grabbed but legitimized by
green energy Anti-Politics Machine. He shows how the implementation of the wind energy project
employs the corporate strategies of depoliticizing both land claims and development interventions.
This process hides how the private sector engagement in large-scale wind energy infrastructure has
created a complex development apparatus ideologically empowered by using the SDGs and Kenya’s
related Vision 2030. Furthermore, the green energy grabbing of pastoral land and related common-pool
resources is hidden by CSR strategies through which dispossession is justified and legitimized.
Another case of commons grabbing in the name of green energy is illustrated in the contribution
of Sarah Ryser [30]. She explains how the largest solar energy project in the world financed by
a public–private partnership removes common property of a Moroccan Amazigh (Berber) clan,
who’s members thereby lose access to pastures and animal fodder. The Anti-Politics Machine of
green energy, including compensation payments and CSR development, hides the fact that a very
low land price was fixed by the state, and further legitimated by the discourse that the land is
wasteland. Furthermore, payments did not reach the communities who also did not fully profit from
CSR-programmes and simultaneously lost access to the commons. Thus, they became less resilient as
their losses were not replaced by the development gains promised. Women, in particular, lost more
than men.
4
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The issue of gender is a particular focus of the paper by Désirée Gmür [31]. She uses data from
her research among the ethnic group of the Wahehe farming communities in Kilolo District, Tanzania,
who had a common property system regarding land and land-related resources that included resource
co-ownership of clan land by women. The investor in this case first tried to get communal land and
then later on so-called private land held by men, who sold it and thereby excluded women form access
to land, water and other resources. While more common-pool resources were enclosed and were no
longer accessible to women, they also lost most of the valuable agricultural land in the valley bottoms
used by them for cash crop production. In addition, the grabbing process by the company also reduced
access to veld products and to water, leading to the loss of food and cash providing resources on which
women depended for their reproductive work. As the traditional rights of women to land has altered,
they are more affected by land and commons grabbing than men and have fewer options in trying to
defend their former property. The company on the other hand uses a green development discourse
to legitimize the selection on environmental legal state institutions and thus the removal of access to
the commons.
5. Conclusions
These case studies indicate several elements of the links between historical and contemporary
commons grabbing processes and how they undermine resilience in food and cash production systems
as well as general livelihoods for marginalized, local communities in the Global South. The cases
presented in this Special Issue show that “resilience grabbing” is the result of commons grabbing as
a process, in which powerful state and corporate actors as well as local elites use institutional and
legal pluralism in the age of neoliberalism. This provides them with the option to select, activate
and transform rules and regulations and to use always new forms of discourses (conservation,
green economy, green investment, CSR-development programs and SDGs) to legitimate their actions.
While the promises of development has been criticized by Ferguson almost three decades ago [9],
the contemporary examples in this Special Issue show the same mechanisms still exist, albeit sometimes
in new forms, but still legitimizing unfavorable outcomes for local actors with less bargaining power.
The tragedy of this notion of development is that in this way the capacity to recover from a human or
environmentally-induced land and resources crisis is reduced. It is assumed that the COVID-crisis and
the related economic and political outcomes on the local level might illustrate this trend.
However, there are cases that show different forms of local reactions and coping strategies that
should be studied further. These may range from small actions of resistance to larger legal claims.
In addition, local groups may develop new identities that boost their bargaining power and try to use
strategies of institution shopping from below or engage in the development of bottom-up institution
building (see Haller et al 2016 [16]). We argue that further research, preferably participatory research
(see Haller and Zingerli 2020 [32]), should focus on these issues.
We hope to have contributed to an understanding that land grabbing in fact removes the communal
rights to own and use not just land but land-related common-pool resources in cultural landscape
ecosystems. These are central for local actors to be able to recover from market and climate induced
crisis and to enhance biodiversity. Undermining these rights and local institutions will accelerate
the global degradation process and further reduce the capacity for local actors to build up resilience
in the face of global environmental and development crises. Enhancing common property and the
development of institutions from below by all actors might be one solution to this set of problems.
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Abstract: Recent debates in social anthropology on land acquisitions highlight the need to go
further back in history in order to analyse their impacts on local livelihoods. The debate over the
commons in economic and ecological anthropology helps us understand some of today’s dynamics
by looking at precolonial common property institutions and the way they were transformed by
Western colonization to state property and then, later in the age of neoliberalism, to privatization and
open access. This paper focuses on Africa and refers to the work of critical scholars who show that
traditional land tenure was misinterpreted as customary tenure without full property rights, while a
broader literature on the commons shows that common-pool resources (pasture, fisheries, wildlife,
forestry etc.) have been effectively managed by locally-developed common property institutions.
This misinterpretation continues to function as a legacy in both juridical and popular senses. Moreover,
the transformation of political systems and the notion of customary land tenure produced effects of
central importance for today’s investment context. During colonial times a policy of indirect rule
based on new elites was created to manage customary lands of so-called native groups who could
use the land as long as it was of no value to the state. However, this land formally remained in the
hands of the state, which also claimed to manage common-pool resources through state institutions.
The neoliberal policies that are now demanded by donor agencies have had two consequences for
land and land-related common-pool resources. On the one hand, states often lack the financial means
to enforce their own natural resource legislation and this has led to de facto open access. On the
other hand, land legally fragmented from its common-pool resources has been transformed from
state to private property. This has enabled new elites and foreign investors to claim private property
on formerly commonly-held land, which also leads to the loss of access to land related common-pool
resources for more marginal local actors. Thus, the paper argues that this process does not just lead to
land grabbing but to commons grabbing as well. This has furthermore undermined the resilience
and adaptive capacity of local populations because access to common-pool resources is vital for the
livelihoods of more marginal groups, especially in times of crisis. Comparative studies undertaken
on floodplains in Botswana, Cameroon, Mali, Tanzania and Zambia based on a New Institutional
Political Ecology (NIPE) approach illustrate this process and its impacts and show how institutional
transformations are key to understanding the impacts of large-scale land acquisitions (LSLA) and
investments in Africa.
Keywords: land grabbing; institutions; common-pool resources; common property; land tenure
transformations; resilience, social anthropology
1. Introduction
This paper tries to reach a conclusion about issues that theoretically seem to relate only in a very
loose way: Resilience is, on the one hand, defined as the capacity to absorb shocks and perturbations
Land 2019, 8, 104; doi:10.3390/land8070104 www.mdpi.com/journal/land9
Land 2019, 8, 104
of social-ecological systems and show their adaptability and transformation capacity often related to a
natural hazard and climate change (see Folke et al., 2010) [1]. On the other hand, new debates in the
social sciences and humanities on land, ecosystems and natural resource managements argue that it is
political constellations that undermine the resilience of local actors [2,3]. The latter is related to critical
perspectives in political ecology and ecological anthropology that have triggered new meanings about
land and land use generally and, in particular, in Sub-Saharan Africa. This region is the geographical
and empirical focus of this paper, which makes the following basic argument: Institutional change
from resource-interrelated common property institutions to fragmented state and then private property
and open access developments leads to commons grabbing for local people. It furthermore creates an
institutional pluralism from which local elites formed during colonial times can profit because they can
select the private property options after the undermining of state property during the implementation
of neoliberal privatization policies driven by donor agencies [2,3]. These processes do not just lead
to commons grabbing; they also undermine the adaptive capacity of local people to enhance their
resilience, and this is the connection, which has not been made in the literature up to now and that
combines the two strands. I thus argue as a theoretical part of this special issue that commons grabbing
will also reduce the adaptive capacity of people in social-ecological systems and are thus to be seen as
resilience grabbing processes.
These processes have often not been recognised in LSLA settings in Africa, because companies
collaborate with local elites and with the state.
My interest in land issues grew from a political ecology perspective in the context of African crises
that were prevalent in the 1970s, and which were repeated in hunger crises in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s
up and continue to the present time. Many of the issues labelled as hunger and underdevelopment,
with the added complication of climate change, have been presented as ‘home made’ African issues in
development studies. These have repeatedly focused on neo-Malthusian, technology-based views and
on narrowly conceptualized neoclassical ideas (see Timberlake’s 1985 Africa in Crisis as one of the most
cited examples). Counter-arguments have been manifold. Perhaps the most important theoretical
strands were neo-Marxist, and local and global political ecology (Robbins 2005 [2], Peet, Robbins,
Watts 2011 [3]) lines of argumentation that advocated colonial and market-specific legacies as reasons
for the ongoing crises.
Another strand dealt with the way Africa and African development is perceived from the
development perspective of the Global North. James Ferguson’s image of the Anti-Politics Machine
focused on Lesotho’s development problems, which were labelled as problems of an independent state
during the Apartheid era. It became evident, however, that Lesotho experienced almost the same
level of dependence as the Bantustans, which were under South African control during the time of
Apartheid. Thus, the Anti-Politics Machine was hiding the asymmetric power relation behind the
notion of development (Ferguson 1994) [4]. This finding led to a political economy lens being used
to look at development issues in Africa in general. On the one hand it might be polemic to view all
African nations as being like the Bantustans, but on the other, there is some basic truth in the concept of
the anti-politics machine: Discourses on development in Africa hide underlying political and economic
interests (or disinterests). But what are these economic interests? Who pushes them? And what is at
stake? Is it just globalized neoliberalism that sets the stage by labelling Africa in a specific way (see
also Ferguson’s 1999 Global Shadows) [5] or are additional issues involved?
It is interesting to see what labels are being used at the present time in this regarding Africa.
While daily political media are full of new versions of the doomed continent, with a recent shift in focus
from ethnic wars, under-development and environmental degradation to issues regarding climate
change and terrorism (and lately the Ebola virus); economic journals, reports and analyses are enthusing
over the new boom in African economies. The latter focus on high GDP growth rates, marvellous
investment opportunities in mining, oil and land as well as, increasingly, in IT and other industries.
In addition, it is said that education is improving, poverty is being reduced and demography—now
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suddenly a good thing—is rising: Africa enables the Fastest Billion “(as Charles Roberson’s 2012 book
title promises) [6] through foreign investment, if “done in the right way”.
One area where Africa has seen much investment is in land. The literature on Large Scale Land
Acquisitions (LSLA) and investments or land grabbing is growing, especially in the resurrected Journal
of Peasant Studies. Several authors with at least three major theoretical orientations have been setting the
scene, (a) outlining opportunities and documenting collateral damage caused by investments (Deininger
2011) [7]; (b) by adopting a critical political economy position, arguing that there will be more losers than
winners (de Schutter 2011 [8], Hall 2011 [9], Cotula 2013 [10]); and (c) a (rather marginal) Neo-Marxist
position. The latter seems to follow Harvey’s A Brief History of Neoliberalism (2007) [11], seeing
large-scale agricultural investments or land grabbing as part of “primitive accumulation” processes
by which the agricultural producers will form an agrarian proletariat (see Basu 2007) [12]. There is a
significant body of newer literature (see the Journal of Peasant Studies since 2011), which unfortunately
rarely includes in-depth field studies or emic views of actors in this field (see critiques by Oya 2013,
and Lanz, Gerber and Haller 2018) [13,14].
However, organizations such as ILC, IIED Oxfam and Justica Ambiental provide more in-depth
case studies, and there are some rare overviews such as the one by German, Schoneveld and Pacheco
(2011) [15]. These do not, however, provide much data from the emic perspectives based on the
longer periods of fieldwork that characterize social anthropological research. Unfortunately, social
anthropology has been rather silent on these issues apart from some overviews (see Li 2011 [16] on
labor issues, and Fairhead, Leach and Scoones 2012 [17] on green grabbing). However, these papers do
not often provide concrete insights into LSLAs or land grabbing processes over a longer period of time,
which could indicate changing constellations of actors, how their decision making unfolds and what
strategic actions they are taking. Human geographers Locher and Sulle, writing about a Tanzanian case
study, are a noteworthy exception [18]. Therefore, a combined institutionalist and political ecology view
on this topic might be helpful, particularly regarding new institutionalist approaches that discuss land
issues in the context of changing rights and obligations. Of course, the actual actors’ perceptions cannot
be neglected. The main question is how deals covering land and related resource rights are perceived
by local actors as these have been changing since precolonial times. This requires an approach that
focusses on how land and land-related common-pool resources are perceived in a changing world in
relation to the bargaining power of involved actors and discourses they use to legitimate their actions:
New institutionalism in social anthropology provides an analytical tool for these issues and links them
to external historical change.
2. Land and New Institutionalism in Social Anthropology
Land has been a research preoccupation of social anthropologists since the colonial era, and has
intensified with more recent land grabbing debates not only in African contexts, in which the land
grabbing debate is most prominent, but as well in Asia and Latin America. What was perceived as
land from a colonial perspective differed much from local views on what land meant. The colonial
gaze made landscapes a wild, uncivilized and at best underused resource, which did not correspond
with the local views on what land meant. However, many social anthropologists were caught in a
dilemma. On the one hand, differences in perception between the local and the colonial actors became
evident and asked for cultural translations while on the other hand, the colonial contexts, in which
anthropologists were working in the Colonial era put them in a position of being collaborators or at
best informants [5,19]. In Latin America, these issues were linked to the eviction of local groups and
their marginalization as these views where not perceived by the colonial powers as being relevant land
claims (see Wolf 1983 [19] for a general overview, Stocks 2005 [20]). In Africa, as well in parts of Asia,
local people partially remained on their territory, but also faced evictions. Still, large portions of areas
in Africa were labelled customary land (see Chanock 1991 [21], Peters 2013 [22] for Africa, Li 2011 [16]
for Asia).
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Colonial developments in Latin America started much earlier and led to debates over frontier
zones. On the colonized side of the frontier, large parts of land were allocated to private land-owners
through the Spanish or Portuguese crown, which were later claimed by the elites of the emerging
states. Behind the frontier, often in rainforest areas, a constant colonialism process occurred that is still
going on today Millington (2018) [23] for Bolivia. The original inhabitants were given reserves and
gained some rights as indigenous peoples after an extremely harsh process of expulsion and physical
partial elimination (see Bodley 1985) [24]. And despite political recognition of indigenous peoples,
the debate that these small groups have rights to too much land is ongoing (see Stocks 2005) [20].
In Asia, similar processes unfold with the exception of India and China (see Geiger ed. 2008) [25],
Li 2014 [26]). Nevertheless, indigeneity is a political tool these groups can use to defend their land
(see also Galvin and Haller eds. 2008) [27]. In contrast, I will now focus on African contexts for the
rest of this paper as most large-scale land acquisitions take place there and because the issues on the
African continent differ significantly from Latin America and Asia as the political notion of indigeneity
is difficult to be applied in Africa.
While colonialization processes in the African context were also not uniform, there are some
similarities between the British and the French control as well as the Lusophone colonial and the
pre-WWI German contexts (see Mamdani 1996: 80ff.) [28]. A globalized view of European expansion
indicates that colonizing Africa in order to use both the land and the work force made much more sense
than colonizing the land without the people. Land is only valuable when made valuable by external
view. This was the case at the beginning of colonial times in Africa in the context of low mechanization.
The fact that the colonial process was one not so much of economic profit but of high costs did not really
matter in the beginning. What mattered was the initial idea of getting minerals and putting virgin land
to use—and this view held sway in the minds of administrators despite the fact that people were living
on the virgin land. The label of customary land was created in colonial times, based on evolutionist
views of land institutions (from free to commons to private property) developed in this initial phase of
colonisation. British colonial indirect rule became the blueprint, and outsourcing the management and
control over land and people to select local authorities called chiefs was part of this model (Mamdani
1996 [28]., see also Haller ed. 2010 [29], Haller 2013 [30]). In many areas studied and compared,
precolonial power structures included politically egalitarian, segmentary lineage groups, big-men
structures (leading rivalling men) or more hierarchical groups. The institution of chief was often a
colonial creation installed by the European authorities and especially undermined the egalitarian and
big-men power structures [29]. These chiefs then commanded a specific territory of a so-called tribe.
In this naturalization process of African land governance systems, it was emphasized that resources
were communal. Therefore, there was no notion of real property. Peters outlines this by referring to
Iliffe as follows:
The imposition of customary tenure with its denial of full ownership rights to land-holders had several
key effects. One was to halt development of a land market by ignoring or denying evidence of past
transfers, and by declaring that land was inalienable “according to tradition”. Another, by placing
land management under the institution of chieftaincy (though ultimately under the colonial state),
intensified competition among the various incumbents of traditional leadership roles and centred that
competition on land. The fixing of territorial boundaries over which the traditional authorities were
made trustees greatly reinforced the link between political authority and authority over land. (Peters
2013, pp. 3–4) [22]
Many examples from African colonies provide evidence that the British tried to implement indirect
rule, as did the French in practice—in contradiction to their direct rule policy (see Mamdani 1996) [28].
Despite the many differences over the continent, this led to the functioning of a cheaper management
structure, never allowing full ownership at the local level (by chiefs) but which kept ultimate control
over ultimate land ownership. As a consequence, this transformation fuelled local conflicts by inciting
competition between installed chiefs and other elites. This is illustrated by Firmin-Sellers [31] and case
studies from Mali, Cameroon, Tanzania, Zambia and Botswana where there is a common shift in chiefly
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authority over land [29]. Therefore, customary property was a camouflage of a wrong labelling of
traditional property systems in which land was said to be (a) not for sale; (b) not related to individual
views of belonging; and (c) commonly owned and therefore not property as such. This colonial narrative
was upheld and supported a discourse on modernization processes in agricultural development:
Common property tenure is perceived as a hindrance to development, despite the fact that during and
after colonial times—with and without force—local peasant smallholders were producing cash crops
for the market (see Netting 1993 [32], Peters 2013 [22]). Nevertheless, it was not just an increasing
population that gave rise to competition over land since the 1970s but also increasing pressure on
reduced land due to growing, multiple interests by the introduction of new agricultural production
methods, mining and through the institutionalization of protected areas (game and forest reserves,
see Neumann 1998 [33], Haller 2013 [30]).
The intensification of land use and land-related resources worldwide, highlighted by repeated
hunger crises in the Sahel zone, created the image of land being degraded due to the overuse of natural
resources held in common. This triggered a debate on the relationships between land and property
not just from an economic angle but from an ecological point of view as well. Reference was made to
Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons (1968) [34]. In this essay, which had no empirical evidence but was
a Neo-Malthusian polemic against the freedom of human population growth, Hardin did not want to
deal with land issues per se. He painted a picture of pastoralism in which actors are only interested in
increasing their herd size illustrating the process of freedom in reproduction (here of cattle and then
more generally of people) as degrading the pasture because it is governed as common, not private,
property (see Acheson 1989 [35], Ostrom 1990 [36], Haller 2007a [37]). This had a strong effect on
state policies, especially in supporting justifications of states to control natural resources within their
boundaries and it was a welcome ideological legitimacy for stricter state governance and later for
neoliberal privatization policies (see Feeney et al., 1990 [38], Fairhead and Leach 1996 [39]).
The arguments picked up by mainstream science and by governments regarding the economic and
ecological flaws of traditional land tenure triggered a process of revision and rethinking. This was led
by Elinor Ostrom, who devoted her Nobel Prize winning work to craft a new picture of common-pool
resource management in common property regimes [36]. The main argument was that renewable
common-pool resources, which are subtractable (what is taken away cannot be used by others for the
moment) and difficult to defend (but possible by a group that can organize collectively), could be
managed in a sustainable way by so-called robust common property institutions. Foremost, she and
other scholars highlighted that Hardin erred in his view on the commons as open access but that
resources held in common property regimes are the property of a group and not no one’s property.
Eight design principles for well-working institutions in her book Governing the Commons (1990) [36]
were deducted from (mostly) social anthropological case studies. They indicated that institutions
address the problem of freedom and free riding by reducing transaction costs (information, monitoring
and sanctioning). Ostrom’s work related to environmental issues, and it followed the line of argument
of new institutionalism on property rights proposed by Douglass North (1990) [40], who in fact had
followed Roland Coase’s theory on the firm and labour contracts to illustrate that institutions do reduce
transaction costs. The amount of work emanating from Ostrom’s approach to new institutionalism as
related to the commons is immense. There is now a digital library of the commons as well as journals
linked directly to the issue. This is proof of the broad scholarly interest and is also manifest in growing
participation in the International Association for the Study of the Commons (IASC), previously named the
International Association for the Study of Common Property.
However, some variables that the economic historian Douglass North had integrated in his model
such as power relations, were missing in Ostrom’s work. She was more concerned with the possibility
of self-organization and sustainable use of common-pool resources and neglected historical embedment
or issues of politics and of power. Despite the recognition that institutions are also embedded in
larger systems, her primary focus was thus not multilayered in the sense that, viewed from a political
economic and ecological stance, local systems are often not articulated but still power-related parts
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of state constitutions, legal systems and state elites as well as of international global governance
regimes and global markets (see Haller 2007a [37], 2007b [41]. While studies focusing on the way
self-organization is made possible as a puzzle stemming from game theory, a new approach from
social anthropology emerged [42]. Starting from models in economic anthropology, Jean Ensminger
(1992) [43], a US social anthropologist, proposed an interrelated model in which external factors
(environment, population and technology) lead to changes in relative prices of goods and services and
had a local impact (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Modelling institutional change. Source: Jean Ensminger (Ensminger 192, p. 10) [43].
Local contexts (in the model bargaining power, institutions, ideology and organisation) are
influenced by the changing relative prices and relative value that a specific resource or a region is
gaining. In line with the work of North [40], Ensminger argues that the bargaining power of actors,
the way they organize and the way they select and craft institutions and legitimate this by ideologies
impacts the distribution, use and finally reproduction of resources in the environment, population
and technology, i.e., the feedback loops in Figure 1. Therefore, in line with North she does not
follow other New Institutionalism economists who predict that the market will choose the optimal
institutions (see Williamson 1987 [44]). Rather, institutional settings and, later, distribution are shaped
by bargaining power and ideology as a resource of legitimacy. This means that, for example, a rise in
the relative price of land will not automatically trigger immediate privatization but can have different
outcomes depending on the bargaining power of actors and the way they are able to produce legitimacy
(ideology) for their choice of a certain institutional option. This model has been enlarged, looking
closely at issues of bargaining power and ideology (including constructivist approaches regarding
discourse and narrative to produce legitimacy, often in either so called traditional or modernization
ideologies [29,30]).
This point will be taken up later in this article as I return to the issue of land and the colonial
and postcolonial discontinuity. But how are these issues related to land, to LSLAs or land grabbing?
The theoretical focus on common-pool resources could direct the view that land is a general category,
linked to the territory of a group of users including multiple resources without specifying the way
the land and its resources are used. This is often ignored, and the focus is on how property rights
on land alone are defined from an outside point of view of the state and its actors. Hence, there is a
paradox: On the one hand, land as agricultural land or soil is often separated from resources other than
soil, while on the other hand land-related common-pool resources are ignored as if these would not
matter for local people and their livelihoods and is only perceived as pure nature [29,30,33,39]. In legal
terms, land becomes a category of its own, separated from all interrelated resources. While water
continues to be seen as an additional and necessary resource for commercial agricultural production,
all other resources and the way they are interconnected are no longer of interest, be they pasture,
fisheries, wildlife, veldt productions, etc. However, from an emic view (local socio-cultural perspective),
land might mean something very different as I will try to show based on the research conducted
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by a team involving three MA and three doctoral students and a postdoctoral researcher in areas of
six African floodplains in Mali, Cameroon, Tanzania, Zambia and Botswana between 2002 and 2008
funded by the Swiss National Science foundation ([29,30,45]).
3. Elements of Emic Perceptions of Land: Insights from Research in African Floodplains
Several authors emphasize that the precolonial notion of land in Africa was shaped by numerous
factors, which involve tenure systems, type of land use and what identities land generates. They argue
that from a local (emic) perspective land was not based on the notion of state and market-related private
property. Instead, it was always considered as a mixture of private and communal property under
the governance of leading offices (e.g., elders, specialists) in more politically symmetrical situations
or through leaders from more asymmetrically powerful groups. And it was related to so-called first
settlement of such groups or as a consequence of the conquest of feudal or more powerful systems
(see Benjaminsen and Lund 2003 [46], Toulmin 2008 [47], Peters 2013 [22]). These authors then argue
that the “traditional tenure systems” we see today do no longer represent precolonial tenure but are
mostly the result of imposed colonial transformations of property rights labelled “customary law” (see
Chanock 2005).
The aim of this paper is not to provide a literature review on this issue as this has been done
elsewhere ([28–31]) but to show insights from a research project called The African Floodplain Wetlands
Project (AFWeP) conducted by our team that introduces some interesting elements of emic views on
land in six floodplain regions in Africa (see Haller ed. 2010) [29]. These cases are of interest in the
context of this paper as comparative research was based on long-term anthropological fieldwork,
including participant observation, oral histories and biographies in order to understand the emic view.
The team combined literature and archival research with oral history on precolonial institutions for the
management of common-pool resources and produced results for the:
1. Inner Niger delta, Mali (different fishing communities, agricultural groups, Fulbe)
2. Waza-Logone floodplain, Cameroon (Kotoko fishing communities with a Sultan, immigrant
Mousgoum agriculturalists, Fulbe and Arab Choa pastoralists)
3. Pangani floodpain, Tanzania (Pare-Peasant and Maasai pastoralists)
4. Rufiji floodplain, Tanzania (local hunter-gatherer, fishing and farming communities)
5. Kafue Flats floodplain, Zambia (hunting-gathering, agro-pastoralists of Ila, immigrated Lozi
and Tonga)
6. Panhandle/Okavango Delta, Botswana (different hunter-gatherer groups, cattle, later on agriculture).
Regarding the emic perception of land in precolonial times, this research revealed that the category
land is embedded in views of territory and landscape with all its resources, which are perceived as being
interconnected and used for securing economic and political existence. People were concerned with a
secure livelihood, as well as the political security that an area with all its resources provided. Four issues
are of importance to understand what land means through this lens: (1) first-comer—late-comer
relations; (2) coordinated and reciprocal use of common-pool resources and related to this; (3) spiritual
landscape relations; and 4) emerging institutions for common-pool resource management (see also
Haller 2019 [48]):
1. As in the cases referred to by Lenz (2006) [49] and Toulmin (2008) [47], political differentiation
regarding resources and territories was based on the distinction between so-called first-comers,
mainly but not always hunter-gatherer or fishing communities, and late-comers, such as
agricultural and pastoral groups. Land in the narrow sense was just one aspect of something
emically called an area (or a territory) with many resources. First-comers did not use all the
resources, while late-comers often used other niches, leading to increased ethnic specialization in
some cases (case studies 1–4) or by using the whole set of resources (case studies 5 and 6 which is
a process that developed later on also in the other cases.
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2. In order to mitigate economic and political risks, reciprocal resource use took place within and
between people of different territories. For example, the different agropastoral subgroups of the
Ila on the Kafue Flats (case study 5) had agreed upon mutually beneficial arrangements for access
to fishing and hunting areas since sharing these resources reduced the risk of low catches.
3. Regarding territory tenure or property, so-called first-comers did not see themselves as “owners of
the land”. Instead, they saw themselves as the ones who established first contact with supernatural
powers that could—if not respected—transform elements of the environment in negative ways
(e.g., through drought, sickness, wild animal attacks). Often these supernatural powers were
seen as spirits in the water, in the land (soil) or related to animals. Some spirits had human
counterparts, so called ritual specialists, with whom they communicated regarding offerings.
From the emic perception this is seen as a kind of reciprocal arrangement of give-and-take based
on the notion that spirits are the actual owners and that one is not alone in the territory. Another
level is made up of the ancestral spirits who grant the use of the landscapes with their multiple
interrelated resources. The interaction with these powers controlling the landscapes is organized
via rituals and related offerings in order to make and renew spiritual contracts on the landscape.
Leaders were those first-comers who had a link to the spirits themselves or who had ritual
specialists who did.
4. These leaders and specialists thus held offices of great importance and interest. They also
coordinated resource use by other members of the communities as well as of late-comers who
were then dependent on them. This was often based on a clear notion of seasonal availability of
resources. Where no conquest took place, institutions in the form of reciprocal arrangements with
neighbouring groups were common. The territory with its multiple and interconnected resources
such as soil, water, pasture, wildlife and fisheries, was used in a coordinated way based on these
emerging co-created institutions. In some cases, long-term agricultural production and use could
develop into a kind of family property of land due to the length of time it had been used and the
investments that had been made. However, the other resources of these small territories could
still be used by all members of the community during the different seasons (e.g., a harvested
field can become a pasture that others use). Most importantly, the territory could be given to
someone else for use after negotiations. Different institutional arrangements in floodplain areas
refer to groups and leaders who are responsible for complex resource use coordination, especially
in floodplains where there are big differences in seasonal resource availability. Adaptation to
seasonality was one driving force; others were conflict and conflict resolution. For example,
the institutions established for the use of pasture, wildlife, fisheries and land use in the Kafue
Flats (Case study 5) were often established after conflicts had occurred. They are based on myths
and oral history but still remember and actively contribute to the establishment of a complex
governance system that is working well.
The case studies also show that there is a peculiar mixture of economic rationale and power
specific justification to institutional arrangements. In addition, they are combined with ecological
adaptive features, fitting into the seasonal flood water advance and retreat. First-comers and more
powerful late-comers tried to legitimize their presence via symbolic interaction with the supernatural
beings living in the landscape as a whole or in important parts of the landscape, (e.g., on land or in
water), but these spirits have further implications if not heeded. Interestingly, more powerful groups
that arrived later in an area tried to marry into first-comer families or to link up with the spiritual world
of the latter. Therefore, land is just one part of a belief system. In this system, people see their economic
and political well-being as a central focal point which is linked to the spiritual world in relation to the
environment. Regardless of differences in political systems (whether segmentary, constructed around
‘big men’ or hierarchical), the locally-developed models show similar forms.
It is also evident that these first-comers and late-comers were trying to find arrangements with the
aim of achieving economic security and political gains for the leaders themselves. This aspect can be
illustrated in the case of the Kafue Flats fisheries (case study 5). There, the Ila late-comers married into
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the Batwa first-comer fishing communities and established a notion of spiritual ownership over ponds
via ancestral links. These ponds are filled with water and fish during the rainy and flooding seasons.
To coordinate the use of fish and to prevent free-riding, collective fishing days are agreed upon by
leaders and their spiritual masters, allowing all members of the community access to fish since it is a
communal resource. Fishing activities are allowed only after rituals for ancestral sprits are completed.
Before the rituals and after the fishing days, fishing is not allowed in the ponds anymore. This rule
is monitored and sanctioned twofold: There are patrols, and there are fines for those disregarding
the dates set by community leaders. In addition, there is a monitoring institution embedded in the
belief system itself. People link ancestral spirits to crocodiles that are found in the ponds after having
left the main river after floods. Not to submit oneself to the rule of coordinated use after a ritual
has been carried out will lead to attacks by ancestral spirits via crocodiles. This functions as a kind
of supernatural sanction. There are also clear rules concerning fishing techniques based on gender
differences (spears for men, baskets for women). Reciprocity in the use of the ponds is furthered by
issuing invitations to members of other communities [30,50,51].
This last point is central to the study. We discovered that local groups have a clear notion
of boundaries and territories, but these notions include an idea of permeability and flexibility of
boundaries. This can be seen as a way to reduce risks resulting from variability in flooding patterns
and consequent availability of resources. Therefore, institutions, which include notions of flexibility
of use, reduce risks and fulfil an important economic aspect inherent in the general principle of
minimax-strategies. However, such a way of coordinating resource governance also make sense
politically as alliances are possible, theft is reduced and, most importantly, the prestige of local
administrators as distributers of resources is enhanced. This is clearly the case with the Kafue Flats
fisheries example but also in other instances (see cases in Cameroon (Fokou 2010 [52]), and Tanzania
(Meroka 2010 [53])).
This leads us to encourage further studies in this direction. At the same time, a preliminary
conclusion can be proposed. From an emic ontology and epistemology, land is part of a larger,
symbolically viewed complex of cultural landscapes inhabited by spiritual beings that influence
production and consumption for people, arriving at various stages in time and therefore occupying
different (hierarchical) identities in this interaction. Moreover, the different resources that we view
separately as outsiders are closely interconnected. This is also reflected in the institutions that often play
the role of a coordinating body between the different, interconnected uses. For example, in the Waza
Logone floodplain (case study 2) fisheries, agricultural practices and pastoralism have to be coordinated
so as not to conflict with one another. Conflicts cannot be ruled out completely, but institutions often
emerge out of conflicts as a result of conflict-resolution mechanisms. Institutions are also flexible
and can be renegotiated if they do not fit a specific problem or are questioned by more powerful
groups: This is a highly interesting aspect. Institutions are often the result of different bargaining
power constellations. The most powerful does not simply win but has to engage in a compromise
with the less powerful in order to reduce resistance that is economically not viable. More powerful
people can of course devise rules that are in their interest alone but will face resistance at high costs
from other users as common-pool resources are not easily defended. Therefore, it is better to share and
to establish a legitimized distribution. For example, hunting institutions in the Kafue Flats illustrate
this point [30,50,51].
This shows that if we focus only on land we miss all the other resource contexts and regulations in
which the land question is embedded. Specifically, poorer resource users (but not just poorer resource
users alone) do not only use the land. They also use the related common-pool resources and institutions
that are organized around this multiple use and depend on these more than the richer resources users
in order to make a living.
What does this mean, especially in the context of recent literature on land and identities by
Benjaminsen and Lund eds. (2003) [46], Kuba and Lenz eds. (2006) [54], Derman et al. (2007) [55]?
We see this literature not as a contradiction, but as a contribution to a better understanding of hitherto
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misread customary “systems in Africa”. We strongly claim that land is a political issue in Africa,
but we also argue that we need a more complex perception of landscape areas with multiple uses and
users. The hegemonic misreading of land in Africa (see also Fairhead and Leach 1996) [39] has huge
resource management and political implications—as we will see later on—that go beyond issues of
land per se but include notions of identity and politics of belonging (see Kuba and Lenz eds. 2006) [54].
We will argue that specific issues of belonging are triggered also by external influences on ideologies
as outlined in the model of new institutionalism. These have become ways to legitimise inclusion
and exclusion in times of externally induced scarcity (Derman et al., 2007) [55] and contestations due
to processes of open access and privatization (see for example Chaveau 2006) [56]. This does not
contradict the view that during precolonial times access to common-pool resources was negotiated
and sometimes unequally distributed (see Derman et al., 2007) [55]. Our studies still show, however,
that in this system people with less power were able to get access as well. In addition, and mainly
relevant to the discourse on nature conservation, the literature shows that we are not dealing with
pure nature but with cultural landscape ecosystems that were created and maintained by the described
common property institutions.
Concrete analysis of fisheries, hunting, pasture and rules related to agricultural production in
the six case studies reveals that marginal groups also profited from these regulations (e.g., special
fishing rights and techniques for women, access to wildlife for the less wealthy, access to pasture on a
relatively equal basis, the right to cultivate land in a specific territory). The right to cultivate can also
take on the form of more exclusive rights that come close to what could be termed private property.
However, these rights did not translate into the right to dispose of the land privately as such decisions
about land and land related common-pool resources are vested in larger groups. This means that
giving away land was not in the hands of these individuals but was a decision taken by the larger
groups and their leaders (e.g., in Kafue Flats although land for cultivation is inherited on the basis of
use rights of fathers, leaders still have the possibility to give the land to someone else if needed [30,51].
This refers to the question of formalization of land rights, and in this regard, the dichotomy
between formal and informal institutions is rightly criticized in this context (see Cleaver 2007) [57].
On the other hand, local institutions do display certain formalizations. While it is made clear to
everyone what basic rules are binding in a specific context, everyday practice might indicate a more
flexible way of handling issues; Douglass North would call this informal. I would also argue that
institutional bricolage (Cleaver 2002) [57] often happens at the informal level, while bargaining and
fixing specific bricolage happens in a more formal arena when rules are revised. Actually, bricolage
might not be the right term as it obscures the contested power-specific and strategic notions that are
inherent in such processes.
The final issue is the one of legal pluralism that is often cited in the literature (e.g., Benjaminsen
and Lund 2003) [46]. Again, based on the six comparative case studies, legal pluralism happens in a
precolonial setting. This pluralism is related to the flexibility of local, seasonally-changing resource use
requirements and is therefore of a different order than the legal pluralism that we see during colonial
and postcolonial times
4. The Colonial and Postcolonial Disconnect
In the previous section, I outlined the different views on land from an emic perspective and
their implications regarding tenure. This analysis is important in order to understand the impact of
colonization on the way land and land related issues are perceived until today. The change brought by
colonial administration cannot be underestimated because it was—despite all the differences in national
colonial policies and formal procedures—a blueprint leading to legal pluralism and disconnections of
another order.
Looking at Scott’s 1998 work on the way that states see resources [58] reveals the basic perspective
adopted by the colonial administrations. Paradoxically the state simplifies—as it wants to know what
is at stake in order to control it—but at the same time complicates management by separating entities
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of natural and social order which were originally intertwined. And according to Li (2014) [26] in a
critique of Scott’s views, it creates messiness. Benjaminsen and Lund are right to argue that this did
not just happen with European colonial powers. They cite the example of the Dina -Code in Mali
which was introduced by the Fulbe Caliphates in the 19th century. The code regulated and formalized
the transhumant use of pasture in the inner Niger delta. Benjaminsen and Lund (2003) [46] do not
recognize, however, that this formalization was based on pre-existing institutions regulating and
mitigating access not just to pastures but also fisheries and agricultural activities (see Moorehead
1985 [59], Beeler and Frei 2010 [60]). The basic idea was thus different from what the European
powers did later. While formalizing some parts of existing regulations and also dealing with them in
Islamic courts in the Dina-System, the European Roman, state-related legal system divided resource
use and management regulations by treating the interlinked resources under separate and different
legal domains. This process was revealed in all the case studies in the AFWeP project (Haller ed.
2010) [29]. It is true that missionaries, trading companies, and later on state administrators and
social anthropologists tried to understand precolonial institutions and fit them into a legal system
colonial in order to capture and use them. But during the process by which traditional institutions
were transformed into so-called customary rights shaped to fit the rights systems of the colonial
powers, many issues were misread (see also Benjaminsen and Lund eds. 2003 [46], Berry 1993 [61],
Chanock 1985 [62], Moore 1986 [63], Peters 2013 [22]). This process created three levels of pluralism
and disconnections.
One is that based on a strategic and single resource-oriented focus during colonial times. Modern
Roman law was introduced in areas of central importance for mining and European settler plantation
agriculture, while the indirect rule (or direct rule that turned into indirect rule in the French system) was
introduced in areas that were less interesting for the state. There, administration was delegated to lower
levels of the so-called customary law. Neo-Marxists in social anthropology such as Claude Meillassoux
and others argued that these areas were just of interest as a reservoir and recreation territories for
cheap labour, to be used elsewhere and then sent back, in order to increase capital accumulation
(Meillassoux 1981) [64]. Therefore, even these areas were only of interest as to set up a system that
faked local but cheap governance for colonial powers. Thus, a three-layered system was created:
written, “traditional” and unwritten. There was the dualism between “modern” European Roman law
for land used by the state and by white private owners linked to the colonial and postcolonial state
and the “traditional” but state controlled and formalized “customary” laws. The third level was made
up of the unwritten rules and norms at the local level, the informal customary rules and regulations,
linked to membership of a community or ethnic group [22,46,65] that partially prevailed but, for the
most part, was undermined [29].
The second source of pluralism and disconnections refers to the way the state looked at resources
in a fragmented way, which then later fitted market, global and neoliberal orders. Colonial and
postcolonial states are not different in this regard. While precolonial systems were mostly about
a specific territory as a whole landscape, including the living and the dead and mystical powers
influencing all elements in a kind of local ecosystem view, the colonial and postcolonial state’s view
was selectively materially oriented in order to profit from or gain prestige from specific resources.
An illustrative case is Tanzania—first a German and then a British colony. Both powers disconnected
the landscape from its resources in order to formally use them for different purposes. One division was
between white farming and protected areas, with the latter being further divided into forest reserves
and game reserves. The forest reserves functioned as areas of timber extraction for the railways;
while the game reserves were privileged spots for “sportsman-like hunting”, reserved for British nobles
and colonial administrators for prestigious habitus-like activities. Protection of such disconnected
areas with the focus on just one resource, led to eviction of people and massive transformations
of these former cultural landscapes. As they turned into bush and became invaded by tsetse flies,
the “wild” animals moved out of the reserves and into the fields of the evicted people (see Neumann
1998 [33], Brockington 2003 [66], Meroka and Haller 2008 [67]). Therefore, the legal disconnect during
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colonial times—the disconnect between land and common-pool resources—became a physical resource
disconnect in these former cultural landscapes as water, fisheries, pasture, forestry were used and
treated as separate units owned by the state and no longer by the local communities under common
property institutions. This process manifests itself in all the case studies in the AFWeP and as well in
research elsewhere in Africa (see for example Fairhead and Leach 1996 [38], Brockington 2003 [66].
The AFWeP also concluded that this disconnect was also manifest in the postcolonial administration of
natural resources in the floodplains studied.
This leads to a third level of pluralism and disconnection. The states in which the floodplain
studies were located (i.e., Mali, Cameroon, Tanzania, Zambia and Botswana) witnessed a massive
institutional change during colonial times from common property including the governance of land and
land-related common-pool resource to state property. Through this process, common-pool resources
were separated legally from the cultural landscape ecosystems created by local people and put them
under different departments such as agriculture, fisheries, wildlife, veterinary, water and energy,
and tourism. All of these departments based, and still base, their actions on their own legislation and
legal settings, leading to a disconnect in management. In Zambia for example, water rights do not
consider problems related to fisheries and wildlife, but only look at energy production and irrigation
for large-scale plantations (see Haller 2013) [25]. Examples such as this illustrate similar processes in
all other countries and regions studied. Such disconnections also produce strife on different levels,
not only creating conflicts between resource users, but also lead to different administrative units
competing with each other. Again, the case of the Kafue Flats is illustrative. Here, wildlife and fishery
departments are creating a conflicting plural setting for resource users as both departments claim
authority over, for example, a protected area due to the presence of both fish and wildlife. As both these
common-pool resources migrate due to flooding and floodwater retreat on the floodplain, management
is complicated and neither local users nor state administrators really know who is in charge or which
institutions to adhere too (see Haller 2013 [30]). This problem has also been studied in Southern Africa
in the DARMA (Defragmenting Resource Management) Project led Mafaniso Hara and colleagues at the
University of Western Cape (see Mlanga et al., 2014 [68]). All of these studies show the overlapping
of legal norms of several distinct departments for just one resource such as fisheries. For example,
in Zimbabwe, five departments have completely uncoordinated regulations on this resource [68]).
Research from Zambia, Cameroon, Tanzania and Botswana shows similar findings [29].
Interestingly, these issues are not directly dealt with in the literature. Rather, the debate focuses on
the “formal—informal” dichotomy or “bureaucratic and embedded” discussion, in which the argument
is put forward that the distinction between formal institutions and informal norms cannot be the basis
of an adequate analysis (see Cleaver 2003) [69]. However, I argue that this position misses the point
because it does not reflect the relationship between historical change up to the present day, including
the impact of the legal fragmentations as well as the ecological misreading of the landscape and the way
social-ecological systems relate to each other (Berkes 1999 [70] makes a similar argument). Therefore,
there is informality in so-called formal systems and formal processes in what are labelled informal and
embedded customary systems. These contribute to institutional and legal pluralism from which actors
can select based on the power constellations they find themselves in. One could, like Benjaminsen and
Lund [46], critically argue that formal (and informal) colonial rule was not well enforced everywhere.
That might be partially correct. Nevertheless, the new legal and formal administrative rules added up
to the pluralism, even if it is not well enforced. They also provided ideological spheres of reference
and can still now be strategically used by many actors.
5. The Presence and Absence of the State
The previous section illustrated how the precolonial emic view on land interlinked with
common-pool resources in the AFWeP cases has been disconnected during colonial and postcolonial
times and has led to new institutional pluralism. This section further tries to understand today’s land
issues by linking them to the states in crisis phenomenon as a further act in this drama. While being at
20
Land 2019, 8, 104
the centre of resource management, the African states researched in the AFWeP case studies, are new
forms of territorial, fiscal and resource management entities that are often still in close contact with and
dependent on the former colonial powers. Increasingly, they are also subscribing to international and
global economic trade networks, which further influence the management of natural resources since
these relationships produce much-needed foreign exchange that is needed to meet state infrastructure
and social expenditures. The new, post-independence African states examined in the comparative
AFWeP project were trying to continue with the raw material export-oriented structures they inherited
from the colonizers. In all of the cases studied, states depended on one or two basic resources for cash
and foreign exchange revenues. In doing so, they were trying for finance what the elites in power saw
as the economic basis for financing imports in order to modernize the countries. Large infrastructure
buildings and services (e.g., road networks, dams, large plantations, green revolution and agrarian
subsidies) were being set up and were often financed with overseas loans with the anticipation of high
revenues in the future. Between 1975 and 2000 changes in relative prices, such as increases in oil prices
(imports) and decreases in the prices of other raw materials (e.g., metals, food and fibre cash crops for
export) led to financial crises and weak state structures as staff salaries and infrastructure could no
longer be financed.
Governments were thus soon in the position where “making a state” became expensive, while at the
same time, state activities could not contribute to the project of modernization (see also Ferguson’s book
Expectations of Modernity 1999) [5]. Four out of five country studies in the AFWeP show that between
the 1970s and 1990s a dismantling of the state, which had formally taken over the management of all
the natural resources in the name of state property, took place. Botswana was the exception as its gains
from diamond mining could be widely distributed. However, in all five countries the state had crafted
huge plural complex and disconnected management systems with laws and regulations. However,
due to the lack of finance, governments were financially unable to “make state”. State institutions
responsible for the management of all the disconnected resources could not be enforced. In most of the
AFWeP cases studied, this led to de facto open access to common-pool resources.
Once again, the Kafue Flats fisheries plainly illustrate this. As many people working in the mines
and in mining towns lost their jobs due to the copper price crash of 1975, they turned to fisheries in
the hinterlands, such as the Kafue Flats, because fish fetched high prices in the urban centres. As the
Zambian fishery department was underfinanced, understaffed and underequipped it was unable to
enforce basic issues such as mesh size and closing times in the Kafue Flats. Many seasonal fishermen
and fish traders (men and women) moved—and still move—to the flats. There they fish as they
please, for example using fine meshed draw nets. However, the state is not only absent; in certain
discourses it appears that it is also very present. For example, when local people complain to the
commercial fishermen that they are unable to enforce their fishery institutions due their lack of power,
the commercial fishermen refer to the fisheries as a national resource and that they, as citizens of the
state, are entitled to fish this state resource. The state is thus present and absent at the same time:
Absent because the state regulations are not enforced and present through the ideology of citizenship
which is used as a source of legitimacy to get free access to the common-pool resource. Actors from
outside the area thus increase their bargaining power in order to select the institutional setting that suits
them best—de facto open access—by legalizing this choice based on the discourse of citizenship [30,50].
Similarly, powerful actors from outside the communities studied in Mali (outside fishermen),
Tanzania (in-migrating peasants) and Cameroon (pastoralists through paying state taxes and immigrated
peasants) choose citizenship as a statement of legitimacy to increase their bargaining power and in
order to be able to select the institution which suits their economic interests best from the institutional
diversity that exists. The notion of citizenship in Botswana is less important and the pressure to use
common-pool resources is not as strong as in the other cases studied. In the case of the panhandle
and Okavango delta, however, local people struggle over the notion of autochthony regarding the
possibility to draft management plans for Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM)
schemes (see Saum 2010) [71].
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Thus, in these cases the competing forms of institutions are a central reality as also shown by
research on the issue of how land and belonging are interlinked (see Benjaminsen and Lund eds.
2003 [39], Derman et al. eds. 2007 [48], Kuba and Lenz eds. 2006 [47]). These authors refer to the
notion of how identity is built and constructed in relation to state institutions, scarcity issues and
the relationship between first-comers “and late-comers”. Nevertheless, it is important to see how,
in the context of state failure and legal pluralism, bargaining power between actors is distributed and
particular institutional choices are strategically made and legitimized in a concrete setting, based on
economic and political options and preferences. These options and preferences are relational and also
depend on fluctuations in prices. Therefore, the new institutionalism model of Ensminger (1992) [43]
tries to analyse how the basis of actors’ bargaining power is influenced by changes in relative prices
and also how it is influenced by ideologies and discourses to legitimate the selection of institutions
such as for example the preference of private property over common property. An often-used obvious
ideological dichotomy is the one between “modernity” and “tradition” [29,30], which is similar to
Ferguson’s “cosmopolitan” and “local” (Ferguson 1999) [5]. The discourse of modern development
often justifies state or private property while the discourse of traditional way of life legitimizes the
claim on common property [29,30]. The Ensminger model of institutional change [43] and the check of
chosen institutions on their robustness regarding resource use (Ostrom 1990) [36] give an indication on
the ecological outcome of common-pool resources depending on distribution between and further
behaviour of actors (see graph 1 from Ensminger [43]).
The model of Ensminger also hints at an important element of change, which triggers many local
changes: External factors transform the relative prices for resources as commodities as well as for
the value of an area compared to other commodities or areas (i.e., fish for trade shows a higher price
increase as labour, an area close to a river under the context of increase of agrarian prices becomes more
valuable for irrigation if infrastructure as a road is build). This change impacts the way that bargaining
power of local actors as well as their options and selection of institution are shaped; at this stage there
is a need to identify the triggering factors in this interactive process. I would argue that changes in
relative prices are one of the strongest factors bringing about change. This is the case especially in the
context of global neoliberal policies with which Africa is confronted.
6. Paradoxes of Neoliberalism
James Ferguson’s work on neoliberalism in Africa outlined in the book Global Shadows (2006) [72]
illustrates the issue of a policy that tries to cut state costs by delegating management of activities to the
market and to lower levels of action arenas under the state and into the private sectors. This strategy
seemed to be a central remedy to cope with state debts all over the continent as well as elsewhere, e.g.,
in Europe. And herein lies the paradox of neoliberalism: The idea of the state that ever since colonial
times had been the vessel for protecting capitalism, now seems to be too expensive to maintain and
needs a cure based on the medicine of dismantling the state. In relation to Africa, the discourse of
efficiency (see Ferguson 2006) [72] also develops in the direction of restructuring the state and state
services as these seem to be too costly. Internalized hegemonic discourses on the waste of financial
resources, on corruption of elites, and on mismanagement and inefficiency in formal legal processes
merge with the notion of the state, which is a naturalized colonial construct to be changed in neoliberal
ways. However, as Harvey (2005) [11] points out from a Neo-Marxist perspective, neoliberalism can
be seen as a political process of “accumulation by dispossession” by which the state reduces its legal
capacities and controls, which then favours the economically and politically strong elites as it creates
cheap spaces for their manoeuvrings. This process of neoliberalism is highly debated in historical
social anthropology and critical geography, such as Wacquant (2009) [73] arguing that the neoliberal
state is a political project which re-engineers the state and strengthens its penal element. This again has
to be looked at from a theoretical (formal) and practical (informal) angle, as Hilgers (2012) [74] points
out, and obtains its legitimacy from the discourse of globalization, which leads to localization practices
(Swyngedouw, E. (2000) [75]). This process again hides the fact that the state still encompasses its
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citizens but frees itself from its duties (Ferguson and Gupta 2002) [76] as it comes under economic
pressure (see Lobao, L., Martin, R., & Rodríguez-Pose, A. (2009) [77]). But these powerful actors still
need the state because the state is the body that restructures the legal order to create what I would call
open opportunities. At the same time, the state provides a security-net for powerful market actors and
provides legitimacy for their actions, arguing that all actions are made in the name of a democratic
state. To marry Ferguson and Harvey on this point, the neoliberal order in Africa helped to distribute
the scarce means into fewer hands by delegating more power to the local level on the front stage, while
backstage, elites are profiting (see also Pootete and Ribot 2011 [78]). This is a new form of indirect
rule by which the state remains the owner of the resources but does not bear transaction costs of their
management, which are delegated to the local level. This is masked by the discourse of the incapacity
of the government, in terms of state structures, to provide services and that the market will do this
much better. Internationally, this discourse received high support, arguing it will give governance
options to the lower level, itself an issue that many critical voices from development studies have been
advocating for a long time. So, there is an ideological win-win situation—efficiency and the moral
legitimacy of local participation, acting itself as an Anti-Politics Machine.
An example from the wildlife sector in Zambia is illustrative. While conservation and protection of
wildlife had been a cornerstone of statehood, it became a major expenditure burden which could not be
upheld after the neoliberal turn from the socialist system under Kenneth Kaunda to the market-oriented
system of Fredrik Chiluba in the 1990s. The Wildlife Department, a military-like state organization,
was then transferred into a so-called “Wildlife Authority”, exposed to partial self-funding and asked
to develop business models, in which tourism sites and lodges in the national parks had to be sold
to foreign companies. This move was based on the obvious inefficiency of the Wildlife Department
because of a lack of funds and increasing prices for wildlife products during the copper crisis when state
income fell. As with the fisheries, the economic downturn led to de facto open access to state-managed
common-pool resources. Due to high prices, pressure from local and outside communities on wildlife
resources as well as from big business for trophy hunting increased [30,79]. Now that the Wildlife
Authority has sold lodges to international operators, there are less revenues for the state as market
forces are now responsible for the management of wildlife. In line with the efficiency and moral
legitimacy discourse, protected areas have become an investment ground for conservation NGOs who,
under the label of participatory approaches, have started the process of so-called “green grabbing”
since profits from tourism and trophy hunting do not really trickle down to local or state levels but are
in private hands (see also Fairhead, Leach and Scoones 2012 [17]). This is happening on territories that
had already been grabbed from local people during colonial and again during postcolonial times that
contain critical common-pool resources such as pasture, fisheries and wildlife as well as veld products
(see Haller 2013 [30]). Chabwela and Haller 2010 [79]) provide a detailed analysis of institutional
change from precolonial to postcolonial wildlife management illustrating this process.
The general argument here is not that the state did better but that by claiming to improve
and decentralize resource governance, a small group of actors are now profiting by legitimizing
this institutional choice through the discourse of efficiency and moral legitimacy. To increase
moral legitimacy, participatory initiatives are linked to development issues. In reality, however,
these initiatives and projects are more about elite control than local control and decentralization of
power (see also Ribot et al., 2006 [80], Brockington, Igoe and Duffy 2008 [81], Galvin and Haller eds.
2008 [82]). While people will participate in monitoring and sanctioning devices in the wildlife sectors,
there are no tangible benefits and no real ownership rights to resources that had been alienated by the
state during colonial times and still, in the last instance, remain state property. Not just in Zambia but
elsewhere in the AFWeP study as well as in the literature (see Haller and Galvin 2011 [82], Poteete
and Ribot 2013 [78]), decentralization of wildlife and other common-pool resources such as timber
for charcoal production is not about delegating power to the local level. On the contrary, it is about
following the aims of—paradoxically—a cheaper way of recentralizing governance by externalizing
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several transaction costs (e.g., in community monitoring projects) to the local level (ibid, see also
Faye 2014) [83].
Returning to land tenure issues, the basic turn came with legal procedures that liberalized land
laws in Africa. Based on the notion that land tenure is insecure and thus no asset for secure investments,
the World Bank and other trade organizations pushed the revision of land tenure rights in many African
countries. This happened before large scale land acquisitions or Land Grabbing became an issue around
2007–2008. However, the idea based on de Soto’s notion that a cheap and smart legal system for land
or leasehold titles would provide enough security needed for investment and development became the
paradigm to follow. In this legal discourse, investors are said “to be attracted” and will provide jobs
and related benefits, leading ultimately to “development”. The outcome of such processes is mixed.
Overviews by Wily (2003) [84] and Toulmin (2008) [47] point out some of the problems and show
two major tendencies. In some areas, village titles provide a large part of land to a collective and,
although driven by elites, they offer much better options for local governance (see for Rufiji Floodplain
Tanzania Haller et al., 2013 [45]), while the other form opens avenues for private titles, be these titles
for sale or leasehold titles for 40 to 99 years (for example in Pangani Floodplain in Tanzania Mbeyale
2010 [85] and the Kafue Flats Haller 2013 [30]). In this context one could argue that neoliberalism
provides at least some gains to local people as their land rights are registered and acknowledged.
But the issue is actually more complicated and exposes one of the paradoxes of neoliberalism. This form
of decentralized recognition does not address social structures and power asymmetries in social
settings, and thus privatized land can be lost due to low power and low economic capacities whereby
poor landowners sell land and, therefore, their resource base. In addition, village land can be grabbed
from the state by formalisation processes, creating zones on which the state has access for conservation
and investments (see Bluwstein et al., 2018 [86]).
A number of examples can be used to illustrate this. As Toulmin points out [47], one needs to
determine who the local owners are, which is not an easy task. As shown above, there are complicated
histories of settlement and of competing rights and institutions to regulate the access of different actors
and actors’ groups to several resources during different times of the year (i.e., seasonality). Toulmin
labels this the problem of the so-called secondary users, who lose access to many resources [47]. I will
illustrate the issue with examples from Sierra Leone and Zambia.
In Sierra Leone, a large Swiss Company called ADDAX plans to develop sugarcane plantations
with the aim of producing bioethanol. One of the policies regarded as best practice is that local
landowners are compensated. There are indeed first-comer families among the Temne ethnic group
who argue they were the first people in the area, while the late-comers were given land to use.
The first-comer families, therefore, regard themselves as managers of the complex resource systems of
forests and palm trees to which others (late-comers) had access based on an allocation process and on
institutional settings of resource use. This access is based on a rotation system and rules for gathering
wild fruits from palm trees or access to water as a common-pool resource. In this case there were
common property-like institutions that regulated the access for members of a village, specifically of
first- and late-comers. The government and ADDAX now tried to find out who the “land owners” were
and created compensation payments for the land they “lease” from the first-comer groups, who were
then labelled exclusive land owners without sharing obligations. While there is still land available,
the best land has already been taken by ADDAX based on these leases. In addition, there are fruit trees
on the land that has been given away, to which access is no longer possible, with only the first-comers
get cash compensation for these losses (see Marfurt et al., 2016) [87]. The second case again illustrates
the situation in Kafue Flats, where—based on a new land act – the president and local chiefs can give
out leasehold titles for 99 years within a chief’s territory. When such lands were to be allocated in the
best pastures in the Kafue Flats, opposition to the procedure surfaced and created great conflicts as the
powerful rich cattle owners as well as the less powerful actors with smaller numbers of cattle both
were about to lose access to pastoral areas (Haller 2013) [30].
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The paradox of a neoliberal order is to reduce state power while at the same time increasing state
power by providing tools on all levels for elites to appropriate resources. And as power structures
at local levels have transformed much since colonial times, powerful actors use whatever institution
and legitimacy is available to profit from this change. Land managers in Sierra Leone thus have no
problem to be seen as “traditional land owners”, while chiefs in Zambia label themselves as “traditional
authority” and therefore become the main actors when it comes to decisions on leasehold titles. This is
then often done over the head of the people (see the title of a paper by Cotula, Vermeulen, Mathieu
and Toulmin 2011) [88]. However, what is not recognized is the fact that this is based on neoliberal
processes that took place before external land investments began to surface. It is then that the impact of
the neoliberal order unfolds on land as an isolated resource: When a rise in relative prices has been
experienced, it attracts not only foreign but also local investment. I argue that these investments are
undermining local livelihoods as access to land related common-pool resources is fragmented. At the
same time the “expectations of modernity” do not come true as there are few jobs and less income,
while subsistence crop production and access to the commons is restricted and becomes impossible.
7. Commons Grabbing or What Is Wrong with Land Grabbing?
As I have tried to show in this paper, the land grabbing issue falls on already previous alienations
and transformations of African tenure systems in colonial and postcolonial times, leading to pluralism,
disconnections and fragmentations, which already removes the commons from people. However,
I would argue that the negative effects of these processes have worsened during times of land grabbing.
This is because existing asymmetries are strengthened and new ones are created as many households
lose access to common-pool resources as a buffer that is important during times of crisis, while having
to take higher risks in normal times to be able to make a livelihood. It is also a process in which
new information technologies and formal urban knowledge represents a cutting edge, while a rural
orientation loses its value and power. My main point is that in this context the label land grabbing
is misleading as are large-scale land acquisitions and investments. What takes place is a process of
primitive accumulation, but in a much stronger sense than originally thought of by Marx and Harvey.
Studies show that despite familiar arguments advocating that common-pool resources are not so central
for local livelihoods, they are, on the contrary, especially so in times of stress and crisis: The crisis
that many households in Africa currently experience is already strong even without the issue of land
appropriation by outsiders. Removing access to common-pool resources by undermining common
property institutions leads to what we call here resilience grabbing. People struggle with the extremely
high volatility of market prices for natural resources and with the stress of having to feed a family
and obtain enough money to meet basic needs such as housing, education, clothing, the subsistence
economy of many households is already undermined (see Haller 2003) [30]. In these cases, people
try to diversify, often travelling long distances to earn money. While they are away from their home
areas, their cultural landscapes can be destroyed or grabbed and common as well as adpative and
transformative capacity [1] is removed from local people. This renders them (smallholders, women and
the elderly) extremely vulnerable to additional stresses such as sickness, climate variability or what is
labelled “climate change”. It leads to a young generation of people who have no future perspective as
they have lost membership of the commons and access to common-pool resources, even if they are well
educated, as they do not belong to the elite. If we speak of commons grabbing leading to resilience
grabbing, and not just land grabbing, the issues become clearer as it adopts the local perspective as
also illustrated by an Ila agropastoral farmer on the Kafue Flats in relation to fisheries:
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“If I have a problem (financial) or not enough food, I go to the flats and get some fish! But now I
cannot get fish anymore, because it is all taken away. Or there is sugarcane, a land-owner or a land
for wild animals (protected area). So, I just go hungry!” (interview with author, December 2003,
Mbeza, Kafue Flats, Zambia)
In the opinion of less powerful local people this process is undermining livelihood options as it
restricts their access to a wide base of resources that are centrally important in times of need. Therefore,
it is not just land that is taken away. Using the label of land grabbing or LSLA leads us into the trap of
the anti-politics machine of development that does not match with local views.
8. Where to Take It from Here
The main argument in this article is, of course, at odds with the idea of a booming Africa with
which I began this paper. It is instead the view of the doomed continent which is, of course, only one
side of the story. The other side—and this is the answer to the question of where to take the debate—is
to clearly analyse how local actors view this process, view the deals and conceptualize aspirations.
It might well be that at the beginning of a land alienation or investment process, many local people
hope for jobs and basic development facilities such as schools, health posts and secure water supplies
and therefore might highly favour such an investment. But on the other hand, research shows that
these promised developments do not come that easily and quickly, while access to vital resources
is often lost immediately. It is interesting to see, then, what type of strategies and resistance local
actors adopt in order to buffer the problem of the commons grabbing which in turn leads to resilience
grabbing. This is then vested in strategies to change and devise their own institutions that might lead
to a bricolage (Cleaver [57]) but also to a strategic selection of options based on bargaining power and
possibilities within institutional pluralism through the strategy of institution shopping.
It will be important to study such processes and to discuss what the dominant strategies are to
regain resilience via adaptation and transformability [1], using and maintaining cultural landscapes via
common property institutions. Communal titles and mapping of resources, new discussions at the local
level about institutions for the management of resources (e.g., by-laws, local conventions) might be an
important way forward. I do not speak in favour of formalization but of true participation. Despite
local political asymmetries, most actors would thus gain a sense of ownership of the institution-building
process, a process which is called constitutionality. This term refers to processes of bottom-up institution
building in which local actors, despite differences in power relations, find a way to get a sense of
ownership in the crafting of institutions. Contrary to approaches such as environmentality (Agrawal
2005) [89], based on Foucault’s governmentality transforming local actors into environmental subjects,
a new approach called constitutionality is based on empirical studies of such processes and argues that
real local participation anticipating power-asymmetries between actors and creativity for setting up
rules addressing resource problems is the key to sustainability (see Haller et al., 2016 [90], 2018, [91]).
Newer publications based on social anthropological research covering cases of impacts of European
investments on land and related commons also show differentiated reactions to commons and resilience
grabbing, reaching from small scale reactions (“weapons of the weak”) to open resistance and bottom-up
institution building (Haller, Breu, de Moor, Rohr and Znoj (eds.) 2019 [92], Haller et al 2019 [93].
Studying such processes can also lead to policy-driven ideas on how to support local resource
users from commons grabbing and to strengthen resilience of their livelihoods and their cultural
landscape ecosystems.
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Abstract: This paper addresses pastoral resilience by drawing out the coping strategies and
mechanisms utilized by the Maasai Pastoralists through a food system approach, based on the
study findings of an anthropological study of pastoralism as a food system in Laikipia County, Rift
Valley, Kenya. The co-existence and interactions of pastoralism as a food system with other types
of food systems in Laikipia, such as large-scale horticulture, justified the selection of the study site.
This paper is guided by the specific objectives aimed at establishing actors and their roles, and
describing the institutional settings and changes that sustain the continued practice of pastoralism.
Using a new institutionalism approach, the paper focuses not only on the actors and their roles
but also on how internal and external forces regulate access and use of common pool resources
(CPRs) resulting in food sustainability within the food system amidst climatic challenges and cyclic
humanitarian crises. We argue that this has an impact on the food system that continually defines
and redefines the actors’ roles and institutional settings and changes (formal and informal rules,
regulations, values and norms) that in turn affirm the value of pastoral economies and benefits
accrued to a wide range of actors beyond the community and leading to pastoral resilience. Data
collected through in-depth interviews amongst pastoral households identified actors and their roles
in pastoralism in the household with a total of 50 households being conveniently sampled. Key
informant interviews with key stakeholders in the food system described the institutional settings and
changes and also identified actors and their roles in pastoralism. Three focus group discussions based
on age and gender, established the actors and their roles and described institutional settings and
changes to supplement data collected from interviews and unstructured observations aimed at giving
a better description of the actors and their roles and also point to observable institutional settings
and changes within and outside the community group ranches. The findings reveal that actors in
the household, state, non-state, and service providers have developed varied coping strategies and
mechanisms that sustain pastoralism. The study also identified institutional settings and changes that
promote pastoral resilience, notably, private land ownership patterns, co-management of livestock
markets, commercialization of herding, decentralization of livestock services, holistic management
of pasture and the water-shed management plans. As a result, increased scholarship and advocacy
in regards to the concept of co-management of livestock markets, are recommended as a means of
understanding the pastoral resilience that the food system exhibits.
Keywords: pastoral resilience; co-management concept; decentralization; holistic management;
water-shed management plan; commercialization of herding; Common Pool Resources (CPRs)
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1. Introduction
Globally, pastoralism, as a food system, is practiced in the rangelands that cover 25–45 per
cent of the earth’s land surface area with two-thirds of these rangelands found in Asia (36%) and
Africa (30%) and being used in common. These rangelands, whether warm or cold, have variable
and often harsh climates and are sparsely populated with limited common pool resources (CPRs)
especially water and pasturelands (Reid et al. 2014 [1]; Dong et al. 2011 [2]). Pastoral cultures relies
heavily on livestock rearing which play a very important role in terms of livelihoods, social capital,
and as an insurance against disaster (World Initiative for Sustainable Pastoralism, WISP, 2007:2 [3]).
Previously, pastoralism was understood as a stepping-stone in socio-economic evolution between
hunter-gatherers and a sedentary agricultural lifestyle. However, it has proved a highly innovative
production system and a livelihood that has evolved to adapt to climatic and environmental conditions
that limit agricultural expansion and other impacts and stressors (Norwegian Refugee Council, NRC,
2014:10 [4]). Currently, pastoralism continues to survive and remain productive within the rangelands
in the midst of environmental stresses such as droughts and floods through various actor roles,
institutions and knowledge systems that showcase pastoral resilience (Hesse, 2009 [5]). Mobility
among the pastoralists allows for extensive utilization of rangelands as common pool resources
through the full use of culture and its attributes (Kaye-Zwiebel and King, 2014 [6]).
In Africa, pastoralism takes up 66 per cent of the continent’s lands for pastoral production as it is
considered to be the most efficient use of rangelands such as the Arid and Semiarid lands (ASALs) of
Kenya (NRC, 2014 [4]; Idris, 2011 [7]). According to Little and McPeak (2014) [8], pastoral resilience as
a concept draws special concerns and relevance to pastoralism on two issues: climate change with
a particular concern for how to build resilient communities in the face of increasingly extreme weather
events and humanitarian crises, especially those that can be traced to the most recent drought-and
conflict-induced disasters experienced in the Horn of Africa. The WISP (2007:2) [3] acknowledges
that the rangelands in the Horn of Africa support a pastoral economy that is based mainly on the
production of milk, meat, blood, hides and skins as well as provision of services such as traction
and transportation. In Kenya, the pastoral groups such as the Maasai pastoralists inhabit Arid and
Semiarid Lands like Laikipia County which are geographically located in the north, East and South
of the country and in total account for 36 per cent of the total population which is around 14 million
people (GOK, 2014) [9]. The pastoralists continuously face environmental stresses as they constantly
navigate the hot and dry climate of the ASALs in search of pasturelands and water sources (Pavanello,
2009) [10].
In the country, 11 counties are clustered as arid, 19 counties as semi-arid and 6 counties as having
pockets of arid and semi-arid climatic conditions (ILRI, 2008) [11]. In addition, it is estimated that
over 60 per cent of all livestock in Kenya is found in the ASALs and pastoralism employs 90 per cent
of the local populations in the ASALs and accounting for nearly 10 per cent of the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) nationally (GOK, 2008) [12]. Farmer and Mbwika (2012) [13] also acknowledge that
the market for meat consumption is not only structured in regards to income with a majority coming
from the middle class but also pastoral meat and other livestock products find their way into markets
of the two large cities in Kenya due to the high demand of the livestock and its products. Moreover,
Kenyan meat supplies from pastoralists have been able to reach the Tanzanian market within the East
African region and, internationally, the United Arabs Emirates (UAE) and current trends show that
new markets are coming up in Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Somalia and Egypt. This study therefore was
aimed at establishing the actors and their roles in pastoralism and describing the institutional settings
and changes of pastoralism as a food system.
2. Pastoral Resilience among the Maasai Pastoralists of Laikipia County
In Kenya, the Arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs) constitute about 84 per cent of the total land
and are populated by about 20 per cent of the country’s population (Idris, 2011 [7]). Bobadoye et al.
(2016:120) [14] acknowledges that the ASALs are the most vulnerable regions to climate change and
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other natural hazards in the country with a huge impact on livestock rearing, small-holder agriculture
and tourism, which are the most dominant sources of livelihoods in these areas. According to Idris
(2011:26) [7] pastoralism is practiced in 75 per cent of the ASALs which are largely populated by
nomadic pastoral communities like the Maasai pastoralists of Laikipia County in the rift valley region,
who rely primarily on their livestock as a source of livelihood and collectively these regions constitute
the most marginalized parts of the country. Ouma et al. (2012:91) [15] add that the root causes of most
of the crises facing the pastoralists who inhabit the ASALs, in the recent past, have been occasioned
by climate variability and change and as well as natural and man-made related factors which have
led to recurrent droughts thus leading to water shortages, conflicts over land access and use, and
the disruption of the vegetation cycle in these regions that they occupy with limited common pool
resources (CPRs).
Bobadoye et al. (2016) [14] allude to the depletion of CPRs within the ASALs as occasioned by
prolonged dry spells, drought events and other hazards have for a long time been the lead to severe
economic and food security risks as the hazards make it difficult for pastoral communities such as
the Maasai pastoralists to maintain their assets and have timely responses to disasters leading to food
sustainability of pastoralism as a food system. Ouma et al. (2012) [15] thus argue that, as a result of
these repeated severe droughts, pastoralists continue to endure catastrophic losses of livestock, which
is their capital and savings, during the drought events.
However, Idris (2011) [7] illustrates that pastoralists have the ability to successfully assess and
manage risks occasioned by the vulnerability that they face in the ASALs from climatic hazards,
poverty, conflicts, and diseases that make them shrewd managers of risks and leads to pastoral
resilience. Limited literature exists on who the actors are and what roles they play in pastoralism as
well as how formal and informal institutions (rules, regulations, norms and values) operating within
pastoralism as a food system are continuously in a transition from fit to misfit and back to fit again.
This paper therefore seeks to provide more insights and add to existing literature on how pastoral
resilience among the Maasai pastoralists of Laikipia County is evidenced by establishing the actors and
their roles as well as describing the institutional settings and changes that result in the development of
coping strategies and mechanisms resulting in the continued sustenance of the food system. These
coping strategies and mechanisms are relied upon by actors in the household levels, the involvement
of state, non-state and service providers as actors in pastoralism within the commons and outside
the commons, the development and use of organizations and associations as actors as well as the
transformation of institutional settings and changes utilized in pastoralism.
3. Methodology
Study Site
This study was conducted in Laikipia County, Rift Valley, Kenya. The county is located in the
central part of Kenya and it is roughly demarcated by Mount Kenya to the East and South-east,
the Aberdares Range to the south and south-west, eastern rift valley to the west, Karisia Hills to the
northwest, Mathews Range to the north, and Buffalo Springs National Reserve and Samburu National
reserves to the Northeast (Butynski and De Jong, 2014) [16]. It is also one of the 14 counties in the rift
valley region and it is bordered by Samburu county to the north, Isiolo County to the north-east, Meru
county to the East, Nyeri County to the south-east, Nyandarua and Nakuru counties to the south-west
and Baringo county to the west (GOK, 2013) [17] as shown in Figure 1.
Geographically, the county has five administrative units, namely, Laikipia East, Laikipia North,
Laikipia Central, Laikipia West, and Nyahururu sub-counties and it is the 15th largest county in the
country by land size covering an area of 9700 square kilometres (GOK, 2014) [18]. In Laikipia County
90 per cent of the land is deemed too dry and thus unfit for cultivation, less than 2 per cent of land is
deemed highly viable for agriculture, 65 per cent of land is defined as wildlife habitat while 38 per
cent of land is comprised of relatively intact, contiguous, and natural habitat (Butynski and De Jong,
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2014) [16]. In addition, the county also consists of a rangeland plateau with a varying altitude of 1500
to 2611 metres above sea level at Ewaso Nyiro basin in the north and Marmanet forest. In the North the
mean annual rainfall is estimated to be 40 cm while in the south-west it is 120 cm (GOK, 2014) [9,18].
Figure 1. Administrative map of Laikipia County inset the map of Kenya (Source: Munyeki, 2013 [33]).
4. Methods
4.1. Study Population and Sampling Procedure
The study population consisted of Maasai pastoralists as the Household level actors, state actors,
non-state actors, service providers as actors, and organizations and associations as value chain actors
in the food system. The unit of analysis was the community that was actively involved in pastoral
activities and gained part of their household livelihood through the food system.
The sample consisted of 20 men and 30 women. The proportion of women was higher because
they were readily available at the household level. This study collected purely qualitative data and
relied on convenient sampling in selecting informants. Secondary data were collected from available
literature on the Maasai pastoralists in Laikipia County, actors and their roles, and the institutional
settings and changes of pastoralism.
Interviews using in-depth interview guides were conducted with the Maasai pastoralists as
actors at the household level. a total of 50 Maasai pastoral households were sampled from within the
community group ranches and outside the community group ranches in the vast Segera ward. In total,
25 pastoral households were sampled in Ilpolei group ranches while another 25 Maasai pastoral
households were sampled in the vast Segera ward based on the willingness and availability of the
pastoral households. This elicited information on the specific objectives establishing actors and their
roles in the food system. Other interviews with state, non-state, service providers and organizations
and associations as actors were carried out using key informant interview guides to reduce information
on establishing the actors and their roles and describing the institutional settings and changes in
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pastoralism. Other data collection methods used included: 3 focus group discussions based on age and
gender with men, women and youth were conducted. The discussants were purposively selected from
the community households that had not participated in the In-depth interviews. The inclusion of men
and women focus group discussions was based on the discussants being 25 years and above and also in
a recognized marriage union within the community. Participation for the youth focus group discussion
comprised of young men, morans, aged 21–25 years of age. The discussants generated knowledge to
address the actors and their roles in the pastoral food system and also alluded to informal and formal
institution settings and changes that operate within the food system. Unstructured observations were
also used to give insights into the observable institutional settings and changes of the food system
and the level of physical interactions teasing out the coping strategies and mechanisms that sustain
pastoralism as a food system resulting in food sustainability for the community, region, nation and
multinationals at large.
This county’s scarce and unreliable rainfall patterns, notably in Laikipia North and Laikipia East
sub-counties make it difficult to practice large-scale agriculture (Ameso et al. 2017) [20]. As a result,
the two sub-counties are largely pastoral zones where nomadic pastoralism is a major source of
livelihood for the inhabitants as shown in Figure 2 [21].
Figure 2. Map of the study area: Laikipia North sub-County.
4.2. Data Processing and Analysis
The qualitative data obtained from In-depth interviews, key informant interviews and focus group
discussions were recorded, transcribed, and translated into English. Data obtained from unstructured
observations and captured in field notes were coded and organized into text for analysis. The two sets
of qualitative data were then sorted and interpreted in relation to the research objectives, to provide
general interpretations of the findings, indicating how thematic areas and issues interrelated.
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5. Findings
Actors and Their Roles in Pastoralism
The household among the Maasai pastoralists is the basic unit of production, distribution,
packaging and consumption in the pastoral value chain. It is also responsible for age and gender
division of labour in pastoralism to guarantee food sustainability, risk management and resilience.
At the household level, various actors have varied roles that they play in pastoralism that guarantee
pastoral resilience. Household heads are one such group of actors in pastoralism. They are the men
among the Maasai pastoralists who are considered to be the sole owner of the pastoral livestock and the
overall-decision makers hence have full control of livestock activities as the main source of livelihood.
They are tasked with the overall role of herding livestock thus they have the power to define access to
pasture and water for livestock. As the overall decision makers they are capable of delegating their
herding role to morans and instructing them on where to graze and water the livestock especially in
the commons.
Currently, the study found that the men among the Maasai pastoralists are leaving for town
centers in search of formal employment. In order to sustain the continued practice of pastoralism,
the men are not only delegating their duties to the morans but also they are hiring herdsmen, fellow
Maasai pastoralists with limited education and who remain behind in the commons (community group
ranches) and other Maasai settlements outside the commons of Mutirithia, Rumuruti in Laikipia north
sub-county. The herdsmen receive a monthly pay of between 5000–7000 Kenyan shillings to herd the
household livestock in the absence of the household heads and morans. Moreover, in the 13 community
group ranches found in the Maasai reserves, the herdsmen not only receive a monthly pay but also are
accommodated with their immediate family members by the hiring pastoral family and become part
of the household level actors.
The household heads also manage livestock health through spraying, dipping and injecting of the
livestock after they purchase the necessary veterinary medication to combat livestock disease like East
Coast Fever (ECF), pneumonia, Anthrax, Foot and Mouth disease (FMD), and Mastitis. It was reported by
one household head that:
. . . We(men) are the ones who are responsible for injecting and dipping the livestock especially the
cattle because when it comes to injecting especially the cattle these cows and bulls, it is very hard for
women as cows and bulls are strong with tough skin and such livestock is left for the men to treat.
This is because men can easily control them since they have the muscles and can subdue the livestock
(Male, 31 years, IDI, Ilpolei Group Ranch).
The household heads are also involved in the sale of livestock as they make the final decision on
which livestock should be sold and when it should be sold. In the sale of livestock, cultural significance
of color is also observed by the household heads. The study was informed that the white and black
coloured goats were valued as a source of blessings through the ability of the goats to reproduce
quickly and thus regarded as a source of wealth. Moreover, the Irkinyango clan among the Maasai
pastoralists of Laikipia values the brown coloured cattle as a source of endless wealth and thus cannot
be sold off quickly without having reproduced at least five times.
The study established that selling off such coloured livestock without them having reproduced
was equated to inviting poverty into one’s household. The men as household heads also decide
on when livestock should be slaughtered for household consumption but also allow for continuous
extraction of other food components from the livestock, namely, blood and milk. Household heads in
special circumstances also perform other roles that are meant to be performed by the women and other
pastoral members. For instance, the study was informed that men milk the livestock in the absence of
women and the girl-child who are traditionally supposed to milk the livestock twice a day (dawn and
dusk). As men grow older and assume the elder’s role in the family, at the household level, they still
participate in pastoralism by giving constant advice to the morans, men and even herdsmen on the
36
Land 2018, 7, 78
appropriate and available pasturelands and watering points to access and use. This however, happens
in the community group ranches where these elders understand the geographical stretches of their
group lands and to avoid conflict advice their morans, men and herdsmen on the appropriate areas
to graze.
Women at the household level coordinate livestock hygiene by cleaning the livestock sheds
regularly. They are also tasked with identifying and separating the injured and sick livestock allowing
for the nursing of injuries and the treatment of sick livestock. The study was made aware of goats
that are separated and treated for partial blindness after the consumption of the invasive and inedible
Opuntia plant species. Women also process livestock products such as milk into fermented milk for
future consumption. They also process the milk cream through heating and condensation to extract
cooking oil. The extracted oil is also used as medicine by the said women who administer it together
with special herbs to their children to prevent them against coughs and influenza. The women also
preserve meat that is slaughtered at the household level by smoking and drying. The study was
informed that the meat can remain preserved and good for consumption for 20–30 days. However,
the study found that women currently in other households have taken over household heads roles,
especially in families that are single-parent headed households and in households where the man has
left for the town centers in search of formal employment. The women hire and pay the herdsmen,
purchase veterinary drugs and inject, and spray the livestock.
In the community group ranches, where CPRs are shared communally most men are polygamous
and thus have more than one household and several compounds that they call home. In most
cases, these men as tradition dictates, with time, move from their first wives households into newly
established younger wives households. As a result, the study established that first wives guarantee
the continued practice of pastoralism in their households by assuming the household head’s roles.
They also delegate livestock rearing activities from production, distribution, processing and packaging
to their household members based on age and gender. They are also bestowed with the overall decision
of whether or not household livestock should be sold and who among the male children will inherit
which type of livestock.
Other actors in the household who carry out various roles but lack decision making capacity in
livestock rearing that guarantee the continued production, processing, distribution, packaging and
consumption of livestock and its products are morans. The morans herd the livestock, provide security
to the livestock during the day and night against wild animals and intruders, slaughter livestock meant
for household consumption and also administer veterinary drugs to livestock as part of the livestock
health management role. As a result of, the commercialization of herding, herdsmen make certain that
livestock have access to proper pasture and water. The herdsmen also administer veterinary drugs to
household livestock in the absence of the men of the household, help in fencing the livestock sheds
and also slaughter household livestock. This was illustrated more by an excerpt from a youth focus
group discussion:
Livestock are beneficial as they create employment for men and morans, who are unable to go into
towns and get formal employment due to limited education levels. Those who remain behind and
have no livestock are being employed as herdsmen by those who have left for town centers, in search
of formal employment. More often than not, herdsmen are those men who dropped out of school due
to one reason or another. But for those who have finished secondary school education especially for
morans, they leave for town centers in search of office jobs. (Youth FGD, Males, Ilpolei Group Ranch).
The young boys who are about 8–10 years of age begin to herd small stocks (calves, lambs and
kids) and they also assist their mothers in milking livestock. a male informant from Mutirithia area in
Segera ward, when asked about the roles of young boys had this to say:
Young boys who are of age and who have not undergone initiation help in milking the livestock.
They also herd the young goats and sheep. Young boys who are old enough as from 8–10 years
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and above graze the livestock. They also help in cleaning the livestock sheds. (Male, 28 years,
IDI, Mutirithia).
The study also learnt that young girls mostly complement the woman of the household in
dispensing their duties. They separate the small stocks from the larger stocks to allow for milking.
They also fetch water and clean the livestock sheds as well as count the livestock as they are brought
back from the grazing fields.
6. Organizations and Associations as Actors in Pastoralism
The study was informed of organizations and associations that were directly and indirectly
involved within and outside the community group ranches in encouraging the practice of pastoralism.
The study was informed of Livestock Marketing Authorities (LMAs), which emphasized on the
adoption of a core co-management concept of livestock markets. This concept allowed for increased
participation of pastoralists in livestock marketing and management of the markets’ infrastructure
in the pastoral counties of Isiolo, Samburu, and Laikipia. In the County of Laikipia, the Laikipia
Livestock Marketing Authority (LLMA), a community-led organization was found that liaises with the
County government of Laikipia to collect livestock sales tax and encourages equitable distribution of
the said tax during market days in the ratio of 1:1. The organization through its branch leadership
which includes a chairman, supervisor, and other senior members of the community selected to serve
in the organization’s leadership, is found in every available livestock market in Laikipia County acts
as the custodian of the sales tax left to the community.
The LLMA leadership in its wisdom retains the revenue allocation left in its possession and
later ploughs it back into agreed upon and prioritized community projects that have received public
acceptability. For instance, the study established that in Kimanjo market the LLMA had agreed to
plough back the revenue allocation into bee keeping projects, hay production projects, building of
slaughterhouses in the market, rehabilitation of run-down cattle dips, building market stalls, educating
the pastoralists on the adoption of new drought resistant breeds of livestock and rehabilitation of the
roads leading to the livestock market in Kimanjo. An officer of the authority echoed these sentiments:
The fifty per cent that is collected as tax during market days and left to the community through the
authority is used differently; ten per cent is used to pay salaries of clerks and other authority employees.
Twenty per cent is left with the authority as savings while the remaining twenty per cent is used on
community initiated projects such as giving bursaries to school going children in the community
like here in Kimanjo, investing in bee keeping activities, hay production projects, and building of
slaughterhouses. Out of the same amount some is used in improving the community’s infrastructure
to allow for access to trade areas like available livestock markets. (Male, 37 years, KII, Kimanjo).
Community ranch management groups are another set of actors that encourage the practice
of pastoralism in the commons. They are associations founded by members of the available 13
community group ranches found in Laikipia North sub-county of: Ilpolei, Kijabe, Lekuruki, Makurian,
Ilgwesi, Morupusi, Kurikuri, Munichoi, Musul, Tiamut, Koija, Ilmotiok and Nkilorit. The community group
ranches were registered in the late 1970s such as Ilpolei community group ranch that was registered in
1976. The role of the community ranch management groups is to regulate the use of available common
pool resources especially pasture and water through advocating for the adoption and utilization of the
concept of holistic management of grazing lands locally referred to as the Olopoleli concept.
The Olopoleli concept gains mandate and implementation support through the community group
ranch constitution that zones the communal lands into grazing, settlement and conservation zones.
The concept stipulates that grazing land zones should be divided into various parts and some of these
parts should be set aside for future grazing during the dry seasons and in the wet seasons the grazing
lands that had previously been in use should be enclosed and set aside to allow grass to grow.
The community ranch management groups also take up the lead role in providing alternatives to
limited CPRs. The study was informed that the management groups like that of Ilpolei community
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group ranch led by the chairman, are authorized to make agreements with private ranches such as
Oljogi during the dry seasons to allow for pastoral livestock to graze in the private ranches that have
access to permanent river waters and constant pasture availability. This is done at a fee of 200 shillings
per cow or bull after a grazing zone within the private ranches has been identified and terms such
as the provision of three herdsmen from the community group ranch to herd the livestock have been
agreed upon. The agreements struck for access to pasture and water also allow pastoral livestock
to gain access to constant vaccination drives, livestock health management plans and also pay the
herdsmen a monthly fee of 7000–8000 Kenyan shillings that will be done at the expense of the private
ranch owners.
Livestock trade which is the back of the pastoral economy in Laikipia County has found support
from pastoral initiated credit associations. These community-led financial institutions, notably,
Nasaruni rural Sacco provides money transfer services and loans to actors who frequent the livestock
markets. Nasaruni rural Sacco an initiative of pastoral women in Kijabe community group ranch
began in 2008 as a financial service organization for pastoral women but by 2013 it had grown into
a fully fledged Sacco. In its current position as a Sacco it provides financial services to the Maasai
pastoralists in Laikipia County, as well as to other pastoral groups found in the neighbouring counties
of Isiolo and Samburu. The financial institution offers development, educational and emergency loans
to pastoralists with livestock being used as collateral. The Sacco takes a picture of the said livestock as
evidence of the available collateral before disbursing the loans.
The pastoralists are also required to be part of one of two groups; one comprising of 5–8
pastoralists who can guarantee one another as good neighbours, Kikundi cha Mkopo (KCM) and another
a collection of at least 3 KCMs with a membership of close to 30 pastoralists who live in the same village
and know one another well enough. The development loans are issued to pastoralists who would
like to build permanent housings with iron-sheet roofings and move away from the grass-thatched
housings. The educational loans are issued mostly in the month of January to cater for tuition fees of
pastoral children, when livestock trade is low and the prices of livestock are unfavorable. In instances,
where urgent medical care and other unforeseen circumstances occur, the Sacco issues emergency
loans. Laikipia Permaculture Centre (LPC) is another organization as an actor in pastoralism that the
study found to be advocating for holistic management of pastoral lands and strict observation of the
carrying capacity of the rangelands.
6.1. State Actors in Pastoralism
The continued practice of pastoralism in Laikipia County as a food system is also pegged on
to the involvement of national and county government actors who: regulate, process, distribute,
provide services and add to the number of users and beneficiaries of pastoral trade and products.
Police officers are national government employees found in the pastoral regions and mandated with
providing security to pastoral actors especially in livestock markets. Their sole responsibility is to
guarantee free and fair trade for livestock buyers and sellers. Through the County Market officials,
the county government of Laikipia is represented in the pastoral economy. They are employees of the
county government, previously of the municipal council of Laikipia. They are charged with the sole
responsibility of collecting sales tax in livestock markets from livestock buyers and sellers.
The study was informed that they collect 30 Kenyan shillings from livestock buyers and sellers per
sheep and per goat, and they also collect 200 Kenyan shillings per cattle bought or sold. They also sit
down with the Laikipia Livestock Marketing Authority management and share the sales tax collected
and make certain that the half that is meant for the county government of Laikipia is safely secured
and taken to the County coffers. The County market officials are aided by Livestock counting clerks in
sales tax collection in livestock markets. The livestock counting clerks are employees of the LLMA.
Veterinary officers are also employees of the county government who provide livestock health
management to the food system. They conduct regular vaccination drives in the event of notifiable
livestock diseases, train the pastoralists on proper purchase and use of veterinary drugs and impose
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possible quarantines. They operate in pastoral regions and the slaughterhouses within the county
where they make certain that the livestock brought for slaughter by actors in pastoralism meet the
necessary requirements before they are slaughtered and released to the public for county and national
level of consumption.
In livestock health management, the veterinary officers conduct livestock disease surveillance in
the pastoral regions along two main stock routes and within the livestock markets where buying and
selling of pastoral livestock takes place. In Laikipia north sub-county, the study was informed that
the two main stock routes were those used by the Maasai pastoralists in search of water and pasture
for their livestock during the dry seasons. The first stock route moved from Kirimon to Kimanjo then
to Ilpolei in the pastoral commons into Kimkandura and Endana and finally reaching Mount Kenya
or the Arbedare ranges. The second stock route began in Kirimon and moved to Rumuruti outside
the pastoral commons and from there into Nyahururu sub-county of Laikipia before ending up in the
much greener Arbedare ranges.
Livestock production officers of the county government of Laikipia train pastoralists on proper
animal husbandry methods and ensure that the carrying capacity of the rangelands is observed.
They also advise the pastoralists on which drought resistant breeds to keep, and the better veterinary
drugs to use. When it comes to the livestock trade among food system actors, the livestock production
officers advise the pastoralists on the need to form Livestock Marketing Authorities (LMAs) to ensure
they get better prices for their livestock. They also work with the Maasai pastoralists on rangeland
management to ensure they deal with the menace of receding rangelands caused by the invasive plant
species of Opuntia.
Another national actor is the Agricultural Sector Development Support Programme (ASDSP).
They work with the Maasai pastoralists to ensure that their products value chains are created with
their input. They also advice the Maasai pastoralists on how to increase the market value of their
livestock and livestock products through the use of quality inputs in livestock rearing like dewormers.
They also discourage the pastoralists from having an overreliance on purchasing inputs from stockists
and other open air market vendors of veterinary drugs with poor storage. They also talk with the
pastoralists on formation of marketing associations like LLMA and promote electronic marketing of
livestock and their products as a measure of guaranteeing a better market value for the sale of pastoral
livestock and products.
6.2. Non-State Actors in Pastoralism
Non-governmental organizations within and outside the pastoral commons of Laikipia county
regulate and provide services to pastoralism that encourage its growth. Regenesis limited and African
Wildlife foundation (AWF) are two non-state actors who work with the Maasai pastoralists to
strengthen their financial position by helping the pastoralists save money from their pastoral activities.
The two organizations have worked with the pastoral women of Kijabe community group ranch and
led to the growth of Nasaruni rural Sacco from a financial service organization in 2008 to a full-fledged
Sacco in 2013.
The Regional Pastoral Livelihood Resilience Project (RPLRP) is a World Bank funded resilience
project hosted by the department of Livestock production in the County government of Laikipia that
works to eliminate the invasive plant genus of Opuntia. The study was informed that the project was
initiated in late 2015 and began full operations in 2016 with an aim of establishing the hazards that
pastoralism in 14 arid and semi-arid counties such as Laikipia, Isiolo, Turkana, Samburu and Wajir
face. The project uses the Community Managed Disaster Risk Reduction Assessment (CMDRRA) to get
Maasai pastoralists to identify the hazards that they face. The study was informed that CMDRRA
listed Opuntia invasive plant genus as one of the main hazards that limits pastoralism and needs to be
dealt with.
The African Conservation Centre (ACC) is another actor in pastoralism that encourages the
practice of livestock rearing and trade. It focuses on livelihood projects aimed at improving the
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livestock breeds that the Maasai pastoralists keep in Laikipia and Narok Counties as well as Amboseli
and Maasai Mara conservancies. In Laikipia County and predominantly in the Maasai reserves,
the organization is working towards improving availability of pasture by emphasizing on the adoption
of the Olopoleli concept. Moreover, the organization is on the forefront, working with women groups
such as Twala women group to build gabions to reduce soil erosions in the commons and encourage
the retention of water through the water-shed management plan.
6.3. Service Providers as Actors in Pastoralism
Agro-vets are one type of service providers who contribute to the health of the pastoral livestock
by providing ready veterinary drugs to Maasai pastoralists within and outside the commons. They are
found in livestock markets of Doldol, Kimanjo, and Naibor with stalls in which they operate in. Others
are peripatetic and they frequent the county of Laikipia from neighbouring counties of Nyeri and
Meru to sell off their veterinary drugs during market days.
Food merchants such as local butchers, hoteliers, and milk vendors provide a ready market for
pastoral products, namely, milk and meat. They sell the products in their raw form to residents of the
town centers found within the pastoral regions and also as ready-to-consume products to frequent
actors in livestock markets who make stopovers in the town centers of Juakali and Naibor outside the
pastoral commons and in Ilpolei town centre in the pastoral commons.
Livestock brokers are another group of actors whose goal in pastoralism is purely
profit-maximization. These young pastoral men and women are actively involved in livestock trade
by purchasing livestock from fellow pastoralists at a lower price and rearing the livestock for awhile
before reselling them at a higher price in livestock markets, to butchers within the town centres or
butchers at the slaughterhouses such as Nanyuki Slaughterhouse in Laikipia County and, Huruma
and Dagoretti slaughterhouses in Nairobi City county.
Livestock buyers are business persons who frequent the livestock markets in Laikipia County
to purchase pastoral livestock. These livestock buyers are non-pastoralists who come from as far as
Nyeri, Murang’a, Meru and Nairobi counties. They purchase livestock from the Maasai pastoralists
in livestock markets with profit-maximization as a motivational factor. They process and package
the livestock products through slaughterhouses and distribute the meat and other livestock products
to their customer base in butcheries, supermarkets, food outlets, hotels, and security, health and
education institutions with which they have pre-existing business agreements. Some of the products
have specific markets based on the concentration of consumers. The study was informed of Eastleigh,
South B and South C as designated markets for camel meat consumption inhabited by residents of
the Somali ethnic group in Nairobi City County. Livestock buyers work hand-in-hand with livestock
transporters who provide transport services to the former. They ferry the purchased livestock from the
pastoral regions to desired designations like Endana and Nanyuki town in Laikipia County as well as
to Nyeri, Murang’a and Nairobi City Counties and towns like Karatina.
7. Institutional Settings and Changes as Coping Strategies and Mechanisms in Pastoralism
Changes in formal and informal rules, regulations and norms governing the practice of pastoralism
have enhanced pastoral resilience in Laikipia County among the Maasai pastoralists within and outside
the pastoral commons. Changes in actor roles have been experienced amongst household level actors to
varying degrees but institutional transformations have emerged as coping strategies and mechanisms
ensuring the continued practice of pastoralism. The study was informed of changes in primary actor
roles. The study found that household heads left their primary role of herding livestock in pastoralism
as they opted to leave for town centres in search of formal employment while education for the morans
changed their primary role in herding livestock. However, in order to cope with these changes in
primary actor roles that threaten the survival of pastoralism, institutional changes within the Maasai
pastoralists have allowed for the outsourcing of herding roles to herdsmen at the household level for
a monthly fee. Other leadership household head roles’ have also been delegated to women who have
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taken control as livestock owners and authority figures. In Maasai pastoral households that cannot
afford the services of herdsmen, women have also taken up the role of herding as well as livestock
health management.
Coping strategies and mechanisms by the Maasai pastoralists have also been witnessed in regards
to pasture. The pastoral regions occupied by the Maasai have over the years been vulnerable to
prolonged drought spells and other hazards such as the outgrowth of the invasive Opuntia plant species
in the commons. To bounce back, from limited pasture supply in the commons, the Maasai pastoralists
are relying on set down formal and informal rules and regulations established in their community
group ranch constitutions. The constitutions have zoned pastoral lands into grazing, settlement, and
conservation zones and this guarantees preservation of given pasture lands for future use through the
emphasis on the use of and adoption of holistic management of pasturelands. Moreover, to ensure
that the enshrined rules and regulations are followed, the community group ranch management and
elders have sanctions and punishments in place for offenders. The study found that for first time
offenders who take their livestock into the restricted and reserved pasturelands for grazing they are
given a warning but for second time offenders they are forced to part away with a he-goat as a fine
for grazing in restricted zones and reserved pasturelands. For third time and repeat offenders legal
actions which involves notifying the local administration is taken and a jail term is a possible outcome.
In the pastoral commons, the Maasai pastoralists also hire pasture fields from neighbouring
private ranches like Oljogi, Impala, Olgarama, Olpajeta, Lenaisho and Oldega. Other Maasai pastoralists
are re-investing the money from livestock trade into private land ownership outside the commons to
guarantee continued access to pasture for their livestock in areas like Mutirithia in Segera ward.
Outside the commons, the Maasai pastoralists cope with limited pasture constrains by purchasing
more than one plot in areas such as Mutirithia in Segera ward. They fence the plots and utilize
one after the other on a rotational basis for grazing. In other areas such as Karionga in Segera ward,
the pastoralists hire grazing plots available from non-pastoralists at a monthly fee of between 7000–8000
Kenyan shillings. Other pastoralists sneak their livestock into neighbouring privately owned ranches
to graze as a coping strategy and mechanism. The large livestock is sneaked into privately owned
ranches at night while the small stocks are sneaked into these ranches during the day. This is done to
avoid the small stocks from being predated upon by the wildlife found in private ranches.
Water shortage is also another hindrance to the practice of pastoralism. To cope with water
shortage, the Maasai pastoralists in the commons who rely on seasonal rivers like Twala River
make informal agreements with private ranches through their group ranch chairmen for their
livestock to have access to water when they are grazing in the private ranches. Another strategy
is the dependence on dams constructed through private-public partnerships between private ranch
owners and county and national government departments. The study found that Oljogi private
ranch had partnered with the Ministry of Irrigation and built a dam for the Ilpolei community group
ranch. Other partnerships between the community group ranch management and conservation
based non-governmental organizations such as the African Conservation Centre, has allowed for the
building of gabions to reduce soil erosion within the community group ranches through the water-shed
management plan.
Outside the commons, the Maasai pastoralists rely on water dams to meet the water needs for their
livestock in areas such as Mutirithia. In other regions of Segera ward such as Karionga, pastoralists
rely on boreholes dug by their agricultural neighbours and they purchase water at a fee of 50 Kenyan
shillings per 20 L jerican. However, other pastoralists rely on the permanent water supply of river
Nanyuki to meet their livestock water demands.
With devolution, pastoralism has stood out as a very important revenue generator for the county
government of Laikipia. As a result, the sales tax collected in livestock markets has increased from 20
Kenyan shillings per goat or sheep to between 30 or 40 Kenyan shillings per goat or sheep. The sales
tax collected per cattle sold has also increased from 100 Kenyan shillings before the dispensation of
the county government and its involvement to 200 Kenyan shillings per cattle. The increased revenue
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collection has been attributed to the co-management policy and concept that has been picked up in the
management of livestock markets.
With the dispensation of County governance in Laikipia there has been a sharp increase in the
cost of livestock vaccinations from 70 Kenyan shillings to 150 Kenyan shillings and the responsibility
of livestock health management has been relegated to individual Maasai pastoralists. However,
despite all this setbacks in livestock health management, pastoralists are developing organizations and
associations such as Laikipia Livestock Marketing Authority that are geared towards providing quality
inputs through providing readily available veterinary medications for pastoral livestock through
building of veterinary drug stalls that are operated by qualified veterinary officers.
8. Discussion of Findings
8.1. Actors and Their Roles in Pastoralism
The study identified actors along the value chain (production, processing, packaging, distribution
and consumption) in the household, state, non-state and service providers in the food system. This is
concurrent with, Young et al. (2012) [22], who regard pastoralism as a livestock production system
that encompasses numerous extensive interests across sectors, disciplines, states and non-state groups.
The actors identified were found to play different but complementary roles along the value chain
within the food system. This is similar to Ferraro and Andreatta (2012) [23], who acknowledge that
pastoralism sustains a wide-range of actors through the raising of domestic animals and also uses
them for transportation and trade. Similar sentiments are echoed by Young et al. (2012) [22], who posit
that pastoral livestock production makes a significant contribution to securing the livelihoods of actors
within and beyond the food system.
Bonvillain (2013) [24] posits that, among the pastoralists, at the household level, rules regulating
gender roles exist allowing for access to livestock products. For example, the study established that
milking is a woman’s role and for young girls who are above 10 years of age. Additionally, within
the Maasai community a strict division of labour that is organized on age group and gender roles
ascribed to by all members exist. As a result, primary producers in the food system were identified as
heads of households (men), women, morans, elders, young boys and girls, and herdsmen who were
found mainly at the household level. Similarly, Bee et al. (2002) [25] agree that men in the Maasai
community are heads of the household, owners of livestock and traditionally responsible for security
and provision of medical care to the livestock. Additionally, Blench (2001) [26] adds that men herd and
sell meat animals within the food system. Kituyi (1990) [27] also points out that in line with tradition,
the responsibility of slaughtering in the household is always retained by the household head, who has
the overall responsibility of deciding who or what to be slaughtered and in most cases he delegates the
roles of slaughtering to a moran. However, the study established that in addition to the morans being
delegated the slaughtering role; the same role can also be delegated to herdsmen by the household
head or by the women at the household level, who are in-charge of their households. This is in line with
FAO (2017) [28], which acknowledges that pastoralism relies on a list of strategies at the household
level to address labour shortages such as the joining with other households in cooperative herding and
watering, taking in impoverished dependants or borrowing a child usually from close kin, expansion
of the household through marriage and more recently the hiring of labour for herding, herdsmen.
For women in the household, they are not only responsible for milking but also herding the
small stocks and young livestock while at home, cleaning the livestock sheds and also processing
milk through fermentation process and also extracting cooking oil from the milk cream. This is in
line with Morner (2006) [29], who acknowledges that women in pastoral communities are normally
assigned the right to milk, conduct dairy processing and beyond that they may or may not sell milk
but usually have control over the proceeds. Additionally, Ferraro and Andreatta (2012) [23] posit that
oil extracts from milk among the pastoralists can be used to prepare vegetables that the pastoralists get
from exchanges with non-pastoral actors.
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The morans are tasked with herding, slaughtering selected livestock for household consumption,
health management of livestock and provision of security by the household heads. Similar findings are
shared by Morner (2006) [29], who states that morans in the Maasai community, search for new pasture
for their livestock, defend and protect their livestock from wild animals and rival tribes and support
their parents in pastoralism generally. Additionally, Bee et al. (2002) [25] add that morans grant security
for the community and educate the young ones on matters related to animal husbandry, resource use,
and good comportments and more crucially, they move with livestock in search of pasture and water.
In the household, the young boys begin to learn livestock responsibilities through introduction at
a tender age. They are introduced to herding of calves, kids, and lambs near their homes but as they get
older, 10 years of age and above, they begin to herd the larger livestock. According to Hauff (2003) [30]
young boys only herd livestock by strictly adhering to grazing schemes given to them by elders and
household heads. Similarly, Tarayia (2004) [31] acknowledges that at an early age, the young boys,
herd calves, lambs and kids close to their home compounds. According to Morner (2006) [31] when
boys are about 5 years of age, their fathers take the responsibility of teaching them on how to take care
of their livestock herds and by the time they are 10 years of age and above, the boys are tasked with
the main responsibilities of larger livestock.
For organizations and associations as actors, they are involved in reinforcing community
participation in pastoral activities like in livestock markets as well as in developmental projects
like rehabilitation of cattle dips. As a result, employment and credit access among the food system
actors has increased remarkably and more returns from livestock rearing trickles down to the primary
actors. Bee et al. (2002) [25] concurs that such involvements with organizations and associations
not only maintain the position of pastoralism as a major source of subsistence, at the household and
community level, but also act a major income creator for the community at large.
Service providers as actors, most notably, food vendors trade in livestock products, also provide
livestock inputs like veterinary drugs to control livestock diseases and manage total livestock health.
Others engage in the constant trade of pastoral livestock such as butchers, hoteliers and livestock
brokers. According to Lengoiboni et al. (2011) [32] livestock provides pastoralists not only provide
sustenance at the household level but also through constant exchange of livestock products and
livestock sales, and the food system provides a means of financing basic needs.
8.2. Institutional Settings and Changes in Pastoralism
The management of CPRs especially pastures and water in the food system is governed by actors
with differing bargaining powers and positions through formal and informal institutions, namely,
rules, regulations, values and norms. With time, changes in roles of some primary actors such as
household heads have changed due to education and the desire for formal employment. The resultant
effect has been women assuming temporal powers and positions of household heads who have left
for town centers in search of formal employment. Moreover, women have also been bestowed the
power to hire and pay herdsmen to take up roles left behind by morans as the community embraces
formal education. According to Kaye-Zwiebel and King (2014) [6] institutions dictate the utilization of
extensive rangelands and the uptake of food system activities as they are an outcome of customary
polycentric governance systems and social networks that allow not only for the proper management of
CPRs but also the responsibilities of individuals. Similarly, Tarayia (2004) [31] highlights that among
the Maasai, for generations, they have had customs regulating occupation of land that is strictly
governed by natural laws that give out the rights to control and use CPRs. Haller (2013) [33] adds
that followers and kinsmen make certain that they monitor the pastures and water access and use.
Sanctions are then issued to those who access the CPRs without gaining proper user rights.
9. Conclusions
In summary, the study established that there are different actors found along the value chain with
varying decision making capabilities and bargaining powers in the food system. At the household
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level, the men are the ultimate decision makers and are also the sole owners of the livestock who decide
on the use of livestock and their products, and the access to and use of CPRs. Women have limited
decision making capabilities while the morans, young boys and girls, and herdsmen lack decision
making capabilities.
Additionally, changing actor roles’ is a current phenomenon in the food system, with household
heads and morans who are leaving for urban areas in search of formal employment and education,
respectively. Women are now taking up the roles previously reserved and performed by the household
heads and morans, by hiring herdsmen for the latter and assuming decision making capabilities of
the former.
The study has also established that actor roles’ are being defined and redefined by formal
and informal institutions (rules, values, norms and regulations). As a result, the study found that
value-chain actors, in the household, state, non-state, and service providers as actors as well as
co-management policy and water-shed management plans are vital in regulating and providing
services for the food system.
10. Recommendations for Further Studies
From the study, with regards to actor roles, value chain actors with different bargaining powers
and varying roles exist within the food system, in the household, community and beyond. In the
household, actors’ roles are defined and redefined by formal and informal rules, regulations, values
and norms operating within the food system as producers, processors, packers, distributors and as
consumers. Therefore, there is a need for broader studies targeting larger sets of the study population,
to elaborate on the food system actors’, their roles and effects of institutional settings and changes.
Secondly, alterations in the formal and informal management of CPRs like pasture, water and
land necessitate changes in rules, regulations, values and norms governing access and use of resources
within a devolved system of governance. The emergence and restructuring of various actors and their
roles to fit within the new constitutional dispensation and power structures and still remain relevant
and sustain the persistent utilization of pastoralism as a food system thus need to be examined further.
For policy concepts like co-management, water-shed management plan, and holistic management
of pasturelands as well as decentralization of livestock services need to be further examined to
understand how such informal and formal rules, regulations, values and norms interact and merge into
highly adaptive and coping mechanisms that contribute immensely to pastoral resilience. Additionally,
advocacy for the adoption of such policies by other larger sets as a way of promoting pastoral resilience
within the food system is highly recommended.
Further studies should be conducted with some public-private partnerships like the Regional
Pastoral Livelihood Resilience project, a project of the World Bank working in collaboration with
national and county governments to eradicate the Opuntia invasive plant species in pastoral regions
and as a result, promoting pastoral resilience. Moreover, the community centered approaches like
the CMDRRA used in search of an initiative emphasizes the need to examine pastoral resilience from
a people centered approach, hence amplifying the position of pastoralism as a domestic food system.
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Abstract: Cambodia has become a principal target of transnational (and domestic) land grabs over
the past decade, mostly in the form of economic land concessions (ELCs). The northeastern part of
the country—where the majority of Cambodia’s indigenous people reside—is a particular hotspot.
In this article, we discuss three policy mechanisms that the Cambodian government has employed to
extend and legitimize land exclusions in the name of national economic development through the
example of two indigenous villages in Srae Preah Commune, Mondulkiri Province. First, we show
how the allocation of two ELCs has deprived indigenous communities of their communally managed
land. Second, we examine how communal land titling processes have failed to provide indigenous
villagers with effective legal mechanisms to counteract ELCs and land encroachment by internal
migrants. Third, we elucidate how the promotion of cash crop production contributed to livelihood
and land use transitions from a reliance on forest resources in 2003 to a dependence on cash crops
in 2012 to a struggle to remain resilient amid a slump in crop prices in 2018. We conclude that the
combination of these policies has undermined communal ownership and livelihood resilience under
a situation of limited exit strategies.
Keywords: land grabbing; resilience; commons; land concessions; communal land titling; Southeast Asia
1. Introduction
Large-scale land acquisitions and leases for agro-industrial, mining, and tourism projects have
affected hundreds of thousands of smallholder farmers and communal landholders in Southeast
Asia, with indigenous people and ethnic minority groups most at risk (Borras & Franco 2011 [1];
Kugelman & Levenstein 2012 [2]; Pearce 2012 [3]; Zoomer & Kaag 2014 [4]; Neef & Singer 2015 [5]).
Cambodia is arguably a major hotspot of transnational and domestic land grabs, which occur mostly
in the form of Economic Land Concessions (ELCs) and occupy a total area of more than two million
hectares, with up to 800,000 people affected by land conflicts, dispossession, and forced displacement
(Neef et al., 2013 [6]; ADHOC 2014 [7]; Oldenburg & Neef 2014 [8]). The massive scale of land grabs
and the violence surrounding their implementation have been met with various forms of resistance by
the rural population. These have ranged from spontaneous protests, counter-violence, and petitions
to more sophisticated forms of NGO-led advocacy resistance and the use of transnational networks
(McLinden Nuijen et al., 2014 [9]; Neef & Touch 2016 [10]; Young 2016 [11]; Verkoren & Ngin 2017 [12];
Lamb et al., 2017 [13]; Schoenberger 2017 [14]).
As a post-colonial and post-conflict country, Cambodia has a particularly chequered land
legislation history. During the Khmer Rouge Regime from 1975 to 1979, private land ownership
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was abolished, and all cadastral documents were destroyed (Un & So 2011 [15]). The long period
of civil conflict that followed was marked by unregulated movements of people, land possession
by occupation, and state-sanctioned allocation of large-scale forest concessions under the 1992 Land
Law (Oldenburg & Neef 2014 [8]). With international financial and legal assistance, a new Land Law
was enacted in 2001, which introduced new property rights categories, including ‘state public land’,
‘state private land’, ‘economic land concession (ELC)’, and ‘communal land title (CLT)’. The latter
category was supposed to formally acknowledge the communal land rights held by the country’s
24 distinct groups of indigenous (i.e., non-Khmer and non-migrant) people, primarily inhabiting
the northeastern part of the country. Yet their territories largely overlapped with ‘state public land’,
most of which the Cambodian government has subsequently reassigned as ‘state private land’ and
then allocated to foreign and domestic investors in the form of ELCs. Meanwhile, communal land
titling—a protracted process involving several ministries—has benefitted no more than 20 out of over
500 indigenous village communities nation-wide to date (Milne 2013 [16]; ODC 2018 [17]).
Research has shown that the Cambodian government has used its land policies and regulations
to legitimize land exclusions and commons enclosures under the name of national and economic
development, often in collusion with bilateral donors and multilateral financial institutions
(Neef et al., 2013 [6]; Beban et al., 2017 [18]). Neef (2016) [19] argues that land grabs and dispossessions
in Cambodia occur by ‘government design’ rather than by government oversight. In this article,
we will look at how ostensibly distinct government policies have actually worked together to deprive
indigenous communities in northeastern Cambodia of their communally managed natural resources,
thereby making them reliant on volatile cash crop markets and precarious wage work. More specifically,
we look at three ways through which the government has pursued its controversial policies and
regulations, namely (1) the indiscriminate allocation of ELCs in indigenous territories and protected
areas, (2) the sluggish and incomplete registration of CLTs as a policy for indigenous land reform,
and (3) agricultural development through promotion of cash crop production.
This article discusses first how two ELC companies in the villages of Srae Ampil and Pukong in
Srae Preah Commune, Mondulkiri Province, affected communally managed land. Second, we examine
how the government’s 2001 Land Law and policies to promote and protect communal land titles have
been rendered ineffectual by the lack of political will and the countervailing forces of other government
priorities. Third, the article will demonstrate how the government supported policy to encourage
cash crop production of cassava and cashew led to livelihood and land use transitions from a reliance
on natural resources in 2003 to a reliance on cash crops in 2012 to a struggle to remain resilient amid
slumping cash crop prices in 2018.
Our study is the first one that examines the impact of land grabbing on indigenous
people in Cambodia over an extended time period of several years, which allows an in-depth
analysis of long-term livelihood transitions and changes in community and household resilience.
Our mixed-methods approach combines quantitative and qualitative data to allow triangulation of
our findings.
2. Background
Mondulkiri Province in northeast Cambodia is largely inhabited by the Bunong indigenous people.
For centuries they have effectively used the natural resources of their upland forest environment.
Since the 1990s, the opening up of the Cambodian economy has had far reaching consequences for the
province. Forest concessions and illegal logging, economic land concessions (ELCs), corporate mining
concessions, the unregulated hunting of wildlife, and rapid in-migration have diminished the rich
natural resources of the province. As of September 2015, 33 ELCs were approved covering 211,317
hectares or nearly 15 percent of the provincial arable land for the cultivation of rubber, cassava,
and plantation trees (ODC [20]). As natural resources become more circumscribed, indigenous people
have been forced to make adaptations to maintain their livelihoods (McAndrew & Oeur 2009 [21]).
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Rapid population growth has exacerbated the exploitation of natural resources. Mondulkiri’s
population more than doubled from 32,407 in 1998 to 72,680 in 2013 (NIS, 2013 [22]), due mainly
to Khmer in-migration. Notably, the share of the indigenous population in Mondulkiri Province
declined from 71 percent in 1998 to 39 percent in 2013 (Asian Development Bank 2000 [23];
Backstrom et al., 2007 [24]; NIS 2009 [25]; NIS-IP Survey 2013 [26]).
The establishment of ELCs and in-migration are closely linked. Net out-migrations occur mainly
from the central areas of Cambodia where population densities are high and agricultural land is scarce
(Chheang & Dulioust 2012 [27]). Government policy encourages displaced and landless populations to
resettle in peripheral provinces such as Mondulkiri and promotes ELCs in these areas as opportunities
to generate revenue and create jobs locally (ibid). Landless migrant farmers are often contracted
upon arrival by agricultural companies to clear land. Many then go on to encroach upon open and
degraded forest areas and ostensibly ‘unused’ or ‘non-occupied’ land near the concessions. These are
inevitably located within indigenous domains. Conflicts often arise between the in-migrants and the
concession holders over boundary intrusions, but also between the in-migrants and indigenous people
over encroachment into ancestral territories (Chheng & Dulioust 2012 [27]).
Substantial investments in ELCs in northeast Cambodia have taken place in parallel with the
government-supported conversion of smallholder subsistence farming into crop production for the
market. Smallholder cultivation of rubber, cashew, and cassava has in turn precipitated a move
away from swidden farming to the production of crops on permanent farms (Fox et al., 2008 [28]).
In Mondulkiri, cassava production increased dramatically from 546 tons in 2001 to 89,993 tons in 2007,
and to 157,505 in 2013. Likewise, the harvested area of cassava in the province rose from 52 hectares
in 2001 to 5806 hectares in 2007 and to 10,271 hectares in 2013 (MAFF, 2008 [29]; MAFF 2013 [30]).
This sharp increase reflected a change in cassava cultivation from a food crop to an industrial crop
with multiple uses such as animal feed and bioethanol. The high export demand for cassava resulted
in rising market prices for the crop locally, albeit with some volatility in recent years.
As Bunong indigenous villagers struggle to adapt to the rapid depletion of their natural resource
base, progressive legislation enacted in Cambodia since 2000 has provided a legal framework for
preventing further decline. The Forestry Law of 2002 recognizes and guarantees the traditional
user rights of local communities to collect forest by-products. The Land Law of 2001 enables
indigenous communities to gain communal titles to their traditional lands and protects the rights
of indigenous communities, formed as legal entities, to use and manage these lands, even before
their full ownership rights have been recognized through a communal title. This renders the sale
of indigenous land outside the community illegal. However, amid increasing rates of indigenous
land alienation, the government has lacked the political will to implement communal land titling
(Analyzing Development Issues 2010 [31]). As of 2018, 20 indigenous communities—of which nine
are located in Mondukiri Province—had received communal land title certificates (ODC 2018 [17]).
In July 2012 the government halted all communal land titling processes under the so-called Order
01. The Order intended to expedite the issuance of private land titles, and thousands of student
volunteers were recruited to demarcate lands that had been in conflict with ELCs. This not only
formalized prior alienation and fragmentation, it rendered communal and individual titles mutually
exclusive and thereby accelerated land commodification (Milne 2013 [16]). Order 01 has been referred
to as the ‘leopard skin’ policy, under which individually owned agricultural plots—like the dots in
a leopard skin—are located in a wide expanse of economic land concessions and state public land
(Milne 2013 [16]; Oldenburg & Neef 2014 [8]).
3. Methods
This article draws on a mixed-method approach comprising panel data from household
questionnaire surveys, in-depth interviews, and participant observation. Household livelihood surveys
were conducted in 2003, 2012, and 2018. Based on random samples of 25 percent of the respective
population, these surveys were conducted in all six villages of Srae Preah Commune. This commune
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was chosen because of its unique location between two wildlife sanctuaries and the prevalence of two
major economic land concessions. Srae Preah Commune comprises five villages, Srae Preah, Pucha,
Ochra, Pukong and Gati (Figure 1). Administratively, Srae Ampil village is located in Srae K’tum
Commune. However, in 2002 local officials maintained that Srae Ampil village of contiguous Srae
K’tum Commune was about to be incorporated into Srae Preah Commune, hence Srae Ampil was
included in the original 2003 study. While the transfer never materialized, the researchers in successive
2012 and 2018 studies continued to consider Srae Ampil village as a part of Srae Preah Commune for
comparative purposes. The authors of this article likewise continue to do so. At the time of the original
survey in 2003 an all-purpose road was being built to the capital town of Sen Monorum which was
seen to precipitate social change in Srae Preah Commune.
Figure 1. Land use demarcations in Srae Preah Commune. Source: Wildlife Conservation Society’s
(WCS) Village Land Use GIS Map (2018) [32]; ODC: Economic Land Concessions [20].
In 2003, under leadership of the second author, 74 households were interviewed from a total
commune population of 316 households; in 2012, 106 households were interviewed from 430 commune
households by a team led by the first author while she was working for a local NGO; and in 2018,
170 households were interviewed from 669 commune households under leadership of the first author.
She made an initial visit to the six villages before the final survey was conducted in 2018 to obtain
household lists from the household record books provided by the village chiefs and inform the local
authorities and village elders about the study objectives and fieldwork schedule. Household lists
provided by the commune and village chiefs were validated and updated through spot mapping.
Both Khmer and indigenous Bunong families were randomly selected from the household lists.
Since the survey questionnaire focused on livelihood experiences, all household members aged over
15 years were encouraged to attend the interview. For Bunong respondents, indigenous Bunong
research assistants were recruited to ask the survey questions primarily in the Bunong language and
record the responses in Khmer.
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The qualitative case studies discussed in this article focus on Srae Ampil and Pukong
villages. The first author and her research assistants sought permission from local authorities,
including commune and village leaders before starting the fieldwork. A total of 31 in-depth interviews
with 16 men and 15 women were conducted. The criteria for the selection of respondents for the
in-depth interview were (1) earning their living predominantly from farming, (2) having lived in
the village more than one year prior to the in-depth interview, and (3) being knowledgeable about
previous land disputes with ELC companies or forest encroachment. Participation was based on
informed and voluntary consent. Among the 31 in-depth interview respondents, nine had participated
in the household livelihoods survey 2018 and another nine respondents had been involved in
both the 2012 and 2018 studies. The in-depth interviews were conducted by the first author in
Khmer. Bunong research assistants helped to facilitate translation from the Bunong language to
Khmer when needed. Participant observation was employed to understand perspectives of the
respondents in relationship to their land ownership title and agriculture practice. The first author
and her research assistants spent about two weeks in each of the two villages to build trust with
research participants and village elders. To minimize the risk of cultural misrepresentation and
misunderstanding, frequent consultations with Bunong research assistants and village elders were
held during the stay in the villages.
Data from the household survey were analyzed by using descriptive statistics. The data were
disaggregated by gender and type of household wealth (better-off, above poor, poor, and very poor
households) and cross-tabulated among relevant variables to examine their associations. Data from
different sources, and primary and secondary data, were triangulated where appropriate.
The in-depth interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed, and translated into English by the
first author. Responses were classified by themes emerging from the transcripts. The analysis of the
in-depth interviews was based on themes developed in the field and emerging from the transcripts.
4. Results
This section is divided into three parts. The first part examines how the ELCs in the villages of
Srae Ampil and Pukong encroached upon common lands of indigenous people and how the conflict
resolution processes unfolded. These are the two villages in the commune whose common lands
have been most affected by the establishment of ELCs. The second part scrutinizes the impacts of the
2001 Land Law and policies that aim to ensure tenure security of indigenous communities through
the Communal Land Titling scheme. The final part discusses livelihood transitions and land use
change as a consequence of government policies that encourage crash crop production. This last
part will demonstrate how the livelihoods in Srae Preah Commune have been transformed from a
natural resource reliance (2003) to a dependence on cash crops in 2012 and the subsequent struggle of
communities and households to remain resilient against the backdrop of the cash crop price decline in
2018. The first and second parts draw on the findings from the in-depth interviews and participant
observation conducted in 2012 and 2018, while the third part compares the results from the household
livelihoods surveys organized in 2003, 2012 and 2018.
4.1. The Pursuit of Economic Land Concessions
The two case studies of Srae Ampil and Pukong villages affected by two distinct ELCs are based
primarily on the in-depth interviews conducted in 2012 and 2018. The case studies examine the
corporate land incursion on common land through the government’s development strategy to attract
foreign and local investment on its natural forest. This part also illuminates processes and strategies of
conflict resolution. Newspaper articles and NGO reports were examined to verify the events and dates
described by the respondents during the in-depth interview.
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4.1.1. The Case of Sovann Reachsey Company Limited in Srae Ampil village
In December 2010, Vietnam-based Sovann Reachsey Company Limited was awarded a 6525
hectare concession for 90 years to develop an agro-industrial plantation for rubber and other crops.
The land is located within Snuol Wildlife Sanctuary which borders Snuol District of Kratie Province and
Keo Seima District of Mondulkiri Province. The company’s initial operation affected approximately
500 hectares of forestland inside Srae Ampil village (Table 1).
Table 1. Summary of events related to communal land titles and ELCs in Srae Ampil and Pukong villages.
Theme Srae Ampil Pukong
Indigenous
Community
2009: NGO (DPA) supported the village
to establish itself as a community for
CLT registration.
2009: NGO (DPA) supported the village
to establish itself as a community for CLT
registration.
ELC
2010: Sovann Reachsey Company was
awarded an ELC on 6525 ha inside
Snuol Wildlife Sanctuary which affected
about 500 ha of forestland in Srae
Ampil.
2011: Binh Phuoc Kratie Rubber I
Company was awarded an ELC on 8926
ha inside Seima Biodiversity
Conservation Forest which affected about
2000 ha of forestland in Pukong.
Illegal Logging
2011: Illegal logging was perpetrated by
individual loggers and loggers
associated with the ELC company.
2013–2014: Illegal logging was
perpetrated by individual loggers and
loggers associated with the ELC company.
Forest Patrol
2011–2014: A forest patrol was
organized 2013–2017: A forest patrol was organized.
Protest
2011: At least two protests were
organized by Srae Ampil villagers
against the company’s operation.
No protest of villagers.
Media coverage
2011: Villagers contacted a local
newspaper and NGOs working in the
area.
2013: A six-member NGO committee was
formed to support the villagers and
investigate the conflict.
Forest encroachment N/A
2014: Forest encroachment took place by




2015: Final conflict resolution reached:
the company compensated villagers in
cash for the land which had already
been cleared and cut. A total 250 ha
from the concession plan was
transferred to the villagers.
2014: Final conflict resolution reached: the
company compensated the resin trees
owners in cash for the resin tress that
were cut by the company.
Source: Authors’ compilation from in-depth interviews in 2012 and 2018.
Srae Ampil village, established in the late 1980s, is primarily inhabited by Bunong people,
followed by Stieng and Khmer. The villagers have traditionally relied mainly on non-timber forest
products (NTFPs), including liquid and gum resin, and paddy rice cultivation as their main livelihood
sources. Since the village is located in a protected area bordering Srae Preah Commune and Snuol
Wildlife Sanctuary, no formal ownership to their land is acknowledged by the law. However,
because this village is predominantly composed of indigenous people, namely, Bunong and Stieng,
according to the Land Law 2001, it is eligible to apply for a CLT that would allow them to occupy their
land resources collectively. In 2010, with the support from a local NGO (Development and Partnership
in Action-DPA), the village was officially recognized by the Ministry of Rural Development (MRD)
as an indigenous community. This formal recognition constituted Stage 1 of the CLT registration.1
1 The process of communal land titling is described in detail in Section 4.2 below.
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This was followed by the establishment of a community management committee, in which the members
of the community elected a leader.
After receiving the ELC license, the Sovann Reachsey Company did not inform the villagers about
their investment plan or the land area to be affected. The company sub-contracted a local company to
clear land and hired loggers to cut timber inside its designated area. However, the villagers maintained
that the logging occurred inside the forestland of the community. By 2012, more than 2000 resin trees
had been cut. In response, the management committee of the community formed groups to patrol
their forest.
Further to patrols, the villagers organized protests and contacted media outlets and NGOs for help.
Forest patrols were not effective in stopping illegal logging, especially when loggers were associated
with the company. Frustrated by this failure, the villagers organized two major protests. In the first
protest held in May 2011, the villagers confronted the company’s workers while they were clearing
the land in the community forest. The company asked the military police to intervene. The police
came and arrested three villagers and accused them of damaging the company’s equipment. In the
second protest that took place in October 2011, village households gathered at the contested area and
stopped the company’s workers from cutting logs and clearing the land. The villagers demanded that
the district authorities resolve the conflict by demarcating the land clearly and by putting a stop to
illegal logging.
During the protests, villagers contacted NGO staff and asked them to witness the confrontation.
Radio and newspaper outlets also came and reported on the protests. An American radio network
(Radio Free Asia–RFA) regularly broadcasted the news. The community leader’s strategy was to
publicize the protests and attract the authorities’ attention. Patrol teams would take pictures of illegal
logging operations and send them to the media to broadcast. In an interview in 2012, a male community
leader stated: “We called . . . [the district governor and commune leader] but they did not respond. When the
RFA interviewed some of us, the district governor and commune chief came to the village and pleaded with us
not to report to the RFA. Before we contacted RFA, we had asked the authorities to intervene two or three times.
But there was no action. If we had not asked RFA to broadcast the news about the conflict, the local authorities
would not have intervened.” (San, male, community leader, Srae Ampil, 2012).2
In response to the strong local resistance movement, the company agreed to suspend its land
clearing operation in 2012. However, the logging still continued. Moreover, land clearing inside
the community forest of 500 hectares was started in 2012 by both local people and military officials.
Local people reported that environmental officials did not allow them to clear the land as it was a
protected area. Military police officials raided the area and forced them to leave. In the meantime,
however, several military officials cleared the land inside the conflict area for their own benefit.
A conflict resolution process was started with the company in 2014. The elected community
leader and members of the management committee reported that they were contacted by the company
representatives to seek informal negotiation. The district governor also contacted the community
representatives to discuss negotiation strategies. In 2015, the final agreement was reached when
the company agreed to demarcate the land boundaries and share half of the contentious land area
with the community. The company also promised to pay for the loss of the land amounting to 250
hectares, provide employment opportunities to the villagers, and construct a village road. Moreover,
the company agreed to offer financial support for a spiritual ceremony as requested by the village
elders. The remaining 50 percent of the land amounting to 250 hectares was distributed to the village
households. In 2017, the final compensation for the lost land was paid and the land distribution
to the village households was completed. The company then built a canal that surrounded its
land boundaries.
2 All respondents’ names are pseudonyms to protect their identity.
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Before the final conflict resolution was reached, solidarity and cooperation among the community
members were strong. The community leader observed that the committee members frequently
convened meetings with the villagers to share information about the negotiation results and consulted
with them about strategies. This collegial relationship broke down after a disagreement on the final
solution. A total of 10 of the 75 village households refused to accept compensation from the company
and continued the protest to reclaim their land. Meanwhile, another six households claimed that their
neighbors had occupied plots that were supposed to have been delivered to them.
Despite its promise to provide employment opportunities, the company ended up employing
only a small number of villagers. Five of the committee members were hired as full-time security
guards and 10 other villagers were hired as seasonal workers on banana and rubber plantations.
The committee members hired as guards resigned after working for the company for about two years.
They complained that the company frequently delayed payment of their salaries, paid them only once
every two or three months, and added extra working hours without providing overtime pay.
4.1.2. The Case of Binh Phuoc Kratie Rubber 1 Company Limited in Pukong Village
Binh Phuoc Kratie Rubber 1 Company, a subsidiary of state-owned Vietnam Rubber Group (VRG),
was granted an 8926-hectare ELC in 2011 for rubber plantations.3 The ELC land, located inside Seima
Protected Area and Biodiversity Conservation (SPA),4 affected Srae Preah and Srae Chhouk Communes
in Keo Seima District. In Srae Preah Commune, about 2000 hectares of forestland in Pukong village
were affected (Table 1).
Pukong village, established in 1940, is predominantly inhabited by Bunong with a sizeable
minority of Khmer migrants who moved into the village in the late 1990s. The villagers have depended
on the collection of NTFPs, including liquid resin, swidden farming, and paddy rice cultivation
as their main sources of livelihoods. Since the village is inside the core zone of SPA,5 in 2006 an
international NGO, Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), assisted the Forest Administration (FA) to
create a Community-Based Production Forest (CBPF) that covers the village and two other villages
of Srae Preah Commune (Figure 1). A management committee of the CBPF was created and a forest
extraction plan was developed. However, since the CBPF is inside the protected area, the Forestry Law
of 2002 prohibits any extraction of forest resources. Concurrently, in 2009 DPA supported the villagers
to establish itself an indigenous community so that it could apply for a CLT. By 2012, the village reached
Stage 2 of the community land titling process. Yet, by early 2018, the village was still struggling to
reach the final stage.
As in the Srae Ampil case, the company did not conduct any consultation meetings with the
villagers upon receiving their license. The villagers said the ELC sub-contracted a local company,
which was well-known for engaging in the logging trade and presided over by a powerful tycoon,
to cut trees inside its land area. The local company, however, expanded its logging into the CBPF
and transported the logs to the ELC’s designated area to make them legal for export (NGO Report,
2015 [35]).
Since 2012 with support from WCS the villagers have conducted patrols to protect their CBPF.
The patrol teams often encountered logging workers and confiscated their equipment. Consequently,
they faced death threats by armed forces recruited by the sub-contracted company to guard its logging
3 The company land size was reduced to 5100 hectares in 2012 by an inter-ministerial committee led by the Minister
of Environment.
4 The Seima Protected Area (SPA) and Biodiversity Conservation which was under the Forestry Administration (FA) of the
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery (MAFF) was changed to Keo Seima Wildlife Sanctuary (KSWS) under the
management of the Ministry of Environment (MoE) in 2016.
5 For management purposes, the protected area was divided into four zones for sustainable management, namely (1) a core
zone which is a high-value forest area where access to forest resources or swidden cultivation is restricted, (2) a conservation
zone, (3) a sustainable use zone, and (4) a community zone (ODC Website [33], WCS REDD+ Program Monitoring and
Evaluation Report, 2018 [34]).
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operation. In response, the village representatives lodged a complaint against the illegal logging
and the destruction of resin trees in the CBPF to the provincial governor. No action was taken by
the provincial governor but a few days later, the district governor issued a letter to the company,
instructing them to confine the logging to the ELC’s land area. Nevertheless, the logging activities
were further expanded between 2013 and 2014. Further to forest patrols, the villagers contacted some
news agencies to publicize the illegal logging and demanded an intervention from the government.
In 2013, a group of six local NGOs formed a special committee to investigate the complaint and
provide support to the villagers. A series of activities were organized and facilitated by the committee,
including consultative meetings between company staff and the villagers, and press conferences.
Meanwhile, the villagers continued to conduct patrols. However, because of the involvement of
military personnel, the community members said they did not have the motivation and capacity to
patrol without the support from WCS or officials from the Provincial Department of Environment
(PDE). The forest patrols, albeit done regularly, yielded limited success.
Unlike the Srae Ampil villagers, the Pukong villagers did not organize any protest. In 2014, the
ELC built a canal that surrounded its land area. They did this by carving out about 500 hectares of land
designated by the Forest Administration as a dense forest and which included the villagers’ spiritual
ground. Despite the boundary demarcation, illegal logging and land encroachment inside the CBPF
continued at an ever-larger scale. In the same year, the 500-hectare land area returned by the company
was occupied by two powerful military officials. Additionally, about one hundred hectares of the
CBPF were cleared by more than 100 Khmer and Cham households who were former ELC workers.
In 2017, in response to the continuous land encroachment inside the CBPF and the ineffectual
forest patrols, a group of villagers cleared the land along the border of the CBPF next to the ELC.
However, they were expelled from the area by PDE officials who, on the basis of the Forestry Law of
2002, declared that land clearing or occupying land inside a protected area was not allowed. Frustrated
with the inability to expand their farmland and the failure to stop land encroachment, some villagers
continued to work on their existing farms although with a shift to cash crop cultivation of cashew nut
and cassava. Others took the risk to secretly clear land inside the protected area. In a 2018 interview,
an NGO staff member maintained that between the years 2013 and 2017 the deforestation rate in
the CBPF was 44 percent. This meant that during this time over 5000 hectares of the CBPF had been
cleared and occupied.
4.2. Promulgation of Communal Land Titling Program and Impacts on Indigenous Communities
This section discusses the government’s Land Law of 2001 and the challenges that indigenous
communities face to complete the final stage of the CLT process. The discussion draws mainly on
in-depth interviews from 2012 and 2018 and from previous studies on the subject matter.
4.2.1. The Communal Land Titling Program under the 2001 Land Law
The Land Law of 2001 adopted by the Royal Government of Cambodia includes a provision aimed
at giving indigenous peoples’ tenure security through Communal Land Titles (CLTs). The recognition
of customary land use of indigenous people stated in the law has been regarded as a significant
step forward to promote the respect of indigenous people rights in Cambodia. It entitles them to
collective ownership on their traditional lands including residential land, agricultural land, and the
reserve land for swidden farming (Backstrom et al., 2007 [24]). Moreover, Article 23 of the law
provides a precise legal definition of indigenous communities as legal entities for communal land
ownership (Brown et al., 2005 [36]). However, the law alone was not sufficient to grant CLTs until
the government issued a sub-decree on the Procedure of Land Registration of Land of Indigenous
Communities in 2009 (RGD, 2009 [37]). It provides a clear procedure and guidelines starting from
the registering of indigenous communities to the issuance of CLT certificates. The process involves
three stages and needs the recognition and approval by three different ministries. First, an interested
village must establish itself as an indigenous community and be recognized by Ministry of Rural
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Development (MRD). Second, the indigenous community must develop community bylaws and a
management committee, and then register itself as a legal entity with the Ministry of Interior (MoI).
The third and final stage involves registering the already measured land with the Ministry of Land
Management, Urban Planning and Construction (MLMUPC) in which CLT certificates will be issued
(ODC Website [38]). All three stages involve various inter-ministerial committees and take several
years to complete.
Srae Ampil and Pukong villages have been engaged in the process of acquiring CLTs since
2009 with the support from NGOs. As of May 2018, Srae Ampil village had just completed the
measurement of communal land, while Pukong village had completed the measurement in 2017.
However, both villages have not yet received CLT certificates.6 The process of CLT land registration
in the two villages has been delayed because of land conflicts with ELCs. In Srae Ampil village, the
land measurement was conducted for a second time in April 2018 after the final conflict negotiation
with the Sovann Reachsey Company was completed. The process of land registration has been further
complicated by the fact that the requested CLT area is located within a protected area. The government
needs to issue a sub-decree to convert the requested land area from the status of ‘state public land’
into ‘state private land’. Only then it can be legally awarded (cf. Baird 2013 [39]). The land areas of
both Srae Ampil and Pukong villages are located inside the SPA and therefore it will take a long time
to complete the final procedures. With the process of CLT land registration delayed, opportunities
remain for further land encroachment within the communal land area and outside the communal land
area (Ngin & Diepart 2016 [40]).
Of note, large land areas outside of the CLTs are under the legal status of ‘state public land’.
In Srae Ampil village, 750 hectares are registered as forestland while in Pukong village more than
10,000 hectares are designated as forestland under the status of ‘state public land’ (Table 2). This raises
the question of whether land under the category of ‘state public land’ will be granted to the future use
of indigenous peoples or reserved as common land for environmental protection (cf. Baird 2013 [39]).
Table 2. Type of Village Land Use, As of May 2018.
Type of Land Use Srae Ampil Pukong
Household Population (hh) 115 89
Land under CLT (ha) of which 523 392
Residential land 46 24
Farmland 214 122
Paddy rice fields 115 65
Reserve land 134 162
Spirit forest 7 8
Burial ground 7 11
Forestland not under CLT (ha) 750 17,328
Total arable village land size (ha) 1273 17,720
Source: DPA GIS Map of Srae Ampil (2018) [41]; and WCS GIS Map (2018) [32].
In Pukong village, nearly 1000 hectares of state public land inside the CBPF have been cleared
and occupied by individual land encroachers and powerful elites. In Srae Ampil Commune, a villager
expressed his concern that the forestland near the Keo Seima mountain would also be encroached
when population in the village increases.
6 In Srae Ampil village, the whole process of communal land titling including the initial establishment of indigenous
community has been solely supported by a local NGO, Development and Partnership in Action (DPA). To reach the final
stage of land registration (measuring land, issue a community land use mapping, and convening meeting with member of
committee) costs approximately USD 4000 (personal communication, 2018). In Pukong, DPA and WCS provide the support.
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4.2.2. Communities Shifting Perceptions about CLT
Local people expressed mixed opinions about the potential benefits of CLTs. Some villagers
thought that CLTs provided some benefits to their community, while others disagreed. One committee
member from Srae Ampil asserted that CLTs both ensured communal land ownership and supported
indigenous peoples’ ways of life. He maintained that with collective titles, poor households would
likewise retain the ability to collect non-timber forest products and would not have to rely solely on
permanent farms that required financial investments in crop cultivation. He argued:
“The communal land title is important to us because it allows us to protect our community forest,
and maintain our culture, tradition and beliefs. I do not want to lose it . . . It is also helps poorer
families. Without the community, we cannot protect our community forest, and the poorer families
cannot earn from forest resources . . . We protect the forest not only for our own benefit, but for the
benefit of the poorer families in the village.” [Soktha, male committee member, 2018, Srae Ampil]
A management committee member of the indigenous community in Pukong village maintained
that once the community received the CLT, it would be able to stop land encroachments because the
boundaries of the community land would be officially recognized by the government’s institutions.
He stated:
“I still think that we must unite as one community . . . If we stay together as one community,
our voices and actions will be stronger to stop the forest encroachment. I am still optimistic that sooner
or later we can stop the forest encroachment.” [Bunna, male committee member, 2018, Pukong]
At the same time many villagers have become increasingly frustrated with the prolonged process
of CLT land registration. They are unsure whether they will eventually be able to receive the full
benefits from the CLT. Given the continued expansion of land encroachment, an acting community
leader in Pukong lamented:
“Villagers) are upset about losing forest lands due to forest encroachment. They have been waiting for
the CLT certificate for a very long time. Some of them do not understand the meaning of state public
land and state private land. The villagers thought that all the land area in Pukong village belongs to
Pukong villagers . . . In reality, the land belongs to the state and is under the management of the state,
not under the community.” [Sao, male, acting community leader, 2018, Pukong village]
Notably, the enthusiasm about continuing the CLT registration process has been significantly
dampened since companies and in-migrants have encroached upon and occupied common land.
Without opportunities to clear new land for swidden cultivation, the villagers work intensively on
their permanent farms, now converted from subsistence cultivation to the production of cash crops
(see Section 4.3 on livelihood transition). The capacity to expand farmland and crop cultivation entails
capital investment and having private land titles instead of the CLT is viewed by some as a better
strategy for securing loans.
As a mother of three and wife of a former community leader in Srae Ampil argued:
“I would rather have a private land title. I cannot use the communal land title certificate to borrow
money from the banks [i.e local microfinance institutions]. But, with a private land title . . . I can
borrow money and use the land as collateral. I can borrow and repay as much as 1 or 2 million
riels. I could get this amount immediately with a private land title.” [Kyao, female villager, 2018,
Srae Ampil]
Over time the perceived benefits of registering for the CLT has changed for several villagers that
were interviewed. In 2012, during the initial stages of the CLT registration process, there was strong
enthusiasm for CLTs in both villages. People viewed the CLTs as an opportunity to conserve both
communal lands and forest lands. For example, a community leader interviewed in 2012 expressed his
preference for the communal land titling process in this way:
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“After the community is formed, no villager is allowed to sell land to outsiders. In the village, there is
still a large area of unoccupied land, but it will be kept for distribution to community members in
the future. Forest areas will be kept as a land reservation for villagers who are landless or for new
families.” [San, male villager, 2012, Srae Ampil]
However, when this same respondent was interviewed again in 2018, he expressed his strong
discontent with the protracted community land titling process. He said that he felt powerless to
defend communal natural resources in the village. By that time, the deal had been struck with the
company and the remaining part of the communal forest had been equally distributed to the villagers.
Furthermore, some villagers had already sold their share of the land to Khmer and Cham in-migrants.
At the same time this respondent maintained that if land had not been distributed to individual
villagers, outsiders or powerful military officers would have come in and taken over the land.
He lamented:
“I am disappointed that we do not have the power to take action to protect our own resources.
Some land areas have been allocated to the community, but powerful people have hired workers to cut
down big trees in our community forest, and we could do nothing to stop them from destroying our
resources.” [San, male villager, 2018, Srae Ampil]
Similarly, Pukong villagers perceived in 2012 that having a CLT would be a good way to secure
land ownership for the community. At that time they had not experienced corporate incursions but
were nevertheless concerned about land encroachments. As one respondent said at the time:
“Many villagers have concerns about future land encroachments if the collective land title will not be
issued to them in the near future.” [Sao, male villager, 2012, Pukong]
This perception had changed in 2018 when it became clear to Pukong villagers that they were not
able to stop corporate land incursions and forest encroachments that had occurred in their community
since 2014.
Interviewed again in 2018 this same respondent stated:
“Forest encroachment is the issue affecting trust and integrity in our village. It contributes to the
breaking down of community solidarity. These days I go from house to house to collect thumbprints
[attesting to the request for the CLT]. Some villagers tell me that they do not want to provide their
thumbprint as they do not have trust in the communal land title.” [Sao, male villager, 2018,
Pukong village]
In sum, the government policy of prioritizing the allocation of ELCs over the registration of
CLTs has led to changes in the communities’ perceptions about communal land rights and caused
internal divisions regarding the further courses of actions to defend natural resources that were once
managed collectively.
4.3. Government Support for Cash Crop Production and Livelihood Transitions from 2003 to 2012 to 2018
As outlined in Section 2, the Cambodian government’s aggressive promotion of ELCs in
Mondulkiri Province took place concurrently with government support for the conversion of
smallholder subsistence farming into cash crop production. Both policies served to promote Khmer
in-migration. In only six years, from 2012 to 2018, the household population in Srae Preah Commune
had increased by 56 percent. This did not include a group of about 170 Khmer households who had
taken up residence on communal lands in O’chra village and a group of more than 100 Khmer and
Cham households in Pukong village. Both of these groups were not yet officially registered in the
village family record books.
Overall, government support for cash crop production in Srae Preah Commune—along with
the government’s incoherent and controversial land policies—contributed to dramatic livelihood
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transitions and land use changes. This in turn resulted in the dispossession from land and forest
resources, a reliance on cash crops, land commodification, land concentration, social differentiation,
and economic inequality. In this section we present findings and analysis which support this argument.
We draw on the 25 percent random sample household surveys that were conducted in 2003, 2012,
and 2018 (see McAndrew et al., 2003 [42], Hak et al., 2015 [43], and Hak et al., 2018 [44]).
In Srae Preah Commune the principal livelihood transition to emerge from 2003 to 2012 was the
shift away from the reliance on forest products, hunting, and trapping to the cultivation of cash crops
such as cassava and cashew nuts for the market (Table 3). This resulted in more households being
involved in upland farming and the expansion of upland areas under cultivation. That noted, in 2012
upland farm sizes varied greatly among cultivators underscoring that households benefited unequally
from the cash crop market. On average, the better-off households cultivated much larger upland
parcels and had substantially higher earnings from cash crop production than did other income groups.
By comparison, the very poor households had the smallest upland farms and the lowest earnings from
cash crop production. Similarly, the better-off households cultivated larger wetland areas and had
higher earnings from paddy production than did the other groups.
Table 3. Shares of different income sources in total average household income Srae Preah Commune
for the years 2003, 2012, and 2018 (in percent).
Source of Income 2003 2012 2018
Cultivating crops 24 51 26
Raising pigs and poultry 13 4 11
Collecting forest products and hunting or trapping 49 32 26
Fishing 3 2 2
Handicrafts and trade 5 3 15
Wage work 6 8 20
Total 100 100 100
Source: McAndrew et al., 2003 [42]; Hak et al., 2015 [43]; Hak et al., 2018 [44].
In 2003 food and other products gathered from the forest—including hunting and
trapping—accounted for 49 percent of total household income. This underscored the reliance of Srae
Preah households on forest resources for their livelihoods. By contrast, in 2018 food and other products
gathered from the forest accounted for only 26 percent of total household income. The diminished
contribution of forest resources to household incomes was largely the result of a rapid decline in liquid
resin tapping as a major source of household earnings. Remarkably, total household income from the
collection of liquid resin plummeted from 28.4 percent in 2003 to only 4.0 percent in 2012. Notably,
the very poor households with the smallest upland farms earned more proportionally from gathering
forest products in 2012 than did most other income groups.
The opening up of lands for cash crop production and paddy rice cultivation spurred economic
growth, but at the cost of exacerbating the threat posed to forested areas and household livelihoods
reliant on forest resources. Meanwhile the rapid adoption of cassava as a boom crop raised concerns
of its own. Reliance on cassava production made indigenous households more vulnerable to the
exigencies of the market economy. Critically, though perhaps less well understood, the pursuit of
cassava cultivation had consequences for social differentiation. As noted above, income earned from
cassava cultivation was related to upland farm size. Better-off farmers cultivated larger upland areas
and earned more from cassava production than did other income groups. In the previous five years,
better-off households had likewise augmented their holdings, buying up more upland than other
income groups.
The accumulation of land in the hands of better-off households threatened to result in the
dispossession of smallholders, potentially to the point of landlessness. While cassava production
created opportunities for agricultural labor, very poor households in the commune earned
proportionally less from wage work than did most other income groups. Moreover, the very poor
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households, like the other income groups, earned little or nothing from trading and migrant remittances.
This revealed that livelihood opportunities and exit options for the very poor households remained
limited. Loss of upland farms and access to forest resources would, no doubt, leave them further
displaced and marginalized.
In 2012 the prospects for economic development in Srae Preah Commune looked promising.
Poverty levels had dropped from 63 percent in 2003 to 43 percent in 2012 as cash crop production
of cassava and cashew nut emerged to offset the declining earnings from forest products.7
The transformation of swidden agriculture from household subsistence cultivation to the production
of cash crops for sale in the market was all but complete. While the 2012 study acknowledged the
vulnerability of cash crop cultivators to the volatility of cassava prices, the sharp decline in cassava
earnings in 2018 was unforeseen.
From 2012 to 2018 household earnings from cultivating crops dropped from 51 to 26 percent
(Table 3). Specifically, cassava earnings dropped from 19.6 percent of total annual household income
in 2012 to 9.4 percent in 2018. Again, this sharp decline in earnings from cassava production was
completely unexpected. Clearly the rapid household population growth from 2012 to 2018 did not
translate into a comparable increase in cassava earnings. The decline in total cassava earnings resulted
from a drop in the percentage of sample households cultivating cassava and from a drop in the
percentage of overall earnings from cassava production itself. Increasingly, upland farmers in Srae
Preah commune were dissuaded from investments in cassava production due, in part, to cassava
root damage from excessive rain, to volatile cassava prices, and to higher production costs. As a
consequence, the incipient cash crop cassava boom evident in 2012 never fully materialized. Of note,
the Gini-coefficient of 0.45 for the sample households in 2018 was much higher than the Gini-coefficient
of 0.38 calculated for the sample households in 2012. This indicates that income inequality among Srae
Preah households had become more severe.
Overall, the principal livelihood trends taking place in Srae Preah Commune from 2012 to 2018
were a decline in earnings from cassava and wet-rice production, a more widespread and organized
involvement in the illegal timber cutting, increased earnings from handicraft and trade, and a greater
reliance on wage work. The rapid rise of the household population in the commune from 2012 to 2018
increased pressure on land and forest resources and constrained overall economic growth. Without
government enforcement of the provisions of the land titling program, indigenous access to ancestral
lands deteriorated noticeably and successful livelihood transitions among indigenous households
remained elusive.
5. Discussion
Our findings confirm that ELC investment, which converts forestland into agro-industrial
plantations, is a form of ‘commons grabbing’ (Haller 2016 [46]) that has profound impacts on livelihood
resilience, particularly among those groups that depend on communally managed forest resources for
their subsistence. The ELCs in both Pukong and Srae Ampil adversely affected indigenous people
who used to access forest resources as their main source of livelihoods. As a consequence, the villagers’
reliance on forest resources has declined, but their dependence on commercial crops has dramatically
increased (Hak et al., 2015 [43]). In furtherance, the leopard-skin policy which was developed after
the government granting ELCs to strengthen implementation of ELCs and avoid land grabbing by
concessionaires has created space for land control by powerful elites and those affiliated to them.
7 Figures for 2003 are based on the poverty line of 1036 riels per capita per day for rural areas set by the Ministry of Planning
(MoP) and the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) (2003). Figures for 2011 are based on World Bank estimates of
the poverty line of 4422 riels per capita per day for rural areas (World Bank 2013 [45]). Since the poverty line for rural areas
in 2003 by the World Bank was unavailable, the authors refer to the poverty line in 2003 set by the Ministry of Planning
(MoP) and the World Food Program (WFP).
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The Pukong villagers were not able to claim back the dense forest and their spiritual ground as it was
subsequently processed for land ownership by military police officials.
The two villages took different responses to the land grabbing by concessionaires and adopted
different strategies for livelihoods changes. Apparently, the villagers of Srae Ampil took outright
resistance against Sovann Reachsey Company in 2012 which resulted in a favorable solution in terms of
land restitution. Through their protest and submission of a petition which attracted temporary media
attention, the Srae Ampil villagers reached a final conflict resolution with monetary compensation
and employment opportunities from the concessionaires. Yet, they lacked an effective mechanism of
monitoring the actual implementation of the company’s promise and their localized social movement
dissolved after they reached a final agreement. In 2018, they have given up their efforts and changed to
a tactic of acceptance and accommodation to land grabbing. They have increased the intensity of cash
crop cultivation on their permanent farms which in 2016/17 was hit by the cassava price downturn
and resulted in loss of profits for the smallholder farmers.
In contrast, Pukong villagers did not show significant resistance against the concessionaire.
Instead, they secretly expanded their farmland into protected areas for cash-crop cultivation.
Following Scott’s (1986) [47] notion of ‘infrapolitics’, the Pukong farmers took a form of covert
resistance to land grabbing. Since they were not able to attract attention from the authorities in dealing
with land encroachment, they took the risk of clearing land in protected areas although they knew that
it was illegal. Yet their actions yielded limited or no results, and they were left more vulnerable to land
grabbing because they had no power to resist encroachment by military officials and internal migrants.
These findings add to the nascent body of literature that suggests that resistance to land grabbing
in rural Cambodia takes mostly the form of community-based, localized struggles, which Baird
(2017) [48] calls ‘contingent contestations’. Indigenous farmers adopt various strategies in response
to the loss of their common land, but mainly in an unstructured, unplanned and sporadic manner
(Neef & Touch 2016 [10]). This lack of coordination tends to lead to unanticipated outcomes, even when
it involves ostensibly ‘successful’ land restitution.
On the surface, the tenure reforms that were instigated under the 2001 Land Law seem to have
provided new opportunities to indigenous communities to defend their communal natural resources.
Yet, in fact, the government’s lackluster implementation of the CLT policy—while at the same time
aggressively pursuing the allocation of ELC—diminished their common land and spurred land
grabbing by local elites and in-migrants. This paradox of the CLT policy reveals the contradiction
explained in the theory of evasion (Biddulph 2011 [49]). The CLT policy was originally intended to
provide formal resource ownership to indigenous communities so that they can secure their tenure
rights and exclude non-indigenous people from encroaching on their ancestral lands. However,
the government’s forest policy and the leopard-skin policy under Order 01 has converted large
portions of their communal land to community-based or state-public land, which has paved the way for
encroachment by external forces. As a consequence, land concentration in the indigenous communities
has intensified and the resilience of the more marginalized groups in the villages has weakened. In a
study of two villages, Travers et al. (2014) [50] assert that leadership capacity within indigenous
communities is crucial to protect communal land from encroachment by outsiders and market forces.
They found that weak leadership could not ensure land security for indigenous members, leading to
land exclusion by market forces (cf. Hall et al., 2011 [51]). However, in Pukong it was the power
relations within and outside of the community that created barriers to tackle the land encroachment
although market forces could play some role in the context of cash crop cultivation. While we
are supportive of the basic principles of communal land ownership, in the case of Cambodia it is
increasingly obvious that CLT is not a genuine process to ensure land ownership of indigenous people,
but rather another exclusionary power that opens the way for indiscriminate commons grabbing.
Our findings also indicate that the government’s agricultural strategies on permanent farms have
made indigenous farmers vulnerable to market price volatility. This has caused income inequality,
land concentration, and social differentiation within the indigenous communities. Our 2003 and 2015
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studies describe how corporate ventures in Srae Preah Commune have led to indigenous villages being
dispossessed of land and forest resources and reveal how the exclusionary effects of market integration
inhibit indigenous residents from participating in certain types of wage work and from becoming
entrepreneurs and traders, thus relegating them to a status of semi-proletarians and compromising
their livelihood resilience. These results support De Koninck et al.’s (2012) [52] findings from
long-term studies in Southeast Asia that the impoverishment of significant numbers of people involved
displacement from land and other productive natural resources in the face of rapid wealth generation.
This has been brought about by capital-intensive extractive ventures, combined with displaced people’s
lack of access to other agrarian and non-agrarian livelihood opportunities. Vandergeest & Rigg
(2012) [53] pursue this discussion further and reiterate that where exit options are limited, vulnerability
to marginalization and displacement grows as does impoverishment induced by commercialization
and resource extraction. We affirm the position of Vandergeest & Rigg (2012) that where exit options are
stymied or of poor quality, the governance and allocation of land and natural resources remain critical
for resilient local livelihoods. This is particularly the case in upland areas inhabited by indigenous
people who have been marginalized in part due to their ethnicity.
The accumulation of land in the hands of better-off households threatens to result in the
dispossession of smallholders potentially to the point of landlessness. While cassava production created
opportunities for agricultural labor, very poor households in both communes earned proportionally
less from wage work than did most other income groups. Moreover, the very poor households, like the
other income groups, earned little or nothing from trading and migrant remittances. This indicates
that livelihood opportunities and exit options for the very poor households remain extremely limited
under these dramatic changes. Loss of upland farming opportunities and access to forest resources
would, no doubt, leave them further displaced and marginalized. As a result, the weakened livelihood
sources would make them more vulnerable or less resilient to environmental changes or natural
hazards. Our case studies confirm that commons grabbing is a form of “resilience grabbing” whereby
livelihood adjustments cannot adequately compensate for the dramatic loss of common pool resources
that have sustained previous livelihoods options (cf. Haller 2016 [46]; Marfurt et al. 2016 [54];
Dell’ Angelo et al. 2017 [55]). Moreover, this form of “resilience grabbing” involves both livelihoods
and culture. As noted by McAndrew (2000) in a study of indigenous villages in neighboring Ratanakiri
Province, land takeovers “have not only diminished natural resources necessary for sustaining livelihoods, they
have also debilitated cultural and social resources needed to deal with the exigencies of change itself ([56], p. 50).”
6. Conclusions
This article has argued that the Cambodian government incoherent laws and policies on ELCs
and CLTs undermined indigenous people’s access to common land. The ELCs in the two villages did
not provide significant benefits to local people in terms of employment opportunities and poverty
alleviation as expected in the government’s proclaimed goals of long-term investment in agriculture.
They in fact further diminished communities’ forest resources through logging and forest clearance.
Indigenous villagers are being restrained from accessing their common land by the government laws
and policies such as the Forestry Law of 2002, which prohibits land clearance inside protected areas.
Yet, their common land was encroached upon by corporations, powerful elite, and landless in-migrants.
Consequently, indigenous farmers used different strategies to demand compensation for the loss of
their common land, including outright resistance and ostensible accommodation.
Further, our study provides evidence that the CLT policy facilitated ‘resilience grabbing’ by
weakening indigenous communities’ livelihood sources and thus their abilities to cope with present
and future environmental disturbances. The policy did not provide indigenous people with an
institutionalized instrument to counteract land grabbing by the ELCs, local elite and in-migrants.
Likewise, the ELCs did not provide monetary compensation or jobs to the local communities. Instead,
the companies employed Khmer in-migrants who exacerbated communal land grabbing. The loss of
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common resources upon which indigenous livelihoods used to rely severely weakens their adaptive
capacity and ecological resilience.
Moreover, the ELC-influenced policy drive for cash crop production in the study commune
resulted in further livelihood transitions and land use changes that culminated in income inequality
and social differentiation. This cash crop trend pushed the transitions of indigenous people’s
livelihoods relying on natural resources (in 2003) to livelihoods relying on cash crops (in 2012)
to livelihoods struggling to be resilient in the face of price downturns (in 2018). While the crop
boom stimulated economic growth, the practice exacerbated the diminishing state of forest and land
resources. This process, driven by the state-sponsored market economy, also resulted in economic
inequality. While the better-off households substantially improved their income through amassing
more land, poor households earned very little or even suffered losses from their cash crop cultivation.
This widening income inequality and social differentiation is likely to further reduce economic and
social resilience among the indigenous communities.
With limited exit strategies, poor indigenous farmers will continue to be threatened with commons
grabbing and ensuing “resilience grabbing” by market forces of land commodification. In the face of
external threats (including intrusions by in-migrants) and increasing pressure on access to land and
forest resources, there is definitely a need to strengthen transnational social movements and human
rights advocacy and implement land titling strategies that benefit the poorest and most vulnerable
groups in rural Cambodia. Otherwise indigenous people’s land areas will continue to recede and the
success of their livelihood transitions will remain precarious at best.
To conclude, this article reveals that land grabbing adversely affects communal solidarity and local
governance effectiveness. It also demonstrates how commons grabbing—including land sales within
the indigenous communities—undermines livelihood resilience and limits the capacity of indigenous
people to deal effectively with policies and strategies implemented by much more powerful forces.
The Khmer-dominated Cambodian government continues to operate with a different understanding
of law, legality, and conflict resolution, and multinational and domestic corporations (through the
acquisition of ELCs) wield tremendous economic and political power to pursue their interests with
impunity and at the expense of customary landholders. While this article has tried to determine
the various ways in which commons grabbing affects the resilience capacity of indigenous people,
there are still knowledge gaps with regard to the role of gendered social relations in responding to and
accommodating commons grabbing. This will be an important area of future research.
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Abstract: This paper is a summary of the findings of research work conducted in two case studies
in the Rift Valley, Kenya. This study used the Neo-Institutional theory to interrogate how the
rules and regulations (institutions involved) of the agrarian reform process in Kenya are constantly
changing and helping to shape the livelihoods of social actors around Mau Forest. The first case
study—Ndungulu, is a settlement scheme where the Ogiek ethnic community were resettled between
1995 and 1997 after the land clashes of 1992. The second case study is the Kamuyu cooperative
farm, a post-colonial settlement scheme owned by a cooperative society that was founded in 1965 by
members from the Kikuyu ethnic group. This study employed qualitative data collection methods
intermittently between 2012 and 2017 for a total of two years. A total of 60 interviews were
conducted for this research. Thirteen (13) of these were key informant interviews with experts
on land. The qualitative interviews were complemented by participant observations and nine focus
group discussions. The qualitative data from the interviews and focus group discussions were
transcribed, coded and analyzed thematically. Observations documented as field notes were also
analyzed to complement the study findings. In this paper, the challenges, bargaining position and
power play between social actors and government institutions implicated in the agrarian reform
process in Kenya has been brought to the forefront. For instance, due to the structural issues that
date back to the colonial period, the Ogiek have found innovative ways to maintain their daily
existence (e.g., maintaining traditional methods of apiculture in Mau Forest). However, constraints
in accessing forest land has resulted in them taking desperate measures, namely; selling off land to
the Kalenjin in what is called “distress land sales”. On the contrary, the neighboring Kikuyu have
maintained their land ownership status despite recurrent ethnic clashes that have occurred during
general election years.
Keywords: forest land governance; Mau Forest; Ogiek; institutions; land grabbing; Community Land
Act and customary law
1. Background
Ethnic conflict over land in the Rift Valley, Kenya is largely brought about by the land reform
resettlement policies starting from the colonial era [1]. The British colonial government was responsible for
reinforcing the adoption of land as private property as opposed to communal land ownership practised
by native Africans. Land was cleared to pave way for developments such as the construction of the
railway [2], ([3] p. 271). This led to the acquisition of African lands through the Crown Land Ordinance
of 1915, the imposition of English tenure through individualisation and the transformation of customary
land tenure systems [4–6]. This was notably in the Rift Valley, as well as central province also known as the
“white highlands”; areas that were climatically suited for the British settlement and large-scale plantation
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(coffee, tea and pyrethrum) farming [5–9]. At the dawn of independence in 1963, ex-settler farms were
available on the land market through a “willing buyer”, “willing seller” arrangement [10].
This paper presents the changing institutional arrangements of land in pre and post-colonial
regimes in Kenya and how this has challenged the resilience of Ogiek as actors within the Ndungulu
settlement scheme. The study compares the Ogiek, to other dominant actors such as Kalenjin
and neighboring community of the Kikuyu. The latter have been resilient despite ethnic clashes,
due to an enabling political environment. Furthermore, according to [11], Kikuyu, men “muthuri” were
always working towards wealth accumulation, gentrification and respectability. These Kikuyu cultural
beliefs may have contributed to the thriving Kamuyu cooperative farm discussed later. Other actors
include a community forest association called ‘Leinguse peace and conflict management association’, a local
peace committee, a non-state actor; Mercy Corps non-governmental organization (NGO), the Assistant
Chief’s office (state actor who oversees informal land sales), and the African Court for Human and
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), an international court. The interactions between formal and informal actors
is against the backdrop of a seemingly enabling domestic legal1 environment (enactment of 2016 Forest
Conservation and Management Act and 2016 Community Land Act, discussed later in this article).
The land claims of Ogiek have been politicized from the colonial era onwards [12]. The institutional
change from common property ownership of land and related resources to private and or state ownership
is at the core of agrarian reform in Kenya. According to [13], p. 7, “Institutions are seen here as formal
and informal ‘rules of the game’. Constrains, norms, values and rules in the community, govern the said
‘rules of the game’. These motivate the intra community dynamic (notably each of the three communities
in this study has its own set of rules and norms) with regard to structure. Interactions within the
community are related to the following factors; generation of wealth (economic) and maintaining social
harmony (collective action)”. Amongst the Ogiek, these interactions are extended to protecting and
conserving the Mau Forest (sustainable resource use).
The skewed redistribution of land in the Rift Valley, has consequently created tension between three
major categories of social actors; the ‘so-called pastoralists2’, see [14], such as Kalenjin sub groups [15],
“forest dwellers” such as the Ogiek of Mau forest [16], and so-called “immigrant guests3” [17], such as the
Kikuyu ethnic group who traditionally are agriculturalists [18]. The eviction of the Ogiek is documented
since colonial time. Firstly, the Carter Commission in 1932 failed to acknowledge minority communities
like the Elgon Ogiek, Mau Ogiek and Sengwer [19], thus requiring them to integrate into acknowledged
ethnic communal land areas. Secondly, the post-colonial government gazetted the forests and forcefully
evicted Ogiek from the forest land [20].
Furthermore, the Constitution and the 2016 Forest Conservation and Management Act4 vests
tenure in the Kenya Forest Service (KFS)5, albeit in trust for the nation. A combination of factors
1 For example, in Kenya there has been reform in land laws rather than policies to encourage social transformation ideologies
on equality and equity. Taking land ownership for example, the Constitution of 2010, National Land Policy of 2009 and
Land Act 2012, Land Registration Act of 2012 all promote land ownership anchored on formal title as the defining feature of
property relations. However, this co-exists with and is constantly in tension with broader and dynamic social processes and
institutions that shape property relations by constantly balancing between various competing claims and values, rights and
obligations. The Community Land Act 2016 takes these factors into account.
2 In this study, I categorize Kalenjin as ‘pastoralists’ because pre-historically, they were pastoralists [14]. In addition, prominent
Kalenjin leaders such as Deputy President William Ruto, addresses his Kalenjin community as “pastoralists” in public functions,
to show the importance that the community places on livestock keeping. Notably, over the years, the Kalenjin have gradually
interacted with Bantu speaking communities and have adapted arable farming and livestock keeping [15].
3 I also use the term “immigrant guests” because during the 2007 post-election violence, it was used to refer to Kikuyu who have
migrated into the Rift Valley, see Jenkins, 2012 [17].
4 In Part IV (No.31), the new Forest Conservation and Management Act simply states that “all public forests in Kenya are
vested in the service.”. This leaves a loophole in the rights of those communities that consider forestland as ancestral land.
Alden Wily (2018, p. 667) [21] argues that “complainant communities understandably consider the privatization of forest
reserves as removing their forested community lands yet further from their grasp”.
5 The Kenya Forest Service is a semi-autonomous agency set up in 2007 to conserve, develop and sustainably manage forest
resources for the country’s socio-economic development. It is managed by a board of directors drawn from both the private
and public sectors that has the mandate to oversee the development of the entire forest sector. The Kenya Forest Service also
regulates the harvesting of firewood by issuing licenses to any persons interested in the wood fuel from the forest.
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including but not limited to; the Ogiek’s misunderstanding of the role of KFS, scarcity of land in Rift
Valley and land grabbing have led to tensions near Mau Forest. All of these factors have contributed to
recurring ethnic conflicts, especially among the aforementioned categories of communities and have
resulted in thousands of displaced families. Furthermore, given the progressive legal environment
in Kenya with regards to enactment of the Community Land Act 2016 and Forest Conservation and
Management Act 2016, it still remains only to a certain extent that the Community Land Act can
secure community forest land rights. Alden Wily (2018) provides an excellent analysis on how in some
instances, the Forest Conservation and Management Act 2016 makes it difficult for communities to
retain traditional forests as their land [21].
2. Pre-Colonial Land Arrangement between Ogiek (Ndorobos) and other Communities
The abundance of land was a main feature of pre-colonial land tenure systems in Kenya.
The autochthones, otherwise known as indigenous communities, such as Maasai [22], and Ogiek [23].
(Ndorobo) were the original land owners in Rift Valley and central province respectively The ‘Ndorobo’
had what, Kitching (1980) [24] terms as the “honey barrel” rule. He states that “Ndorobos” regarded
all forest areas in which they hung their honey barrels as “theirs” and therefore foreigners in an area
inhabited by the “Ndorobo” would be subject to the hunter-gatherer rules of the ‘Ndorobo’ [24],
pp. 282–283. The Ndorobo thought of themselves, and were regarded as Ndorobo, as long as they
hunted and gathered. People classified themselves and others in terms of subsistence patterns and
allegiance [25], p. 1126.
This transfer of land rights between natives and outsiders within the framework of customary law
has been documented by Chauveau, et al. [26] p.14 as a widespread practice in West African societies.
Chauveau, et al. terms this as ‘tutorat’7 and states that it existed within the context of abundance of land
and low population densities. The bilateral relationship between the tuteur and stranger is mediated
by society. It is socially sanctioned and put into effect by the village authorities. The institution of
tutorat is found in most non-market transfers such as ‘inadequate loans and gifts’ to individuals or
groups of outsiders received into local communities [26].
In the context of pre-colonial tenure systems in Central and Rift Valley provinces of Kenya one
could say that the Ndorobo (Ogiek) were the tuteurs of the Kikuyu. In the early 1900s records show
that Kikuyu were entering into land transactions with neighboring communities in an amicable8
way unlike the Nandi who raided their neighbors to conquer land. Similarly, in South Rift Valley,
the Maasai [28] ethnic group were the tuteurs of the Kalenjin.
In the case of ‘Ndorobo’ and Kikuyu, women played an important role in the pre-colonial land
arrangements. Chauveau et al. (2006, p. 16) [26], illustrates how the tuteur9 (an official representative
of a lineage group) could not challenge the bundle of rights granted to his tenant, neither could
he impose new obligations without the agreement of village authorities. The only expectation was
that the beneficiary, in the case of Kenya (the Kikuyu who had been tuteured by Ndorobo) had to
respect the host’s taboos, live in the village and adopt social and economically acceptable attitude.
6 Haugerud [25] has argued that in Central province of Kenya in the nineteenth century was made up of people with a long
history of relations through trade, migration, marriage, clientage and adoption. Neither commercialization nor wealth was
unknown in Central Kenya during the nineteenth century.
7 Chauveau, et al. [26] p. 14 defines the term tutorat as “the reciprocal social relations that develop when a stranger (or group
of strangers) and his family are received into a local community for an indeterminate period, which may span generations.
Transfers are effected through the transfer of land rights between a customary land owner ‘tuteur’ who is either a native or
autochthone. The institution of Tutorat was embedded in client patron-relationships and socio-political relationships”.
8 See Leakey (1952, p. 4) [27].
9 A type of collective tutorat at the village level (i) where the bilateral relations between tuteurs and strangers are entirely
mediated by the social and political organization of the local society. A type of collective inter-village tutorat (ii) where the
customary rules that determine relations with communities settled on the lands of an older village are same as those that
define the relationships between a newcomer and his tuteur at village level. A type of individualized tutorat (iii) where the
bilateral relationship between tuteur and stranger is very strong and seems relatively autonomous of the social and political
organization of the local society. (Chauveau et al., 2006, p. 16) [26].
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Kershaw (1997, p.19) [18] illustrates that these reciprocal social relations were realized between the
Kikuyu and Ogiek (also referred to as Ndorobo), through mixed marriages. These pre-colonial land
agreements and arrangements are important for this study because they show how customary law is
malleable and dynamic. This echoes the work by Joireman, 2011 [29] and Chanock, 1985 [30].
3. Debates on Ogiek’s Right to Ancestral Land
3.1. Why Examine Conflict in Relation to Settlement Schemes and Landownership in Rift Valley?
The root cause of conflict in the Rift Valley is attributed to the occurrence of high in-migration
under a land tenure regime whose sole adjudicator, allocator and arbitrator of rights is the government
of Kenya [9], p. 73. This is what Boone (2014) [9] terms as a ‘statist’ land regime. Ethnicity forms
an interesting theme for discussing insecurity of land tenure in Kenya which has 42 ethnic communities.
However, what seems to be ethnic-led conflict may actually be constructed through what Brubaker
(2004) [31] has termed as ethnic groupings. Theories on constructivism and ethnicity debates form the
bulk of literature about the land question in Rift Valley, Kenya. Many scholars [32–35] have argued
that what exists is politically driven ethnic conflict whose negative impact may be greater than that of
moral ethnicity.
The most recent statistics made by the then Office of the Prime Minister10 in 2009 show
that through a series of forest excisions and encroachment, some 107,707 hectares representing
approximately 25 per cent of the Mau Complex area, has been converted to settlement and farmlands
over the last 15 years. Through the excisions of 2001 alone, 61,586.5 hectares of forest in the Mau Forests
Complex was to be converted to settlements. This research study aimed at ensuring that the arguments
were not lost in the ‘Kalenjin” versus Kikuyu ethnic-conflict rhetoric. The study sought to interrogate
and situate the precarious land tenure arrangements negotiated by different ethnic groups existing in
the same geographical space. The study illuminates the underlying intra and inter community land
rights dynamic experienced by Ogiek, Kalenjin and Kikuyu. This is because the sub groups of Kalenjin
are from areas that are in close proximity to the Ogiek who have settled in Ndungulu.
3.2. Salient Debates
To date, scholarly explanations for agrarian processes have dealt with social categories based on
economic classes; namely “peasant”, “farmer”, and “worker”. These have left out the Ogiek who are
hunter-gatherers, from the agrarian reform process because they do not fit in the aforementioned mode
of classification. This has invigorated the debates on indigenous people’s rights; thus, advancing the
argument that indigenous communities are best placed to care for the natural resources, notably the
forests. The competing sides, one strongly rooted in the belief of tragedy of the commons versus the
customary practices of forest husbandry (indigenous knowledge systems, (IKSs) that is advocated
by conservationists is what has led to renewal of interest in indigenous groups as conservationists.
Theories on political ecology have also helped to reinforce these arguments. In addition, indigenous
way of life is associated with communal subsistence.
Much of the debates on land rights for indigenous groups such as Ogiek have been reinvigorated
and driven by international NGOs such as Survival International and a local NGO; Ogiek Peoples
Development Programme, while others through international organizations such as Minority Rights
Group in Europe and International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Whakatane
mechanism, see [36]. Regardless of the geographical location, the salient features within these debates
revolve around two concepts; indigenous knowledge and natural resource management.
10 Report of the Prime Minister’s Taskforce on the Conservation of the Mau Forest complex. http://www.kws.go.ke/content/
mau-forest-restoration-publications.
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The reason why the belief in mutual benefit between indigenous communities and forests has
gained ground is because; first, various theorists of political ecology echo the principals behind
this belief. By marrying two disciplines namely; Political economy and cultural ecology, renowned
anthropologists [37–39] were able to lay the foundation for the theory of political ecology. This theory
illuminates the importance of local, minority and indigenous knowledge. Further, it underscores the
importance of environmental impact on cultural processes within the political and economic contexts.
In other debates, that link indigenous people with conservation efforts, the tone has been
nostalgic. For example, authors like Davis and Wali (1994) argue that the indigenous knowledge
systems (IKS) that indigenous people in Latin America have maintained over the years are the link to
sustaining “mother earth” in a time when tropical forests are facing destruction [40], as well as climate
change [41]11. In addition, anthropologists are also advancing theories on why communities are better
placed to conserve the so-called protected areas such as forests [42].
The second reason why the Ogiek have gained popularity within these debates can be attributed to the
fact that the indigenous way of life is associated with communal subsistence. This is seen as the antithesis
of land-grabbing12 schemes whose foundation lies in individualized land tenure approach. However,
not everyone agrees with these reason that advance the restitution of ancestral land and ‘commons’ to
indigenous groups. More so, their ownership claims on fertile and productive areas such as Rift Valley and
the forests. Using the example of the Maasai in Tanzania, Hodgson (2011, pp. 8–9) illustrates how external
factors such as international NGOs and advocacy networks that have a transnational mandate compete
against nation state to push ethnic groups to positioning themselves as ‘indigenous’ [22]. The reasons for
this may vary.
Authors such as Médard (2008)13 and Branch et al. (2010) argue that there is an economic incentive
behind the interest in being identified as a minority group [23,43]. According to Branch et al. (2010, p. 187),
the first incentive is the financial returns in selling off the land acquired through these indigenous court
claims [43]. The second incentive is to get access to resources from international14 Institutions that provide
funds as well as create awareness about the authenticity15 of their “indigenousness”. A counterargument
has against these sort of generalizations. Wachira (2008, pp. 85–87) argues that looking at the situation of
indigenous communities from a capitalist standpoint fails to take account of the fact that, while a community
may have adopted a modern way of life, that in itself does not make that community unable to maintain its
cultural and traditional practices [44].
4. Materials and Methods
4.1. Theoretical Framework
This study is anchored on the neo institutional theoretical framework. According to Ensminger
(1998, pp. 1–2), Neo-Institutionalism is the study of how institutions affect the behavior of individuals
and how individual behavior affects the evolution of institutions: pivotal to these relations is the
role of incentives [45]. The approach enabled the study to focus on the role of the state and external
economic, political, demographic and technical changes and how these influence prices for goods and
the terms of trade (changes in relative prices) in relation to the land related institutions in the study
11 Speranza et al. (2009) correlates the usefulness of African indigenous knowledge systems and modern science for enhancing
food security and climate change adaptation in Kenya [41].
12 Land grabbing is seen as part of the wider, large-scale land acquisition schemes to be embraced by African governments.
13 Médard (2008, pp.81–98) argues that the Ogiek of Mount Elgon or from Mau forest areas claim to be the autochthons of Rift Valley
and are reclaiming forest land because of the potential benefits of owning highly fertile land in Rift Valley and not necessarily to
revert back to their hunter-gatherer customary land administration system [23].
14 http://www.survivalinternational.org/news/10119.
15 The detailed information on the “indigenousness” of the Ogiek can be found on various websites such as the http://www.
ogiekpeoples.org/.
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area. The relative prices then have an influence on the local level and lead to changes in informal, local
institutions, organization, ideology and bargaining power of the different actors [46].
4.2. Local and Topographic Characteristics of Uasin Gishu
The area being researched is located in Kesses constituency, Uasin Gishu County in the Rift Valley
province of Kenya as highlighted in Figure 1 below. Kesses is one of the six constituencies16 in Uasin
Gishu County and has a population of 135,979 (Census 2009) and covers an area of approximately
299 square kilometers. The entire 3784 sq. km. of Uasin Gishu is arable land. It is estimated that
about 2354 sq. km. of the land area is considered to be high potential whereas about 1430 sq. km. is
medium potential. There is neither marginal nor irrigated land in the district. Forest reserves occupy
around 6100 hectares. The forests are Timboroa, Cengalo, Nabkoi, Lorenge, Kipkurere and Kapsaret
(NEMA, 2013, p. 14) [47]17.
The two farming communities of Ndungulu (Ogiek and Kalenjin ethnic groups) and Kamuyu
(Kikuyu ethnic group) are the case studies, see Yin, 2003 [48], for this research and are located in
Lainguse sub-location of Ol’Leinguse18 [49] location, Kesses constituency. Kesses is bordered to the
north by Soy and Moiben whose residents are mainly from the Kalenjin sub ethnic groups of Keiyo
and Nandi. In the south it is bordered by Tinderet, where the dominant ethnic group is the Kipsigis,
while to the west, it is bordered by Nandi in which the dominant ethnic group is the Nandi. To the
East it is bordered by Ainabkoi where there is a mix of Kalenjin subethnic groups and some Kikuyu
settlement schemes.
16 There are other constituencies namely Ainabkoi, Kapseret, Moiben, Turbo and Soy. There are three local authorities namely
Wareng County Council, covering the widest area with 21 wards, Eldoret Municipal council with 15 wards and Burnt Forest
Town Council with 6 wards.
17 Statistics from the NEMA report were published before the establishment of county system of local governance. Uasin Gishu
district is now called Uasin Gishu County.
18 According to the Kenya National Population Censu, 2009 [49], p. 145, the area of Ol’leinguse is 132 square kilometers,
with a population density of 122. A total of 7983 are male, while 8122 are female. There are 3177 households in the
Ol’leinguse location.
74
Land 2018, 7, 140
Figure 1. Study area is specifically Burnt Forest, situated in Uasin Gishu County.
Figure 2 below shows Burnt forest commercial center situated along the Eldoret-Nairobi highway.
The settlements schemes are situated near the forest areas in the center of the map. They were excised
off the Tinderet and Ainabkoi forests (all part of the larger Mau Forest ecosystem). Forest cover has
marginally reduced because of land fragmentation as is depicted in the image. The remaining forest
areas, especially Kapilat, is used for ceremonial purposes such as male and female circumcision (done
less and less over the years) among Ogiek and Kalenjin. In addition, traditional harvesting of honey as
well as indigenous medicine is carried out by the Ogiek community.
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Figure 2. Map of the Burnt Forest Area showing Kamuyu farm and Ndungulu settlement.
4.3. Description of Study Area: Ndungulu
Since 1992, Kenya government began resettling Ogiek in Rift Valley, however there exists tensions
between Ogiek and so called “cousins” (Kalenjin sub ethnic groups) who are settled in these areas.
As highlighted in Figure 2, Ndungulu settlement scheme is officially registered in government records
as Cheboror Farm Number 24,644 [47], p. 3519. The word “Ndungulu” stands for ‘salty water springs’ in
Maasai language. According to field interviews in 2017, Ogiek elders aged between 70 and 85 years of
age, stated that the area was a watering point for Maasai cattle. Notably, both case studies of Ndungulu
and Kamuyu are in Ol’leinguse20 location, the smallest government-controlled administrative unit
of Uasin Gishu21 County. The “Ndorobo” or Ogiek were resettled on these 740 hectares22 farm as
compensation for being evicted from the neighboring forests. These include; Bureti (Nabkoi Forest)
Cheboror (Cenghalo Forest), Kipsangany, Sereng’onik Forest, Kipkurerek, and Ngatipkong23 (Kosabei
forest). There are five villages on Ndungulu namely; Tachasis, Koibeiyo, Lengut, Tulwet and Kaptaragon.
Asis means God in Ogiek language. The village that is named Tachasis is situated on the highest altitude
point on the settlement farm and receives the first ray of sunlight in the morning. For the Ogiek, God
is associated with the sun. The other villages represent municipalities that are found bordering forest
land where Ogiek had been evicted from before being resettled at Ndungulu. See details on Table S1
in Supplementary Materials for this article.
19 This report was published before the establishment of county system of local governance [47]. The former Uasin Gishu
district and its environs is now referred to as Uasin Gishu County.
20 Ol’leinguse is a Maasai name.
21 Uasin Gishu is a Maasai name. The area was inhabited by Maasai before the colonial period.
22 The 2009 Report of the Prime Minister’s Taskforce on the Conservation of the Mau Forest complex gives a figure of
788.3 hectares as the land given to Ogiek, while NEMA report gives it as 740 hectares.
23 According to the Complainants’ Submissions on the Merits, Court Document submitted to the African Court on Human
Rights and Peoples Rights. It states that the Ogiek from Kipkurere were evicted in 1986 and forced to live in a small village
Ngatipkong. This was part of the evidence used by the Ogiek “complainants” in court proceedings for the African Commission
on Human Rights and Peoples Rights Vs Republic of Kenya. Communication No. 006/2012. Which helped them win the
case on 26 May 2017. http://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Final-MRG-merits-submissions-pdf.pdf
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4.4. Description of Study Area-Kamuyu
Kamuyu co-operative farm, as highlighted in Figure 2, is officially registered as (Lainguse/Kiptenga
Block 1 and 2) at the Ministry of Lands and settlements. There are three villages namely; Forest, Mbarakira
and Njabini. Those who live in “Forest” neighbor the Matharu forest. Those who live in Mbarakira village
say that there was a dense woodland of mbarakira trees that were cleared to make way for settlements.
Mbarakira is the Kikuyu name for trychocladus ellipticus, an indigenous tree that grows in the Aberdare range
forest and mainly along waterways [50]. Those that live in Njabini are mainly immigrants from Njabini
municipality in Nyandarua County, which is a former homeland for Kikuyu.
As an elder shareholder described . . . “At the dawn of independence in 1965, a group of
233 Kikuyus and 7 Kalenjin from the Nandi sub group bought the Kamuyu land that was about
6000 acres. However, after the land clashes of 1992, the 7 Kalenjin were forced to leave and their land
bought from them. The 1965 land deal was a tripartite agreement brokered between the lending Bank,
the co-operative and DC MacLeod, a white British colonial settler. The Kikuyu buyers nicknamed him
“gichaga” because he used to quarrel with everybody. Some called him ‘Kiguru’ because he walked with
a limp. The farm was sold at 1,000 Kenya shillings per share including the farm equipment. At the
time, Kamuyu was formed, the Kikuyu were rearing pigs, poultry and cows as common investment.
All members were entitled to a maximum of 3 acres for personal use. The rest was used communally
and the proceeds re-invested through their co-operative committee to offset the bank loan that was
used to purchase the land.” Interview with a 75-year-old male shareholder of the Kamuyu
Cooperative society.
The Kamuyu name unites these Kikuyu shareholders. Kamuyu is adopted from a municipality
found in Nyeri, a former homeland of the Kikuyu. Some of the founders of Kamuyu farm were former
Mau Mau freedom fighters from Nyeri who had been jailed in Manyani and Naivasha for long and
when they returned to their homelands in Nyeri, their land had been given to sympathisers24 of the
colonial government [6], p. 242. Some ex-Mau Mau, who were well adjusted to forest husbandry had
obtained jobs as forest wardens in the government ministry at the dawn of independence [51]. Another
bulk of Kikuyu settlers, mainly from an area called Njabini in Kinangop constituency of Nyandarua
County, had been plantation workers earning a living from planting pyrethrum or coffee in the white
highlands occupied by British settlers.
“After purchasing the farm from the white owner in 1965, the members of Kamuyu Co-operative
farm decided to demarcate the land in 1980’s after the bank loan was settled. That marked the end of
community activities such as planting maize and pyrethrum. Before demarcation every member had
a share of 3 acre each and the rest was for the society, afterwards, every member was entitled to at least
7 acres. The good fertile areas were referred to as the ‘special’. Those who obtained the sloppy areas
were given 8 acres each, those who obtained the sloppy and rocky areas were given 9 acres each while
those who obtained the sloppy, hilly and rocky areas which were had to plough were given 10 acres”.
Excerpt from key informant interview, Kamuyu Cooperative society.
4.5. Study Design, Data Collection and Analysis
This study utilized the ethnographic approach that included an array of qualitative methods
to allow for in-depth long-term exploration of the study subject. A total of 47 in-depth interviews,
13 key informant interviews, participant observation and 9 focus group discussions were carried out
intermittently over a total of 2 years between 2012 and 2017 in the study area. The in-depth interviews
24 Rich and educated Kikuyu men were recruited as surveyors and clerks, giving them some leverage in the land consolidation
program. For instance, collaborators tended to favor people who had supported the government while discriminating
against Mau Mau fighters and their sympathizers when allocating land. [6], p. 242.
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were comprised of Ogiek, Kalenjin and Kikuyu. The key informant interviews targeted experts on land
issues while the focus groups were comprised of both men and women from the three communities.
In each case study, one FGD was held jointly (men and women). The rest separately convened either
men or women.
Purposive and convenience sampling were employed in the selection of the study participants.
The communities were selected based on firstly, the conflict that has been prevalent in the area of
Uasin Gishu, Rift Valley during elections periods. A second criteria that was used for selection
was based on the predominance of agriculture as an economic activity (maize, pyrethrum and
wheat farming) in Uasin Gishu. Thirdly, was their willingness to participate in the study and their
geographical accessibility. The qualitative data from the interviews and focus group discussions were
transcribed, coded and analyzed thematically. Observations documented as field notes were also
analyzed to complement the study findings.
4.6. Study Limitation
The findings are not to be used to generalize25 the situation of ethnic conflict in Rift Valley as
homogenous rather, some aspects were singled out being specific to different categories of ethnic
groups depending on (i) the pre-colonial land tenure systems and (ii) current landownership patterns.
For this research, the transcripts from interviews and focus group discussions are detailed26.
5. Findings and Discussions
This section highlights findings anchored on the neo-institutionalism theory to highlight the
institutions and changes faced by the Ogiek as actors in navigating the formal and informal agrarian
reform institutions in gaining ownership to their ancestral forest land in Kenya [29]. According to the
authors of [13], p. 9, there are always competing institutions; those developed by the government,
and are categorized as (formal) and those embedded within the culture of the local community
(informal institutions) [13]”. Institutional settings both formal (Chief’s office) and informal (norms
and values of Kikuyu, Kalenjin and Ogiek) around Mau Forest, play a major role in land ownership
and redistribution. For this study, these ‘rules of the game’ are characterized by the following:
(i) Devolution, land reforms and the role of National Land Commission (NLC), (ii) The role of the
assistant Chief’s office in the adjudication and arbitration of “distress” land sales, (iii) Contestation
of traditional versus modern ways of sustaining Ogiek livelihoods (Ogiek, assistant Chief’s office
and NGOs), (iv) Contestation of access and use of Mau Forest between Ogiek and Kenya Forest
Service, and lastly (v) Resolving land issues in an enabling political environment; the Kikuyu approach.
The following section will elaborate on the aforementioned “institutional settings”.
5.1. Devolution, Land Reforms and the role of the National Land Commission (NLC)
Institutional restructuring for land reform, according to Boone et al. (2016, p. 1), has been realized
through the establishment of the National Land Commission27, which has been devolved at county
level to, Environment and Land court, as well as the County Land Management Boards [52]. This is
a welcome step in adjudication and arbitration of land matters in conflict areas such as Rift Valley.
The challenge remains in the (i) cost of seeking adjudication and (ii) ethnic representation at the
25 Yin (2003, pp. 10–11) states that the second limitation with case studies is that they provide little basis for scientific
generalization. A question often posed is “How can you generalize from a single case?” However, Yin states that, as with
experiments and surveys, case studies are generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes [48].
26 The third limitation of case studies, according to Yin, is that they take too long and result in massive unreadable documents.
This is because of ethnographic and participant observation methods involved. However, this all depends on the timeframe
of the investigator and the aims and objectives of the study [48], pp. 10–11.
27 Land Control Boards are now been abolished since the establishment of the National Land Commission (NLC) in 2012.
However, the NLC will set up new land boards committees at local level that preside over all land matters, that will include
the one-third representation by women as required by the new constitution.
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executive board level. For example, the Land Management Board (LMB) for Uasin Gishu County has
offices in the urban town of Eldoret. Those who live in the rural farming areas have to incur transport
costs and additional court fees when seeking redress in Eldoret.
For this study, the issue of ethnicity and ethnic groupings is important. One may argue that
a precedent may have been set in promoting ethnic bias in the selection of county level officials for
land administrative structures such as land committees. For example, Uasin Gishu County has several
other ethnic groups such as Kikuyu and Ogiek. Yet on 6 November 2014, six members (3 men and
3 women all from Kalenjin ethnic group) were sworn in as the new Land Management Board (LMB) for
Uasin Gishu County28. However, the LMBs were later revoked by the Land Laws (Amendments) Act,
of 2016. A major improvement that has been realized is that there is gender equality on the land boards
and this has created an enabling environment for women to bring forward their land adjudication,
registration and ownership issues. This is a step forward from the old structure of land boards29 which
were often male dominated and had a woman who doubled as the secretary and tea girl30.
In addition, the Kenyan government has made progress in creating an enabling legal environment
for communities interested in registering land under communal land tenure, through the introduction
of the Community Land Act (CLA)31 in October 2016. According to the CLA, community land will
be held under customary, leasehold and freehold tenure systems. Customary32 law will be used in
the adjudication and administration of the community land. However, at national level, there are still
some challenges. A Communal Land Registrar has not been appointed. In addition, the regulations for
the Communal Land Act which were formally announced as being available in 2017, have not yet been
made available [21]. One may argue that, at local level, clan-based community land certificates are
available and viable under the Community Land Act of 2016 and it is up to the community to decide
how to define its community land area. However, findings from the research area show that despite
a sound legal framework, sometimes dominant communities can use the land policies in unlawful
ways and reverse legal gains. This is evidenced in the informal land sales occurring on Ndungulu
settlement scheme highlighted below.
5.2. The Role of the Assistant Chief’s Office in Adjudicating and Arbitrating over “Distress” Land Sales
The Ogiek in Ndungulu settlement scheme have found an innovative way to raise money to
maintain their daily existence. Despite the fact that they (Ogiek) were resettled by the government on
this land, they now circumvent the state machinery such as lawyers, land surveyors and administrative
officers, to enter into binding land sale agreements irrespective of the formal law. The chief’s office is
a formal provincial administrative institution and the Chief is appointed from central government33.
28 http://uasingishu.go.ke/.
29 In most communities in Kenya, land adjudicators and arbitrators were men. This pattern was mirrored in the structure of
land committee and board members. The justification used for a formal institution was simple-women’s participation in this
process has been almost non-existent in the past. ‘Customary law’ was used as the reference point [53], p. 39.
30 When the researcher began data collection in 2012, the Kesses Land Board which had jurisdiction over the Ol’leinguse
location where the case studies are situated, was all male. The members stated that is was “gender compliant” because the
secretary Ms Rael Lamai, was always present at meetings to take notes and to kindly serve them with tea.
31 This was an improvement of the Trust land Act, which was more attune to the governance of ranches by pastoralists. The CLA
is envisaged as a big win for communities which value the communal land tenure systems. In the CLA, “Community” has
been defined to mean a consciously distinct and organized group of users of community land who are citizens of Kenya and
share any of the following attributes: common ancestry, similar culture or unique mode of livelihood; socioeconomic or other
similar common interest; geographical space; ecological space; or ethnicity. The constitution of a community is therefore not
limited to ethnic lines as is the case with the current practice. The reason for this new clause being that ancestral land claims
would balkanize the country into ethnic enclaves.
32 The term “customary land rights” is defined to mean rights conferred by or derived from African customary law, customs
or practices provided that such rights are not inconsistent with the Constitution or any written law.
33 Contrary to the arguments made by [9], pp. 64–68, on “neo-customary” land regimes in Africa, the context is different for Ol’
leinguse location. Unlike other countries such as Ghana (Affou et al., 2007) [54], and South Africa (Rangan and Gilmartin 2002) [55],
whose ethnic groups have well defined structures of chieftaincies, the ethnic groups in the area of Uasin Gishu did not have chiefs
as land administrators. This position was adopted from the colonial period, by the post-colonial government.
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However, the assistant chief34 is a local appointee who is voted into office by the local population.
The research study established that the Ogiek are able to make written agreements through the
office of the assistant chief, with non-Ogiek for the sale of small portions (known as points) of land.
These Non-Ogiek include Tugen, Kipsigis, Nandi and Keiyo from neighboring counties of Baringo,
Kericho, Nandi and Elgeyo Marakwet respectively. The same pattern has been documented about
the Ogiek settled on Tinet [56] settlement scheme. As described by the Assistant Chief of Ol’leinguse
location “I do not like to see Ogiek selling off land and becoming poorer every day, however they voluntary
come to me and request me to adjudicate over these land sales between them and non-Ogiek because it is cheaper
for them to ask for my services rather than engaging a land surveyor” (KII, assistant Chief, Ol’leinguse).
The sales are precarious because the Ogiek do not have tittle deeds for their land. These distress land
sales often occur whenever they are faced with a financial problem. In addition, one may argue that
these sales occur because the settlement scheme is not under communal land tenure, therefore the
community does not have an ‘umbrella’ association that could mitigate poverty and prevent these
kinds of sales. Which is why the 2016 Communal Land Act is a welcome step.
Distress land sales take place under pressure of poverty, usually with a likely long-term negative
effect on household economy. Many Ogiek households were more engaged in “buying” and “selling” of
small portions of land such as a tenth of an acre which is called a “point” and would cost 15,000 Kenya
shillings. Delville, (2003, p. 91) [57] who observed the same in West Africa calls this “institutional innovation”.
He argues that it occurs because the land market has not harmonized the statutory law requirements with
the needs of people in rural areas. The transaction costs for seeking legal justice when entering a land sale
agreement are too high in comparison to the size of the land that is being acquired. These informal land
sales are carried out notwithstanding that the Ogiek do not have tittle-deeds to the land [56].
The Ogiek who were settled between 1995 and 1997 are eligible to apply for a tittle deed for the
whole 740-acre farm but not individually. Therefore, to be able to pay, they must collectively raise
1.5 million Kenya shillings. So far, by 2017, a total of 960,000 shillings has been collected. As explained
by a Kalenjin couple who have bought land from Ogiek, “the Ogiek are too poor to jointly raise that fee
for title-deed registration. If it was up to us (non-Ogiek) we can raise money through our other agricultural
activities in Moiben or Nandi.” Therefore, the study noted that, the Kalenjin have alternative sources of
income unlike the Ogiek. For example, some of them had their “ancestral”35 land elsewhere which
could provide them with the capital which they use to purchase the land from Ogiek.
These distress land sales have implications on security of land tenure for other household members
such as wives and children. These kinds of land sales are organized locally and often finalized in drinking
places, usually by men. Women do not have control over these sales and frequently do not know about
them until they see their husbands with money. During focus group discussions, women voiced their
concerns about these land sales, but are hesitant to confront their husbands, for fear of beatings at home.
5.3. Contestation of Maintaining Traditional Versus Modern Livelihoods (Ogiek, Chief’s Office and NGOs)
Another social economic activity that highlights how dominant ethnic communities may override the
interest of minority groups in settlement areas is evidenced through a beekeeping project captured in Figure 3.
In 2012, The United States Agency for International Aid (USAID) provided a grant of 1000 US dollars
through Mercy36 Corps, to enable the Ndungulu settlement peace37 committee to purchase the necessary
34 At the time of the interview in 2012, the Assistant Chief, a Kalenjin, had held this position since 1989 and was relied upon as
the “institutional memory” for the land sales.
35 Sub ethnic community of Nandi are from Nandi county, the Kipsigis are from Kericho county, Tugen are from Baringo
county and Keiyo from Elgeyo Marakwet counties.
36 Mercy corps has many projects in Uasin gishu on peace. There are passionfruit for peace in Olare that is in the north, then goats
for peace in Kesses, then in Cheptiret there is a rehabilitated market for peace, a poultry project in Chegeiya and a bridge project
in Matharu.
37 Information derived from a key informant interview in 2012, with a Peace Monitor at the Ministry of Internal affairs, District
Commissioners office, Uasin Gishu county, Eldoret town.
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beehives and harvesting equipment for the project. After the post-election violence of 2007, peace committees
were established in ethnic sensitive areas to implement the alternative dispute resolution mechanism at grass
root level. The choice for selecting a beekeeping project by the peace committee for residents of Ndungulu
was based on the fact that the traditional way of beekeeping is seen as a forest-fire hazard by Kenya Forest
Service authorities. When the researcher visited the area in 2017, the project had been abandoned and the
Ogiek elders referred to it as “hiyo mzinga za watu wa agriculture” in Kiswahili, which can be translated as
“those beehives for agriculture extension workers”.
A repetition of mismatching the modern versus traditional economic livelihood approaches
of Ogiek community may likely occur in future because of two recent historic events. Firstly,
the international court ruling of May 2017 Ogiek. Secondly, the loopholes in the Community Land Act
(CLA) 2016. The implications of these two issues are discussed below.
On 26 May 2017, a court ruling38 by the African Court for Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR)
located in Arusha, Tanzania declared that the Ogiek have a right to gain ownership to their ancestral
land. According to Alden Wily (2018, p. 666) [21], the ACHPR found that the Kenya Government had
violated the rights of the Ogiek under various Articles of the African charter. Further, that the Mau
Ogiek had occupied the land since time immemorial and were entitled to occupy and use their lands.
While the court acknowledged that this possession might be restricted for a public purpose, it found
no evidence that the Ogiek presence was the main cause of severe environmental degradation and
encroachment. The legal challenge here is that the same institution that took away the forest land
rights from Ogiek by gazetting all forest land and mandating the Kenya forest service to manage it, is
now expected to give back the land. Already, it has been observed through national media (Star)39 that
the government is likely to compensate the Ogiek rather than restitute their ancestral land to them.
 
Figure 3. Bee-keeping40 project on Ndungulu settlement scheme.
40 Picture taken by Jemaiyo Chabeda.
38 http://en.africancourt.org/images/Cases/Judgment/Application%20006-2012%20-%20African%20Commission%20on%
20Human%20and%20Peoples%E2%80%99%20Rights%20v.%20the%20Republic%20of%20Kenya.pdf.
39 The Star interview: We’ve restored 850k hectares of degraded forests by involving communities-PS. https://www.the-star.
co.ke/news/2017/06/22/interview-weve-restored-850k-hectares-of-degraded-forests-by-involving_c1579273.
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As much as the enactment of the 2016 Community Land Act is a welcome step for communities
that are interested in communal land tenure, there are some legal loopholes that can affect minorities
such as Ogiek. For example, at County level [21], p. 669, points out that, “Draft regulations under
the Act fail to specify the responsibility of counties to investigate which communities are affected by
a development and to insist upon compensation through procedures involving those communities
from the outset”. At local level, there is a risk that this pattern of sidelining minorities such as
Ogiek, will continue within the context of Community Land Management Committees proposed
through the Community Land Act. In the event that for the sake of a “development” project,
the county governments propose that Ogiek enter into communal land ownership agreements with
other communities such as the neighboring Kalenjin, they may eventually be dominated at the
executive level such as in the Community Land Management committees (CLMCs). In addition, lack
of autonomy within land management institutions might give rise to further marginalisation if the
membership is skewed towards a particular ethnic group.
To maximize on the use of the Mau forest for traditional apicultural practices, there needs to be
a horizontal transfer of knowledge (between Ogiek east of Mau forest and Ogiek west of Mau forest)
about marketing networks. The Ogiek in East Mau Forest living in Marishoni, have well-defined
networks of marketing their honey41. However, the Ogiek in Ndungulu sell their honey in small
quantities to herbalists and beer makers locally. They do not have enough access to forest land to
produce as much honey as their counterparts. There are already global markets in place through
organizations such as slow food42 which the Ogiek can tap into. One may argue that, through such
networks, poverty levels can be decreased among the Ogiek and prevent them from carrying out
distress land sales.
5.4. Contestation of Access and Use of Mau Forest (between Ogiek and Kenya Forest Service)
The Ogiek owes its international privileged identity as an “indigenous” community, see [58],
to its specific materiality of beekeeping. In proving that Ogiek are out to protect the forests rather than
exploit the resource, a report (2012)43 was submitted to the African Court for Human and Peoples
Rights. In it, there are various indicators that were used to point how Ogiek took “extra care” in
the way they harvest, store and use honey. The main focus was on the way the Ogiek apply their
indigenous knowledge, see Semali and Kincheloe, 1999 [59], of the forest to sustain livelihoods in
their various government sanctioned settlement schemes, such as Ogiek residing west of Mau Forest
i.e., those in my case study of Ndungulu settlement. The Ogiek want to claim up to 30 distinct
community land areas over the Mau forest ecosystem. They have been able to identify these areas
through an intensive territorial mapping exercise that began through the KIFCON44 project and
recently through the compilation of an atlas of Ogiek peoples’ ancestral territories (OPAT)45.
However, the Ogiek have a tense relationship with the Kenya Forest Service whom they view
as limiting their access to their ancestral land i.e., forests, due to the introduction of community




43 According to the Complainants’ Submissions on the Merits, Court Document submitted to the African Court on Human
Rights and Peoples Rights. This was part of the evidence used by the Ogiek “complainants” in court proceedings for
the African Commission on Human Rights and Peoples Rights Vs Republic of Kenya. Communication No.006/2012.
Which helped them win the case on 26 May 2017.
44 Kenya Indigenous Forest Conservation Project (KIFCON) 1992. A consideration of strategies for settlement of the Okiek
Ndorobo of South west Mau Forest, Ministry of Environment and Tourism, Nairobi.
45 An Ogiek People’s Ancestry and Territories (OPAT) Atlas for the Ogiek of Eastern Mau was published in 2011. With help from
the discussions among Ogiek community members, the University of Bern together with their partners in an organization
called Kenya Environmental Research Mapping and Information Systems in Africa (ERMIS), determined which critical
features (e.g., hills, rivers, cultural areas), are considered as Ogiek clan territory.
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community based natural resource management is a concept that encouraged by governments as a way
for communities that reside next to forest areas to access the forest. According to Koech et al. [60],
there are 11 community forest associations registered in Mau Forest. The process of applying for
registration requires that the members have to have some level of education and money to pay for the
fees which ranges between 2000 and 5000 Kenya shillings per person [60].
Another participatory forest management approach that was introduced by the government after
the post-election violence of 2007/2008 is the shamba system. The word shamba, means garden in
Kiswahili language. This system of farming is originally known as taungya, see [61]. Witcomb and
Doward [62] argue that in theory, it is “beneficial” to local people and the government. However,
in practice, the shamba system only relegates the farmers to a category of “forest users” who have no
real say in forest management. This results in the limited participation of the ‘forest user’ because the
government retains the power over ‘forest user rights’ [62].
After the 2007 post-election violence, the Kenya Forest Service introduced the idea of “shamba”
system as a way to prevent ‘idleness’ and ‘mischief’ amongst youth, see Van Stapele, 2010 [63],
from some ethnic communities. This was done in selected areas such as around Mount Kenya and
Mau Forest in what Mathu and Ng’ethe (2011, p. 16) call the “Plantation Establishment and Livelihood
Improvement Scheme” (PELIS) project [64]. The requirement was that these “shamba” farmers had to
be part of a community forest association (CFA), in response to the policies by global organizations
such as UN REDD.
Overall, this study by [64], established that this set of “forest user rights” as defined by the Kenya
Forest service do not give details on the permitted social practices for those gaining access to the
resource. In the case of Ogiek, the access to the forest is mainly for apiculture and obtaining indigenous
herbal medicine. The shamba system rules are set at the operative level of Kenya Forest Service (KFS)
while there are rules set up at the collective choice level (community level). One may argue that,
benefits from these interactions at the inter-community level (between KFS and communities) and
intra-community level (between the various ethnic group; Ogiek, Kikuyu and Kalenjin forest users),
are realized when the rules remain consistent. However, findings from the case study show that these
rules are skewed in favour of the state institutions such as KFS, who wield the power of access and
ownership of the Mau Forest. In addition, dominant ethnic communities (Kikuyu and Kalenjin make
ultimate decisions on the priorities for forest use e.g., charcoal making as highlighted below.
“We have some “shamba farmers” on Ndungulu farm who had been allowed to cultivate on half
acre each in the Sereng’onik section of Mau forest. This is actually a community forest association
(CFA), called Leinguse peace and conflict management group. It has 72 members from Ogiek, Kikuyu
and Kalenjin communities who are both female and male. What stood out for me was that out of
the 72 members, only 11 are Ogiek. The Ogiek have no money to afford to pay for membership
in such associations. The Ogiek are not interested in the charcoal business like the Kalenjin and
Kikuyu. The dorobo (Ogiek) are not interested because they like to brew alcohol and are lazy. In fact,
the Ogiek who are registered do so because it is the only means through which the Kenya Forest
Service allows them to harvest honey using their traditional beehives. The forest is also important
for carrying out circumcision ceremonies.” Interview with Chairperson, Leinguse peace and
conflict management group.
Furthermore, on Kamuyu farm and Ndungulu settlement scheme, the proximity to the
surrounding forests of Nabkoi, Kapilat and Cenghalo has enabled the Kikuyu and Kalenjin women
and men to ‘tap’ into the business of trading charcoal and firewood. When the research was conducted
in 2012, the Kalenjin women stated that they were able to buy a license issued by Kenya Forest Service
to cut firewood from the forest at 100 shillings. However, by 2013, the KFS had stopped issuing licenses
to the CFAs. The research study established that the Ogiek who do not participate in the charcoal and
firewood business are considered as lazy. In contrast, the Ogiek insist that they are completely against
83
Land 2018, 7, 140
this charcoal and firewood business. They did not see themselves as lazy, on the contrary, they view
the other dominant ethnic communities as having no desire to protect the forest.
This ‘laziness’ narrative is perpetuated by the Kalenjin and Kikuyu communities which may see
themselves as “progressive” because both have been represented at top political echelons e.g., presidency
and at the local government position of Chief and Assistant Chief. The dominant ethnic groups may have
subconsciously developed a negative attitude towards smaller Ogiek because of their lack of interest in
adapting to their income generating activities, such as charcoal and prefer to stick to their traditional
livelihood approaches. This attitude by the dominant ethnic communities correlates with the social
dominance orientation theories. In addition, the level of education attained by the Ogiek in Ndungulu is
comparably lower to that attained by Kalenjin and Kikuyu.
5.5. Resolving Land Issues in an Enabling Political Environment: The Kikuyu Approach
Case of Legal Intervention by Hon. Martha Karua, Former Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs
In contrast to the situation of Ogiek who have had to seek legal representation at international level
for unresolved land issues dating to precolonial time, the Kikuyu who faced land dispossession from
British colonial settlers were aided by the President Jomo Kenyatta, the first post-colonial president
of Kenya. His tenure in office enabled the Kikuyu to own land in other parts outside their ancestral
homeland. His political mantra was “harambee” meaning ‘pulling together’. For land reform policies,
his philosophy was used in reference to pulling together finances for the formation of cooperatives
and land buying companies to acquire land in Rift Valley. President Kenyatta resettled many members
of the Kikuyu ethnic community in Rift Valley following the post-independence land redistribution
plan. As shown in Figure 4, they migrated from Nyandarua and Nyeri to Uasin Gishu.
Figure 4. Map showing homelands of the Kikuyu immigrants on Kamuyu farm from Nyandarua and
Nyeri (Sourced from [65]).
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In post-independence Kenya, large tracts of land officially registered as settlement schemes46,
see [66], and were excised off from Government forests to resettle squatters and Mau war veterans [67].
These included the ‘million acre schemes’ and the “haraka” settlement schemes in Rift Valley [7,8].
In addition, Kanyinga (2009, pp.108–198) states that by early 2004, there were about 418 settlement
schemes in the country, 154 or 37 percent were in Rift Valley, of these one third were owned by Kikuyu
the so-called “immigrant guests” [66]. Furthermore, a “class bias was evident in these programs
because those people with the ability to pay 10 percent deposit for the cost of the plots and operating
capital got larger plots, these were the elite and salaried” [66].
The interview excerpt illustrates how and why the Kikuyu living in an area with recurrent ethnic
conflict have managed to resolve their land ownership issues:
“Mostly the Kamuyu cooperative committee resolves the cases we especially land disputes cases.
However, big cases are handled by our Kikuyu politicians. For example, during the time we were
doing demarcation a government surveyor was employed to do the demarcation, previously it was
done by a private surveyor and that was back in 1980. The government surveyor was brought to come
and put clear boundaries for issuance of title deeds. The surveyor was not good in his work and he cut
out some portions from an owner and allocated them to another person. People started complaining
and they started so many cases of that improper land allocation. When I became chairman in 2004, the
demarcation issue was the first case I started handling. We were happy because Mwai Kibaki (Kikuyu
ethnicity) was president and things were better for Kikuyus. Some of the committee members and I
went to Nairobi and met Martha Karua (the then Minister of Justice and constitutional affairs) who
assigned us a lawyer to oversee that case. Before the case could pick up came the 2007 post-election
violence. When this confusion ended I went back to her office but she was transferred from that
ministry to another. She is a good Kikuyu politician, because she still resolved our matter even though
she had moved.”
(KII, Chairman, Kamuyu Cooperative Farm)
There are two elements at play here, the first is the Kamuyu-Kikuyu community’s mistrust in
immediate local land governance structures, but have confidence in national governance structures
which are dominated by politicians from the Kikuyu ethnic community. This can be attributed to their
status as “immigrant guests”. It should be noted that at the time of this interview in 2012, transport
costs from Burnt Forest to Nairobi to meet with Martha Karua were marginally higher than those from
Burnt forest to Eldoret to meet with area MP Peris Simam, yet the Kamuyu committee preferred to
meet with Ms Karua. In this situation, the committee of Kamuyu cooperative society approach Martha
Karua (Kikuyu ethnic group) who was then the member of parliament for Gichugu (a constituency in
Central province of Kenya) as well as a cabinet minister, for assistance in resolving a land issue for
them in Uasin Gishu rather than approaching their own member of Parliament Ms Peris Simam who is
from the Kalenjin ethnic group. This builds on my earlier arguments about devolution of the National
Land Commission and the ethnic bias in selecting members of the land boards. This type of selectivity
may oblige ethnic groups to seek redress on their land issues through their own networks e.g., Kikuyu
politicians because they are trustworthy.
The second element at play here is that Martha Karua takes up this case and even pays a lawyer
to handle it. Such patron-client relationships are largely motivated by one’s sense of commitment to
the ethnic community. Martha Karua hires a lawyer for the Kamuyu committee even if they are not
from her constituency. She reinforces their trust in “belonging” to the Kikuyu community even though
they have migrated and live far from the so-called Kikuyu homelands in central province.
46 According to Kanyinga, 1989, pp. 108–109 [66], “the skewed nature of the policy in favor of the Kikuyu was an issue of
concern. Some of the settlements schemes were designed to satisfy the Kikuyu land hunger because they-Kikuyu, had the
organization to destabilize the structure of landownership and the economy.”
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6. Discussions
The colonial and post-colonial governments both supported policies that gazetted forests putting
them under management of government. This move affected the livelihoods of indigenous forest
dwellers such as the Ogiek were affected [16,44]. Although the government measures (both colonial
and post-colonial) to protect the forest, may have emerged out of well-founded global concepts of
environmental protection, it swiftly changed from saving the forests to violent eviction of Ogiek [19].
An occurrence that Alden Wily (2018) has referred to as “green grabbing” [21].
In the Rift Valley region of Kenya, the value of land around Mau Forest has increased over the
years because of the favorable climatic conditions and also proximity to a natural resource. That is
why the prevalence of “distress land sales” between Ogiek and non-Ogiek is highlighted in this article.
The Mau forest as a common pool resource, has been exploited by those with stronger bargaining
power such as politicians, local leaders and dominant ethnic groups in several ways. The first, is to
harvest wood and convert it into charcoal, which is a lucrative business conducted between rural
and urban areas. Secondly, to exploit the trees for timber used as building materials. In addition,
over the years, companies such as Timsales and Raiply which have political interests have harvested
trees to supply to the Webuye paper mill [19,20]. Third reason is that, part of the resource has been
sold off to politicians who then convert the forest land into large-scale farms that specialize in cash
crops such as wheat and maize. In addition, to purchasing land near a rich common pool resource
such as Mau Forest, other non-Ogiek are eager to use the new infrastructure that has been put in place
(better road network and rural electrification that started in 2012). This changing state of infrastructure
is driving the prices of land further up.
This issue of “distress land sales” brings forward the implications of compensating a community
with a tenure framework that is individualized rather than “communal land tenure”. The fact that
some Ogiek have chosen to sell land shows the social reality; that economic needs supersede cultural
ties. The Ogiek who sell land may be faced with an economic crisis at household level and choose to
sell off land and lose their social ties with their fellow Ogiek. One may argue that, in a homogenous
(ethnic) communal land tenure setting the community may be able to offer an alternative to this sort of
economic setbacks. Hence, the enactment of the 2016 Communal Land Act is a welcome step in this
regard. Secondly, the Ogiek, do not have a fallback ancestral home like their fellow Kalenjin cousins.
The Ogiek land (Kipsangany and Kipkurerek) are now Gazetted Government forests therefore there is
no extra source of capital to start economic activities. By contrast, the Kalenjin have ancestral land in
Nandi, Elgeyo marakwet, Baringo and Kericho counties.
One cannot ignore the fact that the discourse on victimhood of Ogiek is straddled between human
rights and freedom of culture. First, the proponents of the human rights advocate for individualization
and “self” empowerment. The ‘re-turn’ to customary practices are promoted as communitarian yet in
practice, serve to benefit the patriarchs, more so the senior men of the community. This is evidenced
by the fact that women learn about “distress land sales” after the transaction has occurred. This issue
is examined by Lesorogol (2009) in her study of privatization of Siambu ranch among the Samburu
community in Kenya [68]. Secondly, proponents of the freedom of culture, advocate for the protection
and promotion of cultural practices that are perceived to maintain communal harmony. In addition,
the advocates for the rights for indigenous groups such as Ogiek, advocate for the freedom of culture
and ancestral right to forest land, a move that has not been fully embraced by the government and
associated land administration institutions.
7. Conclusions and Recommendations
The governance of Mau Forest that borders the case study of Ndungulu in Burnt Forest area,
shows how the different communities interact differently with the forest landscape. The Kalenjin and
the Kikuyu value the forest for charcoal, timber harvesting, and firewood for household use. The Ogiek
on the other hand associate the forest with their cultural values such as bee keeping, harvesting
medicinal plants, prayer shrines in remembrance of ancestors and also social memory. A new approach
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to forest governance is through the community-based associations. This approach is said to increase
rights of local people to community forest management. However, findings from this study reveal
the opposite.
The definition of “community” in the new Community Land Act (CLA) of 2016 has been modified
to accommodate multiple users of community land who are citizens of Kenya and share any of the
following attributes: common ancestry, similar culture or unique mode of livelihood. This may
be progressive in the fight against ethnicity, on the contrary, it may water down the strength of
customary land rights of minority ethnic groups seeking to engage in joint agreements. Furthermore,
in instances where there is ethnic heterogeneity in the management of communal land, this may give
rise to hierarchy. This is because dominant groups such as Kalenjin may legally assert themselves in
“communal land ownership spaces” with the indigenous groups’ i.e., the Ogiek. In addition, the CLA,
has introduced the Community Land Management Committees (CLMCs) which may replace the
elder’s council in adjudication of land matters. One may argue that, if Kalenjin sub groups dominate
the management positions of these CLMCs, then decisions are bound to be skewed in favour of
Kalenjin and not Ogiek. Overall, the restitution of land to this indigenous group seems an uphill task
for the government.
The land policies that were successful in western countries may not be the answer for a ‘one-size
fits all’ land reform project for African countries such as Kenya. This study showed that the attempts
by the state to reconcile ethnic animosities between Kalenjin and Kikuyu in Rift Valley tends to
distract the land reform process from the real issue; the plight of the Ogiek. This study demonstrates
that beyond the household level, marginalized communities such as the Ogiek living on Ndungulu
settlement scheme, are in competition with dominant ethnic communities in the politics around
land redistribution.
Supplementary Materials: The following are available online at http://www.mdpi.com/2073-445X/7/4/140/s1,
Table S1: Ogiek Families Settled in 1996/1997 after the Land Clashes of 1992.
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Abstract: Agriculture is the backbone of Kenya’s economy, supporting up to 80% of rural livelihoods.
Kenya’s export horticulture is currently the leading agriculture subsector in Kenya and is regarded
as an agro-industrial food system based on the economies of scale, producing for mass markets
outside of the production area. Much of the food consumed from Kenya’s export horticulture
sector has undergone multiple transformations and been subject to a host of formal and informal
institutions (rules, regulations, standards, norms and values). Kenya’s export horticulture production,
driven by rising global demands, has expanded beyond the ‘traditional’ mountainous high yielding
areas into arid and semi-arid (ASALs) zones such as Laikipia County, Northwest of Mount Kenya.
An anthropological study of export horticulture viewed as an agro-industrial food system in Laikipia
County was carried out utilizing the new institutionalism theory in anthropology to explore the actors,
rules and regulations linked to export horticulture production and access to common pool resources.
The study employed qualitative data collection methods to collect data over an extended field work
period of eight months. The data from 40 in-depth interviews complemented by unstructured
observations, four focus group discussions and five key informant interviews was transcribed,
coded and analyzed thematically based on the grounded theory approach. This paper, therefore,
presents findings from the qualitative case study on the actors as well as the rules and regulations
(the institutional settings) of export horticulture production and access to common pool resources
from an emic perspective of the involved actors. The formal and informal rules and regulations which
form the institutional setting in this food system are viewed as changing and defining the operations
of the food system’s access and management of common pool resources, namely water and land.
With the agro-industrial food system competing with local food systems such as agro-pastoralism
and small holder agriculture for these scarce resources in a semi-arid zone, there is potential for
conflict and reduced production, as well as overall benefits to the different actors in the study area.
Keywords: qualitative; agro-industrial food system; actors; formal and informal rules and regulations;
export horticulture; common pool resources; land; water; Laikipia County
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1. Introduction
Kenya’s export horticulture is regarded as an agro-industrial food system based on the economies
of scale, producing for mass markets outside of the production area [1,2]. Much of the food consumed
from this food system has undergone multiple transformations, travelled substantial distances,
passed through different hands and been subject to formal and informal rules and regulations [1,3].
Currently, the horticulture industry in Kenya is the fastest growing agricultural subsector and
is ranked third in terms of foreign exchange earnings from exports, after tourism and tea [2].
Kenya’s value of horticulture has quadrupled in the last three decades and is now the largest exporter
of horticultural produce in Sub Saharan Africa, with a 16 percent share in the European market.
Kenya’s export horticulture sector also subscribes to international food safety and quality standards as
the European union is its main destination market [2]. The steady growth, as seen in export horticulture
is, however, not felt across other agriculture and foreign income earning subsectors [2,4].
While Kenya’s export horticulture began with a small number of Asian-owned family enterprises in
the 1960s, several well-financed exporters had joined the sector by the 1980s [5–7]. International investments
(foreign direct investments) in Kenya grew rapidly after independence and these included investments
into the horticulture sector [7,8]. The multinational exporters viewed direct sales of export horticulture
produce to retailers in Europe as a way to exploit their advantages in investment, scale and market
linkages [6,8]. As competition has intensified, many small and medium-sized exporters have
shifted to growing crops for the large exporters rather than shouldering the risk of exporting [8,9].
However, despite the increase in large-scale, export-oriented farms, exporters still source at least
some of their produce from their own farms because; control over one’s own production guarantees
continuity of supply and reduces the risk of losing suppliers to competitors and also provides them
with hands-on problem solving capabilities [5,10,11]. In an industry increasingly characterized by
innovation and the need for rapid problem-solving, these are important. Some exporters (and their
associated importers) also believe that vertical integration provides greater control and greater scope
for reducing costs [8,9,11]. Notably, the power in the supply chain lies in possessing resources and
capabilities that are not easily substitutable. Established exporters have some protection from the
competence and relationships that they have built up over time, including knowledge of production
and post-harvest processes; investments in specialized facilities; and relationships based on trust
and reciprocity with overseas customers in the short-term [11]. These capabilities decrease their
vulnerability to substitution within the supply chain, either from within Europe or from another
external supply source [8].
The growth in horticultural production of fruits and vegetables, for export, in developing
countries has also been coupled with dramatic changes in governance patterns of trade in the sector.
This is driven by two key factors related to the European market. The first factor is the increasingly
multifaceted strict environment for control of food safety, particularly pesticide residues and conditions
for post-harvest processing, as well as environmental and labor standards [10,12,13]. Many large
food companies, supermarket chains (the main buyers of the horticultural produce) and NGOs
(Non–Governmental Organization) have engaged in establishing private food standards—that are
often stricter than public requirements—and have implemented food quality and safety standards in
certification protocols, including GLOBAL G.A.P.; Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI); Tesco’s Nature’s
Choice and Save Quality Food (SQV) Programme [3,12,14]. Although private standards are legally not
mandatory, many of them have become indirectly mandatory due to export pressure by a large share
of buyers in international agri-food markets requiring compliance with such private standards [3,8].
The second set of factors is the increasing involvement of retailers (supermarkets) in export horticulture
trade of mainly fresh fruits and vegetables (FFV) which is credited to the strategic importance of the
products. Fresh fruits and vegetables are one of the few items for which consumers will change their
choice of stores and because they are income-elastic products [10,14].
The horticulture sector in Kenya that started with its production dependent heavily on small
holder farming is now dominated by large-scale export, farming owned multinational companies
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as large-scale investments [1,2,15]. Large-scale land investments, such as export horticulture,
often emphasize the rapid increase in yield they can produce and the additional employment they
can provide [16–18]. However, these additional opportunities of agricultural production are not
felt locally or only on a short-term basis [16–19]. There also are small holder farmers producing as
outgrowers for the export companies and others for the domestic markets [19,20]. Export horticulture
has become one of the highlights of African development because it has raised production standards
in agriculture; provided good opportunities for increasing rural area incomes; improved nutrition of
the people; resulted in diversification of exports; provided raw materials for agro-based industries and
created employment, especially for the youth and women [9,19,20]. On the other hand, when export
horticulture is seen as part of an export food system, the economic implications are viewed differently.
Studies on horticulture in Kenya and other African countries, including Senegal, reported both positive
and detrimental effects of this sector to development and livelihoods [4,8,19,20].
Horticulture export, when regarded as an agro-industrial food system producing for commercial
markets outside of the production area, thus, needs to be interrogated further in relation to sustainable
food systems, ecological considerations and resource use. New institutionalism and political ecology
analysis views on the issue of food systems use and access of common pool resources, such as
land and water, regard the subsequent resource contestation as the outcome of problems related to
access, governance and distribution of resources [21–23]. Too much land and common pool resources,
such as water, pasture, forests and fisheries, have seen a change from common, to state and private
property, and are therefore not accessible for marginal people who also do not have the means to
get adequate wage earnings from employment in order to substitute that loss [19,21,22]. There are
formal and informal rules and regulations in export horticulture that define the institutional setting
for production and the access and use of land and water [1,21,22]. As export horticulture rises in
financial importance and becomes more valuable, it impacts on the local institutional setting of working
conditions, property rights and access to common pool resources, such as water and pasture, vital for
local livelihoods, and need to be interrogated further [11,16,21].
2. Export Horticulture and Institutional Settings in Laikipia County
The export horticulture sector in Kenya has evolved over the years since the pre-colonial period
when the shaping of its structure, policies, production and marketing began [7]. The sector’s production
of vegetables, fruits, and high care products is market driven, with increasing stringent food safety
standards resulting from increased consumer awareness and a series of food safety failures in the
1990s [24,25]. Notably, Kenya’s export horticulture production, driven by rising global demands,
has expanded beyond the ‘traditional’ mountainous high yielding areas into arid and semi-arid
(ASALs) zones [19]. As a result of this expansion to regions with varying climatic and agronomic
conditions, most horticulture companies rely on both rain-fed as well as economically modified
conditions for crop production and utilize land to maximize production [26,27]. The ASALs, such as
the Laikipia County region, are often prone to common pool resources (CPR) contestation among the
different food systems, given the poor rainfall and frequent dry spells [19,26,28].
Despite arid climatic conditions in Laikipia County, the horticulture sector is booming with over
30 horticulture companies in 35 farms competing against other food systems, such as small holder
farming and pastoralism in the region, for the already scarce resources [26,28,29]. Agro-industrial
horticulture displays a specific form of interaction with neighboring communities and with the
administration on different levels. In addition, the sector’s culture and institutional settings define its
operations, as well as utilization of common pool resources for the production of food and influences
its linkages with other food systems. Understanding these institutions (rules and regulations), actors,
and linkages provides insights into this sector which is also regarded as part of an agro-industrial
food system.
Developments in agro-industrial horticulture in Kenya can be related to the issue of changes
in relative prices, as in the institutional analysis model of Ensminger [30]. The rise of market prices
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for horticulture products triggers investments, and changes actors’ access to labor, bargaining power
and institutional settings, as land and other common pool resources are much more devoted to this
sector [30]. Despite arid climatic conditions in the north west of Mount Kenya, the horticulture sector
is still growing and, thus, utilizing more resources over time. The region’s different food systems,
namely; agro-industrial horticulture, pastoralism and small holder agriculture, compete for land,
capital, and water, with access to water being particularly hotly contested [18,28]. There is also a
lot of food being produced through this labor intensive agro-industrial horticulture, but there still
remains limited holistic literature that can provide a deeper understanding of the actor involvement,
power relations, the major institutional setting transformations, linkages to the local food systems and
the ‘rules of the game’ of this sector [31].
Previous studies have focused on the impact of the development of the large-scale, export-oriented
horticulture sector on river water resources on the upper Ewaso Ng’iro basin [26,32]. Studies have
also looked into the implications of large-scale, export-oriented horticulture on rural livelihoods in
the North West of the Mount Kenya region [28,29]. Based on the literature reviewed, this study
assumes that power relations of actors with different bargaining powers, perceptions and ideologies,
influence the formal and informal rules and regulations (institutional setting) ‘rules of the game’ of
common pool resource use and access in export horticulture production.
3. History of Land and Water Use and Access in the Study Area
In pre-colonial Kenya, land in Laikipia County extending into the Rift valley region was mainly
owned by pastoral communities, as community lands where water, land and pasture were utilized
communally. When Kenya became a British colony, land in this region, alongside the Nyandarua
ranges, was taken up by the white settlers, and regarded as the White Highlands [33]. At this time,
the pastoral communities were pushed away into the Mugogodo forest area. The White settlers had
casual workers in their farms and establishments who were mainly from the Agikuyu and Ameru
communities [33]. As the colonial era came to an end in the late 1950s into early 1960s, the settlers began
to leave the colony, back to Britain, and hence disposed of their properties and lands. Following Kenya’s
independence in 1963, the land previously occupied by the white settlers was designated to be given
back to the Africans [33]. Prior to independence, the government initiated programmes to register
customary land as private property (Swynnerton Plan) and to reallocate land that had been isolated
during colonization [33]. According to Kohler (1987), the government bought land between 1961 and
1978, from European settlers who were keen to sell their land. This land acquired by the government
was either divided into individually owned plots that were assessed to provide for full subsistence
and a surplus cash production, or handed over as extensive ranches to wealthy and powerful Kenyans.
However, in spite of their large coverage, the government settlement schemes did not meet the demand
for land by the massive landless population [33].
Consequently, people organized themselves into groups/co-operatives to mobilize resources
with which they would then buy land in large tracts from settlers on their own. Notably, for the
private initiatives, public funds were crucial as the government provided credit facilities through the
Agricultural Finance Cooperation (AFC) to over one thousand groups for purchases of land [33]. It is,
however, important to note that not all land acquired post-colonial era was for immediate use; and also,
not all the colonial land was re-sold to government or private settlement groups. Some chunks of land
were still left in the ownership of large-scale landholders [33,34]. The largest settlement schemes were
dominated by beneficiaries of the KANU dominated district governments and in particular the Kikuyu
squatters, while the Luo and Maasai were nearly allocated no land. According to Hornsby, (2012):
p. 120, “the complex bureaucratic processes of land re-allocations used favored those with money,
education and contacts” [35]. This resulted in ethnic and violent tensions around the issue of land
which are ongoing to date [36]. Therefore, the government and private initiatives for the redistribution
of land can be viewed as not having achieved an equal allocation of land repossessed from the colonial
94
Land 2018, 7, 110
regime. Moreover, it is not described in the literature, how post-colonial land acquisitions influenced
the access and use of land for large-scale horticulture, a focal aspect in this study.
Land settlement in Laikipia had long-term effects [33,34]. The settlements resulted in significant
immigration and population growth in the region. Notably, a majority of the immigrants came from
ecologically high-potential areas where land had become scarce [34]. In 1994, the majority of small-scale
farmers in Laikipia were Kikuyu (89%) from the current Nyeri, Muranga and Kiambu counties.
The Ameru (8%) of the current Meru County were reported to occupy almost exclusively the eastern
part of Laikipia. Small-scale farmers who were previously farm laborers or squatters in the region
were found to be of an insignificant proportion [34]. Given the semi-arid conditions of Laikipia County,
the new immigrants had limited expertise in agriculture other than the rain-fed practices horned in
their ecologically high-potential zones of origin. As such, the new land owners converted the expanses
of land previously dedicated to rain-fed beef ranching and wheat cultivation into irrigated small-scale
mixed farming portions to allow for their practice of the traditional agro-pastoralist production [34].
Accordingly, the management of land and related resources, such as water, was transferred from a few,
large-scale land users to include a larger sub-set of individual small holders [33,34].
Numerous studies have documented that river water is the main source for irrigation farming
practices in the semi-arid area [37–39]. Over time, this has resulted in the over use and depletion of
water, an already scarce resource in the region, as well as conflicts over the access by the numerous
food systems including the small holder agro-pastoralists and large-scale users such as wildlife
conservancies, private ranches and horticulture investments in the region [19,26,28,29]. This paper,
therefore, focuses on the actors, rules and regulations in relation to the access of land and water
as common pool resources, linked to export horticulture in Laikipia County. It seeks to outline
the rules and regulations (institutional settings), and changes linked by the different actors to
export horticulture in its access and use of land, as well as the potential for common pool resource
contestation. Furthermore, it relates to research on large-scale land acquisitions, or land grabbing
debates, anchored on the new institutionalism theory that highlights the institutions as rules of the
game, and the food system perspective that regards export horticulture as an agro-industrial food
system [21,31].
4. Materials and Methods
4.1. Description of Study Area
The qualitative case study took place in the Laikipia County region. The research site was
an export horticulture investment (farm and pack-house) located in the Naibor area of Laikipia
North Sub-county (Figures 1 and 2). This research was carried out in the study site located in the
Laikipia County region for several reasons: First, the region is an arid and semi-arid (ASAL) zone
on the lee-ward side of Mount Kenya. It is characterized by dry spells and erratic rainfall patterns
averaging 400 mm per annum [19,28]. Arable land constitutes 1984 km2, non-arable land constitutes
approximately 7456 km2, and urban areas constitute 243.3 km2 out of the 9642 km2 total land mass.
Different food systems including pastoralism, mixed farming, and export horticulture, compete for the
already scarce common pool resources especially water and arable land [26,32,40]. Secondly, in the last
two decades, despite the ASAL characteristics, with the export horticulture sector spreading from the
high yielding mountainous regions with favorable climate into the ASALs, the study area has been
booming in export horticulture [26]. In Laikipia County, there has been notable growth of horticulture
companies from one farm in the 1990s, to 30 horticulture companies that operated at 35 farms and
covered an area of 1385 hectares in 2013 [26,32]. The area has, over the years, attracted migrants
from all over Kenya to work in the horticulture companies, with the native inhabitants of the region
mainly practicing pastoralism and small holder farming in their portions of land owned individually
or communally [26,32,33,40].
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Figure 1. Map of Kenya highlighting Laikipia County, the research area (Source: CETRAD, 2018 [41]).
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Figure 2. Map of the research area (Source: CETRAD, 2018 [42]).
4.2. Study Design and Selection of Study Participants
This study adopted an inductive case study design based on in-depth, qualitative exploration
to establish the institutional setting of export horticulture in the Laikipia County region in relation
to common pool resources. The study adopted a qualitative approach to allow for emic perspectives
of the food system actors. The study employed the purposive, non-probability technique to
sample the export horticulture farm and pack-house [hereafter regarded as investment], and study
participants respectively. Once the permission to carry out research was granted, the researcher
relocated to the neighboring area where she lived with a host family for the entire period of research.
These arrangements enabled interactions with different workers and with members of the communities
neighboring the horticulture investment.
Data was collected in two research phases that were carried out simultaneously. The preliminary
research stage involved direct and indirect observations complemented by informal, in-depth
interviews recorded on a daily basis as field notes. With the preliminary data from the informal
interviews, discussions and observations, different actors linked to the horticulture investment were
identified. The in-depth research stage, during which the bulk of the data was collected, followed the
preliminary stage without a break in between. At the preliminary research stage, the horticulture
investment was sampled purposively through existing networks based on its location, products,
and willingness of the company to host the research. The participants included: Representatives of
management, workers at different cadres in the farm and pack-house, county, and national government
representatives. Their participation was subject to their linkage to export horticulture production and
willingness to voluntarily participate in the study. Study participants were sampled conveniently and
taken through the informed consent process and verbal consent obtained with an emphasis on the
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participant’s right of voluntarism in deciding whether or not to participate in the study.1 The unit of
analysis in this research was the actors linked to the export horticulture setting.
4.3. Fieldwork and Data Analysis
The qualitative data was collected through 40, in-depth interviews, complemented by
unstructured observations, four focus groups discussions and five key informant interviews as
summarized in Table 1. This data was collected from August 2016 to March 2017 to enable long-term
exploration and interaction with the actors in export horticulture settings in Laikipia County. The study
findings were analyzed thematically, based on the grounded theory approach, to inform the study
objectives. Data obtained through the qualitative interviews was transcribed and translated into
English transcripts for coding and analysis, as most of the interviews were conducted in Swahili.
The field notes were also transcribed for analysis. Names of informants and places that were identifiers
were replaced with pseudonyms on the transcripts for anonymity and confidentiality of the study
participants. Once transcribed, the interview transcripts were reviewed for accuracy. Coding was
done manually. The researcher read through the transcripts repeatedly to identify and list inductive
codes. The codes were used to develop a codebook which was flexible to include new codes, delete or
merge other codes as the analysis went on. After coder agreement and transcript review, themes were
identified in line with the study objectives. Research findings have been integrated and presented as
thick descriptions complemented with verbatim quotations in this paper. Ethical considerations were
applied to data collection and subsequent analysis.1
Table 1. Summary of data collection tools and study participants.
Data Collection Tool Respondent (s)
In-Depth Interviews (n = 40)
Targeted at export horticulture workers, neighbors that lived in the
study area and practiced small holder farming for subsistence;
outgrowers and pastoralists sampled purposively in the study area.
Focus Group Discussions
n = 4 groups comprised of 6 to 8 members each
Workers and members of neighboring communities (small holder
farmers and pastoralists) who had knowledge regarding the access
and use of common pool resources in the study area.
Key Informant Interviews
n = 5
Key informant interviews targeted individuals identified as
knowledgeable on the institutional changes regarding common pool
resources use and access in the study area, as well as those with
deeper understanding of the export horticulture institutional settings.
These key informants were namely; two senior managers with over
5 years work experience in the horticulture investment; the Naibor area
assistant chief; a village elder from Muramati and a representative of a
local outgrower farmer group in Jua Kali area linked to the research site.
Unstructured Observation Carried out daily and recorded as field notes for the entire duration ofthe study.
5. Findings
Actors with Common Pool Resource Use, Access and Sharing Linked to Export Horticulture in the Study Area
Actors were identified in this study to include the members of communities neighboring the export
horticulture investment, including the local authorities. Investors, outgrower farmers and workers in
the horticulture setting were also identified as actors. Members of the communities neighboring the
export horticulture setting included the people residing around Jua Kali and Muramati town centers
1 Ethical considerations. The approval and permit for this study was issued by the National Council of Science, Technology
and Innovation (NACOSTI), Kenya. Collaboration and approval was further sought from the Export horticulture investment,
county government education and agriculture offices. The participants were given full details of the study including any
foreseen or anticipated risks and how to tackle them in case they occurred, and any benefits/compensations or lack of
beforehand. Informed consent and permission to record interviews was obtained.
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about 5 km each from the horticulture farm and pack-house. These community actors were engaged in
different livelihood activities including outgrowers/contract farmers for the horticulture farm located
within the study area; people who have moved into the locality to work in horticulture farming.
Besides working as wage laborers in the horticulture farm, people also obtain casual employment for
construction, clearing fields and even farming in these other establishments. There are pastoralists
who have come from Naibor and Doldol and bought land and settled around the horticulture farm’s
surrounding. These pastoralists still have their herds in the group ranches back in Naibor and Doldol.
They have herders and members of their larger families to look after them and from time to time visit
to tend after them. The small towns of Jua Kali and Muramati neighboring the farm also provide
opportunities for small traders to bring merchandise from Nanyuki town and sell to the people living
here. In addition, besides looking for work at the horticulture farm, people can find casual work in the
development estates.
As observed in this study, in the neighboring areas close to the horticulture farm most of the
housing is permanent (stone-built) or semi-permanent (wooden-built) for rentals. There are also
individuals who have built their own homes and reside there. The road is tarmacked, there is
electricity and, in some cases, tapped water is provided by the Nanyuki Water and Sewerage Company.
As you move from the town towards the horticulture farm, a distance of about 3 km, there are people’s
homesteads, though these are sparsely placed. Most of these homesteads (built mainly of stone and
wood with corrugated iron roofing) either have water tanks for water storage (which are used to store
rain water) or just have to depend on the river water. These communities comprised people of different
ethnicities originating from the study area, with others who migrated into the region in search of
work, pasture and livelihood opportunities. There were other investments that offered work for the
population, such as development companies constructing property, as well as smaller farms doing









Figure 3. Summary of land use and economic activities in the study area (Source: Author, 2017).
(A) Picture of permanent corrugated iron roofed houses in the study area; (B) Picture of a signpost of
one of the real estate developments in the study area; (C) Picture of the export horticulture open field
production in the study area; (D) Picture capturing a packhouse for export horticulture (green building)
and real estate homes being developed for sale in the study area (cream buildings).
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The investors and owners were identified as value chain actors playing the role of producer
and processor in export horticulture in the study area. The owners established the horticulture
exporting company and subsequently production units such as the horticulture investment in Laikipia
County where the study took place. As reported in this study, investors set up the production unit
and facilities for post-harvest management to enable the production, processing and distribution of
export horticulture produce. Owners and investors provided the capital to access the land, water,
technology, material inputs. They engaged outgrowers and employ workforce for the labor intensive
horticulture production. As of 2017, the investors had three big farms and pack-houses including the
investment in Laikipia County. In addition to acquiring the land, the investors had capital investments
for setting up the infrastructure for the operations and running of the export horticulture investment.
Notably, the large-scale export horticulture investors had integrated technology into the processes
and activities for production and post-harvest handling to guarantee safety, efficiency, freshness and
quality of the high value, yet perishable, products.
Workers in the horticulture investment also identified as value chain actors in this study comprised
of both skilled and unskilled labor that was engaged on permanent and short-term wage-based
contracts, respectively. The workers played the roles of producers and processors as reported in
this study. Many workers, especially women, found short term sources of income through the wage
employment opportunities in large-scale horticulture as is further highlighted in the following excerpts:
In the morning in Nanyuki town, you will find about 20 buses or more that ferry workers both from
the management level and the farm hands moving across to the various farms. The locus of their
operation is Nanyuki town. (KII_09, County Agriculture officer, Male, 47 years)
Currently there are about 1073 employees with the farm having about 600 and the rest being in the
pack-house. Of the workers, the majority are women because most of the work here is done better by
women than men. (IDI_31, Crop manager, Female, 41 years)
The bulk of employees (over 80%) comprised of unskilled seasonal workers hired on a short-term
wage basis. These workers lived in the surrounding areas with most of them being immigrants into
the Laikipia County region in search of work. The majority of these workers did not own land in the
region as illustrated in the excerpt:
For the seasonal staff we give them contracts are varying from between 1 to 3 months renewable based
on work availability and performance. Most of these workers do not have land to farm on here and the
few who have, say about one percent of our workers only do subsistence or outgrower farming. The
pastoralists who are the majority original inhabitants of this region rarely come to work in horticulture
farms. (IDI_06, Administrative officer, Male, 38 years)
There were also a few small holder farmers in the study area as well, who teamed up into farmers
groups and provided outgrower/contract farming services to the horticulture investment, as well
as other horticulture farms in Laikipia County. The outgrowers often produced for the horticulture
investment crops that required less monitoring, like the fine beans and baby corn. The outgrowers
provided diversity by contributing to about 20 per cent of the export product for the company.
The involvement of the outgrower contract farmers is further detailed in the following excerpts:
We have contracted farmers around who supply different products like the fine beans coming in from
the Timau group. (IDI_03, Team leader, Male, 29 years)
We work with outgrowers to grow different horticulture produce from what was available at our own
farm like fine or french beans (green and yellow) and baby corn and in this way, we increase the variety
of produce for the consumers. (IDI_06, Administrative officer, Male, 38 years)
Small growers have also come up because we are getting produce from the outgrowers who are around the
farm so that some were working here; they went out and started doing their work. (KII_01, Manager,
Horticulture investment, Laikipia County)
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However, over the years the involvement of outgrowers had been greatly affected by the increasing
market standards, whose compliance costs are to be met by the individuals. Consequently, outgrowers not
meeting the market standards were often dropped off the value chain as explained in the
following excerpt:
We gave them the new regulations, for those who managed we continued with them and for those
who did not manage by the new standards we had to let them go because it was very difficult to have
everybody on board. (IDI_06, Administrative officer, Male, 38 years)
These different actors namely; the investors, the workers, the members of the neighboring
communities, including the outgrowers around the study setting, have many narratives to project
their ideologies based on their perceptions and bargaining power positions to explain common pool
resource (water and land) use and access overtime.
6. Perceptions of Actors on the Access and Use of Land as a Common Pool Resource Linked to
Export Horticulture in Laikipia County
In 2004/2005, when the export horticulture investment in Laikipia County was set up,
the investors ventured into establishing the farm in that locality as the first of its production units for
three key reasons namely; the cheap land rates, availability of large tracts of underutilized land and
the proximity to water sources. These aspects are as detailed in the following excerpt, as detailed from
an interview with one of the managers of the horticulture investment:
Why we started with a farm Nanyuki was mainly because of the availability of the land. We not only
found the land here but there were rivers that were flowing that time and this land at that time was cheaper
as compared to the other areas. (KII_02, Manager, Horticulture investment, Laikipia County)
At that time, land in the region was available as large underutilized and unexploited tracts of
land that mostly were left fallow. In 2004/2005, one acre cost the exporting company Kshs 50,000
(500 USD) and they bought 700 acres within one locality from one owner under the freehold land
tenure, as explained in the following excerpts from key informant interviews:
If you wanted an acre or two depending on your ability to buy, they sell it to you an acre for about 50 to
60 thousand Kenya shillings back in 2008, 2007. Like this horticulture farm where I used to work bought
land from one man who owns a lot of land in this area. (Village elder, Laikipia County, KII_03)
We acquired an acre for about 50,000 Kenya shillings. Today the price is almost increase by 100 per
cent. (KII_02, Manager, Horticulture investment, Laikipia County)
The land, on which the export horticulture investment was located, was initially owned by one
individual who had amassed large tracts of land and invested heavily in real estate in the region as
detailed in key informant interview excerpt:
[And all that land was bought from Mugambi?] Yes. It all belonged to Mugambi. It was very big.
Half of Muramati belongs to him. He bought very many shares from the white man. No, they were
a group. [Okay, a group? Then they left the land to the Africans who had shares?] You know,
some Africans refused to contribute for the shares. It was not compulsory. If you wanted to get the
shares, that was okay. Then when the Europeans were leaving, they would leave the farm to the
Africans who had shares in the land. Even if the land was 2000 acres, 1000 acres, they just left the
land to them. (Village elder, Laikipia County, KII_03)
Notably, in the Laikipia County region, land at one point in pre-colonial era was communally
owned and belonged to the pastoral communities. As reported in the study and corroborated in
literature, in independent Kenya, land was mainly secured by the different actors on freehold titles
obtained through purchase of the property from private owners. The new land owners utilized
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land and related resources for economic activities, such as small holder agriculture; large-scale
export-oriented horticulture as in the case of the farm; real estate development; private ranching
and wildlife conservancies. These actors’ perceptions on land ownership in the study area are further
elaborated in the excerpts:
Like for us when we started the church, where I am a pastor in 2004 there were no homesteads in this
Kariunga area. Then there were very few people. That was when the farm was beginning. There are
now more people living in this area especially after the farm was established. Now this is a big village.
(Community FGD_02, Laikipia County)
Other foreigners besides the owners of the horticulture farm also started to buy land here for ranching
and other farms and life has gone on. We get construction jobs in those farms. (Community FGD_02,
Laikipia County)
The pastoral communities lived more towards the Northern part of the region where they were
settled by the government in community trust lands and land and pasture use and access was
communal. There were some pastoralists who had come from Naibor and Doldol and bought land
and settled around the horticulture farm’s surrounding as illustrated in the excerpts:
These pastoralists still had their herds in the group ranches back in Naibor and Doldol. They engaged
herders and members of their larger families to look after them and from time to time visit to tend after
them. (Community FGD_01, Laikipia County)
You can’t build in a land that is not yours. So, they have bought the land and they have their own title
deeds. Only that family can build on that land. (Community FGD_01, Laikipia County)
In desperate times, when there was scarcity of grass for their herds, the pastoral communities
would overlook the institutional settings of land and private property, and, especially in the dry
seasons, would trespass into the horticulture farm’s land to graze their animals as illustrated in
the excerpt:
We must search for the animals. Sometimes we even go to the farm to search for grass there.
The horticulture farm doesn’t allow, but as pastoralists, we don’t fear them. We just let the animals
wander to that farm. When asked we say they had wandered to that farm but in the real sense it was
us that drove the animals there for food. (Community FGD_04, Laikipia County)
While this was not a common practice, the pastoral community had the potential to break the
existing institutional settings and affect the agro-industrial food system. Given that the private property
land tenure was familiar to the communities linked to the horticulture investment, and that, over time,
they had co-existed peacefully, the semi-arid environmental characteristics could work against the
actors and create situations of conflict as illustrated in the excerpt:
Some time ago there was a court case that lasted for some six to seven years about grazing goats in
large-scale farm by one individual, and it was a case taken to court for some time. They even had hired
lawyers and it went on for so long. But since then we have not had any more issues. And it almost
caused enmity in the community because the head of security that had forwarded the case became the
people’s enemy. There was even a case of mistaken identity, where a villager was accidentally pierced
with a spear after being mistaken for the security man. This was caused by that quarrel. That led
to that man moving from this area and settled in a different area. We learnt that it is good for the
community to live in harmony with its neighbors . . . . (Community FGD_02, Laikipia County)
Given the dynamics of seeking a livelihood for the local actors, particularly the pastoralists,
and the need for production even in the dry seasons for the horticulture investment, these set of actors
instituted unwritten/informal arrangements and rules to complement the formal institutions of land
tenure as illustrated in the following excerpts:
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We have even donated some part our farm which still has its natural vegetation and is not arable at
the moment to the community to graze their cattle. And in return they are taking care of this place.
(KII_02, Manager, Horticulture investment, Laikipia County)
The only areas we do not allow them to graze in the farm is where we have planted. But outside
the farm towards Muramati we have quite a big chunk of unfarmed land and we let the pastoralist
graze. The farm is now part of the community. They have taken ownership and even before others
come from far wanting to invade our farm they are the first ones to stop them. (KII_01, Manager,
Horticulture investment, Laikipia County)
The investor had also instituted informal arrangements especially for the pastoral communities
to access pasture in the uncultivated section of the farm, alongside other community development
activities through the company’s corporate social responsibility. According to the investors, the good
relationship with the neighboring community was important for the export horticulture investment as
it secured its territory, produce and investments, as further detailed in the excerpt:
To be very honest the community has been very supportive. You can see even when we have these cattle
rustlers we just hear it from very far but don’t come around. (KII_01, Manager, Horticulture investment,
Laikipia County)
These institutional settings and changes around land in the study area are founded on historic
entitlements and laws on land ownership. While individual owners buy and own land in the formal
arrangements, pastoral communities have a historic claim on land. They perceive access rights to
be passed down, as these were their ancestral lands wrongfully taken from them. With the erratic
rainfall in the semi-arid lands, there is periodic drought where pastures are scarce. In those seasons,
given the unequal distribution of gains from the land, there is potential for conflict especially between
large-scale land investors, such as the export horticulture investment, and communities linked to it by
virtue of location.
For instance, pastoralists in search of pasture and water could trespass into privately owned
properties, including large-scale horticulture farms, creating potential for resource related conflicts.
In the study area, these resource related conflicts were witnessed in 2017, with herders invading private
large-scale ranches to access water and pasture for their livestock. The horticulture farm was not
directly affected by these conflicts as the herders targeted ranches rearing livestock and conserving
wildlife. However, data collection this study was concluded as this pastoralist—private ranches
conflict was developing. Detailed studies that explore the contentious issues around water and land as
shared resources in Laikipia County are recommended. This discourse on potential conflicts is further
advanced in the following section that presents the institutional settings of access and use of water.
7. Resource Contestation Linked to Water Scarcity
The export horticulture investment settled on their first farm in the Laikipia County location
because of the proximity to two rivers, namely, River Timau and River Ontilili which pass by the hedges
in two sides of the land. This was a guarantee to water availability. Due to the year-round production in
order to meet market demands, the horticulture investment practiced irrigation agriculture. Water was
an important factor to consider in export horticulture production, given the water-intensity of the
crops grown in this sector. When the farm was established, proximity of the land to a reliable source of
water was considered a key factor when choosing its location. This, to them, was seen a guarantee to
water availability as espoused in the excerpts:
The fact that there were two rivers namely; Timau and Ontilili which pass by its hedges of this land
was another factor that was important in selecting the location of this farm. These rivers were to them
viewed as a guarantee to water availability because these horticulture crops have high water demands.
(KII_01, Manager, horticulture investment, Laikipia County)
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We get our water from River Timau. In fact, when we started we were getting water from Ontilili
river but somewhere around 2005 to 2007 the river started drying up. It is then that we went to
Timau River from around 2010. (IDI_31, Crop manager, female, 41 years)
At the point of acquiring the farm, the investors were strategic in being able to have the river water
sources accessible for use through abstraction and harvesting. However, this element has changed,
over the years since the farm was acquired, with the rivers drying up and becoming seasonal as in
the excerpts:
The main source of water is River Timau which is abstracted to dams within the farm. The Ontilili
river has now become seasonal and is not as dependable. (IDI_24, Farm worker, Male, 45 years)
This farm generally faces water shortage challenges because Timau which is much closer to the forest
where the river waters flow from has many horticulture farms and by the time this water flows
downstream to this farm only very little is left. (IDI_32, Farm worker, Male, 27 years)
The water that is tapped into the rivers in the rainy season, often dries up in the dry season, as
had been the case between December 2016 and March 2017. The horticulture farm now invests in
alternative water sources, such as rainwater harvesting and underground water from boreholes to
manage its water demands as espoused in the excerpt:
There are three dams and one manmade lake. A fourth dam is under construction. Water for cleaning
buildings as well as for use in the sanitary units is also sourced from the dam. However, water for
irrigating crops in the green houses (NPDs) as well as for use in the canteen for cooking as well as
drinking is strictly sourced from the boreholes or tanks containing rain harvested water. Water from
the dams is not fit for human consumption as it is not purified before use. It is mainly filtered to
remove particles of dirt that may cause blockages on the drip pipes. If you actually walk around the
hydrant posts you find signages indicating ‘do not drink hydrant water’. (IDI_19, Farm supervisor,
Male, 45 years)
The use and regulation of water in the region was managed by the national government through
Water Resources Authority (WRA) which worked through community led Water Resource Users
Associations (WRUAs) to regulate river water users. WRA had structures in place, including water
meters in farms, to record the cubic meters of water utilized for monthly payments. The horticulture
investment was in two WRUAs, given its location, namely Ontilili and Timau, as summarized in
the excerpts:
But there are people from the water authority who monitor that water even as you pump it. Because like
now, the water is not enough, pumping river water is regulated because some people may not get water.
Sometimes those people can even carry your generator. (Community FGD_01, Laikipia County)
If your farm goes up to the river, 10 ft towards the river belongs to the government. So even if your
farm goes all the way to the river, you are not allowed to farm very close to the river. So, what you do is
put pipes and pump water from the river using a generator right to your farm. (Community FGD_01,
Laikipia County)
As the horticulture investment accessed water, it shared this resource with other users including
small holder farmers, other horticulture establishments and pastoralists, as it was located downstream
of the Ewaso Ng’iro River basin. The neighbors of the horticulture farm share common pool resources,
especially water and land, for farming and pasture with the establishment as elaborated in the excerpts:
But sometimes the river dries up, like now it is dry and we cannot plant anything, our crops are
drying in the farms. Even the fine beans we have been harvesting to take to the horticulture farm will
now just wither unless by good luck it rains. (Community FGD_02, Laikipia County)
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We get water from the river but now the river is dry. We are now buying water from this borehole [in
a nearby private farm close to the location of the discussion] or we go to Jua Kali. If you don’t have
enough money you go to the other river at Jua Kali. (Community FGD_04, Laikipia County)
The horticulture farm regarded its downstream location, coupled with both the erratic rainfall
patterns in this leeward side of Mount Kenya and with the semi-arid climate, as the main challenge
in accessing water for irrigation. There was also increased river water use upstream of the two main
rivers, now turning seasonal. In spite of the erratic rainfalls, downstream users argued that river water
would still be available, and enough, if it was properly regulated and coordinated as elaborated in
the excerpt:
So many people, local farmers are getting water up stream and other big growers like Finlays and
also other flower growers are getting water are also getting water from the same river. There is no
proper control that is why it is drying up. Which we have Timau River user associations where we
also belong and there is very little they can do to control these local people because they steal at night.
(IDI_06, Administrative officer, Male, 38 years)
Not all river water users were registered and there was, therefore, the possibility of many users
beyond the river’s capacity. Users upstream, including the horticulture farms, were also blamed for
excess abstraction of water, limiting the access by the downstream users, as espoused in the excerpts:
Because the horticulture farms tamper with the meter and that is not something that is hidden.
They use huge meters that abstract most of the water, then they release water that has been
contaminated with chemicals. (IDI_33, Small holder farmer, Female, 38 years)
Even when it is dry, the river has water. Another horticulture farm [H] has closed this water. They are
the ones who have closed it. You know they grow flowers, and the demand for flowers is big because of
weddings and all that. . . . . H is a very big company. When we complain, we are just locals, those are
big people. If they give a bribe of say three million, we can’t compete with that? Sometimes even when
we complain, we are told it will be opened, when we come back home, there’s no water, or they open it
for some time then close it again. (Community FGD_03, Laikipia County)
The water authorities, especially the water resource user associations (WRUAs) that comprised
leadership from the local communities around the water catchment areas, were faulted for not fully
regulating the use of the river water as detailed in the excerpt:
But you see now these local WRA officials are not being honest. So, when someone goes to the head
office asking for the additional water points, you get one and you can see from their system there
aren’t many users authorized to access the water. However, in practical there are so many other users
and we don’t know whether they are allowed or not. (KII_02, Manager, horticulture investment,
Laikipia County)
Large investments dealt with the water scarcity in the Laikipia County region by investing in
alternative water sources, such as boreholes and manmade dams within their settings, to supplement
the diminishing river water as in the case of the horticulture farm, as elaborated in the excerpt:
When it is raining we harvest a lot of water, we have five dams and we are still digging more of the
dams. We want to excavate a lot of dams so that we can have a lot of water as much as possible so
that it can take us at least for a year even if we don’t get rain. If we can store about two million
cubic meters last us throughout the year if it doesn’t rain. But we have less than a million right now
and that is why at some point we will have to depend on the rains which are not very predictable.
(KII_01, Manager, Horticulture investment, Laikipia County)
Additionally, at the County, the Nanyuki Water and Sewerage Company (NAWASCO) offered
tapped water services, payable monthly, to supplement water for domestic use, mainly from the
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boreholes and rainwater harvested in the horticulture farms and large-scale ranches in the region.
The alternative sources were not yet sufficient to sustain the horticulture investments’ water needs.
As such, the investment lost many crops that could not be watered and had to depend on other sources
to supplement their market supplies for the season between December 2016 and late March 2017 when
the rain started as espoused in the excerpts:
In some instances, like what we are now experiencing we have to leave already planted crop dry in the
farm because we cannot harvest without water. This will cause massive losses for the us as well as our
outgrower farmers who are also affected by this dry season. (IDI_07, Crop manager, male, 32 years)
There’s plenty of work but there is no water to do the work. You see the river is drying up already.
(Community FGD_02, Laikipia County)
Through informal institutional arrangements, the horticulture investment shared water as a
common pool resource as illuminated in the excerpts:
We have Kariunga police station and another police base at Muramati we supply them with water on
a weekly basis. (IDI_06, Administrative officer, Male, 38 years)
Workers were able to access clean drinking water while in the horticulture investment. As observed
in the study, at times in the dry season, senior management could even carry water for use at home.
However, given that the water was barely enough for the production activities, the majority of the
workers had to source alternative sources of water outside of the horticulture investment, however,
as detailed in the excerpt;
A 20 liter can of water was sold at 20 Kenya shillings from local water suppliers including NAWASCO
and individuals with tapped ground water. In most desperate instances water then was fetched from
the already drying up river bed. (Community FGD_01, Laikipia County)
The water scarcity also affected outgrower farmers in the region who mostly depended on river
water for irrigation and did not have the capacity to set up alternative water sources as alluded in
the excerpt:
Water scarcity affects us as we solely depend on the river water. We do not have the resources to put up
reservoirs and boreholes to sustain us a bit more in dry seasons. So, in the dry seasons our crops just dry
in the sun and we lose our incomes. (KII_04, Outgrower farmer group secretary, Laikipia County)
Additionally, the communities around the river, especially those downstream, faced the threat of
using contaminated water redirected from the large-scale horticulture farms as illustrated in the excerpt:
There was a time the local communities were drinking dirty water. The water in the river was
contaminated by water from the pack-house. There was a problem and I think they had not realized it.
And you know one can’t tell dirty water when it’s flowing in the river because the soil purifies
that water. When the horticulture farm realized the mistake, it seems their pipes were faulty,
they constructed that dam you are seeing there. (Community FGD_03, Laikipia County)
The farms used large amounts of chemicals for pest management and often, when not monitored,
would dispose of the waste inappropriately. The chemical waste would end up mixing with
the flowing river water which other food producers accessed for domestic and subsistence use.
Water, likely contaminated with pesticides and fertilizer residue from horticulture farming was,
therefore, a threat to human and animal health, and the environment, in the study area as illustrated in
the excerpt:
In addition to water abstraction, the communities along the river, and downstream take this water
contaminated by chemicals from the big horticulture farms...I remember at some point in there was a
huge demonstration by the all the people from Isiolo and Laikipia, the pastoral communities that are there
because this Ewaso Ng’iro River is their lifeline as there is no other river so. (IDI_27, Small holder
farmer, 35 years)
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8. Discussion of Findings
8.1. Actors with Common Pool Resource Use, Access and Sharing Linked to Export Horticulture in the Study Area
As reported in this study, the different actors had different roles in the export horticulture value
chain with some actors, such as the investors and workers, having multiple roles. When analyzed,
the agro-industrial horticulture sector is regarded as having many stakeholders along the value chain.
In addition, especially after the market liberalization of the 1990s, the sector became multi-stakeholder
with the private sector playing key roles. These included input provision, credit, extension services,
post-harvest handling, value addition, agro-processing and market access [4,5,43]. The study findings
corroborated the literature and identified the owners/investors, the workforce, and the neighboring
community as the main actors in large scale, export-oriented horticulture use of land and water
as a common pool resource. The owners and investors provide the capital to access the land,
water, technology, and material inputs, as well as workforce required in the horticulture production.
Workers provide labor for production and share water as a common pool resource in the region with
the horticulture investment. Export oriented, large-scale horticulture production of vegetables and
flowers targeting the European market, started in the study area in the early 1990s [32]. The region
has over 1085 hectares of land dedicated to horticulture and employs about 4700–7400 persons [39].
The outgrowers are producers for the horticulture investment and, in their position as small holder
farmers, also share land and water as common pool resources. As illustrated by this study and reported
in other literature, there are multi-level stakeholders in the horticulture sector forming formal and
informal rules and regulations for production, as well as access to water and land [21,43,44].
Actors in export horticulture have varying perceptions and bargaining power positions that
drive the formal and informal rules and regulations (institutional settings) and changes in the food
system as illustrated by the study findings. The actors’ bargaining power positions are founded on
their perceptions about the food system and their ability to benefit from it for food security and food
sustainability. The actors’ positions were differentiated by their resource base in export horticulture,
as this defined their bargaining power and, ultimately, their ability to formulate and shape formal
and informal institutions in the food system. This consequently impacted on the actors’ capability to
benefit from the food system through income as profits from sales or wages; skills and welfare for
development in relation to food production, security and sustainability. The investors’ perceptions of
large-scale, export horticulture were based on their power position as the owners of the horticulture
investment. They had a higher bargaining power position, given that they had direct linkages to
the markets and also capital to invest in the business, compared to their wage workers, outgrowers,
and local communities. In their opinion as investors, they viewed the horticulture investment in terms
of its usefulness to the local communities and for the generation of income opportunities [9,25,44].
8.2. Resource Contestation Linked to Water Scarcity
Developments in horticultural export in Laikipia County can be related to the issue of changes in
relative prices, as in the institutional analysis model [30]. The rise of market prices for horticulture
products triggers investments and changes actors’ access to labor, bargaining power and institutional
settings (rules and regulations) as land and other common pool resources are much more devoted
to this sector [21,30]. Further, from existing literature, export horticulture is seen as one of the bright
spots of African development as it has raised production standards in agriculture; created supporting
industries, and provided considerable employment in rural areas [20,25,44]. However, critics argue
that increased globalization in export horticulture does not benefit the poor [18,45,46].
The study findings illustrated that agro-industrial horticulture is dependent on the market
demand, and access to water to determine the production. The study site, while able to adhere to the
production standards and align to the trade regimes to a large extent, the production capacity is often
affected by the water shortages resulting from the erratic weather in the region. Production, in turn,
defines the magnitude of labor to be engaged. For the study site, the market has remained stable
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over the years as they have established a consumer base for their produce. The challenge, however,
is on the water availability throughout the year to meet the production demands. The fresh fruits and
vegetables grown in the farm are water intensive and require irrigation. The farm where the research
took place is located within the North West Mount Kenya region which experiences erratic rainfall
because of the semi-arid climate it is located within. Additionally, given the downstream location of
the study site, access to river water is limited since other users abstract a lot of water upstream, with
only a little remaining for downstream users, including the horticulture farm. Similar findings are
reported elsewhere [19,28,37,39].
As illustrated by the study findings, the drying up of the two rivers that provided water for
irrigation farming, and had domestic uses for local actors, as well as the horticulture investment,
are prevailing challenges facing the use and access of water by the different food system actors.
Additionally, due to the limited alternative water options for most local users, the possible
contamination of water, overuse of water for export horticulture activities, and the unresolved river
water managements issues fueled by the ideologies of different actors on their ownership and access
rights, pose as a platform for conflicts and tension over water as a common pool resource in the
Laikipia County dominated by export horticulture despite its semi-arid climate characteristics that
limit access to water for the production of food.
Most new institutionalism analyses have looked into institutional settings that structure access to
land and associated natural resources—often Common Pool Resources (CPR) (e.g., Elinor Ostrom (1990)
provides a detailed account on common property rights in general. Jean Ensminger (1992),
Carolyn Lesorogol (2008) and Tobias Haller (2013) elaborately describe institutional settings that
structure access to CPR, such as pastures or fisheries) [21,47,48]. However, institutional settings also
structure other aspects of food systems, such as property rights (e.g., inheritance of goods or social
status), labor arrangements (e.g., wage-labor or labor arrangements based on kinship) or access to
infrastructure and knowledge (e.g., secret knowledge or patents) [21,43]. Even though the content of
these different institutions varies, their nature remains similar as illustrated by the study findings.
The ASALs, such as the Laikipia County region, are often prone to common pool resource (CPR)
contestation among the different food systems, given the poor rainfall and frequent dry spells [28,38].
The region’s different food systems compete for land, capital, and water, with access to water
being particularly hotly contested [19,26,29]. Despite arid climatic conditions in Laikipia County,
the horticulture sector is booming, with over 30 horticulture companies in 35 farms competing against
other food systems in the region for the already scarce resources [28,29,32]. Notably, the demand for
fresh horticultural products in Europe is at its peak during the winter season which coincides with the
dry season in Kenya, as well as in the study area.
Most of the commercial medium- and large-scale horticulture farms are located between 1700 and
2500 m a.s.l. (Above Sea Level) on the upper and lower mountain slopes, as well as in the highlands of
Laikipia County. Therefore, they are part of important ecological interactions within the Upper Ewaso
Ng’iro North Basin where depleted river water resources in the upper reaches of the system have great
consequences on downstream users [26,27].
In addition to the already erratic rainfall patterns in Laikipia County, the rain water does not
provide adequate water at the most crucial time for horticulture production, even when harvested
and stored [19,28]. At this point, the production is based on irrigation farming which was, initially,
largely dependent on river water abstraction. Since the irrigation farming was also practiced by
smallholder farmers and pastoralists also used this for their herds, there was significant reduction in
discharge rates of local rivers [26,39]. Horticultural investments in the region were held responsible
for aggravating irrigation water shortages in the dry season [26,32]. These water shortages affected,
and continue to have an impact on, the production levels in the large-scale export horticultural
companies, often resulting in massive losses. In a bid to resolve the perennial water scarcity and
contain the water-related conflicts, the investments increasingly established water reservoirs, to retain
river water in the wet seasons, and ground water pumps (boreholes), as well as supported the formation
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and operation of local water user associations [26,32,39]. These measures reduced the impacts on
the river water discharge rates during the dry seasons and to some level mitigated the water-related
conflicts [39].
There is also an on-going debate on the local to national impact of large-scale land acquisitions
(LSLAs) for export-oriented horticulture. While agricultural commercialization is the new phenomenon
in Africa, the ongoing, large-scale land acquisitions have led to an explosion of literature about their
drivers and effects [16–18]. These international investments, especially by powerful economic actors
in the global north on ‘empty’ land in the global south, can serve as sites for large-scale production,
for instance, for large-scale export-oriented horticulture [18,49]. Agro-industrial horticulture companies
are regarded as large-scale land investments by multinationals, and there is on-going debate on the
local to national impact of these investments in the target regions and countries [1,49]. The debate of the
large-scale land acquisitions (LSLAs) is going on amidst the increasing global demands on agricultural
land resulting from increased population, the on-going global food crisis, increased dietary needs and
the use of bio fuels [17]. The potential benefits of large-scale, export-oriented horticulture as an LSLA,
including insurance against food price shocks and increased global food supply, cannot be over emphasized.
However, these land deal transactions often take place at the expense of, and without the informed consent
from, prior land users, a fact often ignored by the governments and the investors [16–18,49]. The growing
demand for food, such as export fruits and vegetables and non-food crops, fuel, and other raw
materials, are seen as the main drivers of these large-scale land investments, such as the export
horticulture investments [17,18]. As such, the utilization of common pool resources, such as land
and water by the agro-industrial food system, and management of common pool resources such as
water and land, pose a threat for conflicts with other food systems competing for the same resource
as in the study findings. Similar findings are reported elsewhere [21,28,39]. The competition for land
and water as common pool resources for food production in export horticulture against local food
systems, such as agro-pastoralism and small holder agriculture in the arid and semi-arid region where
export horticulture is growing, was illustrated in this study. The resource linked conflict arising from
contestation over the scarce water and land in the study area needs further examination to outline
sustainable and equitable distribution of the common pool resources.
9. Conclusions and Recommendations
In analyzing the actors, rules and regulations linked to export horticulture production, and the
use and access to land and water as common pool resources, the concept of institutions as fit,
turning to misfit and then to fit again is experienced, as the formal and informal rules of the game
are changed to meet the different actors bargaining power in taking part in the food system [21].
All of these interactions are manifested in the distributional effect and socio-economic behavior
of export-oriented horticulture linked actors, and in a cyclic effect, manifest in the environment,
population and technological aspects that influence the relative prices in this global value chain.
The inequalities in common pool resources, mainly water and land, in relation to export horticulture
production in arid and semi-arid areas, are highlighted in this and other studies. These include the land
ownership disparities experienced between the rich and poor, unresolved colonial land legacies and
post-colonial disintegration of big-man, big-land notions that have continuously marginalized local
populations who have lesser resources and, thus, lesser bargaining power over their right to access
and use land for the production of food.
The emerging issues in institutional settings, and changes in export horticulture, are crucial to the
viability of the sector as an agro-industrial food system in the food security and sustainability discourses
in the local context. Research studies that include larger samples of agro-industrial horticulture
companies and actors are needed to better address issues emerging from the food system analysis.
Additionally, given that different food systems including export horticulture, small holder agriculture
and pastoralism co-exist in arid and semi-arid zones competing for resources, there is potential for
conflict as in the study findings.
109
Land 2018, 7, 110
This study recommends a re-examination of resource use and sharing among the food producers,
the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, and the Agricultural Sector Development Program (ASDSP).
In their mandate to ensure sustainable resource use and allocation for the different food systems,
to ensure food security, there is a need to look into the institutional settings and changes governing
common pool resources, namely land and water. Studies that allow in-depth understanding of the
experiences and dynamics of the food system are recommended.
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Abstract: The ongoing expansion of agro-industrial food systems is associated with severe
socio-ecological problems. For a closer look at the socio-ecological impacts, we analyze the capacity
of six food systems to provide farm-based agroecosystem services with the Agroecosystem Service
Capacity (ASC) approach. At the same time, we analyze how food systems affect the management of
common pool resources (CPR). Our findings show that indigenous peoples and agroecological food
systems can have up to three times the ASC-index of agro-industrial food systems. Through their
contribution to the sustainable management of cultural landscapes with robust institutions for the
management of CPRs, food systems contribute to socio-ecological integrity. On the other hand,
regional and agro-industrial food systems with a lower ASC-index contribute less to socio-ecological
integrity, and they undermine and open up common property institutions for robust CPR management.
As a result, they appropriate (or grab) access to CPRs that are vital for food systems with higher
ASC-indexes resulting from a robust management of CPRs. Strengthening a robust management of
CPRs could put a halt to the ongoing expansion of food systems with a low ASC-index by replacing
them with a high ASC-index to prevent an exacerbation of the current socio-ecological situation.
Keywords: common pool resources; food systems; agroecosystems and agroecosystem service
1. Introduction
Food system activities, such as the provision of inputs in the form of pesticides, genetically modified
organisms (GMO) seeds, the production of food as well as the following steps of processing, retail and
consumption, have caused severe socio-environmental impacts by degrading the quality of natural
resources and ecosystems. However, food systems and their related activities still have a strong potential
to solve these problems by providing benefits and services to society and to the environment [1].
Food system activities include more than just the production of food. According to Colonna et al.,
a food system is “an interdependent network of stakeholders (companies, financial institutions,
public and private organizations), localized in a given geographical area (region, state, multinational
region), participating directly or indirectly in the creation of a flow of goods and services geared
towards satisfying the food needs of one or more groups of consumers” [2]. A food system extends from
food production through food processing and distribution to food consumption or utilization of food
(Figure in Section 1.1.2). Foley, DeFries [3] and Tilman, Cassman [4] have shown that food production
is the main food system activity that has modified Earth’s terrestrial land cover, reaching 40% of the
Earth’s surface. Food production occurs in so-called agroecosystems and has transformed parts of
natural ecosystems geared towards food production [5]. Agroecosystems rely on natural resources
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that have been managed historically through common property institutions and can as such be viewed
as common pool resources (CPRs). Today, agroecosystems and their links with the larger ecological
environment and cultural landscape ecosystems are managed through state, private and common
property regimes.
Food production is the most obvious ecosystem service provided by agroecosystems [6].
However, agroecosystems can also provide other agroecosystem services, such as soil nutrient recycling,
regulation of local and global climate or opportunities for resilient livelihoods [7,8]. These additional
services benefit the environment (locally and globally), the sustainability of food systems and the
resilience of the involved actors. In this paper, we analyze how food systems affect the management
and maintenance of CPRs.
In general, farmers are the main managers of globally usable lands by using intensive and extensive
technologies; hence, they have shaped the surface of the Earth in a way that (as Ellen [9] argues) there is no
so called pure nature remaining. Rather, we face a high diversity of cultural landscape ecosystems [4,10].
Management decisions regarding farming practices affect the sustainability of food systems and
the integrity of the ecological environment. How farmers and other actors manage farms and
agroecosystems and the previously described additional contribution is influenced by property regimes
and regulating institutions that are embedded in larger institutional settings. These property regimes
that regulate institutions and institutional settings are subject to transformations over time [11,12].
Generally, there is a trend towards the commodification, privatization and fragmentation of former
interlinked common property institution settings [12,13]. Adherents of a more neo-liberal development
discourse see investments in the agriculture as an opportunity for modernizing the backward agriculture
in underdeveloped countries that helps to meet the rising global demands for agricultural products and
a general development of these countries (these ideas build on Rostow’s [14] assumption for economic
growth). On the other hand, critics warn that the neoliberal development discourses behind such
investments veil negative impacts caused by such investments (e.g., management transformations that
lead to a concentration of power or the fragmentation and commodification of commonly managed
agroecosystems). These transformations, fragmentations and commodification of common property
regimes reduce the ability of food systems to provide services for environmental integrity and food
sustainability (these ideas build on Ferguson’s [15] analysis of anti-politic machines). The use of CPRs
without contributing much towards their availability is a form of “commons grabbing” (the acquisition
of CPRs that are provided by others). The acquisition of CPRs or the missing contribution to the
maintenance of CPRs reduces their availability. The resilience of those contributing to the CPRs is
grabbed by those who acquire the CPR and do not contribute to their generation or maintenance.
To better understand farm-based agroecosystems and how they can contribute to solving the
socio-environmental challenges that humanity faces today with regard to the collective use of natural
resources and ecosystems, we conceptualize agricultural landscapes as agroecosystems and farms as
farm-based agroecosystems. This enables us to acknowledge that every piece of land on Earth has a
role with regard to the use and management of natural resources and ecosystems and that humans can
attribute roles to parts of these land cover classes, mostly those agricultural landscapes and farm-based
agroecosystems. This ties to the Gaia hypothesis by Lovelock that argues that Earth is a self-regulating
system where each component (living and non-living) has a fundamental role that can radically affect
the living condition on Earth [16] (i.e., every living organism and non-living thing has a function
and a capacity to contribute to the well-being of a larger system; i.e., a land cover class contributes
to the sustainability of a farm-based agroecosystems). The farm-based agroecosystems contribute to
the sustainability of food systems, which can contribute to the commonly used and managed global
ecological integrity of the planetary system.
There is a growing body of literature on studies that assess sustainability of food systems [17],
the multifunctionality of agricultural landscapes [18–22] or cultural landscape ecosystems [9,10].
We use the Agroecosystem Service Capacity (ASC) approach [23] that allows comparing different
farm-based agroecosystems and their capacity to provide agroecosystem services. The ASC-index
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approach was inspired by the paradigm shift suggested by Perfecto, Vandermeer and Wright [24],
which integrates conservation and agriculture in high-quality landscape patches [23].The ASC-index is
grounded on the methodological approach of Burkhard, Kroll [25] that study landscapes’ capacities
to provide ecosystem services [26]. We selected the ASC-index framework because: First, it allows
us to assess farms not solely as units of biomass production, but as comprehensive components
that have the capacity to produce biomass as well as other farm-based agroecosystem services [23].
Second, the ASC-index uses data that is generated at the farm level with semi-structured interviews
and visual tools for soil assessment. Last but not least, the ASC-index allows us to create maps that
can help visualize the capacities of farm-based agroecosystems to provide farm-based agroecosystem
services. The latter is useful to make the information easily accessible for non-scientific arena and
decision makers. The method is described in summary in Section 2.4 and in detail by Augstburger [23].
The purpose of this paper is to compare the capacities of six food systems to manage CPRs in the
cultural landscape ecosystems that comply, more or less, with the eight principles of CPRs to provide
farm-based agroecosystems services. This will indicate that farm-based agroecosystems can either
contribute to the availability of CPRs and a robust management of them; or in contrast, that farm-based
agroecosystems deteriorate the availability and management of CPRs through the process of commons
grabbing, which also undermines the resilience capacities of these systems and the actors using and
reproducing these systems.
In this paper, we look at food systems with a focus on the food production of farms. The subject of
our study are farm-based agroecosystems, and the smallest units of analysis are the land cover classes
of the farm-based agroecosystems. Our overall research question is: How do farms of different food
systems contribute to the availability and robust management of selected CPRs, ecological integrity
and food sustainability? Therefore, we analyze the capacity of each farm-based agroecosystems
to provide farm-based agroecosystems services within the different food systems. The results
provide values that allow us to compare land cover classes within a farm-based agroecosystem and
also to compare farm-based agroecosystems that belong to different food system. The results also
provide a different perspective on the roles that food systems have within the agricultural landscapes
and cultural landscape ecosystems in which they are embedded. This enables us to compare the
performance of food systems with different management and property institutions and to unveil
hidden appropriations or grabbing processes of CPRs. The results can be used by decision makers in
order to decide which food system to prioritize based on the capacity that the food systems have to
provide farm-based agroecosystem-services.
To describe the contribution of food systems to CPRs, we first reflect briefly on the definition
of CPRs. Then, we describe the CPR compliance approach that we use to assess how much food
systems contribute or not contribute to the availability of CPRs and a robust management of them [27].
Thereafter, we refer to the ASC approach that we use to compare different food systems. Following
this theoretical part, we describe the contribution of food systems to CPRs and their management on
the basis of data from our case study in Kenya and Bolivia as described in subtitle study sites.
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1.1. Background Concepts
1.1.1. Definition of Common Pool Resources
The definition of a resource system as a CPR refers to its use and management. CPRs are
used by more than one actor, and the use is rivalrous. Traditionally, CPRs have been described
as natural resources that are used by a small group of actors (e.g., a pasture used by a group of
pastoralists (for examples see Hardin [28] or Netting [29]). With the term “global commons”, it is
indicated that CPRs can also be large, even global, resource systems that are used by a large number
of people. For example, the atmosphere of our planet, biodiversity or outer space can be described
as a global common [30]. In addition to natural resource systems, CPRs can also be commonly used
human-made resource systems, such as a corral, a path, or a dam that is constructed, maintained
and used collectively [27]. If this idea is further elaborated, CPRs must not necessarily be something
physical but can be a service provided by and available for a group of actors. Access to an alpine
pasture through collectively built and maintained paths and corrals, mutual support by members of a
group, access to information through the world wide web, or a food system that provides goods and
services to its participants can all be viewed as CPRs.
Hardin [28] propagated the assumption that collective action problems inevitably lead to the
overexploitation of CPRs. This assumption has been challenged by various authors. Ostrom [27]
has used examples from ethnographic studies to show that groups are able to deal with collective
action problems and are thus capable of managing a commonly used resource in a way that prevents
overexploitation. To do so, they depend on jointly drafted rules and regulations. Ostrom developed
eight design principles as indicators for a robust management of commons that is more likely to deal
with collective action problems and to prevent overexploitation (Figure 1). Over the years, a vast body
of literature on commons on how to solve collective action problems, the role of informal and property
right institutions, the role of power relations for the drafting of institutions, etc. has been developed
(for an overview, see reference [30] and reference [27] and for a more recent overview, see reference [12].
Figure 1. Table of Design Principles for Robust CPR Management Institutions according to Ostrom [27].
Regarding the management of CPRs, a further question to be addressed is about who contributes
to the provision of a CPR and who benefits from its use. A contribution can be active construction,
maintenance work, or restraint in its use. According to Haller [12], Ostrom misses the point that
the contribution to a CPR and benefits from it are not necessarily shared equally–this also applies in
situations of robust management of CPRs. First, asymmetric power relations within a group using and
managing a CPR can account for a management favoring powerful actors over others. Powerful actors
can force weaker actors to accept an unequal distribution contribution to and benefits from a CPR.
116
Land 2019, 8, 71
Weaker actors might have to accept an unequal cooperation instead of not benefiting from a CPR at all.
Ensminger [10] has developed a useful model to include the role of power relations in the negotiation
of rules and regulations that account for the management of CPRs (Figure 2). Secondly, the provision of
a CPR can benefit or affect people that are not members of the group that directly uses or manages the
resource. On the other hand, activities of actors not being involved in the management of a CPR can
affect its quality. This shows that not all actors being affected by or affecting a CPR might be included
in its management. Such indirect impacts are described as externalities in economic terms. Some of
these externalities can be very vague and reach a global scale. This poses the question of whom should
be included in the management of a CPR if externalities affect or are affected by a large group of actors.
 
 
Figure 2. Schematic figure for modeling change, according to Ensminger [11].
The expansion of food production for agro-industrial food systems is often accompanied by a
fragmentation via state property and privatization of former cultural landscape ecosystems and CPRs
that were important for food production in other food systems [9]. With the fragmentation of cultural
landscape ecosystems and the privatization of property and user rights, interconnected systems are
torn apart and the rights of marginalized actors are being suppressed. This leads to a marginalization
of already marginalized actors engaging in other food systems [12,31] or in the context of the land
grabbing debate [32].
1.1.2. Food Systems and Common Pool Resources
Food systems link a group or groups of consumers with actors that contribute towards the
satisfaction of the food needs of these groups. In addition to satisfying food needs, food systems
provide a range of other goods and services (see Figure 3). Such additional goods and services can be
income opportunities, increases in biodiversity, CO2 sequestration or enhanced resilience. These goods
and services benefit different actors of the food systems, and, more indirectly through impacts on the
ecological and socio-economic environment, all people living on our planet [23]. Food systems rely
on natural resources and affect their management. These natural resources include the atmosphere,
freshwater, genetic diversity, soil, pollinators, land, etc. Some of these resources are managed through
CPR institutions, others are managed by state or private property institutions. Lack of adequate
management institutions results in open access constellation with no measures in place to prevent
overexploitation. Different types of food systems tend to have different impacts on the management of
natural resources and contribute differently towards their maintenance and availability. For a detailed
description of food systems and their interlinks, see Figure 3.
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To link the theoretical sphere with practical issues, we show in the second part of this paper how
different selected food systems contribute to the integrity of the global ecological environment and
food sustainability.
Figure 3. Conceptual model of a food system. Food systems are part of the global ecological environment,
and their activities depend on it and shape it at the same time. Based on references [23,33–35].
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. The Agroecosystem Service Capacity (ASC) Approach
In this study, we use the ASC approach [23] to estimate the capacity of each land cover class to
provide farm-based agroecosystem services and to calculate the ASC-index for the whole farm-based
agroecosystem. Thus, we use the concept of farm-based agroecosystems to refer to farms, yet we assess
them from a holistic perspective and study them as farm-based agroecosystems and compare their
capacities to provide 23 farm-based agroecosystem services.
2.2. Study Area—The Food Systems
As previously mentioned, this paper is part of a larger research project that studies food systems
sustainability in Bolivia and Kenya. The study regions are Santa Cruz in Bolivia and the north-western
Mount Kenya region (specifically the counties of Meru, Nyeri and Laikipia in Kenya). The criteria for
the selection of the study sites were as follows: (1) their importance for regional national food security,
(2) the possibility of studying conflicts competition and synergies in the context of currently coexisting
food systems, (3) the presence of rapid agrarian change leading to upheaval in local agricultural
systems and activities and their impacts on the livelihood of local rural people, and (4) the possibility
of drawing upon the previous research of Southern Partners [36].
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The selection of the food systems to be investigated in each study region was guided by the
following criteria: (1) their spatial, economic, social, and cultural relevance within the study region;
(2) representation of all five-ideal typical food systems as defined by Colonna et al. [2] in the overall
sample; and (3) coexistence of several food systems in the study regions, enabling investigation of the
effects of their interactions [30]. Although there are deferent approaches to describe and assess food
systems [33,37–41], Colonna et al. [2] provides a set of differentiating variables useful to draw borders
between one food system and the other. Because of the aforesaid argument we use the five-ideal food
systems described by Colonna [2]. The number of food systems was limited to six, and in each food
system, we studied three farm-based agroecosystem, in accordance with the project’s human and
financial resources [36].
Food System Main Characteristics
Table 1 describes the food systems according to the food system differentiating variables proposed
by Colonna et al. [2]. It is important to mention that none of the food systems are purely one or the
other. There are always influences from one food system onto another food system, because food
systems are open systems with ill-defined and permeable boundaries. For analytical purposes,
we draw conceptual boundaries between them. For a detailed analysis of the agroecological food
system in Bolivia, see Schälle [42]. For a detailed analysis of an agro-industrial food system in
Bolivia, see Augstburger et. al. [26]. For a detailed analysis of an indigenous food system in Bolivia,
see Heusser [43]. For a detailed analysis of a local food system in Kenya, see Käser [44]. For a detailed
analysis of a regional food system in Kenya, see Ottiger [45]. Finally, for a detailed analysis of an
agro-industrial food system in Kenya, see Ngutu Peter [46].
2.3. Study Sites and Methodology—The Farm-Based Agroecosystems
In each one of the six food systems, we selected three farms that we called farm-based
agroecosystems to carry out the ASC assessment. In order to select three farm-based agroecosystems,
we did introductory interviews with farmers of the different food systems in Bolivia and Kenya. For
the interviews, we used semi-structured interviews in order to collect general data on their agricultural
practices. To select the farmers that could be considered as representative samples, we used the
purposeful sampling criteria of Palinkas, Horwitz [47]. From this process, we selected three farm-based
agroecosystems for each food system (all briefly described in Table 2).
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2.4. The Agroecosystem Service Capacity Index
To compare the capacity that different farm-based agroecosystems have in providing farm-based
agroecosystem services, we used the ASC-Index [23]. In a nutshell (see Figure 4), the ASC allows us to
assess the capacity of each land cover class of a farm-based agroecosystem to provide 23 farm-based
agroecosystem services (Table 1). Hence, the smallest units of analysis being compared are land cover
classes. In order to implement the ASC, there are two major phases: data collection and data analysis.
 
Figure 4. The agroecosystem capacity index in nutshell based on Augstburger, and Rist [26].
Data collection:
1) Land cover classification: Identify the land cover classes of the farm-based agroecosystem under
study. For this, we used participatory mapping approaches.
2) Land cover class description: Collect data on the capacity of each land cover class to provide the
23 farm-based agroecosystem services. For this, we used semi-structured interviews.
Data analysis:
For the analysis of the data, a central element of the ASC is the Agroecosystem Service Matrix
(ASM) (Figure 5). The ASM centralizes all the information that is later required to calculate the ASC
per land cover class and the ASC-index for the whole farm-based agroecosystem. The number of land
cover classes (rows) in the ASM depends on the amount and type of land cover classes present in the
farm-based agroecosystem. In the columns are the 23 farm-based agroecosystem services. The second
row of the matrix provides the equations for the calculations in the corresponding column. The last
column on the left is the equation to calculate the ASC per land cover class. The ASC-index is the sum
of all ASCs depicted in the yellow box [23]. Below the total number of land cover classes is the row
depicting the farm-based agroecosystem’s capacity to provide farm-based agroecosystem services.
1) Fill in the ASM:
A key tool to create the ASM is the ASC rating scale that is provided in the paper that describes
the ASC approach [23]. The rating scale is a scale that provide values between zero and five to rate the
capacity of a land cover class in providing a specific farm-based agroecosystem service [23]. To fill in
the ASM, two sources of information are needed: (i) the land cover classification and (ii) the land cover
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class description. The values of the rating scale are introduced in the ASM in the intersection of the
land cover class and the agroecosystem service that is being assessed. This number later represents the
strength (Si) that the land cover class has for providing agroecosystem services.
2) Figure 5:
 
Figure 5. Example of an empty Agroecosystem Service Matrix (ASM).
3) Calculate the ASC-index
The ASC-index is calculated using three main elements: Area (Ai) that a land cover class occupies
within the farm-based agroecosystem, the Strength (Si) that land cover class has in providing farm-based
agroecosystem services and the number of services (Ni) that are provided by the land cover class
(all the equations are available in Figure 5). On the right-hand side of the ASM are the equations used
to obtain the values for each one of the aforementioned components. Each one of the components is
then introduced in the equation to estimate the ASC per land cover class, the ASC-map, and finally the
ASC-index for the whole farm-based agroecosystem. We added one row to the ASM on the bottom left
below the total number of land cover classes. The row is the farm-based agroecosystems capacity to
provide farm-based agroecosystem services; this row depicts the capacity of the whole farm-based
agroecosystem to provide one specific farm-based agroecosystem service. This value can help us
assess how the farm-based agroecosystem contributes or does not contribute to the commons that we
previously defined (food system sustainability and the global ecological environment).
3. Results
3.1. The Agroecosystem Service Capacity of Food Systems
Table 3 shows a summary of the results of the application of the ASC in the different food systems
in Bolivia and Kenya. The largest farm-based agroecosystem that we studied was the farm-based
agroecosystem Reg-2 (with an area of 4200 ha), and the farm-based agroecosystem Lo-3 (with an area
of 0.5 ha) was the smallest farm-based agroecosystem we studied. Interestingly, it is not the largest
farm-based agroecosystem that has the highest ASC (ASC Reg-2 = 1.2). In economies of scale, there is
the marginal cost (cost of producing one more unit), which is reduced by increasing the number of
units produced. The opposite of what occurs with marginal costs in economies of scale seems to
happen with the capacity to provide agroecosystem services—the larger the area, the lower the ASC.
124
Land 2019, 8, 71
This is so because the farm-based agroecosystems that we have studied have large areas of operation
practice monoculture or agriculture with little diversity in relation to the whole area that they manage
within the landscape.
Table 3. Area, number of land cover classes and agroecosystem services provided and CPR compliance













Lo-1K Reg-1K AgI-1K Ae-1B AgI-1B In-1B
Area (ha) 2.9 2532.3 48.8 3.9 28.00 3.6
Land cover classes 5 11 8 12 6 6
# services 47 76 69 141 46 91
Lo-2K Reg-2K AgI-2K Ae-2B AgI-2B In-2B
Area (ha) 0.6 4269.0 130.0 11.7 20 2.9
Land cover classes 3 8 9 9 2 5
# services 32 64 68 87 11 48
Lo-3K Reg-3K AgI-3K Ae-3B AgI-3B In-3B
Area (ha) 0.5 45.1 298.0 5.1 39 1.8
Land cover classes 1 7 8 6 3 5
# services 12 47 72 66 21 49
3.2. Agroecosystem Service Matrix
Figure displays the ASM of one farm-based agroecosystem in each one of the six food systems
(the ASM of the other farm-based agroecosystems are the annex). Each number in the ASM indicates
the strength (Si) that each land cover class has in providing the specific farm-based agroecosystem
service. Also, in the ASM are the Area (Ai) occupied by the land cover class within the farm-based
agroecosystem and the number (Ni) of services provided. The three aforementioned elements are part
of the equation to calculate the ASC capacity of each land cover class and the ASC-index of the whole
farm-based agroecosystem. The ASC-map column has different colors. The color code in Figure 3 was
used to assign colors to the land cover class according to the capacity of the land cover class to provide
ASC services.
AgI-1B has the lowest ASC-index (0.89) and also the least number of land cover classes (5). AgI-1B
has a low ASC-index, because it has five land cover classes in an area of 28 ha. Additionally, the land
cover classes provide a total of 46 farm-based agroecosystem services (Table 3). In-1B has a medium
ASC-index (2.12) and total of six land cover classes (only one more than the farm-based agroecosystem
AgI-1B). However, In-1B has six land cover classes in an area of 3.6 ha. The land cover classes of
In-1B can provide a total of 91 farm-based agroecosystem services (Figure 3). Ae-1B has the highest
ASC-index (2.8) and also the highest number of land cover classes (12). Ae-1B has a high ASC-index,
because it has 12 cover classes in an area of 3.9 ha. Additionally, the land cover classes provide a total
of 141 farm-based agroecosystem services (Figure 6).
For the farm-based agroecosystems of Kenya (see Figure 7), Reg-1K has the lowest ASC-index
(1.48) and 12 land cover classes. Reg-1K has a low ASC-index, because it has 12 land cover classes in
an area of 2532 ha. Additionally, the land cover classes provide a total of 76 farm-based agroecosystem
services (Figure 7). AgI-1K has a middle ASC-index value (1.76) and 8 land cover classes in an area of
48 ha. Additionally, the land cover classes provide a total of 69 farm-based agroecosystem services
(Table 4) Lo-1K has the highest ASC-index (2.12) with five land cover classes in an area of 2.9 ha.
The land cover classes provide a total of 47 farm-based agroecosystem services (Table 4).
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Figure 6. Agroecosystem service matrix of three farm-based agroecosystems in Bolivia (modified from [26]).
Figure 8 shows the farm-based agroecosystem service index for the 15 farm-based agroecosystems
that we studied. The farm-based agroecosystem of the Agroecological food system has the highest
overall ASC-index capacity to provide farm-based agroecosystem services (Ae-1B = 2.80, Ae-2B = 2.39
and Ae-3B= 2.52). The farm-based agroecosystem of the Indigenous food system is second (In-1B = 2.12,
In-2B = 2.47 and In-3B = 2.51). The farm-based agroecosystem of the Local food system is third, and the
differences between its different farm-based agroecosystem is the highest (Lo-1K = 2.12, Lo-2K = 1.78
and Lo-3K = 1.47). The farm-based agroecosystem of the Agro-industrial food system are fourth in
ASC values (AgI-1K = 1.59, AgI-2K = 1.64 and AgI-3K = 1.76). The fifth and lowest ASC values were
identified in the farm-based agroecosystem of the Regional food system (Reg-1K = 1.48, Reg-2K = 1.33
and Reg-3K = 1.40). The overall lowest was identified in the Agro-industrial food system in Bolivia
(AgI-1B = 0.89, AgI-2B = 0.74 and AgI-3B = 0.85).
The farm-based agroecosystem with the highest capacity, Ae-1B = 2.8, has two times the capacity
to provide farm-based agroecosystem services than Reg-2 = 1.33, and three times the capacity to
provide farm-based agroecosystem services than AgI-1B = 0.89 (i.e., this means that an agroecological
food system can be at least three times more beneficial to the contribution of the global environmental
integrity availability than an agro-industrial food system). As such, the agroecological food system has
a higher capability than the agro-industrial food system to contribute to the availability of a global
common that is used by both food systems.
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Figure 7. Agroecosystem service matrix of three farm-based agroecosystems in Kenya.
When comparing the capacity of the whole farm-based agroecosystem to provide specific
agroecosystem services (last row on the bottom in Figures 6 and 7), a new perspective comes to
light. The farm-based agroecosystems with the highest ASC-index are the farm-based agroecosystems
that can contribute more to the existence of the commons, food system sustainability and global
ecological integrity. As can be seen in the last row of Figure 6, Ae-1B has values greater than one to
provide 14 out of 23 farm-based agroecosystem services. In contrast, AgI-1B has a capacity to provide
farm-based agroecosystem services greater than one for one farm-based agroecosystem service. In
Kenya (Figure 7), AgI-3K has values greater than one for nine farm-based agroecosystem services. The
lowest is for Reg-1K that has values greater than one for five farm-based agroecosystem services. When
comparing all the farm-based agroecosystems in Bolivia and Kenya, we see that the most farm-based
agroecosystem services are for Ae-1B.
Figure 9 illustrates the capacity of the farm-based agroecosystem to provide specific farm-based
agroecosystem services. Interestingly, the agroecological and indigenous farm-based agroecosystems
are skewed to the left (mostly regulating services), although they also have a relevant capacity to
provide provisioning services. In both countries, most of the capacity for agro-industrial food systems
to provide services is related to provisioning services.
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Figure 8. Agroecosystem capacity index of 18 farm-based agroecosystems.
Figure 9. Capacity of the farm-based agroecosystems to provide the 23 farm-based agroecosystem services.
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3.3. Common Pool Resource Compliance Assessment Tool
Up to now, we have gained insights on the different ASC- index capacities of food system.
We go one step further, and assess the relation between the ASC-index values and the contribution of
food system towards a management of CPRs that complies with the eight principles of robust CPR
management as proposed by Ostrom [27]. Certain food systems tend more towards fostering and
depending on natural resources management as CPRs (e.g., indigenous food systems), whereas others
lean more towards private property regimes and open access situations (e.g., agro-industrial horticulture
operations).
The objective of the common pool resource assessment tool is to assess the relation between an
ASC-index of the food system and the level of compliance of the resource’s management with the
eight principles of robust CPR management proposed by Ostrom [21]. In order to develop this tool,
the guiding question is: To what degree does the resources management of a food system comply with
the principles of Ostrom?
For the construction of the assessment tool we proceeded as follows: First we listed the eight
principles robust CPR management. Second, we assessed the degree of compliance of the food system’s
resources management with each individual principle of Ostrom [27]. For that purpose we use the
following ordinal scale: 0 = no compliance (e.g., dependence on private and state property regimes
or open access constellations, contributing to transformations of CPRs to state or private property or
open access), 1 = some compliance (e.g., dependence on private and state property regimes as well as
CPR institutions or contribution towards a transformation of state and private property regimes or
open access situations towards CPRs management) and 2 = full compliance (e.g., general dependence
on CPRs and contribution towards a transformation of state and private property regimes or open
access situations towards CPRs management). The CPRs compliance assessment relies on an analysis
of selected literature on different food systems in the study area (see Table 4).
4. Discussion/Conclusions
Some food system activities, mostly production activities, that take place in farm-based
agroecosystems have negative socio-environmental impacts. Yet food system activities have the
capacity to provide multifunctional farm-based agroecosystems that can benefit local and global CPRs
and their management. In this research we provide empirical data to compare the capacity of farm-based
agroecosystems to provide farm-based agroecosystem services that belong to six typical food systems,
as described by Colonna et al. [2]. The farm-based agroecosystems with the lowest ASC-indexes are
the ones that are part of the agro-industrial food system. The farm-based agroecosystems of this food
system are typical large-scale operations with few land cover classes, and hence have low ASC-index
values. The farm-based agroecosystems with the highest ASC-indexes are those that belong to the
agroecological food system. The farm-based agroecosystems of the agroecological food system can have
an ASC-index up to two times that one of a regional food system (i.e., the farm-based agroecosystem of
the agroecological food system provide two times more farm-based agroecosystem services to humans
and nature than the regional food system).
Production activities of food systems that have a higher capacity to provide farm-based
agroecosystem services also tend to contribute more to the management and maintenance of CPRs.
As can be seen in Table 4, the food system with highest CPR compliance score (1.88) is the indigenous
food system, and it also has the second highest ASC (2.37). It is not as high as the agroecological food
system ASC (2.57) solely because in some cases farmers of this type of food system are using herbicides
that degrade the capacity of the food systems to provide agroecosystem services. The agroecological
food systems have the highest ASC (2.57), yet have the second highest CPR compliance (1.75).
The agroecological food systems comply with fewer criteria of the CPR because most of the farm-based
agroecosystems in this case are managed privately. The agro-industrial food system of Bolivia has the
lowest overall ASC (0.87) and CPR compliance (0.63). The agro-industrial food system in Kenya has
the lowest CPR compliance (1.00) and also has a low ASC value (1.12).
132
Land 2019, 8, 71
Generally, the main objective of a farmer managing a farm-based agroecosystem is to produce
biomass, yet our results show that all farm-based agroecosystems have a capacity, not commonly
brought to light, to provide other farm-based agroecosystem services (e.g., soil formation and climate
regulation). ASC allows us to shed light on the potential of farm-based agroecosystems to provide
farm-based agroecosystem services. The result also suggests that farm-based agroecosystems of food
systems with high ASC-index values subsidize the farm-based agroecosystems that have low ASC-index
values using farm-based agroecosystem services such as global climate regulation. The farm-based
agroecosystem services with a low ASC-index are either subsidized by the farm-based agroecosystems
with a high ASC-index today, respectively, through their contribution to global commons, or they are
getting the subsidies from future generations that will not be able to receive services from these natural
resources and ecosystems for their farm-based agroecosystem in the future. In other terms, farm-based
agroecosystems with a low ASC-index grab farm-based agroecosystem services from farm-based
agroecosystems with a high ASC-index or from future generations that today are deprived of their
resource basis. As such, it can be said that a Bolivian farmer of an agroecological food system or a
local farmer in Kenya that operates farms with an overall high ASC-index contributes to local and
global commons and subsidizes food production for regional and global food systems that operate on
farms with low ASC-indexes. Food production that depends on local and global commons without
contributing much towards their availability grabs these global commons and prevents other food
production that would contribute to local and global commons from operating in its place. In addition,
the food systems grabbing from local and global commons often expand their production area at the
expense of the food systems that contribute to local and global commons.
In addition, our results show that there tends to be a reduction in the ASC capacity of the
farm-based agroecosystem when the size of operation of the farm-based agroecosystem is increased.
This suggests that there is an environmental marginal cost that increases in large-scale operations where
their marginal production costs are probably reduced by increasing the size of operation. The latter is
because the larger the farm-based agroecosystem, the more land cover classes it has to have in order to
have a “good” ASC-index. What normally happens is that the larger the operation, the lesser the land
cover classes (hence, the lower the ASC-index).
Food production in agroecosystems that depend on and manage cultural landscape ecosystems
through robust common property regimes, such as the indigenous and agroecological food system in
Bolivia and partially the local food system in Kenya, have a higher ASC-index and contribute more
towards ecological integrity and food sustainability. With the privatization and commodification of
food production, cultural landscape ecosystems and CPRs became fragmented. Generally, commodified
private food production of agro-industrial and regional food systems has a lower ASC-index and
contributes less to ecological integrity and food sustainability.
Commodification, privatization and fragmentation has often occurred through transformation
processes that were carried out in the name of development. Neo-liberal development discourses
and a narrowed focus on food production only have veiled the commons grabbing coming along
with the privatization and commodification of food production. As a result, these developmental
discourses and narrowed foci on food production acted like an anti-politics machine as described by
Ferguson [14].
Moreover, the privatization and commodification of food production not only result in commons
grabbing but also the dominance of such food systems suppresses other food systems. This reduces
their ability to provide the services of which they are capable. Ecological compensation areas or CSR
measures of agro-industrial or regional farms neither enhance the ecological nor the social performance
of agro-industrial food systems significantly. However, they are used to legitimize their operations.
Therefore, this is just another anti-politics machine obscuring the negative impacts of such food systems.
The agroecological food system has the best ASC-index. An anthropological analysis of parts of
this food system in Bolivia has shown that despite the good performance at farm level, other aspects
of this food system prevent the participation of many marginal actors that could benefit from an
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inclusion [42]. This indicates that even with a comprehensive farm-based agroecosystem service
analysis, not all aspects of the performance of a food system can be unveiled. Thus, even in such food
systems, Ferguson’s anti-politic machines might be operating.
4.1. Limitations of the Research
The ASC-index is limited to an index, and it provides an overall indication of the capacity of a
farm-based agroecosystem to provide farm-based agroecosystem services on a scale from zero to five.
Thus, the results are not absolute values. The ASC-index values that we show are related to the capacity of
the farm-based agroecosystems that belong to different food systems to provide farm-based agroecosystem
services. In this case, the ASC does not assess the full food system (i.e., we did not assess the capacity to
provide farm-based agroecosystem services of land cover classes such as retail infrastructure or agriculture
input production units, which are common land cover classes of food systems).
The CPR compliance assessment is an explorative tool to assess how much a food system complies
or does not comply with the eight principles of CPRs developed by Ostrom [27] (i.e., it is not a measure
of the compliance). The intention with this tool was to be able to say food systems that are managed
more as commons also provide more benefit to the global environmental integrity than a global
common. In contrast, food systems that are managed under private property regimes consume CPRs
and provide little or very little benefit to global environmental integrity as a global common.
4.2. Future Research
In the future, we need to find simple ways to operationalize food system sustainability and to bring
in debates on regenerative food systems. The results provided by the ASC contribute to the debate on
operationalizing the sustainability of food systems by showing how much more or less a food system can
contribute to food system sustainability in terms of its capacity to provide farm-based agroecosystem
services. The aforementioned contributes to the idea that the more farm-based agroecosystem services
a farm-based agroecosystem can provide, the higher the environmental performance; hence, it can
contribute towards food system sustainability. A way to operationalize food system sustainability
using the ASC is to set a minimum ASC-index for the farm-based agroecosystem; hence, farm-based
agroecosystems should shape their land cover classes in order to provide a diversity of farm-based
agroecosystem services. This could be used for the instauration of a regulations that could promote
farm-based agroecosystem that have a capacity to provide a range of services. This in contrast to the
farm-based agroecosystem that we are promoting today, that only provide a small set of farm-based
agroecosystem services for humans and none for the environment.
Standards for organic or sustainable agriculture have had a key role in making agriculture more
sustainable, yet both can be further improved in the future. These standards tend to have a reductionist
view on what the role of an agroecosystem is within a planetary system. An example of this is the case
of organic quinoa production the Andes in southwest Bolivia. Although the produce is organic, its
cultivation for the export markets has, in some cases, transformed natural vegetation into deserts [48].
Although the produce is organic it lacks an assessment of the capacity of the whole farm-based
agroecosystem to provide farm-based agroecosystem services. This problem could be reduced by
including the ASC-index in the standards of organic agriculture and good agriculture practices such as
Global Gap; hence, the farm-based agroecosystem would be required to have a minimum ASC-index
and provide a minimum of services/benefits to society and nature.
Today, the idea of recognizing Earth as a self-regulating system where each living and non-living
organism plays a role has gained acceptance in the scientific community [16]. Moreover, a tragedy of
commons can be avoided if CPRs are managed sustainably [27]. Both authors suggest that we have
to evolve institutional and collective action to ensure a management of global CPRs that ensures a
sustainable use of these commons. If we consider the planet as a self-regulating system, as suggested by
Lovelock [16], where every land cover class has a role as well as every living and non-living organism,
then it makes sense to assess the capacity of each of these land cover classes to provide benefits to the
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planet and society. If humans would change the role that is given to agricultural landscapes and instead
of regarding them as production units we conceive them as farm-based agroecosystems that provide
a set of farm-based agroecosystem services/benefits, then we could also appreciate the contribution
of farm-based agroecosystems to local and global common pool recourses. Changing the role that is
given to agriculture can be used as concepts in environmental education for the population in general.
A next step would be to link the ASC approach with incentives in the agricultural sector.
An example of this, as suggested by Lant et al. and Brouwer and Lowe [49,50], involves shifting from
single-purpose resource management to more holistic and integrated approaches and developing
institutional subsidy frameworks that are based on agroecosystem services to increase provisions
of farm-based agroecosystems such as water purification or soil conservation. Incentives could be
monetary or other types of compensation for having farm-based agroecosystems that provide a larger
set of farm-based agroecosystem services. This could help revert CPR grabbing and instead promote
the provisions of CPRs.
Further applications of the ASC approach are needed in order to also have more empirical data
to adapt the rating scale to different contexts. The ASC was developed and applied in very different
farm-based agroecosystems in Kenya and Bolivia, yet it is necessary to apply the ASC in other places
to improve the rating scale and make it adaptable to more diverse farm-based agroecosystems.
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Abstract: In a wave of global conservationism, Ecuador established two large protected areas in its
Amazon region in 1979. One of these is the Reserva de Producción Faunística Cuyabeno (RPFC),
located in the northeastern corner of the country. Given that this land was previously managed
as commons by local indigenous groups, the establishment of protected areas has had numerous
consequences for these people. The research conducted comprised three months’ fieldwork in three
of the affected Siona communities, primarily through the use of participant observation. Based on the
framework developed by Ensminger, this paper demonstrates how institutional change has occurred
in the last few centuries with the arrival of various frontiers overriding the region. This has led
to the almost total eradication of traditional institutions and the introduction of a new ideology,
namely conservationism. In order to legitimize their existence in the Reserve, indigenous groups
are compelled to argue in a conservationist discourse if they want to stay in their ancestral territory.
The article discusses tourism as one key impact on the lives of the local Siona, alongside their response
to the grabbing process, which takes the form of a re-creation of their identity, including institution
shopping from below. This article contributes to the debate on commons grabbing from the perspective
of local actors by arguing that institution shopping from below does not necessarily mean a loss of
authenticity, considering different ontological perspectives in the process of identity construction.
Keywords: conservationism; identity; commons grabbing; protected areas; institution shopping;
institutional change; Ecuador
1. Introduction
In 1979, in the northeastern corner of the Ecuadorian Amazon region, the Reserva de Producción
Faunística del Cuyabeno (RPFC) was created with the purpose of protecting flora and fauna, as well
as the indigenous groups of the region [1]. The author places the Reserve’s establishment within the
broad wave of conservationism, a recent ideology in this region, but one that is spreading across the
world. Its principal goal is the protection of the natural environment. Given that conservationism is
based on a naturalistic ontology that divides nature from culture, the creation of protected areas has
a fundamental influence on local inhabitants [2,3].
This article will first address the question of institutional change and how this has led to
institutional pluralism in the region. Subsequently, the perceptions and responses of local commoners
to the grabbing process will be analyzed in order to show how institution shopping from below serves
as a strategy to regain institutional control. In this context, questions of identity become important,
as a balance between one’s own and foreign values needs to be achieved.
As a review on the literature on the region and the Siona specifically (which remains very limited)
shows, the Siona are an indigenous group who belong to the language group of the Western Tukanos
living in the Amazon region of Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Their history has been traced back to
their contact with European conquerors and Jesuit missionaries at the beginning of the 17th century [4].
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Whereas throughout the 19th century missionary action declined and the indigenous groups of the
region were mostly left to themselves, the 20th century brought three new frontier waves: the rubber
boom, the reactivation of the missions, and finally, the petroleum boom [4]. This last boom, which has
continued until the present day, has contributed to increased rates of deforestation and environmental
pollution [5].
However, at stake is not just pure nature but a cultural landscape that has been used by the
Siona as their commons for centuries. It is, therefore, important to understand the institutional setting
prior to the arrival of the various frontiers and how the forest resources were managed as common
property, notably via specific local knowledge and perceptions of the environment, including a spiritual
world. As Berkes has shown in his reflections on traditional knowledge and management systems [6],
institutions are embedded in an overlying ideology. In the case of the Siona, their ideology concerns
a knowledge system centered on the yagé plant. Yagé (Banisteriopsis caapis), better known as Ayahuasca
in other parts of Amazonia, forms the medium through which a shaman acquires knowledge and
power. It provides a means by which communication with supernatural spirits is rendered possible
and mundane conditions can be influenced [4]. Through the ingestion of yagé as part of a special
ceremony, the shaman is able to enter the world of the spirit masters and negotiate with them so that
they will send their animals close to the village and allow them to be hunted. As each animal species
has a different master, various rituals are required.
In his Siona-Secoya ethnography, Vickers argues that the perception of the natural order and
the forces of the universe influence people’s behavior [4]. In this sense, the yagé ceremony can be
considered part of Siona ideology, which may itself be located in the broader ontology of animism,
as Descola has noted [7]. Siona people are embedded in a web of social relationships that link human
and non-human societies in the forest. The way in which they differentiate between human and
non-humans is different from a naturalist ontology, where lines are drawn along interior qualities,
such as the ability to think morally and having a soul [7]. Instead of assuming that numerous cultures
exist in one nature [4], the Siona perceive their environment as comprising one culture shared by all
living beings, who differentiate themselves through physical appearance. In this way, the Siona regard
animals as having the same culture as themselves, each holding a human perspective of living in
thatched houses, eating cooked meat, and drinking manioc beer [8]. Plants, especially trees, are said to
be the houses of the spirit masters, who are the owners1 of animal species. Hence, yagé ideology is
intrinsically connected and inseparable from the tropical rainforest, with any notion of Nature as being
separate from humans simply nonexistent.
However, with the arrival of outside contact and the establishment of the different frontiers,
the institutional setting was prone to change.
This article shows how the ecological boom, as Albert [9] has perceptively recognized,
has stimulated indigenous peoples to legitimize their territorial claims in terms of an ‘ecological
ethnicity’. This special form of self-identification combines their own cosmological references with
idioms borrowed from outside in order to achieve necessary political recognition. In this process,
indigeneity is used as a powerful label to be taken seriously by conservationist actors.
The author’s research has shown that, although when individual members of Siona communities
are considered, they appear to be far from a homogeneous group, where four communities inside the
RPFC have formally united, presenting themselves as the Siona of Cuyabeno. The author argues that
the reason for their union is a common apocalyptic feeling related to the Anthropocene, an epoch in
which resource extractivism and climate change foster a feeling of urgency to save living space not
only, but especially, among indigenous peoples. Various factors are creating conflict inside, as well as
across the four communities. Indeed, the presence of petroleum extraction, tourism, and the Christian
religion have led the Siona to strive for the legalization of their land titles.
1 In Spanish, dueños. Spirit masters are said to have a master–pet relationship with their animal species.
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Currently, they count with usufruct rights and a management plan for their ancestral territory,
which according to the law belongs to the state because it lies inside a protected area. Property titles
are treated as a source of power with which to exert control over their living space.
This article will highlight the implications of institutional change and associated conservationism
as a new (Western) introduced ideology. First, through this ideology, the nature reserve is created
and then tourism is introduced to the region. Second, together with other factors, the expanded new
frontier leading to commons grabbing is perceived by local indigenous groups as an approaching
apocalypse of their way of life, reducing their resilience and chances of survival. This subsequently
triggers their response to the grabbing process as a form of institution shopping in a pluralistic setting,
balancing externally imposed views of themselves as primitive destructors versus noble savages with
means of self-determination. Thus, a re-creation of identity is taking place in line with the requirements
of the United Nations (UN) definition of indigenous peoples.
2. Theoretical Perspective
This article explains the relationship between ideology and legitimacy in a conservationist
discourse and its consequences at a local level. It seeks to shed light on local responses to a pluralistic
institutional setting wherein grabbing processes are at work.
In order to grasp the extent and importance of institutions for the governance of natural resources,
New Institutionalism provides a valuable framework in this article. This theoretical approach discusses
the way in which management regimes evolve, as well as their influence on the economic strategies of
individuals or groups. Following Jean Ensminger, New Institutionalism can be defined as “the study of
how institutions affect the behavior of individuals and how individual behavior affects the evolution of
institutions” [10] (p. 774). In her book about the Orma in Kenya, Ensminger demonstrates how changes
in political, economic and social institutions through the introduction of the market economy affect the
strategies of individuals and families [11]. According to Ensminger, by considering the individual
motivations of different actors, including the social conditions and incentives that affect their decisions,
it is possible to analyze (economic) change. She further asserts that economic activities are directly
influenced by ideologies, institutions, organizations, and bargaining power [11]. Whereas bargaining
power delineates the ability of actors to obtain what they want based on either their economic wealth
or social position, an ideology refers to the beliefs and values of a group [11]. It is a framework for
orientation and provides symbolic meaning and justification for actions [2]. Organizations in this
context are groups formed by people in order to realize their goals (e.g., of changing an institutional
structure or even the ideology of a whole society) [11]. Finally, institutions are defined by North as
the ‘rules of the game’ [12]. In addition to these internal factors are external factors (environmental
conditions, sociopolitical situation, demography, and technology), which are influenced by relative
prices (the value of a certain good in comparison to other goods) [11]. Once relative prices change,
they modify economic incentives, again inducing institutional change as a result. This change is
directed by the actor with the most bargaining power, as well as the ideologies used to legitimize
certain institutional settings. Figure 1 shows how different parts of Ensminger’s model influence
one another.
While the framework of New Institutionalism has proved useful in studying the institutional
change of the resource governance of pastures and fisheries [11,13], Wartmann et al. have also
demonstrated its value in understanding institutional change in the context of protected areas [14].
They argue that institutional change can lead to the geographical overlap of different institutions,
in their case protected areas and indigenous territories [14].
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Figure 1. Modeling change according to Ensminger 1992.
This same process, which they term ‘institutional pluralism’ [14], is occurring in the Cuyabeno
area. Akin to the notion of ‘forum shopping’ under legal pluralism, institution shopping means that
actors may choose the best institution for claiming natural resources according to their power and
knowledge [14]. What is important to note here is that ideologies change and are used strategically.
Galvin et al. have widened the New Institutionalist approach in the sense that they claim that not
only relative prices but also bargaining power and ideologies influence institutions and institutional
change [2]. This means that when powerful actors manage to justify and legitimize their actions
through ideologies, they gain acceptance and reduce transaction costs [2]. Consequently, Galvin et
al. argue, local actors are sometimes able to boost their bargaining power by using certain identities
based on ideologies, which legitimize their rightful ownership and access to resources [2]. Indeed,
they use discourses (meaning a certain way of rationalizing issues in a logical way) and narratives
to explain their perception of the state of things [2]. Ideology, discourses and narratives, therefore,
form a pool of legitimacy, aimed at increasing one’s bargaining power, while simultaneously reducing
that of others. As a result, allies and outside support can be found and power and financial resources
are mobilized [2]. Combining this theoretical approach with Rasmussen et al.’s findings concerning
territorialization in frontier spaces [15], this article shows how any claims to the natural resources in
the Cuyabeno region must be formed following the conservationist ideology, which has only become
established as the dominant ideology through institutional change in the last 50 years.
Paul E. Little defines frontiers as generally poorly populated geographic regions at the periphery
that undergo accelerated demographic, agricultural, and technological changes [5]. In this way,
the frontier is not only a geographical but also a temporal space. Geiger adds to this definition the
characteristics of economic potential for exploitation and unequal power relations [16]. Frontiers work
by delegitimizing existing institutional settings. Rasmussen and Lund argue that whereas non-native
private actors in pursuit of newly discovered resources influence the formation of new institutions,
civil administration generally has sparse coverage in frontier regions [15]. As a contact zone, the frontier
is considered by Tsing as a site of encounter between different knowledge practices, jurisdictions,
and visions of progress and development [17,18]. In this convergence of different worldviews or
ontologies, new institutions are formed, always influenced by the actor with the most bargaining
power. With state control lacking and racism against indigenous people flourishing even today in
Ecuador, the Siona more often than not find themselves in a less powerful position.
Rasmussen et al. argue that “the frontier moment is a reconfiguration of the conditions of
possibility” [15] (p. 391). In this way, land and resources are abstracted from their former owners and
hence freed for new forms of appropriation [15].
The transitional character of the frontier explains its connection with the need for
territorialization [15]. Indeed, if existing social orders have been dissolved, new ones have to
established. Hence, the eradication of existing orders and the establishment of new institutions threaten
142
Land 2019, 8, 182
the Siona’s ideology and puts the group in a vulnerable position, which I deem one explanation for
their urgency in obtaining land titles to their territory.
These frontier waves cannot simply be understood as an expansion of ‘civilization’, but must,
according to Cleary, be seen as a capitalist frontier [19], engendering the expansion of resource
commodification and new property regimes [20,21]. The commodification of the environment can be
seen in the tourist crowds arriving at Puente del Cuyabeno every day, paying large amounts of money
to see the preserved nature inside the Reserve. Thus, the creation of the Reserve has facilitated the
commodification of nature. Robertson and Tsing that commodification is accompanied by enclosure
and privatization [20,21]. Certainly, even though the Reserve is owned by the state, enclosure has
definitely happened. New institutions have been created to determine how the resources are to be
managed inside the Reserve, but the Siona have had little say in this process.
However, as Rasmussen et al. note, the destruction of previous institutions does not necessarily
imply the complete erasure of repertoires of legitimation [15]. In fact, if old institutions are legitimized
and adapted to the new situation, they might form the building blocks for assembling a new institutional
setting [15]. As we have seen, unequal power relations and considerable interest in the area’s resources
allow for the dissolution of old institutions and present possibilities for the creation of new ones. In this
process of re-territorialization, the creation of the RPFC can be seen as a form of territorial claims and
an attempt by the state to control the region.
3. Methodology
The research project was undertaken in the Reserva de Producción Faunística Cuyabeno (RPFC),
located in the northeastern part of the Ecuadorian Amazon in three Siona communities, namely Puerto
Bolivar, San Victoriano, and Sëoqueya. All three lie in close proximity to each other on the shores of the
Cuyabeno River, about two hours by motorized canoe upstream from the confluence of the Cuyabeno
and the Aguarico rivers. The three villages are located in the heart of the RPFC, which is marked green
on the map in Figure 2. The only way to access the communities is by boat.
Fieldwork comprised three months of data collection between July and October 2018.
As a qualitative research project, the research primarily relied on participant observation, combined with
informal and unstructured interviews, semi-structured interviews, and two focus group discussions,
separately with a group of shamans and young people. Participant observation can be defined as
the foundation method for ethnographic research, where the researcher observes and takes part in
the activities of the people being studied, explicitly recording events and analyzing the gathered
information [22]. As the name suggests, this method requires the researcher to balance proximity and
distance. Indeed, whereas participation means proximity (attempting to act as someone who belongs
to the setting), observation means distance (maintaining the perception of an outsider) [23]. Participant
observation serves specially to understand daily processes, social interactions and the behaviors of
people at work, within the family or at public meetings [23]. Furthermore, it allows the researcher to
witness unpredictable events and presents opportunities to talk to people outside of a planned and
somehow artificially created interview situation. In this way, I was able to observe some people acting
in ways that contradicted what was claimed in interviews, enabling them to be understood within
their specific contexts. In order to put observations on record, a fieldwork diary was kept with daily
entries about the events alongside some initial analytical thoughts.
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Figure 2. Official map of the Reserva de Producción Faunística Cuyabeno (RPFC).
See http://www.cuyabenolodge.com/national-parks/reserva-de-produccion-de-fauna-cuyabeno/
reserva-de-produccion-de-fauna-cuyabeno.jpg; accessed on 1 September 2019.
Informal and unstructured interviews afford interviewees a degree of freedom to stray from
a specific topic. This can facilitate the detection of important research topics and provide a further step
towards a deeper understanding of the emic perspective [24]. Such interviews helped me to understand
issues of importance to the local population. On the other hand, semi-structured interviews proved
useful in gathering information on specific topics, while still allowing the respondent to add important
aspects that were not otherwise being asked [24]. Finally, group discussions offered insights into group
dynamics, competing individual views, and broader structures inside and across the villages [25].
During fieldwork, a total of 24 interviews were conducted with people from three of the four Siona
communities located inside the RPFC. Most of the interviews were semi-structured, although three
were biographical and two were focus group discussions. Most interviews were recorded and later
transcribed. All interviews were conducted in Spanish, as my familiarity with the local language
Baicoca is very limited. All of the interviewees were fluent in Spanish, most being even more fluent
than in Baicoca. In order to analyze the data, the methods of coding and memoing were applied to
systematically read the field notes as a data set [25,26]. First, different themes and ideas are identified
with open coding, which then serve as analytical categories [26]. Departing from those codes, themes
were selected according to what would best answer the research questions but also leaving space
for new topics to emerge that seemed more important to the research partners. In a further step,
the selected topics were distinguished in sub-themes and subtopics with focused coding, and related
to each other by integrative memos [26]. Finally, relevant parts were marked with theoretical memos
in order to connect them to matching theories [25]. This process is described as ‘triangulation’ by
Fetterman, where different patterns are contrasted and compared. He argues that when testing these
sources against each other, ethnographic validity can be increased [27].
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My access to the field was facilitated by my husband. Already in December 2017, it was agreed
with the leaders of Puerto Bolivar that I would be able to conduct fieldwork there; the conditions were
that a document had to be developed that the leaders could later use in the process of land legalization.
This profoundly influenced the research, as constraints were placed on how the resulting material could
be used. As Kirsch argues, it may not be sufficient to sustain alternative interpretations [28]. This could
also be seen with regard to the fact that this research was conducted during a relatively short period of
time, which was not otherwise possible in the thesis format. Therefore, it may be too much dependent
on reported speech [28]. Due to time and economic restrictions, I was unable to conduct interviews
with other actors like the Ecuadorian Ministry of Environment (MAE), international non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), or tourist agencies. However, I consulted all of the documents issued by the
MAE that I could access.
Nonetheless, Kirsch argues that short-term, engaged research can provide valuable insights into
how certain political claims are formulated from a very specific position [28]. Indeed, what can be
learned is how people in a very specific context mobilize their culture, history, and identities in response
to political challenges and ambitions [28]. Hence, the anthropological contribution of this article lies in
providing insights into how the Siona in this specific context mobilize certain narratives and discourses
around their culture and identity.
In May 2018, permission was requested from the MAE to conduct fieldwork inside the RPFC.
However, it was not until mid-July and only with considerable pressure and perseverance on my part
that this permission was obtained. Once access was provided, my husband and I lived in a guest house
at the edge of the village. This made it possible to conduct research on largely neutral ground that
was not linked to any particular group or person. Important to consider here was the presence and
influence of my husband on the research. Having worked as a tourist guide in the RPFC, he knew the
majority of people in Puerto Bolívar, albeit from a very specific position. Moreover, as an indigenous
Kichwa, he identified with the Siona in terms of sharing a common indigenous identity. However,
his role as a tourist guide also provided a certain distance, as relationships between the people of Puerto
Bolívar and such workers are not always positive. Regardless, he acted as my gatekeeper, introducing
me to the leaders of the village and rendering fieldwork in Puerto Bolívar possible in the first place.
At a later stage, he was also present in some of the interviews, occasionally even participating, lending
the interviews a new dynamic. On the one hand, I somehow felt that I was able to access insights into
indigenous thinking2—and especially with male members of the community—that were otherwise
impossible for a white European woman in such a context. On the other hand, my husband’s presence
and involvement also had negative impacts on the scientific research, as I was unable to establish
individual relationships on the same basis as if I had been on my own. Furthermore, my husband’s
political action and articulation of his opinions occasionally compromised my position as a researcher.
It must be acknowledged that no researcher is (or should be) neutral or without a position [28–30].
However, sometimes a more diplomatic position might have allowed for more differentiated answers.
In general, I agree with Kirsch [28] that using one’s skills and knowledge to support one’s informants’
political goals actually contributes to anthropology, a discipline based on reciprocity. Furthermore,
as Scheper-Hughes [29] has noted, anthropologists who deny themselves the power to identify an ill
are collaborating with the relations of power that allow the destruction or inequalities to continue.
Although, due to transportation issues, I was unable to talk to people from one of the communities,
I managed to at least interview the presidents of both San Victoriano and Sëoquëya. Nevertheless,
most interviews were conducted in Puerto Bolivar.
2 With this, the author refers to indigenous world views, in this case, Siona yagé ideology.
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4. Results
In order to understand how institution shopping from below is possible in this case, the pluralistic
setting has to be understood. As described in the introduction, the Cuyabeno region is marked by
various frontiers.
The introduction of nation-state borders and the increasing colonization of the area have altered
the demographic composition of the Amazon region, while applying greater pressure on both resources
and land (see ‘Environment’ and ‘Population’ in Figure 1). The Siona people have been forced to live
in smaller territories due to external pressure, as well as by missionaries who have encouraged them to
settle in village centers along the rivers in the past [31]. Furthermore, the intensified demand of global
markets and the decreasing availability of animal hides and furs have resulted in rises in relative prices
(see Figure 1). Consequently, congruent with other Amazonian regions [5], hunters from other areas
have been attracted to Cuyabeno by prospects of profit, putting them in competition with local hunters
who already struggle to make even a small income. This has led to the near extinction of animals,
such as the anaconda, giant otter, manatee, and jaguar.
In addition, the discovery of oil in the region in the 1960s stimulated a dramatic increase in
infrastructure in the so-called Oriente [5]. Roads to new cities in the Amazon region were constructed
to reduce transportation costs for oil (see ‘Technology’ in Ensminger’s model in Figure 1). Petroleum
production is one of Ecuador’s most important export products, currently accounting for around
30% [32]. Indeed, oil concessions can be sold at the southwest coast of the country, as well as
across the Amazon region. In the Cuyabeno area, there are two oil companies with concessions:
Petroamazonas (Ecuadorian) and Andes Petroleum Ecuador (Chinese) [33]. Throughout the entire
country, only two intangible zones exist where oil extraction is prohibited. Both zones lie inside the
two largest national parks: Yasuní and Cuyabeno. However, the legal situation inside protected areas
in Ecuador is somehow double-edged. Technically, inside a reserve absolutely no extractivist activities
are allowed [34]; however, given that the president is able to circumvent this law, it can be subject to
political arbitrariness. Furthermore, protected areas legally belong to the state. This is why even though
there is a right to collective rights in Ecuador, it does not apply inside the Reserve. Finally, Ecuador has
declared itself a plurinational state and even recognizes the rights of Nature in its constitution [35].
While the implementation of these laws does not always seem particularly environmentally friendly
in reality, the country presents itself through an explicitly conservationist discourse by proclaiming
the protection of the natural environment, a result of the global extractive boom. Although Western
conservationists have perceived this as a loss of pristine nature, for indigenous people it has meant
an unanticipated loss of wildlife and forest commons. Furthermore, the aforementioned changes in
external factors have resulted in changing institutions (internal change in Figure 1) for wildlife and
forestry, manifesting themselves in the creation of the RPFC in the Cuyabeno area.
The Cuyabeno Faunistic Reserve (RPFC) was established in 1979 as a protected area located in the
far northeast of the Ecuadorian Amazon, which, according to the MAE, contains unique ecosystems
representative of the Amazon region [1]. It currently comprises approximately 590’112 ha3 [1].
The first page of the management plan of the Reserve states that the RPFC is the biggest lacustrine
system in the country, characterized by high indices of globally recognized biodiversity and regarded
as a sanctuary of forest life [1]. These introductory words exemplify the MAE’s conservationist interest
in the area and relate to its ideology (Figure 1). Such conservationism depicts indigenous people as
noble savages, or as part of nature. The subjects deemed most worthy of protection are, in this exact
3 There have been significant discussions about the size of the Reserve, which more than doubled in 1991, only to then
be reduced again due to colonist pressure. Furthermore, acceptance of the limits has always been ambiguous owing to
landholdings in the area prior to the establishment of the Reserve, as well as the lacking coincidence of limits established in
the official register and on the ground.
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order: aquatic mammals (Amazon river dolphin, Amazonian manatee, giant otter); Cuyabeno and
Lagartococha river sheds and lagoons; indigenous communities inside the Reserve; and the jaguar [1].
There are five different indigenous ethnic groups living inside the Reserve (Cofán, Kichwa, Secoya,
Shuar, and Siona). Moreover, the number of communities has increased over time, with eleven
officially recognized communities currently residing here4. The relationships between the indigenous
communities and the MAE, as well as among themselves, are not always positive, mostly owing to
their divergent perspectives of conservation.
Aside from animals and indigenous people, the flora of the RPFC is also worth mentioning.
Five types of forest include over 473 tree species and at least 1400 plant species [1]. Compared
to the situation outside their territory, especially to the west of the Reserve, forest cover has been
almost entirely maintained inside the RPFC, as maps from different years of the same area indicate.
Being located in a region that has been highly deforested due to oil explorations since the 1970s,
the RPFC actually looks like a forest sanctuary from above [1]. When considering Figure 1, this can be
seen as the influence of a certain ideology on political behavior, again influencing the environment
in turn. However, over time, oil explorations have also been conducted inside the Reserve, which,
alongside tourist operations, have contaminated the rivers. In response, the MAE has produced
a management plan of the reserve to lay down some rules, but given that the Siona do not agree with
the plan, they have created their own organizations (Figure 1), such as ONASSCE5. Finally, bargaining
power (Figure 1) is always contested but is mostly dominated by the state in the form of the MAE,
as well as foreign tourist operators. This represents one aspect where the establishment of the Reserve
has brought about significant changes in the lives of the Siona. Due to its unique lagoon systems
and incredible biodiversity, the RPFC is interesting for tourism. Currently, touristic activities are
mainly concentrated around the Laguna Grande, which belongs to the Siona territory. Nevertheless,
the Lagartococha lagoons, as well as other communities, are also visited on an irregular basis [1]. In the
last twenty years, the tourist flux has constantly increased. However, this does not necessarily bring
exclusive benefits for the local communities.
4.1. Tourism (Perceptions of Commoners to the Grabbing Process)
Although there are other influences on the Siona and other indigenous communities who today
live inside the RPFC, including missionary action and petroleum production, tourism is by far the
most ambiguous, being regarded as both a positive and a negative influence. Indeed, it provides
an economic income source, which is considered a positive asset. However, like petroleum production,
it is perceived as creating physical damage to the environment by contaminating the river. This might
come as a surprise, as tourism inside the RPFC is promoted as being eco-friendly and as a means of
heightening awareness of the importance of conservationism. However, the interviews revealed that
local Siona do not necessarily share this opinion. In particular, the President of San Victoriano and
her husband, the President of the ONASSCE, were furious about the lodges’ ignorant treatment of
their residual waters. Both described how wastewater is being directed into the river when the level of
waste is high. As the latter estimated how much excrement the 600 tourists who stayed in the lodges
during the high season produced, he became more and more agitated:
These biodigesters are made of a closed tank, it fills up. Because where would the water go?
There is a tap, so when the tank is full, what do they do? They open it and send off all the shit
to the river to keep operating. (President of local indigenous organization, male, 35 years old,
living in Puerto Bolivar, Ecuador. Excerpt from an interview conducted in September 2018.)
4 Several communities have divided into two in order to obtain access to economic resources by creating communities in
different cantons or have migrated into the Reserve in search of superior subsistence means.
5 Organización de la Nacionalidad Siona Sucumbíos Cuyabeno Ecuador.
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He described how one day he had to take an early bus to the city of Coca. While driving his canoe
to the road in Aguas Negras, he discovered how the lodge owners disposed of their unwanted sewage:
They thought that at this hour there would be nobody [ . . . ]. I was like two river bends away
when I was hit by an unbearable smell! They heard my motor and turned off the lights. It was
like a film of grease, and the fish shupshupshup [he moved his hand like a fish jumping out
of the water]. So these are things I have seen, it is not that I am inventing it. (President of
local indigenous organization, male, 35 years old, living in Puerto Bolivar, Ecuador. Excerpt
from an interview conducted in September 2018.)
These quotations show how tourism is affecting the livelihoods of the Siona in a physical way,
contaminating the river from which they drink water during dry periods6.
Tourism is also having a major impact on the social structure and cohesion of the villages.
There are currently eleven lodges spread out around the lagoon system, an attractive aspect of the
RPFC. According to village members, the system works along the following lines: If a tourist agency
is interested in building a lodge in the Cuyabeno area, they ask an individual member of one of the
four Siona villages for permission. This person asks for permission at a community assembly to use
a certain part of their communal land for individual purposes. If this request is approved, he or she
builds the lodge together with his or her family and usually also works for the owner in the future.
The owners of all eleven lodges are foreign to the region, as the President of San Victoriano noted:
Throughout the twenty years that we have had tourism here, not one single [Siona] person
has been owner of a lodge. (President of one of the four Siona communities, female, 32 years
old. Excerpt from an interview conducted in September 2018.)
Significant power and economic differences can be observed between the tourist agencies/lodge
owners and the local people. Indeed, of the approximately 300 tourists who enter the reserve every
day and pay on average USD $400 for five nights, the vast majority visit one of the four villages during
their stay. However, the individual contracts between the members of the communities and the lodge
owners state that they are only paid USD $200 a month for the rental of the land plot7.
My research demonstrates that when categorizing the modes of income from tourism for the
Siona, this first category of renting includes the rental of motorized canoes. Certain individuals who
own a canoe rent it for a daily fee of USD $80 to the lodges, which then have the canoe at their disposal
during the day, including gas.
A further form of income from tourism is generated by working for the lodges. Today, there exist
two modes of work. The first concerns transportation, whereby mostly young men drive the motorized
canoes that represent the only possible means of transportation within the RPFC. The second kind of
work concerns the kitchen, where men, as well as women, are employed to cook adapted traditional,
as well as European dishes, for tourists. A third possibility of work, which is only just emerging, is
that of guide. To date, only four of the over 50 guides working in the RPFC were born inside the
Reserve8. It is likely that this will soon change, with discussions taking place to introduce a fee for
outsider guides who apply for the guide course (curso de guia) in Cuyabeno. Furthermore, there have
been attempts to only allow people native to the region to take the guide course9.
6 The organization Ceibo has provided them with rainwater tanks. However, even when no rain falls for a long period of
time, the river is still used as a secondary drinking water source. Furthermore, all people bathe and wash their dishes and
clothes in the river every day.
7 This amount has been achieved following numerous discussions wherein the lodge owners have argued that they cannot
afford to pay the Siona more than this sum, which is obviously a lie. The Siona have achieved a rise in monthly rent only
by arguing that tourism has been contaminating the Reserve for over 20 years and have threatened with compensation
payments, which should be much higher.
8 An additional difference between the guides from inside the Reserve and outsiders is that the former usually do not speak
English, affording them a lower status and thus a lower salary.
9 At the moment, there has been one course with exclusive access for Cuyabeno-born indigenous people. However, only people
with a graduation (bachillerato) are allowed to take the course.
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One final (although very small) source of income from tourism is represented by the shamans and
certain women of the villages. In order to see the shamanic presentation and women’s preparation
of traditional flatbread, tourists pay an additional fee of USD $5, which must be paid directly to the
shamans afterwards. However, some of this money is occasionally diverted into the guides’ pockets,
as there exists some ambiguity about where and when everyone should pay. Furthermore, as every
guide has his or her own personal contacts with certain families and shamans, conflicts can arise
between different families, as unequal income situations are created.
Economic conflicts may be regarded as a general influence of tourism on the villages. In particular,
individual land use contracts between lodge owners and individual families may create divisions
inside, as well as across, the different villages. This can be seen by the fact that inhabitants of Puerto
Bolivar enjoy considerably more contact with lodges than their three counterparts. The number of
contacts one has at tourist agencies also seems to be related to one’s degree of political power and
engagement. This can be observed in the ascending scale of political recognition and infrastructure
from one community to the others, from Tarabiaya (which does not even have legal recognition as
a community) to Sëoquëya (which has very limited infrastructure) and San Victoriano and ultimately
to Puerto Bolivar (which has rainwater tanks, a paved main street, and solar electricity, all products
of personal contact with political authorities). However, other actors, such as the apostolic church
installed in Sëoquëya, help to disturb these clear differentiations.
A final aspect I want to briefly mention is how tourism is physically taking away land from the
Siona because the MAE has illegally assigned land titles to at least one tourist operator. Even though
this issue may be contested due to its illegality, it still poses a serious threat to the Siona, as one village
elder stated:
Well, about tourism. At the moment we have our little places with lodges. But as I said,
who lived by the lagoon? The grandfathers. They lived there. And now, only recently the
Ministry [of Environment] awarded the Neotropic Lodge this land. They give them titles.
So what is this? As I always say, until when? Deals are made without consultation, under the
table, without our knowledge. (Village elder in Puerto Bolivar, male, ca. 70 years old. Excerpt
from an interview conducted in August 2018.)
This example of local perceptions of tourism indicates that the conservationist frontier, which most
clearly manifests itself in the lives of the Siona in the form of tourism, has an influence on the social
dimension of Siona life. It creates internal divisions and affects the physical dimension by damaging
the river and taking away land that was in the past exclusively managed by the Siona. I consider
tourism one product of the conservationist frontier, legitimized according to a conservationist ideology.
However, it does not conform with the environmental visions of all actors involved. The grabbing
process is, therefore, not being watched in total silence by the former commoners.
4.2. Re-Creation of an Indigenous Identity (Responses of Commoners to the Grabbing Process)
One important response among the Siona to the grabbing process concerns their identity building.
I argue that the conditions that shape some components of Siona identity are derived from powerful
global actors. Nevertheless, this does not imply that Siona identity is not authentic. Even though there
is a discrepancy between the image the Siona present of themselves in their quest to obtain control
over their ancestral territory and their actual daily life, their ideology operates as a bridge between the
two. In addition, Siona ideology proposes a way of seeing identity in a hybrid way. This section will
try to display how the Siona (re)create their collective identity on an everyday basis.
Identity is by definition dependent on its relation to others and is a result of interactions between
different individuals and groups [36]. In order to separate one’s group from others, markers are
selected to define categorical boundaries in a subjective and contextual manner [36]. The UN Working
Group on Indigenous Peoples has created a definition for indigenous people. The requirements
include cultural distinctiveness, priority in time with respect to occupying and using a certain territory,
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and self-identification [37]. It may be argued that although the fairly rigid definition of indigenous
peoples formulated by the UN has certainly helped many marginalized people across the world,
it very much shapes and limits the picture an indigenous group is allowed to paint of itself in public.
I, therefore, take these three categorizing factors to illustrate how outside conditions form Siona
identity today.
The analysis has shown that two markers currently help to define who is Siona and who is
not: language and clothing. These factors provide visible proof of cultural distinctiveness. Notably,
these factors seem to have been imposed from the outside.
If I show up as I am now [in shorts and t-shirt], they won’t pay me much attention. But when
you are in your típica10, they pay attention; this attracts many, tourists, whoever. The clothing
and the language attracts the whole world, because many people want to come and see the
culture, the tradition from here. (President of local indigenous organization, male, 35 years old,
living in Puerto Bolivar, Ecuador. Excerpt from an interview conducted in September 2018.)
In this case, the outside actors even get a face: tourists. However, the tourists are also influenced
in their desire to observe pristine, native cultures. I argue that this is linked to the time in which
we are living. The Anthropocene11 fosters a feeling of urgency: for the Siona to survive as a people;
for Western tourists to observe undisturbed cultures in a world of destruction. Moreover, even though
most tourists who visit the RPFC have probably never read the UN definition, it indirectly forms their
vision of an authentic indigenous group. This is not to say that these elements are not authentically
Siona. Baicoca has always been the Siona language and their traditional clothing are embedded in
their ideology:
Our necklaces are our knowledge. [ . . . ] When you drink yagé, the cascabeles are something
quite beautiful. When you touch them, the spirit of nature12 is present with the necklaces.
And the clothing: the most beautiful color is bright blue, or sky blue and white. I don’t know
why but these colors call the spirits’ attention. (Vice-President of Puerto Bolivar, female,
30 years old. Excerpt from an interview conducted in August 2018.)
Concerning the second requirement of the UN definition—priority in time—, there exists some
further ambiguity. Almost all of the interviewees possessed an impressive family history to share.
By collecting different kinship stories, I was able to produce a genealogical tree that related all of the
families in Puerto Bolivar, including some in the other three villages. In this way, almost everyone is
somehow related to one of the five men who were the first known in a line of ancestors to inhabit the
area of today’s Cuyabeno.
Hence, almost all people living in the four communities today can prove their kinship with people
who lived here before settlers and other indigenous groups arrived in the region. It can, therefore,
be argued that the second UN requirement for being an indigenous group is also fulfilled. However,
a qualification needs to be made: not all of these five founding fathers were Siona13. Owing to the
region’s complex history and permeable indigenous boundaries as regards territories, different ethnic
groups have always intermarried and mixed. The limits of collectivities have become blurred. How can
this still be a distinctive indigenous group?
Here, the third UN requirement concerning self-identification comes to the fore. The Siona of
the Cuyabeno have highly specific traditions, with the Secoya in particular, who share very similar
practices and language, representing a threat to their identity claims. The two groups have even been
10 Traditional costume.
11 Our current geological epoch, which is characterized by the fact that human agency has had such a substantial impact on the
Earth that it can be recognized in geological sediment layers.
12 Original version: el espíritu de la naturaleza.
13 Two of them were Secoya and one Cofán.
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called Siona-Secoya due to the union created by the SIL14 in the 1960s [31]. However, given that most of
the Secoya families followed the SIL to San Pablo on the River Aguarico in 1974 [4,31], the Siona argue
that they have cared more for the Cuyabeno forest. Therefore, even though Siona, Secoya, and Cofán
people have mixed for decades, the key point in defining an indigenous group as distinct is the fact
that the four communities living inside the RPFC have formally united and self-identify as the Siona
of the Cuyabeno. I, therefore, argue that, while all of the Siona are able to present family relations
with one of the founding fathers of Siona Cuyabeno settlements, self-identification plays an even more
important role at the collective, as well as at the individual level.
In general, it can be said that the Siona’s response to the green grabbing process in which they see
themselves involved concerns a re-creation of their indigenous identity in accordance with the UN
definition for indigenous peoples.
5. Discussion
Considering the historical context, the application of the Ensminger frame to analyze institutional
change [11] has allowed me to demonstrate how the situation of institutional pluralism and urgency for
the commoners has come to be. The influence of the different frontiers overriding the region has played
a particularly important role in this regard. The situation prior to the arrival of colonial conquerors
was characterized by a relatively strong institutional setting: a spiritually interlinked world with
indigenous territories governed by shamans who acted according to an animist ideology to manage
common property resources in a period of permeable mobility. However, the arrival of the frontiers
led to the gradual undermining and replacement of the Siona’s traditional institutions through the
introduction of a capitalist ideology, accompanied by conservationism.
I, therefore, argue that changes in institutions, as well as in the Siona’s experiences with frontiers
and institutions, explain their urgent need to legalize their land in order to re-establish control over
who has access to the natural resources inside their ancestral territory and how they are managed.
As has been established in this article, the institutional setting in the RPFC is pluralistic and
even ambiguous. Local informal institutions are being replaced in the re-territorialization process of
the frontier. Furthermore, formal institutions are first not always implemented as legally stated and,
second, occasionally contradict and override each other. Although the RPFC has been established
as part of a global wave of conservationism in an attempt to save the abundant biodiversity of the
Cuyabeno region, today its effectiveness in protecting the environment is being questioned by the Siona.
In order to regain control over their territory, the Siona have formed a union between four
communities and have revived their formal organization through the creation of ONASSCE in order to
augment their bargaining power. As has been shown by other authors, even though powerful actors
may replace existing ideologies with their own, older ideologies might also be re-instrumentalized
if they fit into the new system [14,15]. In order to achieve their goals, it could be argued that they
apply a perspectivist ontology strategy [7]. Just as a hunter may paint his face with a jaguar design
when hunting a peccary or an anaconda design when fishing, Siona representatives assume the role
of either Western conservationists or ecologically noble savages, depending on their counterpart.
When talking to MAE officials, the Siona use a Western conservationist discourse in order to legitimize
their land claims. In contrast, in order to attract attention and financial support from NGOs and
tourists, they assume the role of a remote, native people with traditions and institutions as old as the
forest worthy of protection. Hence, they use different discourses of legitimization depending on their
audience. Meanwhile, both discourses are connected through the animist worldview, which has been
part of their ontology for centuries, but can also be partly integrated into a modern, conservationist
logic of living in harmony with one’s environment.
14 Summer Institute of Linguistics.
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However, the Siona are struggling to maintain the UN-defined picture of an indigenous
group because traditional institutions, as well as their language (despite being authentically Siona),
are vanishing, and a modern indigenous identity that would combine old and new elements is not
required. Having talked to members of the Cuyabeno Siona communities, examined their dynamic
history and considered the importance of self-identification, I have come to the conclusion that Siona
identity is coercively hybrid and ever-changing. There is a Spanish proverb that, even though it is
generally interpreted in an alternative (and negative) way, seems to have considerable compatibility
with animist ideas of seeing oneself in relation to others: Even though the monkey may wear silk, he is
still a monkey15.
In Descola’s definition of animism, physical appearance is important in distinguishing one from
other beings [7]. Indeed, the monkey may wear silk in order to distinguish himself from other monkeys.
The Siona may wear tunics in order to distinguish themselves from other human groups16. However,
the inside is always human, or Siona, in this case. The monkey is still a monkey; the Siona are still Siona.
It is not important whether it is a monkey or a Siona because in animist myths the idea persists that
there was a time when everyone had the body of humans, until they changed their form under different
circumstances [7]. Hence, everybody has a human interior, or a soul, when phrased in Western terms.
In addition, when considering Viveiro de Castro’s thoughts on perspectivism [8], in which everyone
sees themselves as human, it can be concluded that in animist ontology, a cultural continuum exists
across all human and non-human species [7]. This means that the monkey may wear anything or
appear as anything he wants, but inside he will always be human, or seen from a human’s perspective,
a monkey. From their own perspective, therefore, a Siona will always be a Siona inside, no matter how
he or she presents himself or herself to the outside. In this way, when seen from an animist perspective,
identity is a hybrid concept that is able to change. As shown above, language and clothing, which are
embedded in Siona ideology, form one authentic part of Siona identity. Even though they only represent
a fraction of Siona identity, they are used to present a rigid picture of indigeneity, as requested by
global actors, such as (conservationist) NGOs and tourists, in order to be accepted as a donor target on
the one hand and, in this case more importantly, the legitimate owners of the Cuyabeno.
Taking into account foucauldian poststructuralist insights [38,39], it can be argued that the
Siona are made subjects of more powerful actors, such as NGOs or the state. There exists some
ambivalence between embodying and presenting an identity that stands in line with one’s own values
but that simultaneously is accepted by the outside world. Certainly, a balance has to be found and
constantly upheld between externally imposed views and self-representation. However, I would
like to stress the point that this argument should neither negate local people’s agency nor their
authenticity. Even though the Siona present a picture required from the outside, they are still Siona.
Thus, they create their contemporary collective identity using traditional elements that have always
been part of Siona life. When comparing this research with similar previous studies, its contribution on
the importance of identity stands out. Indeed, while other authors have focused more generally on the
region [5], on a different indigenous group and their environmental struggles [40], or on ontological
perspectives [41], there is no recent study on the Siona and their battle for survival. The only study
focusing on the Siona was conducted twenty years ago, when Siona-Secoya was considered a single
indigenous group [4].
6. Conclusions
For these reasons, large-scale land acquisition processes under the name of conservationism must
be analyzed regarding their implications for all concerned actors. The RPFC is presented as a protected
15 Original version: Aunque el mono se vista de seda, mono es.
16 When assuming an animist perspective, it is not disrespectful to compare a person to a monkey because both are actually
human, as will be explained in a moment.
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area where flora and fauna can thrive in an undisturbed manner, a forest sanctuary where Nature
can still be observed in its pristine condition. Eco-tourism is promoted in the area and many Western
tourists trek to the Amazon in order to observe this natural heritage. Local responses to tourism as one
aspect of the grabbing process include ambiguous reactions. On the one hand, tourism provides—albeit
in very modest ways—a source of income in one of Ecuador’s most marginalized and geographically
remote regions. On the other hand, it does not concur with local visions of an environmentally
friendly lifestyle and physically takes away land that was formerly managed exclusively by this local
indigenous group. It has been shown in African [39,42] and Asian [43] contexts how commons systems
provide vital resources for marginal groups, the dismantling of which undermines the resilience of
social and ecological systems [44,45]. In this way, this article can be seen as congruent.
Furthermore, this article has shown how the reigning ideology in a society defines which discourses
and forms of legitimization are acceptable. In the process of commons and resilience grabbing,
the Western ideology of conservationism has spread to many parts of the world, where indigenous
people find themselves obligated to legitimize their existence in resourceful areas in conservationist
terms [14,38,46]. Consequently, the study’s main contribution to the debate around commons grabbing
processes consists of focusing on its influence on identity building processes. This article has illustrated
parts of a land grabbing process from the perspective of the Siona, a group of local indigenous people
who, even though their agency is restricted, do not accept mere victimhood. Instead, they develop
their own strategies and re-create their identities, including institution shopping from below.
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Abstract: State-led development visions and the accompanying large-scale investments at the
geographical margins of Kenya rest on the potential of public–private partnerships to fast-tract
sustainable development through accelerated investments. Yet, the conceptualisation, planning
and implementation of these visions often deploy a depoliticising development discourse that
reinforces and expands long-standing misconceptions about the margins primarily directed at pastoral
livelihoods and related communal land tenure. This paper illustrates how the implementation of
a wind energy project employs the corporate strategies of depoliticising both land claims and
development interventions. In Northern Kenya, private sector participation in large-scale wind
energy infrastructure has created a complex development apparatus in which players are empowered
to undertake the accelerated investments required to shape the delivery of the Kenya Vision 2030 in
the region. An analysis of corporate actors’ strategies in the implementation of the contested wind
farm presents a depoliticised framing of “low-cost green energy”, representations of pastoral land
tenure and corporate social responsibility strategies through which dispossession is justified and
legitimised. This case underscores the extent to which corporate counterresistance is shaped by the
reproduction of a historical depoliticised discourse about pastoralism and communal tenure and
challenges the traditional narrative of government hegemony against local resistance to large-scale
land acquisitions (LSLAs).
Keywords: large-scale land acquisitions; common pool resources; green energy; corporate social
responsibility
1. Introduction
Recent scholarship has produced a wide range of insightful analyses on the trajectories and
dynamics of large-scale land acquisitions (LSLAs) and related grassroots mobilisation against their
dispossessing potential. Within this vast literature, LSLAs of common property resources (CPRs)
have received limited attention despite their legal vulnerability and preferential targeting by the
grabbing processes. Nevertheless, several important studies have highlighted the historical shifts
in the commodification of land relations [1], the role of law and government policy embedded in
neoliberal economic ideologies in consolidating dispossessory trends in CPRs [2] and the political
reactions from below to commons grabbing [3]. This paper contributes to these debates by emphasizing
the role of historical construction and denial of the proprietary character of communal tenure and their
reproduction in contemporary technical “development” discourse [4] in creating and perpetuating
commons dispossession. Contemporary LSLAs, which are deeply embedded in institutions and
policy planning systems of the state, are presented as “new” development visions to throw off
aid dependencies [5] and are expressed as an “unavoidable prerequisite for implementing the
productivity-enhancing technologies” [6], hence dispossessing indigenous communities by securing
exclusionary rights over their common pool resources.
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Drawing from the case study of a wind power development project in Northern Kenya,
the Lake Turkana Wind Power Project (LTWP), this contribution critically analyses the historical
and contemporary technical discourse around the “visions of viability” [7] of pastoralism enacted
through colonial and postcolonial policy and planning and their practical and political consequences
for LSLA of community land. The key questions guiding the analysis of this contribution are as follows:
how does state ‘development’ discourse on pastoral commons inform present-day legitimisation of
commons dispossession, and, more importantly, how do commercial and political interests select from
diverse delegitimising discourse to maintain and promote alternative investments in communally
owned land? To answer these questions, this paper analyses how the introduction of investment
designed to provide reliable and low-cost green energy to the pastoral commons at the margins of
Kenya reproduces colonial misconceptions on local livelihoods, customary tenure and the utilisation
of common pool resources. The pursuit of the LTWP project, a new flagship project under the Kenya
Vision 2030, has created unresolved contest between corporate entities involved in the LTWP project
and indigenous pastoral communities trying to resist exclusion from their access to critical CPRs.
The case study in this paper is derived from Sarima in the Mt. Kulal region of Marsabit County,
an arid region in Northern Kenya and home to autonomous and tribally-based migratory pastoralist
societies that include the Rendille, Samburu, Gabra and Turkana. With its large central plains,
the Mt. Kulal region covers approximately 20,000 km2 of bushland and dwarf shrublands dotted
with lines of seasonal sand rivers that dry out in the open plains. Despite the low annual rainfall
of less than 500 mm, the proximity of the Eastern shores of Lake Turkana has important impacts on
the hydrology of the area, including being an important source of perennial grasses. As a major dry
season resource with enough open grasslands, the Mt. Kulal region is a point of convergence for
migratory pastoral groups, which necessitates intertribal negotiations for rangeland pasture and water
resources. In 2006, the isolated and hitherto marginalised Mt. Kulal region was set for transformation
with the authorisation of an LTWP comprising a wind farm with 365 wind turbines and related
infrastructure on 150,000 acres of land, a high voltage substation, an associated transmission line
and 204 km of road upgrades. In 2014, communities in the Laisamis Constituency brought a case to
Kenya’s Environment and Land Court (ELC) for the immediate cessation of all project activities by
the LTWP, citing irregular, unprocedural and illegal acquisition and annexation of community land,
commissioning of a “self-serving” [8] Socio-Economic and Environmental Impact Assessment (SEIA)
by the proprietors of the LTWP project and denial of the indigenous status of communities around
the Mt. Kulal region. Challenging the community case in the ELC, the LTWP, through its lawyers,
submitted that the land in question was “uninhabited—the community was not being merely left on
the roadside” and “situated in the middle of nowhere” and that LTWP investment was “a Kenya Vision
2030 flagship project which has benefitted the community immensely and will continue to benefit
them.” [8].
The countercontestation to the community opposition to the LTWP offers a glimpse into the
development discourse that legitimises commons grabbing. The LTWP fits a wider and well
documented pattern of the depoliticisation of development [4] and the extension of state control
through a specific knowledge structure that presents pastoralism as unviable and legitimises large-scale
investments as the ideal. Furthermore, it demonstrates how, as argued by Cousins and Scoones [7],
by creating technical discourse around visions of economic viability, large-scale investments become
enacted through policy and planning without interrogation. Further, the LTWP case illustrates
the relevance of the notion of the “anti-politics machine” as a lens to analyze depoliticisation
within development discourse. The discussion presented in this paper about the depoliticisation
of development interventions is based on the understanding of pastoralism as a rational adaptation to
an environment dominated by variability through mobility and utilisation of common pool resources
(CPR) held in common property institutions. Though mobility, pastoralists can interface extreme
variability in the environment with variability in the production system [9], hence exploiting the
economic benefits associated with flexibility [10].
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This paper draws on James Ferguson’s thesis of an anti-politics machine to examine historically
conditioned colonial discourses about pastoralism and the tradition of their reproduction in
development discourses in postcolonial investment and policy in pastoral regions to legitimise the
dispossession of commons. The paper proceeds as follows: The next section presents Ferguson’s
anti-politics machine framework before a presentation of historical representations and dispossession
of the pastoral commons in the Kenyan context. This is followed by descriptions of the study area and
research methods. The paper then considers the key anti-politics machine derived from the LTWP’s
wind power development to identify a myriad of strategies employed by the LTWP project to justify
its investment. These strategies are then used to demonstrate the discursive relations between the
LTWP’s anti-politics machine and the broader historical and contemporary development discourse
that shapes the dispossession of pastoral commons. Finally, we conclude with a discussion on the
relevance of depoliticisation on commons dispossession and how such contested appropriation of
commons constitutes “resilience grabbing”, with deleterious impacts on commons reliance on CPRs.
2. Anti-Politics Machine and Common Pool Resources in Kenya
A theoretical understanding of anti-politics in development discourse and practice was developed
by anthropologist James Ferguson. While studying state power and development discourse in Lesotho,
Ferguson illustrated how supposedly “politically neutral” development interventions overlooked
complex political and structural realities within specific communities—what he termed “anti-politics
machines” of development [4]. The anti-politics machine thesis argues that development institutions
have a tendency to “generate their own form of discourse” by creating “a structure of knowledge”
around subjects of development interventions that have the effect of expanding and entrenching the
bureaucratic power of the state as well as projecting a representation of economic and social life that
denies and suspends politics and its effects [4]. Consequently, development interventions “inevitably
adopt a technocratic and universalizing approach that tends to obscure both the essentially political
character of many development problems and the local and national political processes on who gets to
define and benefit from development’ [11].” Ferguson further observes that despite the widespread
and apparently unintended consequences of their development interventions, governments and their
networks of donor agencies continue to justify increased and similar interventions based on the same
erroneous assumptions. However, as Buscher argues, “anti-politics can serve the necessary political
strategy to try to ‘make things happen in’ or ‘get things out of’ intensely politicised and increasingly
commoditised environments [12].”
Ferguson’s work has been criticised for ignoring a “third discourse” in development that
represents the subject of development projects as “the rurally based, land-poor migrant worker”
who would benefit from having a “market, or a road, or a school, or a clinic only 5–10 miles away,
instead of 50 [13].” Similarly, Ferguson’s argument that the development apparatus constitutes an
“anti-politics machine depoliticising everything it touches” [4] has been questioned. Examining
historical and contemporary development interventions in Indonesia, Li argues that development
programs may “become a politically charged arena” in which rules and claims are constantly reassessed
and reworked [14]. However, Ferguson’s thesis has been extensively used to critically examine how
knowledge is generated and used in development and has continued to be provide useful analyses of
the effects of development interventions. This paper employs Ferguson’s framework to structure an
analysis of legitimising discourse related to historical and contemporary dispossessions of commons
in development interventions in Kenya. The framework’s focus on construction of development
representation and their institutional rationales is appropriate given the development policies and
strategies employed in the study area. The four theoretical premises for development representation
and the institutional rationales of Ferguson’s framework included the following [4]:
(a) That the target of development programs is not yet incorporated into the modern world and that
investments in infrastructure, education, introduction of cash economy, etc., can “open it up” and
transform it into a developed modern economy;
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(b) That the target of development programs “must be agricultural” so that its development can be
achieved through technical inputs and extension services;
(c) That the target of development programs constitutes a national economy and thus supports the
idea of national economic planning and the notion and idea of sector-based programs; and
(d) That the target of development programs is subject to the idea of governmentality—the
control of a neutral, unitary and effective national government—and is thus responsive to
planners’ blueprints.
3. The Historical Processes of Commons Representations in Kenya
In Kenya’s arid and semiarid lands (ASALs), depoliticisation has long been associated with the
social relations related to land and productivity of the dominant land uses. The coming of colonial
rule initiated two changes that shaped the future of government policy in relation to ASALs. First,
Kenya’s ASALs have a problematic history whereby the colonial administration not only constructed
the dominant land use—pastoralism—as an “irrational” way of life but instituted legal and policy
strategies to introduce private property rights in the ASALs, thereby curtailing mobility and taking
away common property resources from the control of flexible customary resource management
institutions. This representation of pastoralism was not only isolationist and discriminative but also
laid down policies for its restriction, as observed by Zwanenberg:
“The colonial view had consistently been that pastoral, and particular nomadic activities,
were primitive, backward and to be discouraged. This view underlay the permanency of
the stock control regulations, and especially the quarantine [screening] regulations, which
precluded any official encouragement of stock trade.” [15]
Pastoral livelihoods in the ASALs depended on spatial and social mobility to interface extreme
variability in the environment with variability in the production system [9] by making use of a wide
range of natural resources, social resources and opportunities [16]. However, colonialism created
boundaries challenging pastoralists’ imperative of free movement, “disrupting the natural process
of adjustment that maintained a balance between people, land and livestock [17].” This colonial
restructuring reduced the mobility on which pastoralism depended. In addition, increasing droughts
and intensification of disease outbreaks pressured pastoral households.
Second, the colonial white settlers erroneously perceived any unoccupied piece of land as “no
man’s land” and annexed it. Under the colonial “civilisation” mission, the colonial administrators
began the process of individualisation of rights in land as “the first stage in the modern departure from
the customary system of landholding [18].” This ideology enabled European settlers and corporations
to take for themselves the best land and mineral resources, including fragmenting the pastoralist
domain and fracturing pastoralist communities, which, according to Markakis, is “a historic injustice
that awaits redress [19].” The colonial state not only enforced individual rights in land to exclude others
but also “claimed all apparently ‘vacant’ or ‘unused’ land for itself as ‘public land’, so that occupiers
lacking express approval could be treated as squatters in the land of their birth, and evicted [18].”
By imposing private property rights on critical rangeland resources, such as dry season grazing
areas and migration routes, the colonial government contributed to the transformation of pastoral
rangelands, supporting and reproducing vulnerability to risks.
The independent Kenyan administration, in a bid to achieve development and defeat the three
ills of disease, ignorance and poverty, stated that development planning is the most important
instrument to achieve those goals. However, the colonial regulatory and policy infrastructure was
transferred largely intact and was endorsed and funded by international development agencies.
In the ASALs, narratives of scarcity in lowland ecologies and productivity of pastoral economies
became the cornerstone of development planning. Most of the development strategies adopted
after independence were “technical” solutions that had “the allure and unquestionable legitimacy of
science [16].” For instance, the premise of range management concepts such as “carrying capacity”,
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“cattle complex” [20] and “tragedy of commons” [21] became a handy simplification of the complex
African pastoral system. Accordingly, issues of donor mobilisation around critical areas of ASAL
development became a key part of government interventions to include volume and value production.
The 1970s saw the introduction of group ranches that were “promoted with the intention of easing
the transition from communal tenure and encouraging commercial production by offering veterinary
support and better access to markets [16].” However, the group ranches model was incompatible with
the way in which pastoralists managed collective access to resources [16], and consequently, critical
common property resources were lost, leading to the displacement of pastoralists
Recent trends in regional and national development policies towards the ASALs have seen efforts
to “rectify” [22] this historical marginalisation through inclusive policies and state-led development
“visions” that aim to open up these areas as “new frontiers for development” and incorporate them
into the state [5]. These “new visions” of development are being created to increase agricultural
productivity [23], generate mineral resources for export [24] and expand infrastructure required
for regional economic integration [25]. These new visions were also responsible for a change
in narratives from constructing pastoralism as an “irrational way of life” to understanding the
unique challenges to the development of the region and the rationale for protecting and promoting
mobility and supporting the pastoral customary institutions [26]. The deployment of LSLAs and
the related infrastructure installations have been accompanied by many perceived advantages,
including addressing unsustainable fossil-fueled economies and the Earth’s climate crisis [27,28].
Consequently, there is considerable pressure to invest in reenabled energy projects globally as part
of a long term strategy to achieve the dual goal of meeting targets to increase shares of renewable
energy (and by extension reduce the reliance on greenhouse gas (GHG)-emitting fossil fuels) and
enhance environmental sustainability [29,30]. However, renewable energy projects around the
globe have been associated with “land grabbing”, which is “a measure used by some governments
(and corporations) to meet their food and energy requirements by acquiring land in a foreign
country [31].” Experiences around the world indicate fierce sociopolitical conflicts in relation to
renewable energy installations [32,33]. Traditionally, the terrain of contestation comprises diverse
issues ranging from “struggles against dispossession” involving expulsion and dispossession of land
from local communities to issues of incorporation and the terms of such inclusions [33,34]. As a
result, contestations against mobilisation around renewable energy have not only mobilised a wide
range of actors, including human rights, agrarian and environmental activists [34] but also involve
diverse strategies of resistance from covert to more open opposition to dispossession and terms of
inclusion [35,36].
LSLAs involve a great deal of political dynamics involving transformations in existing
infrastructure, land rushes and reconfigurations of local livelihoods [37,38]. In the context of common
property systems, land rush has been associated with the unintended effects of transforming and
redefining common land rights essential for the communal systems of production that ensure the
sustainable use of natural resources. Among the African commons, this is particularly exacerbated by
the weak status of community-derived ownership over the commons [39] from years of government
policy measures that sought to take rights and responsibilities related to natural resources out of
the hands of local communities [39,40]. While government policies and their impacts on communal
ownership do play a significant role in the ease by which commons are easy targets of LSLAs in general,
the vulnerability of commons to LSLAs has been thought to be exacerbated by the incompatibilities
between uses, claims and values that common users attach to natural resources on one hand and the
commodification goals of governments that seek to formalise property rights on the other [2,41,42].
As LSLAs unfold, the dispossession of commons is leading to a loss of principal and scarce natural
capital, with grave implications for social and political stability.
In Kenya, the development vision of achieving prosperity and middle-income status by 2030
contained in Kenya Vision 2030 has impacted the scale and approaches to commons dispossession.
Growing recognition of ASALs as “new frontiers of opportunity” were accentuated in the government’s
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U-turn in its understanding and investments in the ASALs after decades of marginalisation, and this
has been articulated in development visions such as Kenya Vision 2030 with massive investments
in infrastructure, energy and irrigated agriculture. Vision 2030 and related policy visions have an
array of strategies for transforming the ASALs. First, through the creation of new development
corridors—“networks of roads, railways, pipelines and ports that facilitate the movement of
commodities” [43]—the frontier areas are expected to be incorporated fully into the state [5]. Second,
these strategies aim to “create an enabling environment for private sector participation in infrastructure
and technology development, including appropriate tax breaks and incentives, in all areas of
infrastructure investment [26].” Third, Vision 2030 aims to transform the country into “a newly
industrializing, middle income country providing a high quality of life to all its citizens in a clean and
secure environment”, including sector specific flagship projects. While these visions are conceptualised
as transformations to space, there is a great deal of uncertainty on exactly when and where they will
materialize [5]. In addition, it is unclear whether the redesignation of ASALs as new frontiers of
opportunity is demonstrative of the recurrent reassessment of development concepts witnessed in the
last five decades or is, in fact, a reinterpretation of the quality of territory for green and bioeconomic
forms of development [44].
The legacy of these development visions on ASALs is already evident in the inevitable
physical and social fragmentations of the ASALs’ landscapes, claims of dispossession of indigenous
communities and contested land politics. According to Browne, one of the major Kenya Vision 2030
flagship projects, the Lamu-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET), “has failed to realise the
developmentalist ‘Africa rising’ narrative of its promoters” [45]. For pastoral commons along the path
of the LAPSSET project, inevitable disruptions of migration routes and losses of crucial dry season
fallback zones during drought [46] constitute what has been dubbed “resilience grabbing”. Moreover,
development visions have been associated with “the new scramble for Africa”: dispossession of land
characterised by “the haste, the lack of negotiation about conditions, the privileging of foreigners
over locals and when we know that c. 70% of the land thus far acquired is not (yet) taken into
production [47].” Furthermore, the framing of development visions often engenders a discourse of
depoliticisation of the local land use and the natural resource context typically enacted by governments
and their investors to legitimise dispossession as state appropriation of “unused” or “vacant” land [47].
This sees the state exhibiting anti-politic strategies not only through “development by dispossession”
but also through encouraging and endorsing corporate agencies’ CSR and greenwashing strategies of
sustainable development narratives to preempt resistance and minimise conflict.
4. Methods and Study Site
4.1. Data and Methods
The empirical material for this article is drawn from field work that took place between July 2016
and June 2018 in the Northern Kenya County of Marsabit (see Figure 1), where, since 2006, the local
government authorities with support from national government institutions has proactively enabled a
private corporation to acquire 150,000 acres of community land to implement a wind power project
expected to add 310 MW to the national grid. The objective of the field work was to examine mechanics
of the 2006 acquisition of 150,000 acres of community land for wind power development by the LTWP
consortium, grassroots political resistance to the project and attempts by state and corporate actors
to restrict and manage contestation of the wind power project. This paper employed a qualitative
data collection strategy aimed at identifying: (a) the main actors in the grassroots resistance to the
LTWP project, their characteristics and their underlying ideological and campaign strategies and the
subjects of their suit; (b) the coercive and anti-political maneuvering and counterresistance measures
of the LTWP project and affiliated government institutions; and, (c) how diverse delegitimising
“development” discourse employed by the LTWP project is associated with historical delegitimisation
of pastoral commons and the generalizability of these strategies in similar contexts. This strategy
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entailed the collection of the three types of data used in the study: semi-structured interview responses,
a content analysis of ELC proceedings and archival and secondary data from government policy and
publicly available LTWP project documents.
First, the main actors in the grassroots resistance to the wind power project were identified
through a review of court documents relating to the ELC Civil Suit No 163 of 2014 and key informants.
At this stage, two main groups of actors were identified: (a) the petitioners (TPs) and (b) the interested
parties (IPs). Further, apart from the LTWP project, which the TPs identified as the main respondent, a
third category of actors was identified: (c) government institutions with direct responsibility for land
administration in the study area including the County Government of Marsabit, The Attorney General,
the Chief Land Registrar and the National Land Commission (NLC). Semi-structured interviews
were administered to the members and the leadership of two grassroots groups in the ELC Civil Suit
No 163 of 2014, which included a set of key informant surveys (i.e., three key leaders in each group;
N = 6); a set of key informants in the areas represented by each group (N = 16); key informants drawn
from the National Land Commission (NLC) (N = 2); officials of the County Government of Marsabit
(N = 5); members of County Representatives in the Marsabit County Assembly (CA) (N = 6); and
political aspirants for national and county assembly seats in Laisamis Constituency (N = 5). Responses
from the TPs and IPs revealed the historical context and the channels of expression of the grassroots
resistance to the LTWP project, the coercive and anti-political maneuvering and counterresistance
measures of the LTWP project and affiliated government institutions. Details of community land
acquisition for the project were obtained from records of the now defunct Marsabit County Council
and semistructured interviews with four former Marsabit County Council councilors and five serving
County Representatives in the Marsabit County Assembly (CA). Government policy documents, LTWP
documents, correspondences and court proceedings were obtained to triangulate community claims
and the corporate counterclaims and narratives legitimising the project. Archival research conducted
in the Kenya National Archives between July 2016 and June 2017 was used to understand historical
aspects of communal land and ASALs legal land institutions.
Second, the anti-political nature of discourse associated with the LTWP project case was
investigated by reviewing publicly available government and company documents and the proceedings
of the ELC Civil Suit No 163 of 2014. Through critical analysis of documents, court proceeding and
related rulings and additional materials from secondary sources, the paper identified discourses
associated with Kenya’s key development visions and green energy, including counter-framings of
the TP application; the company’s representations of community land and related claims of illegal
land acquisition; and the meanings associated with the company’s corporate social responsibility
(CSR) investments and the indigenous status of the local communities. These analyses paid attention
to the practices and strategies of the LTWP project regarding the “depoliticisation” of green energy,
land redistribution claims of TPs, communal tenure and local communities. Finally, from the analysis
of the first two sets of data, the paper identified strategies of depoliticisation, their articulation and
the mechanisms for their reproduction employed by the LTWP project and its network of local and
national actors as well as how they relate to the dominant colonial and postcolonial discourse that
delegitimised pastoral commons and legitimised alternative large-scale investments as the ideal.
However, there is need to highlight a methodological shortcoming of research on “land grab”.
Given some of the characteristics of LSLAs, Oya points out that land deals generally provide “killer facts
that raise awareness and induce action [48].” While certainly not ruling out all sources of potential bias
from the interview conducted with key informants—given land (and by extension the LTWP project)
is a key issue around which local politics are organised—this paper tries to address these problems by
focusing on the multiple layers and contradictions by disaggregating, clarifying and testing various
claims and counter claims used by different interviewees, as suggested by Oya. In addition, the paper
tries to enhance the comparability of the arguments and counterarguments in the ELC Civil Suit No 163
of 2014 with historical discourse on pastoralism development.
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Figure 1. Map of Marsabit County highlighting the study area.
4.2. Study Area
Marsabit County falls within the larger ASALs of Kenya and is among the 3 counties comprising
the upper Eastern bloc. Marsabit County is the largest county in Kenya in terms of land mass
(70,961.2 km2) and has a population of 291,166 [49] people, which includes three major migrant
pastoralist groups: Boran, Gabra and Rendille. Marsabit County comprises extensive plains lying
between 300 and 900 m above sea level and an extensive dwarf-shrub grassland or a very dry form of
bushed grassland [50]. The county is also endowed with mountain ranges, including the Ol Donyo
Ranges (2066 m above sea level) in the southwest, Mt. Marsabit (1865 m above sea level) in the central
part of the county, the Hurri Hills (1685 m above sea level) in the Northeastern part of the county and
Mt. Kulal (2235 m above sea level) in the northwest [50]. The constitutive plains comprise diverse
ecological zones ranging from subhumid to arid that form a natural habitat for diverse grasses and
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shrubs that provide pasture in different seasons. Migrant pastoral communities utilise these diverse
pasture types through the migration of herds.
Marsabit County and the entire arid region of Northern Kenya have been politically and
economically removed from the power of the state. According to Catley et al., these borderlands
have been “beyond the reach of the state and so the development industry” and, as such, have been
designated as “sites of famine, destitution and impoverishment....while contributing little tax or tribute
to state coffers [51].” However, in an apparent U-turn from the marginalisation policy, the Kenyan state
embarked on a “rebalancing of national development” through “accelerated investment in previously
neglected regions essential for sharing in the promise and benefits of Vision 2030” [26] including
“interventions required to bring the ASALs to the same threshold as the rest of the country [52].”
The state-led development visions still have the old stereotypes, including a distinct security dimension,
but they also articulate a “new departure....to transform them [5].” The premise underlying these
development visions is that “the Government will release the latent potential of the arid and semiarid
lands in livestock, tourism, and renewable energy, and regions comparative advantage in its strategic
location as Kenya’s bridgehead to the markets of North Africa and the Middle East [26].” Some of the
major projects outlined in Kenya’s development vision for the development of Northern Kenya include
large-scale infrastructure development and renewable energy development, including “prioritizing
the development of transport corridors linking Kenya to key markets in Ethiopia, South Sudan and
Somalia and beyond them to the Middle East, such as the Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia transport
corridor [26].” Constructed under the “imagery of a seamless Africa” [43] for ease of movement of
capital, commodities and people, they have had negative impacts such as the emergence of “economies
of anticipation” for benefits and compensations [5].
The LTWP was launched in Sarima in 2006 as a Vision 2030 flagship project with funding from a
consortium of international investors. The project website offers a brief introduction to the 310 MW
wind farm underlining green energy and partnership with local public power company:
“Once operational, the wind farm will provide 310 MW of reliable, low-cost energy to
Kenya’s national grid (i.e., approx. 17% of the country’s installed capacity), which will be
bought at a fixed price by Kenya Power and Lighting Company Ltd. (KPLC) over a 20-year
period in accordance with the Power Purchase Agreement.” [53]
The Sarima area of the Mt. Kulal region comprises large arid plains with a hill mass, Mt. Kulal,
to the east and Lake Turkana to the west. Endowed with a unique geographical condition, Sarima
experiences strong predictable wind streams as a result of fluctuations in daily temperatures between
Lake Turkana and the desert hinterland. Located between Mt. Kulal and Mt. Nyiro, Sarima is a valley
that acts as a funnel in which wind streams are accelerated to high speeds, 11 m per second, which are
among the highest recorded in the world. Sarima is thus endowed with extractable wind power, which
the LTWP has translated into a capacity of 300 MW. Consequently, the LTWP was designated as a
flagship project of Kenya Vision 2030 to the extent that the project will generate reliable green energy at
a lower cost through a public-private partnership (PPP). Following a memorandum of understanding
signed between the KPLC and the LTWP on 10 April 2008, the wind farm facility, comprising 365
turbines, a high voltage substation and a transmission line, was begun in 2014. The LTWP, Kenya’s
biggest PPP, with an investment of over $700 million that is expected to increase the country’s energy
output by 15–20%, was promoted as socially and environmentally benign with positive impacts on
sustainable energy, job creation and the development of rural Northern Kenya.
Designated as the largest wind farm in Africa, the LTWP project also drew the interest of
international development funding agencies with interest in renewable energy and carbon credit
generating assets. The project is financed by a consortium of international donors, including the
African Development Bank (AfDB), Finn Fund, Norfund, the Danish Investment Fund for Developing
Countries (IFU), the Danish Export Credit Agency (EKF) and Vestas, which manufactures turbines.
Initially, the World Bank was interested in providing risk guarantee for the project but withdrew its
support in 2012 with concerns around Kenya’s capacity to consume all of the electricity generated
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by the project [54] and fears that the Power Purchase Agreement would expose the country to large
financial risk [55]. However, in 2018, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), World Bank’s
corporate finance branch signed a cooperation agreement with the Finnish government for a €114
million loan to the LTWP project as part of its support for wind power projects across the continent [56].
After the withdrawal of the World Bank, AfDB stepped in to provide partial risk guarantee to the other
project financiers.
Relatedly, it was not long before the procedure of land acquisition and the socio-economic and
environmental impacts of the project were questioned considering the socioecological and cultural and
religious affiliations attached to the region by the pastoralist communities. In 2014, residents of the
Laisamis Constituency and Karare Ward in Marsabit County filed a lawsuit in Kenya’s ELC to contest
the “unprocedural and illegal” acquisition of 150,000 acres of community land in Sarima, including
a lack of public consultation or compensation for affected communities. The land in question was
constitutionally designated as Trust Land with clear procedures for setting apart public consultation
and compensation in accordance with the Trust Lands Act Cap 288. The communities argued that the
unprocedural acquisition of their land will not only alter the use of land but will also permanently alter
the landscape, which will render them unable to seasonally and cyclically use pasture lands, cultural
sites and a camel migration corridor to Lake Turkana.
Furthermore, the petitioners, acting on behalf of pastoral communities that jointly utilise the
common grazing plains of Sarima, accused the LTWP of carrying out a “self-serving Environmental
and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA)” [57] without involving the communities in the area and without
evaluating the possible negative impacts of the project on the economic, social, cultural and physical
well-beings of the indigenous communities in the area [8]. Moreover, the petitioners claimed that
the application for an additional 110,000 acres in addition to the LTWP’s initial application of 40,000
acres occurred at an excessively rapid pace and with substantial secrecy, thereby disallowing time for
procedures for setting apart community land in accordance with the Trust Lands Act. According to the
petitioners, the unprocedural acquisition of community land and the possible negative impacts of the
project on local communities have led to growing public discontent and hence their application to the
ELC for termination of the wind power development.
Nevertheless, the construction of the wind farm continued without interruption, even as the ELC
determined that the issues before it were important legally. In a court ruling dated 18 March 2016,
the ELC ordered the LTWP to confine its activities to the 87.5 acres it was given to utilise and to ensure
that resident communities’ access to Lake Turkana through the project was not blocked [8]. In addition,
the case was referred for mediation by the Marsabit CA to encourage an out of court settlement of the
issues in dispute. Despite delays in the determination of the court, there was little concerted resistance
to the project except in the Kargi location, where the company trucks were blocked by the Kargi
residents from accessing the wind site through the Marsabit–Kargi–Loiyangalani route. Other road
blockages by the local communities were reported from settlements along the Laisamis–Loiyangalani
route with communities reporting concerns around employment and frustrations over delays by
the LTWP project to address their complaints [58]. The lack of concerted community activism
was attributed to the fact that, despite widespread opposition to the project by communities and
their local leaders, some local political leaders from the area and the local government were in
full support of the project, to which a Rendille elder desperately remarked, “with some of our
leaders eating from the enemy’s (LTWP) pot, how can we achieve a united front to confront this
monster?”(Interview_024_Rendille Elder, interviewed in Meru Law Courts on 17 March 2016). Indeed,
this not only created tension between the two groups but also made the LTWP and land issues in
general key campaign issues for the 2017 general elections (Interview_015, Political seat contestant
Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Marsabit on the 27 April 2017).
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5. The Politics of Grassroots Mobilisation around LTWP Project
Understanding local resistance to the LTWP project in the local pastoralists’ communities
necessitates an exploration of the politics of land as well as the territorialised ethnicity in Kenya’s
pastoral areas. As “arenas of action”, political reactions “from below” [33] to the wind power project
were symbolic of the prevailing politics of land in the area which found a clear ideological expression
following Kenya’s 2013 general elections. The local resistance was made up of two groups (see
Table 1), the petitioners (TPs) who brought the case against LTWP project to the ELC on behalf of the
indigenous communities in Laisamis Constituency and Karare Ward (Karare Ward, largely inhabited
by the Samburu speaking Arial group, is a local electoral area of the Marsabit County under Saku
constituency. The local groups have claims to the contested area for dry season grazing as well as
cultural affiliations) of Marsabit County, and the interested parties (IPs) who asked to be enjoined
to the case to represent the interests of the communities residing in the immediate vicinity of the
project. The TPs included elected members of the Marsabit County Assembly drawn from the larger
Laisamis Constituency. They represented themselves as “patriotic” Rendille and Samburu leaders
who put “communities’ interest” before their own and described the IP supporting the continuation
of the project as “puppets (of the LTWP project) after individual interest.” (Interview_015, Political
seat contestant Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Marsabit on 27 April 2017). On the other
hand, the IPs pictured themselves as “defenders of the local communities rights to development” and
claimed that they have “already seen the fruits of this (LTWP project) development” (Interview_025,
Interested Party to the LTWP case, interviewed in Nanyuki on the 30 May 2017). While the claim of the
wind project’s “development contribution” to the region could be easily rationalised by the IPs, they
did not dismiss claims of dispossession that have fueled the opposition to the project. For example,
according to one of the IPs:
“As an IP, I do not support any illegality in relation to the land acquisition by the company,
and that is precisely why we have asked the court to refer the matter of land acquisition
for arbitration. There are certainly unanswered questions related to the procedure of land
acquisition. This is a procedural issue which can be corrected.” (Interview_025, Interested
Party to the LTWP case, interviewed in Nanyuki on the 30 May 2017)
The nature of ethnic solidarities that epitomises the control of natural resources in the study area
remains fundamental to mobilisation efforts against the LTWP project. Historically, Sarima was used
for dry season grazing and cultural rights by the Samburu and the Rendille who are bound together
by political alliances, kinship ties and negotiated access to resources to create reciprocity [59] However,
while reciprocal access and use rights could be granted to neighboring pastoral communities during
periods of droughts, hostility to the Turkana by these groups was attributed to practices in resource use
such as “Turkana cut trees and burn charcoal, being less concerned about the environment [59]”. Hence,
while the historical hegemony over Sarima was with the Samburu and Rendille, conflict over dry season
water and pasture with migrating Turkana groups was a common occurrence, particularly between the
Samburu and Turkana pastoral groups [60,61]. Hence, ethnic contest over natural resources remains
fundamental in the area as it has been for decades. TPs emphasise that the company exploited the
history of interethnic conflict in the area to reframe the term “indigenous” in a bid to deemphasise
the claims of the “resident” Rendille and Samburu groups over claims of the Turkana “migrants”
(Interview_015, Political seat contestant Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in Marsabit on
the 27 April 2017). Specifically, TPs argue that the LTWP project proprietors used the government
machinery at national and local levels to “rubber stamp” an illegal land deal (Interview_031, Petitioner,
interviewed in Marsabit on the 18 February 2017).
Another issue is the diversity both of the pastoral communities in the area and the interests that
often have an ethnic dimension and tend to provoke political mobilisation around land issues. Two
aspects of the political history in the area shaped the character of the resistance movement against
the LTWP project. First, following the 2010 Kenyan constitution that devolved power to the local
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county level, territorialised ethnicity [62] has emerged and has become greatly politicised, leading to
coalition building between ethnic groups towards the 2013 elections. Consequently, the 2013 elections
were characterised by alliance-making which also brought about an increased role of customary
leaders in Marsabit politics [63] in which the idea that every group had a homeland gained ground.
This led to the formation of the Rendille-Gabra-Burji (REGABU) coalition which went on to win the
inaugural Marsabit County elections in 2013. This dimension of politics also yielded “power sharing”
at the community level where the pursuit of ethnic and clan interests emerged as part of the political
discourse. As a result, the Rendille and Samburu ethnic groups dominated the politics of the Laisamis
Constituency with steady numerical dominance (4 out of 5 ward representatives from the Constituency
in the Marsabit County assembly). The fear of losing “homeland” enhanced the local political leverage
of the dominant ethnic groups across Marsabit County and posed a constant fear of displacement for
minority tribes (Interview_015, Political seat contestant Marsabit County Assembly, interviewed in
Marsabit on the 27 April 2017). Second, the immediate fallout of the 2013 REGABU coalition yielded
fresh political realignments for the 2017 elections with an equivocal emphasis on land issues. In the
Laisamis Constituency, in particular, land grabbing claims by the LTWP project brought new variations
on the political leaders. The main line of confrontation was that political leaders were “either with
us, or with the land grabbers (LTWP project)” which was a measure of the 2017 aspirants’ degree
of “Rendilleness” or “Samburuness” (Interview_031, Petitioner, interviewed in Marsabit on the 18
February 2017). This emphasis enabled an intimate political mobilisation of communities for the 2017
general elections in Laisamis Constituency.
In the midst of these politicisations, the emerging grassroots resistance to the LTWP project was
divergent and un-coordinated, reflecting first, the markedly little past experience with challenging the
state’s development plans and significant challenges in the knowledge and capacity of communities
and associated issues of coordination in popular responses to LSLAs [64]. Second, finding a united
front to challenge the infringement of communal rights to land was challenged by unequal power
relations and conflicts of interest defined along ethnic identity lines that have characterised natural
resources politics in the area for decades [65]. Finally, the framing of land rights within the context of
the community and the larger social and cultural context (and the fact that all the representatives of
the parties to the land suit were men), offers a continuation of cultural bias towards women and the
socially constructed gendered roles of women which “affects the processes by which women’s and
men’s differential relationship, access, control, ownership, and security over land are negotiated [66].”
Table 1. Key features of actors in the context of the Lake Turkana Wind Power Project (LTWP) project
contestation in the Environment and Land Court (ELC).
Issue
Petitioners (Representing Laisamis





Local political leaders/local community elites drawn
from the larger Kargi and Karare wards. Part
of/representing disposed communities
Local community elites drawn from the Loiyangalani
area representing the interests of communities living
at the project site
Key struggle Agrarian justice, environmental justice, humanrights/indigenous peoples’ rights [33] Right to development
Arenas of struggle
Struggle against land redistribution; struggles in
defense of the commons and struggles against
exploitation; compliance with some relevant global
governance principles (FPIC, UNDRIP) (The
petitioners have specifically taken issue with the
Company’s lack of Free, Prior, Informed Consent
(FPIC) and no-adherence to the UN Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP))
The struggle for incorporation or for the
improvement of the terms of incorporation; struggle
for inclusion; recognition of claims over territory
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Constituency and Karare Ward Residents)
Interested Parties (Representing
Loiyangalani Residents)
Preferred form of action on the
LTWP project
That the LTWP be compelled to stop the project to
address issues relating to the legal procedure of land
acquisition, the Environmental and Social Impact
Assessment (ESIA) and the indigenous status of
resident communities
That the LTWP project be continued as the
community has benefitted from the project
Overarching campaign framework Protection of communal land rights, right tolivelihoods and rights to cultural sites
Implicitly for communal land rights; right to
“development” promised by the LTWP project
Perspective on the project/LSLA
LTWP project should be “exposed and opposed”; no
space for dialogue and negotiation; should be
“delegitimised” [67]
Dialogue, collaboration and partnership with LTWP
project and other development projects
Position on the role of government
(local and national) in dispossession Key institution in dispossession of community land Silent/not clear
6. The Anti-Politics of Wind Power Development
In response to the popular opposition and legal challenge to their investment, the LTWP
project used various mechanisms to circumvent claims of illegal dispossession of communities and
irregularities in the process of EIA and community consultation. Despite a lack of strong grassroots
resistance to the project, top-down counterresistance was manifested through the actions of government
institutions and corporate actors seeking to counterbalance and contain the dominance of communities’
claims in their material and symbolic terms. In the socioeconomic context of “political reaction from
above”, the state-led and private sectors delivered development visions constituting the centerpiece of
legitimising dispossession. Here, we define political reactions from above as multipronged strategies
and techniques that serve a “state-driven, productive, employment-generating form of national
development that enjoyed significant ideological legitimacy” [68], with the aim of making LSLA
operations politically and socially feasible. By their very nature, these strategies express a discontent
with local livelihoods and related land uses through particular conceptions of viability embodied
in technical recommendations on the “economic units” and based on modernisation narratives [7].
The proponents of wind power in Northern Kenya sought to circumvent claims of nonadherence to
legal procedures for community land acquisition and the need for international instruments for free
informed and prior consent (FPIC) of local indigenous communities. The strategies employed by the
corporate actors in LTWP project are highlighted below.
(a) Discursive regimes of representation
The premise of development discourse by the Kenyan government and the corporate actors
involved in the LTWP contained in the development blueprint, the Kenya Vision 2030, and extensively
reproduced in the LEC, positions the development of the hitherto marginalised north, energy deficiency
and visions of affordable green energy as the centerpiece, legitimising exploitation and dispossession
which characterised the process of land acquisition for the project. Kenya’s 2002 elections not only
brought Moi’s 24-year rule to a close but also ushered in an era of development visions that sought to
identify the key policy actions and reforms with an objective of realising a “higher and sustainable
growth of the economy in a more equitable environment, accompanied by increased employment
opportunities [69]”. Kenya’s Vision 2030 resonates with discourses of “frontier economies” and
“Africa rising” [5] and a revolutionary character through “modern opportunities for creating wealth
(President Uhuru Kenyatta during the ground breaking ceremony for the LTWP Project quoted in
Danwatch (2016) [70])”, involving “new mindsets and methods, innovative strategies [26]”. At the
same time, however, these visions derive from and are embedded in the institutional patronages
and settings that frame them. These ensuing visions, in addition to recognizing the “obscured but
untapped potential” of marginalised areas such as Northern Kenya, also present a construction based
on neoliberal ideologies of economic development that seek to correct existing social and economic
inequalities through priority investments in infrastructure, energy and land reform. Considering the
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historical evolution of development frames in Kenya, the emergent processes are likely to be less
profound and less far-reaching [5].
The framing of the development of Northern Kenya is influenced by “technology transfer
approaches, in which ‘scientific’ farming practices and technologies are provided to help modernise
and civilise ‘backward’ farming systems” [7] and specifically refers to frontier economies as emerging
centers of opportunities and engines of growth [71]. In this context, the government discourse is taken
up by the corporate actors and positioned as “putting the lands to better use” for the benefit of local
communities as well as meeting national development goals. The LTWP attorney stated the following
in court proceedings at the March 2016 sitting of the LEC in Meru:
“Mr. Nyaoga told the Court that the respondents and the interested parties recognised the
importance of the challenged project. He said that it was a Vision 2030 project. He said that
the community had benefited immensely and will continue to benefit (Mr. Nyaoga, advocate
for LTWP project. Civil Suit 163 of 2014 (Formerly Nairobi ELC 1330 of 2014) | Kenya Law
Reports 2018. Page 11 of 28. http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/130470. Accesses
on 29 June 2018).”
“for the first time since independence, the interested parties were seeing the fruits of
independence through the challenged project (Mr. Kiprop, advocate for interested parties.
Civil Suit 163 of 2014 Kenya Law Reports 2018. Page 11 of 28. http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/
cases/view/130470. Accesses on 29 June 2018).”
The imperative of generating more energy at lower cost to meet the increased demand for
energy in the realisation of the Kenya Vision 2030 as well as reducing energy costs in Kenya, which
are higher than those of all regional competitors, is another argument often made to legitimise the
project. This discourse supports the admission by Kenya’s government of energy insufficiency and the
role of more private sector players in the energy sector [69]. The LTWP’s discourse on wind power
development heavily aligns with energy reliability narratives of Kenya Vision 2030:
“Kenya has developed policies that align with these low emission development strategies
(LEDS) outcomes. For example, Kenya Vision 2030 includes a National Climate Change
Action Plan highlighting the importance of developing a secure, climate-resilient national
grid that can support Kenya’s development ambitions. In addition, Kenya’s Draft National
Energy and Petroleum Policy (2015) aims to ensure an affordable, competitive, sustainable,
and reliable supply of energy to meet national development needs at lowest cost, while
protecting and conserving the environment.”
“These goals are crucial for Kenya’s development, as fewer than 50% of Kenya’s population
have access to electricity.”
“LTWP constructed a 208 km road from Laisamis to Sarima, which has transformed the
transportation network in the area. This has significantly increased access to markets as well
as to health care and educational facilities for the local population (WOC (2018). Community
projects. https://ltwp.co.ke/winds-of-change/).”
Moreover, the LTWP portrays wind power development within the green energy discourse
validated against a host of standards and certification schemes and international environmental
treaties. The project was registered as a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) project with The
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Green energy fits within
the image of Kenya as being among the countries pursuing low emission development strategies
(LES)—countries that grow their economies while reducing GHG emissions [72]. Consequently, Kenya
Vision 2030 has a diverse strategy of generating more energy at a lower cost, including exploitation of
new sources of renewable energy through legal and policy instruments that aim to ensure an affordable,
competitive, sustainable, and reliable supply of energy to meet national development needs at the
170
Land 2019, 8, 7
lowest cost, including an emphasis on the need to reduce GHG emissions and encourage the use of
renewable energy as a mitigation measure [69]. The LTWP understands and aligns their wind energy
activities with this agenda while remaining extra confident of their investment gaining credibility
and buy-in from a large cross section of stakeholders. The LTWP’s discourse on green energy is
clearly linked to the push and established targets for green energy and opportunities arising from
their development:
“The electricity generated from LTWP will provide a cost-effective alternative to fossil
fuels, decrease dependency on foreign fuel imports, and stabilise prices through reliable
generation. Power from LTWP will be sold to the grid at about one-third of the cost of
fossil fuel-generated electricity. Additionally, the capacity from LTWP is expected to reduce
the country’s reliance on fuel imports. These avoided fuel imports are anticipated to save
Kenya more than €100 million (US$113 million) per year, improving the country’s energy
security.” [72]
This strategy of development visions and green energy discourse is very effective, with LEC
noting that the matter before it “involves a massive project”. It also involves “weighty issues”, noting
in addition that the “project is the single largest private investment in Kenya’s history” and that
“through the Power Purchase Agreement, public funds have been and continue to be utlised ( . . . )
The fact that the project is massive appears not to be in dispute [57]”. This not only creates favorable
conditions for the continuation of the wind power projects despite the “alienation of such expansive
piece of community land to a private entity”, which amounts to “a contemporary land injustice” [57]
but also such discourse depoliticises the wind power development by omitting equally weighty issues
related to impacts of the project on local livelihoods, ancestral and cultural heritage and loss of key
common pool resources.
(b) The anti-politics of commons governance
The depoliticisation of wind power development by the LTWP has been characterised by a
planning process that casts local pastoral livelihoods and communal land use as “unviable” and a
need to transform “idle” and “underutlised” land through an efficient infrastructure network, creating
an enabling environment for private sector participation and harnessing wind, solar and geothermal
energy among other strategies. This not only puts the responsibility of planning, constructing and
operating large-scale development programs into the hands of private sector actors but also creates
an illusion that state bureaucrats and local institutions are absolved from their responsibility and
accountability [4,73] as planners and implementers of economic and social policies. From the time the
proposal for the wind farm was put before the Marsabit County Council (MCC), the LTWP investors
had a free hand in matters related to land acquisition, making concession agreements and defining
which local community groups qualify as “indigenous” and hence qualify for compensation for the
wind power project development in the area.
The initial application for the lease of 100 acres of land by the LTWP from the Marsabit County
Council was made on 20 November 2006. According to the Trust Lands Act cap 288, which was the
applicable law for community land at the time, the MCC was required, upon receipt of such requests,
to notify the Divisional Land Board (DLB) or in the case of its absence establish one to meet to consider
the proposal, notify people in the concerned area, hear and record submissions from people who
were present and submit written recommendations to the council [74]. By the LTWP’s own admission,
public consultations began a year after their initial application, but no records exist to that effect. More
importantly, the said public consultations were neither representative of the Loiyangalani residents,
nor did they involve full disclosure of the project, as explained by the attorney representing the
communities’ interest in the case:
“The only meeting held was attended by town dwellers and fishermen from one area
(Loiyangalani) and did not involve the pastoralist community and the project therefore lacks
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public participation in its establishment. This meeting neither declared the size of land
required for the project, nor did it inform the community of the loss of access to their land,
but instead concentrated on the benefits to the community.” [70]
On 13 August 2017, the LTWP’s application for a 99-year lease of 150,000 acres of community
land was approved. Without a clear response from the MCC on whether the DLB existed at the time of
the application and given the scant details of the community consultation carried out for the LTWP’s
application, the communities denied any knowledge of the project or its application for their land
prior to site preparation activities in 2007. In its defense, the LTWP submitted that the instituters of
the suit “were not inhabitants of the affected area ( . . . ) that one can only have ancestral rights if one
was a descendant of known ancestors and a denizen of the apposite area ( . . . ) therefore cannot be
representing the project affected communities [8].” Consequently, the LTWP invested heavily in legal
representation to delegitimise indigenous communities’ claims by promoting and actively pursuing
an ideologically-charged discourse informed largely by the colonial conception of the communal
utilisation of land. In responding to the claims of illegal annexation of community land during the
inception of the project in 2007 and subsequent alleged unprocedural acquisition of an additional
110,000 acres of community land, LTWP used frontier imaginations of “idle, unoccupied” land to
explain the rationale of dispossession. The following quote from LTWP lawyers at ELC proceedings
illustrates this point:
“Mr. Nyaoga (LTPW lawyer) told the court that the land in question in this matter is currently
uninhabited. He told the court that this would be made clear if the court visited the suit land.
Mr. Nyaoga opined that the community was not merely being left on the roadside (Civil Suit
163 of 2014 (Formerly Nairobi ELC 1330 of 2014) | Kenya Law Reports 2018. Page 14 of 28.
http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/130470. Accesses on 29 June 2018).”
More importantly, alongside the lack of community consultation, the LTWP’s compensation
entitlement of the affected communities’ agenda reveals inconsistencies with the Trust Lands Act,
drawing attention to instances of ‘bribery’ involving local political leaders [63]. Attributed largely to
the fact that LTWP project designated the land as “empty” and because of its narrow definition
of indigenous communities in the area, no compensation was paid. Instead of the mandatory
compensation entitlements where community land is acquired, as stipulated in the Trust Lands
Act, LTWP employed a predominantly Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) focus (explored in
the next section) that highlights the advantages of investments in community projects. The systematic
presentation of CSR as “development gains” for the local community highlights the ways in which
transformative CSR investments in infrastructure that support local livelihoods are linked to the LTWP
project’s wind power development in the area. CSR investments projects are chosen and refined
through a “deliberative” process of consultation providing community “validation”, perhaps the
reason, despite the largely popular opposition to the project, that they remain popular.
Another feature of the LTWP project’s development discourse is the conception of “local
communities” as a simple agglomeration of “ethnicities” which, according to Ferguson, reduces
the complexities relating to resource access and use to the “level of individual ‘values’, ‘attitudes’
and ‘motivations’ [4].” This conception was evident in the planning of the wind power project and in
drafting an Indigenous Peoples Policy Framework in 2011, in which LTWP notes:
“It is clear that while most of these tribes are considered marginalised at international,
regional and national levels, they have the same chance under this project to voice their
concerns if their rights, interest, needs, livelihood, culture or desires are affected (Quoted in
Danwatch report “A people in the way of progress”).” [70]
In this respect, LTWP’s conception of a picture of local communities as merely “ethnically
diverse” takes no account of the competitive environments that characterise resource access and
entitlement in a CPR system. In ethnically diverse settings, such as the LTWP project site, resource
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access and entitlement can not only accentuate contestation and conflict between ethnic groups but
also consequent market integration can lead to rising inequality and declining resource conditions
for local livelihoods [75]. Apart from depoliticising natural resource politics and repositioning local
ethnic groups as driven by nothing more than individual motivations, these representations assume
that LTWP’s “same chance under this project to voice their concerns” strategy will be free from social
and political contestations inherent in this context.
(c) CSR—greenwashing dispossession
Claims of dispossession and contestation have affected the relationship between the company and
the local pastoralist communities and polarised the local political leaders along the lines of ethnicity
and whether a specific community supports the project. The combined effect of the representation of
local communities and heightened ethnic tensions over the ownership of land in Sarima generated an
ingrained antipathy towards the company, which the local communities view as a threat, occasioning
economic and social challenges and hardships and “exposing their lives to vagaries of nature (Ibid
Page 17–18 of 23).” The LTWP, in return, has sought to counter this antipathy through CSR investments
mainly carried out through the Winds of Change (WOC) Foundation to achieve local level legitimacy
and challenge the image of its label as a “land grabbing” corporate body. In effect, the CSR strategies
seek a “social license to operate (SLO)” to “gain the approval and support of local communities”
through “responsible” or “sustainable” management of the adverse social and environmental impacts
of corporate activities [76,77] and to achieve legitimacy in their operations [78]. Hence, by establishing
and funding the activities of WOC, the LTWP has a stated aim of improving the livelihoods of the
communities in the project area (Winds of Change is expected to be funded for a period of 20 years
(the operational life of the project) with a contribution of Euro 10 Million. WOC is expected to confine
its operations to the Laisamis constituency in Marsabit County). According to the LTWP, the WOC
activities will be confined to education and vocational training support, supporting health education
and health infrastructure, and provisions of water to improve livelihoods with a shift that emphasises
midterm livelihood activities. According to WOC website:
“WOC works in partnership with the county government, local leaders, NGOs, CBOs and
government departments in implementing negotiated activities to ensure optimal stakeholder
engagement, participation and ownership. WOC aims to catalyse positive sustainable
development to enhance livelihoods in the areas surrounding the wind farm (WOC website
https://ltwp.co.ke/winds-of-change/).”
For the LTWP, becoming “trusted partners” of local communities is important for two reasons.
First, it is instrumental in seeking the recognition of, and, by extension, the legitimacy to operate in the
area, through funding “negotiated activities”. Basic health and education infrastructure has lagged
in the region, and it has had one of the lowest human development indicators in the country [79].
The region, which has experienced increasing populations and associated competition for resources, has
also been experiencing increasing droughts that have had constraining effects on the livelihood options
and have generated the massive socioeconomic differentiation of households [51,80], significantly
alternative livelihood trades, petty businesses and wage labor in the informal sector [81]. In the context
of unpredictable weather, investments in education, healthcare and local livelihoods are thought to
increase local communities’ resilience to drought. To reduce livelihood vulnerabilities and improve
the provisioning of basic services in the regions on the margins, development interventions work
with and through existing policies that support the provisioning of basic services of education, health
and entrepreneurialism [51]. The LTWP’s CSR strategy therefore forms the “central core of a layered
approach in which each layer relates to specific stakeholders and their associated concerns” [76], which
is meant to legitimise the activities of the company in the minds of local communities. According
to WOC,
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“It is anticipated that the planned social investment activities will enable LTWP and its
project partners to become trusted partners in development with the local community
around the wind farm and the larger Laisamis constituency (WOC (2018). Community
projects. https://ltwp.co.ke/winds-of-change/).”
This strategy has proved to be very effective, with WOC investing in over 30 projects in the
Laisamis Constituency that span the education, health and water sectors. A health center nurse
explained the WOC investment in health infrastructure and the implications this has had on the
availability of essential drugs and health indictors in the area:
“We never had lights (in the health facility). I was using a spotlight to do deliveries (at
night). Now we have a working solar powered lighting system and a delivery bed. We
can now store the drugs here safely in this facility. The health indicators are going up
(Interview_024_Health Centre Nurse, Video “Insights in to the social footprints of the Lake
Turkana Wind Power Project” https://ltwp.co.ke/winds-of-change/).”
The appropriation of CSR to obtain SLO by the LTWP in the context of a contestation of its activities
can be understood as examples of a “green washing” dispossession. However, as with Loperena’s
account of similar practices in conservation [82], CSR does not stop the exploitative processes of
appropriation by the state and corporate investors set in motion by development visions of the state
focused on appropriating natural resources premised on low-cost green energy development. Apart
from the fact that CSR activities risk presenting certain business values as non-negotiable universal
values and hence overriding the role of business in poverty reduction in the developing world [83], CSR
activities, in a context where the state has failed to provide the necessary social amenities, as Ferguson
argues, may reinforce and expand “the exercise of bureaucratic state power, which takes poverty
as its entry point” in launching an intervention that has adverse effects on local communities [4].
The LTWP’s CSR strategies mask the material practices of dispossessions of pastoral communities of
their CPRs through CSR investments. The company’s CSR investment strategy suggests that there
may be important commonalities with past experiences where CSR are not adequately aligned with
those of the local livelihoods [83] and do little to redress the pervasive resource conflicts as a result of
the degradation and shrinkage of the natural resource base associated with LSLAs for incompatible
development projects [84]. These pastoral CPRs are important because they harbor important resources
for local people’s livelihoods, enabling resilience against complex ecological contexts.
7. The LTWP’s Anti-Politics Machine and Comparative Observations
The case of the LTWP has played an important part in the discursive process of endorsing and
legitimising the development discourse through the reproduction and circulation of their own version
of pastoralism representation vis-à-vis wind energy in Northern Kenya. Thus, this section provides a
detailed commentary on the theoretical premises of the development representation, together with
their institutional rationales through Ferguson’s anti-politics machine framework: (1) the context in
which anti-politics of dispossession of pastoral commons are constructed, (2) how the anti-politics
machine is developed and (3) the key elements of the anti-politics machine, focusing on the articulation
of the notions of “development” and “green energy” by the LTWP and the specific ways they are
constructed around pastoral land use.
First, the context under which the LTWP has supported and promoted an anti-politics machine
involves a complex array of historical and contemporary reproductions of pastoral land regions as
“backward” and “emerging” [85]. Historically, pastoral lands have been seen by the colonial states
as sites of famine and impoverishment, undermining political stability through forms of rebellion
and insurrection [51]. The premise of pastoralism development discourse as an exercise in dealing
with “backward, primitive and war-like” nomads through visions and plans entailing “modernity
and progress, security and stabilisation” goes back to the colonial project in east Africa that sought
to appropriate land for the colonial settlers. The position of the states in postindependence east
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Africa changed very little in its policy discourse about pastoral land use. Apart from being viewed as
“unproductive”, states have viewed pastoral areas as a threat to the political, security and commercial
interests of leading industrialised countries, in effect creating a precarious politics and, with it,
top-down development interventions that often take a security dimension [51]. These trends, driven
by neoliberal development policies encouraged by the World Bank [86] and bilateral donors, promoted
interventions that focus on alternative land uses to pastoralism, including the promotion of private
rights in land that not only led to the loss of communal land rights but also encouraged sedentarisation
of pastoral populations, which has been associated with impoverishment, resource competition and
population pressure [87,88]. Thus, even with evidence of massive failures of development interventions
based on the incompatibility between modernised interventions and transhumant herders [89], the
LTWP project utilises the state policy discourse that emphasises “opening up” marginal areas through
large-scale investments in infrastructure and energy projects. Hence, the failure of the LTWP and
local governance institutions to adhere to the guidance on stakeholder engagement and FPIC and the
subsequent depoliticisation of wind power development in Northern Kenya is linked to a historical
development discourse about the viability of pastoralism and communal tenure in the debate on
land redistribution.
Second, the way in which the anti-politics machine has been developed within the LTWP’s
development discourse involves alliance building with state agencies and local elites that is meant
to downplay the political character of land redistribution. The processes of land acquisition for the
wind power project have been generated less through community consultation established in the law
and more so through smaller and select groups of local and national institutions and elite networks.
This was described in detail in the defense statements of the LTWP in the ELC:
“He told the court that the first defendant (LTWP project) approached the then County
Council of Marsabit with its intention to embark on a wind energy project in 2005. He said
that from the year 2005, continuous consultation between the defunct County Council of
Marsabit and the local community had taken place. He also told the court that the defunct
County Council of Marsabit and the National Government had been in consultations for a
period of 9 years.” (Records of the ELC proceedings on 8 March 2016 [8])
The key point here is that the processes of land redistribution are partly in continuity with
previous interactions between the state and pastoral communities [90], where the state has perpetuated
dispossession without regard for legal procedures. In this sense, the LTWP’s anti-politics machine
relies on being aware of and working within a broader state development discourse on “pastoral
life-worlds, politics and resource management [85].”
The core elements of the LTWP’s anti-politics machine are representations related to “green
energy” development and pastoral land tenure. This discourse serves the dual purpose of representing
the transformative impacts of the wind power project on pastoral land on one hand and, on the other,
a representation of pastoral land use as “idle” and that needs to be “opened up”, a discourse that tends
to propagate a depoliticised interpretation of pastoral land tenure and resource governance, which are
products of colonial antagonisms towards communal land rights. The LTWP has provided several
representations that illustrate the importance of “affordable green energy” for the “development” of
the region, creating an interdiscursive process where dispossession of “wasteful” pastoralists and
“idle” community land is justified for the greater good of “development”. This strategy shifts the focus
of grassroots resistance from corporate actors to public institutions, which is presented as a neutral
tool for planning and implementing economic policy and is incapable of working against the interests
of the people. In constructing its anti-politics machine, the LTWP’s strategy of low-cost green energy
development is discursively constructed in ways that emphasise the backwardness of the region and the
investments required for its transformation, without any mention of the project’s social, economic and
environmental impacts on the local communities. Once constructed, the anti-politics machine “shapes
not only the formation of reports and documents, but the construction of organisations, institutions
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and programs [4].” For instance, the ELC, in referring the case for hearing and determination by a
bench of judges, elaborated the court’s position:
“A question arises as to whether the alienation and annihilation of the community’s ancestral
land to the tune of 150,000 acres amounts to an irreparable loss and an unquantifiable
inter-generational loss (......) that the project is the single largest private investment in
Kenya’s history, and that through the Power Purchase Agreement, public funds have been
and continue to be utilised (......) The fact that the project is massive appears not to be in
dispute. (......) I am inclined to find that the manner in which public funds (which is the tax
payers’ money) have been used and continue to be used in a project of such great magnitude
is an issue of general public importance and of great public interest.” [57]
Thus, a discourse is built around government policy on the importance of efficient utilisation of
public finances that would support national development. The LTWP’s anti-politics machine builds
on these efficiency motives and builds a cumulative discourse about how ‘low-cost green energy’
will benefit national development. This reiterates Ferguson’s insightful observation that it is the
“promise of real input that makes the “development” form of engagement such a tempting one for
many intellectuals [4].” The anti-politics machine not only represents the LTWP as a dutiful private
sector player committed to delivering low-cost green energy but is also charged with the task of
empowering the region’s economically marginalised poor.
Complicating matters is the fact that community opposition to the LTWP reflected
ethnicity-centered relations in the area. The litigants in the ELC case against the LTWP were mainly
drawn from Rendille and Samburu pastoral groups that claimed the project was not only going to
affect their livelihoods through reduced access to dry season pastures but would also reduce access
to ancient ancestral sites for cultural rituals (Important cultural ceremonies of the Rendille and the
Samburu include initiation rituals, galgulame—a gathering of all Rendille clans once in 14 years, a
year after the circumcision ceremony. For a detailed description, see Schlee (1989) [91]). The LTWP’s
articulation of “community” in the area was drawn from a narrow definition as follows:
“Sarima village is the only village located on the wind farm. The ESIA process established
that the location of Sarima village on the C-77 road would pose health and safety risks to the
community from increased road traffic during the project’s construction phase.” [92]
Under the company’s own admission, the Turkana population in the area only settled at the
project site in the mid-2000s—the same time the project was initiated—after experiencing heightened
conflicts in Turkana County [92]. This trend has been manifesting in the pastoral areas of the Horn of
Africa, where Goldsmith [93] observed that high rates of demographic growth and contested rights
because of uneven capitalists’ transitions in the region are leading to conflicts. Similar dynamics have
been observed in Northern Kenya [94] and Southern Ethiopia [85], where economic incorporation
is promoting new forms of criminality and the politicisation of kinship relations, respectively. This,
according to Hagmann and Mulugeta, is a characteristic trend of the securitisation of development
projects in pastoral areas, where a section of the local community or group or their local leaders is
coopted to uphold security and state interests at the local level [85]. In the case of the LTWP, the
illustration of Sarima as the “only village located in the wind farm” has not only excluded the larger
pastoralist communities dependent on the region for livelihood and cultural reasons but also served to
redefine ethnic communities competing for benefits from the project. According to a local NGO,
“The company (LTWP) seems to adopt a de facto policy of encouraging the Turkana to settle
on a land that is not clearly theirs. First, they denied the Rendille and the Samburu who
are the real owners of this land their rights for ‘living far from Serima’. Then, they claim
the same pastoral land tenure allowed the Turkana to own land that doesn’t belong to them
(even though the company acknowledges Turkana’s settled here in the 2000s). The selective
representations of pastoral land tenure points to just how dishonest this whole arrangement
is.” (Interview_013_Local NGO representative interview in Nairobi, 7 May 2017)
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Likewise, in terms of CSR investments, the WOC newsletter has been an important avenue
through which to disseminate the work carried out by the company that benefits the local community
from the project through the commitment to “invest a portion of its operating revenues to WOC to
improve the livelihoods of the communities in the project area” [95]. These types of striking selective
representations of local communities by the LTWP have provoked differing reactions from the local
communities, some of which have asked to be enjoined in the suit against the company as “interested
parties” that can attest to the benefits of the investment to the local areas but also legitimise the
company’s discourse on pastoral land tenure. Through their attorney, the interested parties, who are
the residents of Loiyangalani District, argued that:
“the proposed interested parties were the ones directly affected by the project. He said
that they had been consulted in all matters concerning the challenged project and that
the consultations started around 2005.... the plaintiffs/applicants were strangers. He said
that for the first time since independence, the interested parties were seeing the fruits of
independence through the challenged project.... (they implored the court) to maintain the
status quo (Civil Suit 163 of 2014 (Formerly Nairobi ELC 1330 of 2014) | Kenya Law Reports
2018: Page 20 of 23. http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/130470. Accesses on 29 June
2018).”
Under this discourse, the frequent selective representation of pastoral commons by the LTWP has
a reiterative effect that is important in the establishment and perpetuation of the anti-politics machine.
This discourse can also be read beyond the company’s CSR activities and understood in terms of the
representation of ethnic ascriptions and ethnicity as “economic assets in a development process” [96]
within ethnically mixed settings.
In sum, the LTWP is the key actor in the wind power development in Northern Kenya, in terms
of constructing, sustaining and reproducing the anti-politics machine that this paper has identified.
This contribution has identified the reproduction of historical misconceptions about pastoral land
tenure “progressively governmentalised” [4,97] by the bureaucratic state institutions, but also found the
specific knots of depoliticisation of development interventions conceived, implanted and legitimised
by the LTWP. Its reproduction of the Kenyan state’s discourse on key discursive elements, such as
‘low-cost green energy’ and representations of pastural land tenure, not only guarantees continuity
with previous interactions between the state and pastoral communities largely experienced in the east
African region [85,90] but also shapes the larger mechanisms through which such misconceptions are
produced and reproduced in development interventions. In this way, the LTWP’s anti-politics machine
provides a medium for the expansion and depoliticisation of state development visions. The Vision
2030 and its flagship project—the LTWP project—have provided an apparently technical and apolitical
entry point for an intervention that largely dispossesses communities of their land.
The analyses in this paper provide insights into the extent to which the processes of depoliticised
development discourse identified in this single Kenyan case operate in other pastoral commons
development contexts. Certainly, there are a lot of context-specific factors that are particular to the
Kenyan case presented in this paper that limit the generalisability of this case study to other similar
contexts. For instance, unlike the exclusion of communities in land acquisition in the Kenyan case,
in Ghana customary authorities were proactively engaged by a private company in the process
of land acquisition and benefit sharing in a biofuel plantation project without any government
intermediaries [98]. Other experiences across similar LSLAs in Kenya and similar African contexts
indicate that the pattern of grassroots mobilisation is not always necessarily one of “expose and oppose”
as it was with the LTWP project case, but of attempting to ensure greater inclusion, incorporating
the improvement of the terms of incorporation and recognition of claims over territory. For instance,
the case of overt protest by the local Turkana community against the oil exploration company Tullow
Oil Kenya sought more jobs for the local community members and a bigger share of the oil revenue
to the region [5]. However, there are similarity factors that support the view that some degree of
generalisability may be possible from the case of LTWP project in Kenya.
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In post-colonial Africa, the persistence and centrality of mobility and communal land ownership
were associated with “the tragedy of commons” [21] which governments in Africa used as
justification for taking away rights and responsibilities related to resources out of the hands
of local communities [99]. Further, communal land has been pointed to by state development
policies in developing countries as evidence of “marginal”, “empty” and “available” for alternative
development [42,100,101]. These categorisations of pastoral land use and common property rights
have become key operational mechanisms through which land-use changes are facilitated [102]. Hence,
many development visions for the “development” of pastoral commons remain remarkably uniform
and standardised, as illustrated by cases from Africa pastoral commons, both generally [2,39,64,100]
and specifically in among pastoral commons in Ethiopia [6,103–105], and west Africa nations [106].
These examples are illustrative of the fact that the Kenyan case shows similarities to other practice
associated with depoliticised representation of pastoral commons in very different contexts and
therefore does not seem to be an exception.
Another aspect which could influence the generalisability of the Kenyan case is ideological
underpinning of transformative development policies which is “premised on a classic conception of
modernisation, which presumes a steady decline in the share of agriculture in the national income and
in the composition of the labour force” where pastoral communities “constitute a vast reservoir
of backwardness and a structural impediment to economic modernization [6].” The process of
“development by dispossession” shows continuities with historical processes of dispossession across
the world [107] with the vulnerability of lands to dispossession being highly correlated with the extent
to which local and international legal systems recognise the multiple values that society attaches to
land [42]. The Kenyan legal situation of communal tenure (especially prior to the 2010 constitution)
is similar to that of many other countries where the proprietary character of the commons has been
denied by both colonial and post-colonial administrations [108] and classified as “wastelands” and
legally fully disposable by the state at its will [2]. These trends in the historical dispossession of
pastoral commons and the role of weak legal recognition show strong resemblance across pastoral
populations beyond the Kenyan case.
Finally, CSR activities, the central focus of the corporate anti-politics machine, constitute the
discursive logic of assuming away and rendering unproblematic the depoliticisation of development
interventions. This strategy of “greenwashing dispossession” [109] and “engineering consent” [110]
is not unique either to the Kenyan case or commons dispossession; similar experiences have been
observed in African contexts and globally in different sectors of LSLAs, such as agriculture, mining,
energy and infrastructure [111]. CSR investments are thus an inevitable characteristic of LSLAs
deployed to make development interventions politically feasible in the face of determined political
mobilisation from affected communities.
8. Conclusions
This study has unveiled the anti-politics machine in the relationship between development
visions and accompanying LSLA programs and the dispossession of pastoral commons in the current
LSLA in Kenya. The analysis of the LTWP revealed that there is more to the recent discourse on the
development of wind power in Northern Kenya than the imperative of generating more energy at
lower cost to meet the increased demand in the realisation of Kenya Vision 2030. Drawing on Ferguson’s
anti-politics machine, the paper has shown that development visions of the hitherto marginalised
Northern Kenya and their focus on large-scale infrastructure and energy programs are contingent upon
the construction of ASAL livelihoods as unviable—a dominant colonial and postcolonial discourse that
legitimises alternative large-scale investments as the ideal. Accompanying practices, such as placing the
responsibility for the planning and operation of LSLA programs into the hands of private sector actors
that attempt to absolve state and local institutions from their responsibility and accountability projects,
legitimises the depoliticisation of development programs to secure the extraction of value from natural
resources by the private sector. LSLAs are constructed as the necessary interventions required to bring
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the isolated ASALs to integration with the national economy, excluding local pastoral livelihoods
from being recognised as viable investment options to economic development. This representation,
through discourses, technical recommendations, institutional apparatuses and apolitical interventions,
forms the anti-politics machine that depoliticises important realities that characterise CPR use and
governance and makes them amenable to solutions that may have no effect on their sustainable
development but instead have undesirable results. As Agrawal argues,
“Without attention to the politics that generates underdevelopment and environmental
degradation as universal problems, it may be impossible to address poverty,
underdevelopment, and environmental degradation effectively.” [112]
This anti-politics machine has the undesired effect of prioritising natural resource appropriation
for national development goals over local priorities for them. In the LTWP case, the state and its
network of corporate actors and local elites uncritically endorse the acquisition of community land
for wind power development through a process that plays down the significance of the inherent
complexities of CPR use and governance and their contestations related to disproportionate access
and control by local communities. This is achieved through the anti-politics machinery that enables
the implicit reproduction of historical misconceptions about pastoralism and communal tenure to
legitimise the alleged irregular acquisition of community land.
To build on the concept of an anti-politics machine and its role in dispossession of commons,
putting some of our findings in perspective is necessary. The case of the LTWP project is emblematic
of the depoliticisation of new development visions involving the opening of frontier borderlands
as new sites for the investments needed for growth of the national economy. Although these
development visions involve strategies promulgated by the state, they involve a broad range of
actors and a combination of public and private finance and governance [64] through public–private
partnerships [113]. The contingent nature of these development visions as “arenas of action” relies on
what Scott refers to as “state simplification” processes involving the reorganisation of natural resources
for easy manipulation by the state and the uncritical optimism in the possibilities of planning through
which state development policies were facilitated. This means that the private sectors actors with the
vital role of delivering these development visions have a high degree of political power within these
arenas of action and may, and often do, engage in a depoliticised partnership with the state. In this
context, unveiling the anti-politics machine strategies employed in development visions involving
public–private partnerships is key to understanding how private capital is involved in the distribution,
multiplication and intensification of state power [4]. This is particularly the case for renewable energy
systems built to further capital accumulation [114], where private capital with the technical solutions
and capital drives the agenda for the implementation of environmentally friendly technologies for
energy production.
Further, the paper has shown that common assumptions in development discourses promoting
LSLAs involving public–private partnerships promote a depoliticised representation of local
communities and oversimplification of competing interests and power structures at multiple levels.
The depoliticised discourse, as Ferguson argues, “provides the technical point of entry” [4] for an
intervention serving the political interests of corporate actors. However, the LTWP project’s anti-politics
machine is certainly not the source of the depoliticising discourse and strategy but rather, as Ferguson
argues, one among the links in the mechanism that produces and articulates it [4]. Even more
importantly, the logic of the LTWP project’s anti-politics machine draws from the (mis)representations
inherent in the state’s own development discourse that have characterised ASALs development since
colonial times. As a result, these misrepresentations often bring to the fore state-centric notions of
the understanding of viability of marginal lands, such as the ASALs “powerfully informed by ideas
about efficiency derived from neo-classical economics, and is rooted in the dominance of a particular
type of commercial farming” [7] which lays the justification for alternative investments in land which
serves the goal of “reinforcing and expanding the exercise of bureaucratic state power [4].” In the
case study presented in this paper, the dominant storyline by the TP regarding the role of the wind
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project in dispossessing communities through irregular acquisition of their land is ceding ground to
one, advanced by the LTWP project and its network of government institutions, that transcends the
logic of dispossession—generating low-cost green energy and the contribution of the project to the
regions development through infrastructure that will connect the hitherto marginalised region to the
rest of Kenya. Consequently, legal protection and judicial support sought by the communities affected
often “veers away from questioning the fundamental roots of land-grabbing...while engaging in the
problematic notion of win-win scenarios [113].”
The case of the LTWP illustrates some of the tensions between land redistribution and
depoliticising development discourse about ambitious development interventions that have been a
characteristic occurrence in Kenya’s ASALs. However, the LTWP is not the only case, and indeed,
there are several examples of comparable cases where indigenous peoples and local communities
were dispossessed of their communal lands without industry guidance on stakeholder engagement
and FPIC [47,103]. Beyond the likely dispossession of commons, depoliticisation has influenced
debates and outcomes on compensations to communities affected by land redistribution apparatuses
and ethnic tensions. The depoliticisation of land redistribution for private sector-led interventions
carried out under the “progressivist and triumphal banners of development” [115] has already had
far-reaching effects on pastoral commons; it leads to the development of exploitative relationships
between corporations and communities through the concomitant restructuring of CPR governance
and to associated losses of important pasture and migration resources through the erosion of
CPRs [116]. This challenges the resilient use of the pastoral rangelands, decreasing the potential for
innovatory husbandry [115] and effectively constituting “resilience grabbing”. The broad distribution
of CPRs and the existence of customary rules that guarantee use rights to communities mediated
through an inclusive process of management has given pastoral commons a unique resilience
against unpredictability and spatial and temporal distributions across the pastoral rangelands. Land
investments that extinguish use and access to critical dry season resources that enable transhumance
and offset drought risk [117] and the erosion of an associated institutional design that ensures
excludability and addresses the problems of subtractability [40] by extension actually generate greater
vulnerability and poverty.
This paper has shown how seemingly simple technical solutions in “development visions” and
accompanying public–private partnerships in Kenya employ a depoliticised representation of local
realities in the ASALs, aimed at reinforcing historical ghettoisation of pastoralism and communal land
tenure. However, considering the specificity of the Kenyan case, important questions not addressed
in this paper include the following: Is the corporate anti-politics machine dynamic and relational or
static? How is re-politicisation negotiated and with what impacts? This work indicates the need for
further research on how the anti-politics machine may be differently generated and negotiated in the
context of development visions.
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Abstract: The Moroccan Agency for Sustainable Energy (MASEN) established one of the largest
solar energy projects in the world through a public–private partnership. It is on communal land
previously owned by a Moroccan Amazigh (Berber) clan in the Ghessate rural council area, 10 km
away from Ouarzazate. The land for the energy project comprises a surface area of more than
3000 hectares. This large-scale land acquisition has led to the loss of access to common-pool resources
(land, water, and plants), which were formerly managed by local common property institutions,
due to its enclosure, and the areas themselves. This paper outlines how the framing of the low
value of land by national elites, the state administration, MASEN, and the subsequent discourses of
development, act as an anti-politics machine to hide the loss of land and land-related common-pool
resources, and thus an attack on resilience—we call it in our scientific discipline a process of ‘resilience
grabbing’ (Resilience is the ability of a person and/or a household to restore basic livelihood capacities
after shocks and hazards. Such capacities need to be available over time and remain high for the unit
(household, community) to be resilient), especially for women. As a form of compensation for the
land losses, economic livelihood initiatives have been introduced for local people based on the funds
from the sale of the land and revenue from the solar energy project Noor Ouarzazate. The loss of land
representing the ‘old’ commons is—in the official discourse—legitimated by what the government
and the parastatal company call the development-related ‘fruits of growth’, and should serve as ‘new
forms of commons’ to the local communities. The investment therefore acts as a catalyst through
which natural resources (land, water, and plants) are institutionally transformed into new monetary
resources that local actors are said to be able to access, under specific conditions, to sustain their
livelihood. There are, however, pertinent questions of access (i.e., inclusion and exclusion), regulation,
and equality of opportunities for meeting the different livelihood conditions previously supported by
the ‘old’ commons.
Keywords: resilience and commons grabbing; gender; sustainable energy; development policy
1. Introduction
When analysing the Moroccan ‘green energy dream’, the policy on developing green energy
production, especially solar power in the context of large-scale land acquisition (LSLA), is meaningful
because it focuses on a green energy project in a so-called ‘no man’s land’ or ‘wasteland’ (not being
productively used). Anthropological research is rather uncommon in the (green) energy domain.
The LSLA is in no man’s land and research will unearth how different actors in the research area either
benefit or lose directly or indirectly from the LSLA project. The various elements, the uncertainties,
pro and contra positions for and against LSLA generating solar power, and the dynamic multifaceted
complex context in the Moroccan case study reflect the reality, and include different sentiments and
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opinions from all kinds of actors with their own views of the situation in the research area. The author
sees the various elements in this research as very important. The results of analysing the LSLA in
Morocco and the effects of the Noor Ouarzazate solar project are not simply ‘negative’ or ‘positive’,
but demonstrate a very dynamic and complex context. There are ambivalent views towards the
complexity of problems brought by the Noor Ouarzazate solar project, alongside the production of
green solar energy—therein lies the significance of the paper. People claim how proud they are that
the project is on their land and how important the infrastructure investments are. They talk about
their relationship, the connection to King Mohammed VI and the King’s national investment policies,
but they also hint at the loss of their land, and feelings of sadness when looking at the enclosure.
Even the pathways we used before are no longer there! Once, we went with our animals
to the other side of the plateau and were able to come back home in the evening. But now
we cannot because it’s closed. We also used to go to Ouarzazate by mule or donkey only
in 2 h and 45 min. Now you cannot pass anymore. We didn’t benefit from this. (Herder,
Tasselmante, Morocco, excerpt from an interview conducted in April 2016)
Herders explained why it was important to go from one riverbed to the other and come back in
the evening with the herd. There is little feed, and the animals have to move around the whole day
and find new food. It is important for herders to come home in the evening and to do some work
in their house or garden. When they cannot walk across the area because it is fenced off, making a
detour with the goats and sheep takes too much time. The pathways were also important for travel to
Ouarzazate, which has a bigger local market and many important public amenities. The herders also
mention the interpretation or classification of the land as ‘wasteland’, which is not adequate in their
view, because there are many different local actors for whom the land was certainly not wasteland
before it was used for investment. Such contradictions and ambiguity provide an important part
of the analyses, showing the ambivalent nature and complexity leading to the different perceptions
of people involved in different ways. LSLA green grabbing1 examples have to be contextualised
and green energy infrastructure investments must be connected to all debates about fighting climate
change, as well as the discourse on the effects of global warming, generating sustainable energy,
and SDGs (sustainable development goals). Climate change and global warming are linked not only
to energy consumption, but also to biodiversity. In the Moroccan case, the Noor Ouarzazate solar
project is framed as a ‘win-win-win’2 situation for all actors involved and is therefore narratively
legitimised. The “deployment of colonial legal instruments for territorial dispossession” [3] was used
to acquire the land necessary for national green energy development and this will continue also in
the future (see Reference [3]). As shown elsewhere [4], the example of the Noor Ouarzazate solar
project, built on the common land of the Amazigh Aït Ougrour, illustrates how a large-scale land
acquisition (LSLA) project for generating green energy “impacts existing power constellations and
gender relations governing access to land and land-related, common-pool resources (pasture, plateau
products, e.g., plants for medicinal or domestic use, and animal fodder) and leads to a loss of these
resources previously managed as common property” [4]. It is argued that this loss is compensated for
by payments from the state and the company MASEN (Moroccan Agency for Sustainable Energy) and
state-driven development programmes “as well as by contributions from the operating company’s
Corporate Social Responsibility Projects (CSR)” [4]. The state, national, and international donors argue
that “these projects provide a form of ‘new commons’, which promise to deliver on-going revenues
and development” [4]. MASEN [5,6] transferred instalments to a special account belonging to the
1 ‘Green grabbing can be understood as part of the vigorous debate on ‘land grabbing’ more generally, a debate which already
highlights instances where ‘green’ credentials are called upon to justify appropriations of land for food or fuel [1] in [2] (p. 2)’
and in this case study for green solar energy plants.
2 (1) It makes worthless parts of the country valuable; (2) It makes Morocco a greener country, helping the world fight against
climate change and global warming; and (3) It brings development for marginalised groups such as rural women and men.
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Ministry of the Interior, who holds the money on behalf of the Aït Ougrour community3. The DAR4
manages the account and decides with the Community Supervisory Council how the money will be
used. In this way—according to the discourse of the administration—local community expectations
are better addressed. Project designers claim that they create development opportunities for local
people, and specifically for women: “By creating opportunities for the redistribution of access to ‘new’
resources, such as job opportunities or benefits from CSR schemes, they often come at the cost of
common-pool resources for women. These new benefits are often labelled in general terms, such as
the ‘development’ that LSLA investments provide to local areas, but the kind of development they
provide needs to be analysed from a local perspective” [4]. As we will see in this article, one of the
key questions is, “do the Amazigh people need this kind of development?” The focus of this paper
will also be, as the title suggests, on how the process of the anti-politics machine [7] is used by the
national leaders who shape the policy, and subsequently the acquisition of the land for the project.
The author will furthermore outline the socio-economic impacts of the project, such as changes to the
local people’s access to the land due to the investments and the discourses used as a strategy against
opposition and objection.
2. Theoretical Perspective
With a neo-Marxist-inspired focus on feminist political ecology at a micro-level in the research,
the article explains the relationships between the political, economic, and social factors, and environmental
issues and changes. It tries to shed light on the Moroccan discourse on ethnic identity and ‘tribal heroism’.
It will explain the socio-ecological effect of related investment with the example of gendered initiatives
for women’s empowerment at a local level.
These approaches stress the socially, culturally, historically, and politically constructed nature of
gender relations, and the interaction of gender with other socially important variables, such as age,
marital status, class, ethnicity, and migratory status. Feminist political ecology introduces gender as
a critical variable in shaping resource use, access, and control, including environmental rights and
responsibilities, and processes of ecological change (see Reference [8]). It shows that gendered rights
and responsibilities can be very complex (see, for example, Reference [9]). Environmental issues are
approached from the lens of social, distribution, and knowledge conflicts. The focus is clearly on power
structures and women’s and men’s interrelated strategic interests that determine resource access and
control over resources (see References [8,10–12]). The gender, environment, and development (GED)
approach is also useful for analysing relationships between gender and the environment. It consists
of the feminist political ecology approach outlined above (see References [8,10,11]), and feminist
environmentalism, which focuses more on the material aspects of the relationship between gender and
the environment, associated most notably with Bina Agarwal ([13,14]). Women, in this case study,
are also in charge of household and food security (see, for example, Reference [15])—a role that also
comes under stress during environmental and institutional change. A focus on care work, as one of the
domains in which gender inequalities are the most pronounced and hardest to change, is therefore
extremely important for any study of gender relations (see Reference [16]). From a feminist political
ecology perspective, this will mean assessing how this domain of control by women changes as a result
of the changing environment and the institutions governing access to land resources due to investment.
This feminist political ecology perspective is a good addition to the new institutionalism approach in
social anthropology, in which mechanisms such as externally shaped changes in relative prices for land
3 In accordance with Article 6 of the Royal Dahir of 19 March 1951, by a commission of expertise comprised of the following
members: (i) the pasha or caïd as president; (ii) a local representative of the Ministry of Finance; (iii) local representatives of the
Ministries of Agriculture and Commerce and the High Commission for Water and Forests; and (iv) a local representative of the
Ministry of Public Works. The community tutelage council will decide on the use of funds from the sale of land to the benefit
of the community of Ait Oukrour Toundout. (Moroccan Agency for Solar Energy (MASEN [6] Plan d’Acquisition de Terrain).
4 DAR: Direction des Affaires Rurales/Directorate of Rural Affairs.
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and resources have an impact on local gendered bargaining power constellations of actors, the way
these are able or not, via their changed power, to select the institutional setting they prefer, and the
way this is organised and legitimised ideologically. Ferguson’s anti-politics machine [7] relates to this
process by legitimating investment via green development discourse, and hides the grabbing process
which—as a feminist political ecology would show—affects men and women differently, as well as the
identity of ethnic groups.
Following Lila Abu-Lughod’s work [17], Do Muslim Women Need Saving?, the author also
formulated the questions, “do Amazigh people need this kind of ‘development’ and such ‘modernity’?”
and “do women need empowerment?” National and international discourses on modernity focusing
on development are linked to promoting green energy projects, which are also defined as gendered,
meaning that both women and men should benefit from the development in general but also from the
specific development projects that constitute part of the LSLA. If the discourses claiming that rural
areas in Morocco or the Amazigh5 people need development/modernity are credible, then its founding
is easier to legitimise. It is all connected, and insights from feminist discourse into development
will help to shed light on questions about who gets to decide what is necessary or to propose and
choose the CSR projects constituting the so-called development of the rural Amazigh woman, and who
benefits from the existing source of capital. These are all linked to theoretical insights from feminist
political ecology about who gains and who loses, but also show how this is shaped in an anti-politics
machine manner in combination with the discourse on state modernity and modern sustainable green
development, which also evokes national and local identities.
3. Methodology
The research was carried out in the surrounding area of the largest solar project in Morocco,
situated close to Ouarzazate (see Figure 1). Fieldwork comprised more than 12 months of data
collection, between 2015 and 2018. As a qualitative research project, the research relied heavily on
participant observation in combination with narrative interviews, informal conversations with experts,
associations, and non-governmental organisation (NGO) representatives, and focus group discussions
with both men and women (e.g., sex workers, local women, solar project workers, and others). This was
then augmented with in-depth biographies and secondary data from a literature review.
The research process first involved an exploratory phase at the beginning of July 2015, when I
travelled to the study area to make initial contact with local actors and tested the data collection tools.
This was followed by a second phase of intensive data collection a month later, after all adjustments to
the questionnaire were completed and updated. A prolonged period of stay in the local community
with members of the extended family opened many doors during the research and granted access to
the local community members. When I arrived in Ouarzazate together with my family—two small
children and my Moroccan/Swiss husband (of Arabic/Berber origin)—we first had to find a place to
stay and a school for the children. Of course, the summer was very hot and dry, in the area of a solar
energy project, but we had underestimated the extent of this. The weather forced many people to stay
inside their houses, a fact compounded by windy, dusty conditions on the plateau and the fact that
the semi-nomads or herders are not often outside in the day during summer. For a researcher doing
ethnographic fieldwork using qualitative methods, including participant observation, this was not
an easy situation in which to start fieldwork and to enter a community, even in a hospitable country
like Morocco, where people often invite strangers for tea and invite them into their houses. I did not
5 Since 1980, Imazighen (sing. Amazigh) has come to refer to all Berbers from North Africa. Regional subgroups are distinguished
with specific names [18]. Imazighen, in its original meaning, also refers to the Berbers of central and south-east-central
Morocco where the author conducted fieldwork. Other Berber subgroups in Morocco are Ishilhayen in south-western
Morocco and Irifiyen, the Rifians in north-eastern Morocco [18]. The term Amazigh did not come from scratch in 1980, in fact
it has been there for longer than that. Since it is the endonym, it was ‘revived’ to be used instead of potentially derogatory
terms like ‘Barbar’ in Arabic and ‘berbères’ in French.
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find it possible to start the research by knocking directly on private doors, and therefore I had to find
other ways to gain access to the community. Fortunately, this all changed after a month, when we all
acclimatised and our children had started school. This additionally gave us a point of contact with
other families. It was very important to stay a whole year in the region, so as to know more about the
people and to experience everyday life amongst them; for example, to understand how semi-nomads
move from one area to the other and why they choose specific places. In other words, the long stay in
the field enriched the author’s knowledge of the local transhumance, the day-to-day routine of local
Amazigh groups, and the ecosystem and the financial strategies of women in the area. I also developed
an eye for institutional designs on access to commons for local people.
 
Figure 1. Location and map of the wider case study area. Map compilation and design: Gämperli
Krauer Ulla (2018), CDE, Centre for Development and Environment, University of Bern, Switzerland.
Geodata source: OSM data by OSMaxx (2018). Geometalab, HSR University of Applied Sciences
Rapperswil, Switzerland, and Ryser, Sarah [4], Institute of Social Anthropology, University of Bern,
Bern, Switzerland (Parts of the map were used for previous publications).
The study mainly focuses on four main categories of local actors affected by the project. Each of
these groups of actors has individual interests in the solar project, which are very varied. All of these
groups often consisted of women, or mixed women and men:
(a) Herders, pastoralists, and local community members who used the 3000 ha Noor solar project
area (Figures 1 and 2) as a passage for transhumance and collecting herbage, fuelwood, and other
plateau products are concerned with the new utilisation of the territory. Even if it is not a desirable
location for extending pasture, it is not what is commonly called ‘wasteland’, which the state
understands as land which is not productively used. Following the establishment of the project
and the lack of access to the land for transhumance, collecting wood and herbs for animal fodder,
and plants for medicinal or domestic use, or the use of the pathways, local community members,
who once used the land for this purpose, had to seek alternative options. This group has little
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bargaining power even when they can take part in the decision-making processes. Even a Na’ib6
from a village, the communal land representatives aradi aljoumoua, has little bargaining power
because they are between their community and the local state representatives. It is, for example,
difficult for a Na’ib to refuse such an investment on their own communal land.
(b) Local community members (women and men) from neighbouring villages who do not have access
to jobs and receive no related short-term benefits. They will be looking for alternative means of
subsistence and a coping strategy, such as involvement in government development programmes
(i.e., participation in cooperative, Maroc vert7 and ‘INDH8). Through programmes such as these,
the Moroccan government and MASEN argue that the local community members would be able to
earn money whilst at the same time be empowered through information, awareness, government
support, and easy access to economic and social amenities, including health facilities, education,
and the promotion of local ‘wares’ or products on the market, thereby reducing losses arising
from the LSLA project. These affected people, community members from neighbouring villages
(in the Atlas Mountain for example), are completely cut off because they are not part of the Aït
Ougrour community and therefore not included in decision-making. Community members of
neighbouring villages are not included in most of the CSR programme but still affected by the
loss of the ‘old’ commons. In their case, they used the land mostly as passage. Very few CRS
projects address this actor group.
(c) The third group of actors comprises the so-called local non-citizens. These are actors who moved
to Ouarzazate and the surrounding area, close to the solar project, purposefully in search of new
opportunities. Some of these may include, for example, prostitution. The gendered implications
of these new arrivals to the local communities also need to be ascertained. What then becomes of
these communities in terms of cost and benefits, such as rents and related fees? These actors have
almost no bargaining power, and are not concerned at all with accessing the ‘new’ commons,
as they were not affected by the loss of the ‘old’ commons.
(d) The fourth group comprises Moroccan policymakers, such as the politicians, the royal institutions,
especially King Mohammed VI, the very heterogenic local administration, and international actors,
such as foreign companies and governments (such as Spain, Germany, France, and China) and
foreign state actors, development agencies, NGOs, and technical companies, mainly from Germany,
Spain, and Saudi Arabia. These actors had, from the beginning, a level of high bargaining power.
Some have made decisions about the implementation of additional CSR projects, and some were
able to decide on the price of common land in terms of acquisition. They are also the first to have
all the information about various processes and can share this information with whomever they
decide. Local state representatives, such as the Caïd9, the governor of a region, or the president
of a community, also have high bargaining power; they can interpret state control according to
their understanding of the governmental supervision of a region or a community. Development
agencies and NGOs decide to whom a CSR project is important and who has access, and often
they are also influential in deciding which CSR projects will be implemented.
6 The Na’ib or Na’iba (female in very few cases) is the elected person to speak on behalf of the people. For example,
the communal land representatives are the Na’ib aradi aljoumoua. The Na’ib or Na’iba is elected by his/her community as the
person responsible for managing the collective land affairs and maintaining contact with the state’s Directorate of Rural
Affairs (DAR). It is any person chosen by villagers to be in charge of any talks or communications with another party, like the
inverstors or the state, as well as the case of dividing the land.
7 For more information see footnote 1.
8 National Human Development Initiative (INDH, the French acronym for Initiative Nationale pour le Développement Humain).
9 At the times of French and Spanish colonialization, Caïds (plural of Caïd, which means leader or head of an authority office)
were appointed in communes to maintain control. It was a type of indirect ruling office structured of men representing the
state. In every district the Caïd/a exercises a great deal of power, keeps the peace, manages people’s daily affairs in terms of
security, policing and gendarme armed forces, and represents the authority at the communal level. Today the Caïd is the
local representative of the Ministry of Interior.
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Figure 2. Noor Ouarzazate Solar Project complex (Photo: Sarah Ryser 2018).
4. LSLA Investment Policies and Creating National and Local Identities through Projects
In order to understand the anti-politics machine and levels of identity operating in the context of
Morocco, one has to understand that the royal institution in Morocco (especially King Mohammed VI)
can be considered an arbitrator among the different Moroccan populations. During protectorate times,
however, the French created tensions between the Amazigh and ‘Arabs’ [19], but it seems that the
idea of the French using the Amazigh to divide Moroccans into Amazigh and ‘Arab’ was somewhat
distorted (Diary, Fieldnotes Ryser 2015–2018)10. The royal family lived in exile during the period of
the French protectorate and Spanish colonisation. Local people often referred to Thami Glaoui, who
ruled the research area at the time as a dictator. He used his power, gained by cooperating with the
colonial power, to oppress the local people (Diary, Fieldnotes Ryser 2015–2018). People interviewed in
the research experienced and remember the oppression under Thami Glaoui’s rule very well.
Father: Well life at the time was cruel and difficult, starting from 1912 on. And if you own a sheep
or anything else then it’s not yours because the authorities take all what they see. My father used
to go to ‘Koulfa’ (military conscription), he worked for free in Tichka11 and other places.
Author: You mean the Muqaddam and Amghar (local authorities) practiced their authority here?
Father: That’s true, as I told if they saw anything that belongs to you, they took it. It’s not
yours anymore.
First son: There was this centre of Telouet, they used to take everything like wood from
Imghran to there. They used to take wool, almonds, and anything else. El Glaoui used to
rule all of the south-east and Marrakech too as he was the Pacha of Marrakech.
Father: He had sort of three Kasbahs here, one also in Taourirt. If we happen to be four men
in a house, then one of us should go to work with him. At that time, there was nothing
neither for men nor for women. Things like clothes, shoes were not available as they are now.
All there were as shoes was sandal-like partly made of palm tree leaves.
Second son: I think there weren’t covers too, people used to sleep on hay to keep warm.
10 The informant is referring Mohamed Mounib [20] statements in his work: to Al-dahîr ‘al-barbarî’: akbar ukdûba siyâsiyya fî
tarikh al-Maghrib al-mu’asir [The ‘Berber Decree’: The biggest lie in the history of modern Morocco].
11 Local Mountain chain
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Father: No electricity too, only fire was used as light source, for example when having dinner,
one should set fire next to them in order to have a clear sight. And some time after came the
candles, lanterns, carbon, and then the gas bottle during 70s and 80s. I was born in the 50s,
so all what I know is just from what I was told. El Glaoui used to kill people too, he was
very authoritative. There’s still one of his prisons in Kasbah Tamddaght where people were
tortured and killed. People used to have no rights, either you do what you’re told or be killed.
(Father and two sons, living in Tasselmante, Morocco, excerpt from an interview conducted
in February 2017)
They often mentioned in the interviews how different the rule of Thami Glaoui was from that of
King Mohammed V (living at that time in exile) and his grandson, the current King Mohammed VI.
The pan-Arabist nationalist Allal al-Fassi and members of the nationalist movement exploited a legal
decree issued by the French protectorate power to fuel this idea of division.
The marginalisation and later ban on Tamazight as a language and culture was essentially because
of the Moroccan regime’s adoption of Arabisation as a programme that pushed nationally under the
strong influence of pan-Arabist ideologies coming from the east. Everything therefore related to the
Amazigh was by turns either neglected or attacked. The tensions between the Amazigh and people
influenced by pan-Arabism12 were reconciled by King Hassan II, who also chose an Amazigh from
Khénifra for a wife. This move is seen as one of the first steps toward the national unity of the Moroccan
people after the French protectorate ended in 1956.
The research between summer 2015 and 2018 showed that the royal family enjoyed a high degree
of esteem among the local Amazigh groups, especially after the periods of the protectorate and the
era of the unloved Thami Glaoui rule. Despite the impact of the solar project in terms of the loss of
communal land, it did not meet much resistance, at least at the beginning, because of local people’s
love for King Mohammed VI, and maybe also their fear of repression. There certainly was respect for
this method of conducting development. This is remarkable, because this form of land alienation took
and still takes place in many Amazigh communities as land grabbing by the state and international
and national companies on a large scale [3]. Several local people told the researcher this, and tribes
and communities deprived of their collective, or even private, lands could be observed during the
fieldwork, not only in Ouarzazate, and not only for green energy infrastructure, but also in the whole
Draâ valley, the Souss, Haouz and in the eastern part of the country—for example, the province of
Figuig. This lack of resistance was not always the case. When King Hassan II, the current King’s father,
constructed a large dam in the research region in 1970, it was contested until local people realised its
utility for irrigation as well as its ability to mitigate group conflicts stemming from water scarcity [4].
The dam issue is particularly important for the solar project, because its water is used for cooling solar
installations such as Noor I (although a small amount, it is still significant from a local perspective).
There was no initial resistance to the solar project, however, as King Mohammed VI is admired
locally for his social projects. The current King’s positive reputation is based on efforts such as (a)
fighting poverty, which meant bringing infrastructure and jobs into marginal regions; (b) introducing
a new family law (New Moudawana), which was intended to change, at least on paper, women’s
inheritance rights; and (c) normalising the political situation after King Hassan II, which contributed to
local conflicts [21] (and see also, in the context of gender and reconciliation commission after Hassan
II, Bettina Dennerlein, [22,23]). The current King also promised that the gains from the solar project
would be locally distributed and should also create new jobs for the local population. At the same time,
it should make Morocco an energy-independent country and generate surplus green energy for export
to other African and European countries. The media announced that up to 90,000 green jobs would be
12 I prefer to use this term and not ‘Arab’, because there were Amazighophone people too in the nationalist movements and
indeed due to ignorance and Arabisation conducted through education, a significant amount of Berber-speaking masses
were victims of Middle Eastern pan-Arabist ideologies.
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created in Morocco by 2020 [24]. With this development plan, the Moroccan government endorsed a
local infrastructure development policy that they called ‘regionalisation’, allowing regional autonomy
through the devolution of power to regional provinces. This move makes large-scale land acquisition a
relevant issue in the politics of regionalisation: this regional investment option came at a time when
regional provinces had gained some autonomy over the land. The politics of regionalisation also serve
as an anti-politics machine, however, because the process was still controlled by the King, who did
not—and still does not—focus exclusively on solar energy and green development.
For the local purpose of gaining a positive reputation, the King’s and the government’s discourses
highlight that the solar project is also linked to local development initiatives that are defined as
representing regional development, combining ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ approaches. One element of
these discourses is the promotion of traditional handicrafts as a means of keeping local traditional
knowledge and creating jobs for women in rural areas. Altogether, these strategies constitute a holistic
policy that the Moroccan national government—controlled by the King—uses to promote its vision
of rural development. National-level development projects involving large-scale land investments
in agriculture and infrastructure are at the top of the political agenda. Such projects include the
largest ports in Africa (the 2009 Tanger Med and Tanger Med II) and the national railroad network.
The recently opened Moroccan High-Speed Rail (TGV Al Boraq or HSR) network links the port of Tanger
Med with other important industrial centres, and guarantees the fast transportation of passengers as
well as goods and services. It is the first high-speed line on the African continent (for more and current
information see, for example Reference [25]). The line between Tanger and Casablanca was inaugurated
on 15th November 2018, and the journey between Tanger and Rabat takes now 1 h and 20 min by HSR,
instead of 3 h and 45 min by normal train [25]. All these investments are legitimised by the argument
that they are boosting the nation’s green development and providing new job opportunities on all
levels, with a particular focus on women and on mitigating climate change.
4.1. ‘Moroccan Green Energy Projects’ as Part of the National Climate Mitigation Discourse
Discourses on national strategies to support women and protect the environment are based on
visions of national unity related to territory and land. The Kingdom of Morocco covers 710,800 km2
and has a population of 35 million people, most of whom inhabit the northern and central part of
the country. Yasmine Berriane [26] describes in her article, entitled The Complexities of Inclusive
Participatory Governance: The Case of Moroccan Associational Life in the Context of the INDH,
how Morocco transitioned “from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one” after forty years of rule
by King Hassan II (1961–1999), at least in the official discourse about the transition process (see also
Reference [27]). Berriane [26] illustrates in her article how, in Morocco, democratic norms and practices
(such as the promotion of inclusionary practices of participation) have been combined with practices
associated with authoritarian regimes, leading to a hybrid political system. She shows through this the
ambivalences of current political change in Morocco. The French protectorate ended in 1956, when the
French recognised the Kingdom as independent. Spanish colonial power ended only after the marche
verte in 1975. Some 350,000 unarmed Moroccan civilians entered the Western Sahara/Moroccan Sahara
(depending on the political point of view) in November 1975. Morocco extended its control into
the two provinces of Oued Eddahab and Aousserd, where it faced a separatist movement, Polisario,
which is nowadays based in Tindouf in the Algerian Desert. From the official national point of view,
Morocco recuperated its land after Spanish colonisation and did not occupy the Saharan regions.
Much historical literature, which will not be referred to further in this article (for further reading see
Reference [21]), supports the official Moroccan position. This Western Sahara conflict is important in an
indirect way for the research in Ouarzazate (although as the region is in the Draâ-Tafilalt, it is not part
of the Moroccan Sahara) because the conflict there led to a strong unity in the nationwide discourse,
and acts as a symbol of Moroccan unity and political stability. The conflict in the Western, or Moroccan,
Sahara increased “the King’s legitimacy as defender of the country’s territorial integrity” [28] (p. 51).
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Based on this history, the issue of national unity—one of the main red lines of the regime—is
seen as focused on the throne and the Royal Family, and therefore their opinions are very important
in informing views of the Moroccan public, as the author’s data have shown. The Western Sahara
conflict is used as part of the justification for accelerating the implementation of the decentralisation
in Moroccan regions [28]. The Moroccan decentralisation process, which started with independence
from France, is important for this research and the research area, regarding the implementation of
local autonomy.
The solar energy project in Ouarzazate needs to be understood in this context, as it reinforces the
hegemonic concept of the issue of national unity and the discourse on fighting together against climate
change and global warming. State projects such as that under study can count on wide support within
Moroccan society. These discourses are further linked to other issues with positive connotations13,
such as gender equality, participation, and decentralisation, which were rhetorically also used by King
Mohammed VI to underline the process of modern technological and societal transition, albeit in the
context of tradition, as mentioned above (see also Reference [26,29]). This discourse does not match
reality, however, as there is a huge difference between the governmental discourse and its presence in
the media on the one hand, and the daily experiences of livelihood challenges in rural Moroccan areas
on the other. The whole process of investing in collective land is framed within broader key words,
such as development, gender equality, and human development. This is a way to justify these big
extensive projects and also to justify the use of collective lands (see Reference [29]). There is a small
example of where to find the controversial reality between political discourse and daily life. A couple
of years ago the Moroccan government stopped the use of plastic bags, in accordance with the COP
2214 in Marrakech in 2017. Many people disapproved of this action, even though it was under the
umbrella of protecting the environment, as the state had not provided alternatives to such bags and
the black market for selling plastic bags in Morocco was growing year-by-year. The project was named
‘zero mika’15, and was accompanied by a national campaign regarding the negative impact of plastic
bags on the environment. Why does the government not similarly encourage and help locals to sell
pots made of palm fronds or reeds, a material that is not only 100% biodegradable but also a traditional
handcraft with locally abundant materials? Cloth bags are now available everywhere in Morocco.
Many shops use paper bags, but most of the cloth bags are produced by an external company and
not by local actors. This means that the ‘zero mika’ project enables only a few people to profit from
the new income source, thus supporting the growing black market. There are local people working
on traditional handcrafts and making baskets and pots from reeds or palm fronds, as the following
citation will show. Therefore, the project ‘zero mika’ should support these local producers as well.
“Tasselmante has a few men working on traditional handcrafts like making pots from palm
fronds and knitting woollen garments with sheep’s wool, or the carpentry and engraving of
wooden doors with Tifinagh. Many of those guys who worked on traditional handcrafts
have died. Some men are working as carpenters. Near the water dam you can also find men
working with palm fronds or reeds, making all kinds of pots, chairs, sunshades, or camouflage
for the garden”. (Younes, male ca. 22 years old, living in a village close to the Solar Project
Ouarzazate, Morocco, excerpt from an interview conducted in October 2018)
Gender is also important in this context as a dimension of social actions that defines the tasks and
roles (with considerable variation) that people play in several spheres of life, but it is also an arena of
overlapping interests. Here again, the topic of contradiction and ambiguity returns.
13 Positive within a specific global and national context of international norms, national discourse of change, development,
human rights and so on. These terms are not per se positive but they are seen as positive within a more general frame
or context.
14 2016 United Nations Climate Change Conference.
15 Mika is Darija for plastic bag.
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“We did receive farm animals from MASEN (Moroccan Agency for Sustainable Energy) and
we received two sheep from ‘Rosa’ three years ago. More recently, they came to register those
who will receive farm animals; they registered 24 names, all men, except me the 25th, who is
a woman. They wondered why 24 men and only one woman (laugh). I told them I had to
register my name because my husband is working and I’m ‘the man of the house’ now . . . ”.
(Fatima, female ca. 55 years old, living in a village close to the Solar Project Ouarzazate,
Morocco, excerpt from an interview conducted in April 2016)
We should realise that gender-specific roles are limited and flexible, and cannot be identified
when individuals, men and women, take or would like to take on ‘other’ roles that are classified as
gender-specific by the CSR projects—which then deprives some men and women of profiting from
several CSR projects. The CSR projects do not consider the context of variability and the meanings
of gendered roles, because of the loss of an emic perspective. Most of the CSR projects for men from
MASEN focus on job opportunities in the solar project, which generate income, while those for rural
women do not. Why is this the case? Women should also be able to generate income. Another example
is that handicraft projects are not focused on men, even though men work with handicrafts, such as
palm fronds and reed pots from the Ouarzazate region, that are sold and generate income. What is the
relevance of a large-scale green energy project to environmental discourse and the everyday experience
of local people? It would appear that the country’s engagement in promoting the discourse of green
energy and green economy has instigated a new common feeling. The discourse promoted by the state
presenting an African nation with this immense national green energy project and the satisfaction of
having a leadership position as the first African nation in solar energy production at an international
level is stimulating a sense of community among Moroccans. This discourse includes all Moroccans,
the whole heterogenic population of the North African country. The Moroccan government stresses
that all Moroccans are part of this sustainable development programme and these discourses are even
more visible in the rural parts of the country. As national government actors often claim, based on
my fieldwork experiences following official speeches and (conference) press releases, “it does not
matter where you come from, what language you speak, what profession you exercise, whether you
are male or female—all Moroccans, the whole nation, are included and will profit from this green
energy from all different levels”. There is an understanding that, “natural common-pool resources
disappear for a particular group of people, but ‘new commons’ like this solar project emerge for
the benefit of our entire heterogeneous country”. This hegemonic discourse makes it difficult but
not impossible for the actors in this research, including those working for the solar project, to take
a critical attitude, to have critical thoughts or to express a critical position in public. This unity not
only entails a national political stability, but, due to its location, peace in the country ensures stability.
The strategic position of Morocco thus makes it unique in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa)
region, because it is able to maintain unity among its diverse religious denominations within Islam
and others, such as Judaism, Christianity, and Buddhism, and this unity has been due to the country’s
ability to transform its political structure compared to the other MENA countries. The capacity for
reform was part of the policy efforts that were initiated by King Hassan II in the 1990s and continued
by his son Mohammed VI [30] (p. 282). The change of status quo maintained a political system where
the kingdom could co-evolve with democratic governance. This strategic move by the kingship and its
acceptance of democratic governance makes Morocco a favourite of international and national firms
for large-scale investments.
Infrastructure projects are also legitimised by the argument that they reduce the country’s
dependency on foreign supplies to meet its growing energy demands [31] (p. 291). It is argued
that the specific geographical location of Morocco makes it very suitable for producing solar, wind,
and water energy, and Morocco is also the only African country with a power transmission cable link
to Europe [31] (p. 291). Several international banks are involved, as well as development agencies and
technical companies from Spain, Germany, Saudi Arabia, and China. These investments are made
according to the King’s decision and vision for Morocco. At the national level, King Mohammed VI and
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the government demonstrate a strong intention to realise these ambitious renewable energy projects.
There are also plans to use green energy for water desalination rather than irrigation systems and to
serve inhabitants, as part of the Moroccan energy policies. The projects involving energy production
and water desalination are linked to agricultural development programmes.
4.2. A Regionally Green Morocco with Modern Agrarian Development
In public discussions about the subject, the King and politicians underline the importance of these
projects for all Moroccans. Their discourse aims to stimulate a sense of community among Moroccans.
Dear people,
We are determined to maintain our course in order to complete the constitutional institutions
and meet the requirements of good governance. The will that invigorates us in this respect is
matched only by our determination to persevere to give substance to our societal project
combining economic growth, sustainable development, and social solidarity [. . .] It is in the
same spirit as the desire to endow Morocco with the capacity to produce renewable energies,
thus helping to give concrete manifestation to our vision of sustainable development. Hence
the implementation of the solar energy program, especially the launch of construction sites
of the ‘Noor Complex’ in Ouarzazate, in parallel with the deadlines included in the wind
energy program. Besides their environmental importance, these projects will make us less
dependent on energy imports. It is therefore necessary to engage in an efficient training policy
and to develop skills in this domain, which on top of that will favour the implementation
of the National Charter for Environment [. . .] ‘Green Morocco’ Plan contributes to the
modernisation of the agricultural sector, taking due account of the constant interest of small
farmers in improving their living conditions’16.
It is thus clear that the project is related to the vision of a “Green Morocco” and the protection
of the environment. These discourses add much credibility to investment and the impact this has
seems to be minor when labelled this way. Indeed, governmental development programmes, such as le
Programme Maroc Vert elaborate a tailored agricultural strategy for each of Morocco’s agro-ecological
regions and include as one of their key goals the mobilisation of 700,000 ha of collectively owned land,
to be used to connect small-scale farmers to the national (and global) market, including the use and
promotion of sustainable energy [33,34], as well as that of gender-supportive policies.
Under these projects, small-scale farmers receive double governmental support. This is important for
the case study because women are active in smallholder agriculture and so, through these programmes,
the Moroccan state argues that it serves multiple purposes: a political objective that combines agriculture
development, women’s empowerment, and the use of green energy through the installation of solar
panels, for example, on farmers’ roofs, which is financed with government money. It is argued that
16 Cher peuple,
Nous avons la ferme volonté de maintenir le cap pour parachever les institutions constitutionnelles et répondre aux
impératifs de bonne gouvernance. La volonté qui Nous anime à cet égard n’a d’égale que Notre détermination à persévérer
pour donner corps à Notre projet sociétal alliant croissance économique pérenne, développement durable et solidarité sociale
. . . ’ ‘ . . . C’est dans le même esprit que s’inscrit la volonté de doter le Maroc de la capacité de produire des énergies
renouvelables, contribuant ainsi à donner son expression concrète à Notre vision du développement durable. D’où la
mise en oeuvre du programme d’énergie solaire, notamment le lancement de chantiers de construction du ‘Complexe
Nour’ à Ouarzazate, parallèlement aux échéances inscrites au programme d’énergie éolienne. Outre leur importance
environnementale, ces chantiers nous rendront moins dépendants des importations énergétiques. Il est donc nécessaire
d’engager une politique de formation efficiente et de développer les compétences en la matière, ce qui favorisera, de
surcroît, la mise en oeuvre de la Charte nationale de l’environnement . . . ’ ‘ . . . Le programme ‘Maroc Vert’ contribue à la
modernisation du secteur agricole, en tenant dûment compte de l’intérêt constant qui doit être porté aux petits agriculteurs,
en vue d’améliorer leurs conditions de vie . . . ’ 30/07/2013—Texte intégral du discours adressé par SM le Roi à la Nation à
l’occasion de la Fête du Trône-Casablanca. [32]
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support for smallholder farmers will reduce outmigration from rural to urban areas and is used to
legitimise the acquisition of land for solar energy by connecting the benefits of the solar project to the
modernisation of rural agriculture.
The implementation of the solar project has also been linked to the discourse on agriculture
development, by indicating that community members who have lost access to land and its related
common-pool resources will be incorporated into such modernised agriculture projects. While women
are active in small-scale agriculture through these programmes, which the Moroccan state argues serve
multiple purposes, the political objective thus combines (a) agriculture development; (b) women’s
empowerment; and (c) the use of green energy through the installation of solar panels, for example on
farmers’ roofs, which is financed with government funding. Therefore, in addition to the argument
that support for small-scale farmers will reduce outmigration, it is also argued that it will legitimise
the privatisation of the previous common land for solar energy based on the ideology of modernity
and the discourse on gender-sensitive rural development as benefits of the solar project as part
of the modernisation of rural agriculture. The Maroc Vert programme (PMV), the Morocco Green
Plan, launched in 2008, is expected to be one of the “the main engine[s] of growth” [28] (p. 21) and
should affect poverty reduction in the whole country [28] (p. 21). According to Bergh, this national
development programme aims to stimulate “the involvement of citizens and of associations” with
rural and urban development and provide support in the sector of agriculture, including small-scale
farmers [28] (p. 21).
For the so-called ‘autochthonous groups’, gender relations are based on Islamic norms but
nevertheless give women in the local context the opportunity to participate in the new initiatives,
especially in female cooperatives17. Since 2005 the INDH, Initiative Nationale pour le Développement
Humain, has governed and financed several projects, especially for women but also for men in Morocco,
and been promoted as the “key development strategy for the country, with important implications for
local-governance arrangements” [28] (p. 21). The INDH ‘n’est ni un projet ponctuel, ni un programme
conjoncturel de circonstance, c’est un chantier de règne’ (The speech by King Mohammed VI, 18 May 2015).
The so-called ‘cooperatives’ are often included and subsidised by the INDH, which proclaims that its
17 ‘Appeared in the luggage of French settlers, cooperatives were first put at their service before the dahir of 8 June 1938 allowed
the establishment of cooperatives among artisans and Moroccan farmers. But it is truly in the aftermath of independence
that these economic entities will find an echo in the state. Cooperation is indeed recommended, both by state leaders and by
various political and trade union organizations . . . ’ [35].
‘Through their values of democracy, solidarity, sharing and mutual aid, cooperatives play an increasingly important role in
the economic and social development of Morocco. Their attractiveness has increased especially since 2005, when the launch
of l’initiative nationale du développement humain (INDH), the National Initiative for Human Development, encouraged the
creation and sustainability of social and solidarity economy structures. This contribution addresses the issues of cooperative
entrepreneurship, examines the institutional and fiscal support offered by the Moroccan state to cooperatives and finally
presents the economic and social weight of cooperatives in the Moroccan economy . . . ’
‘ . . . An even more notable asset is that these cooperatives are 95% female. In fact, female entrepreneurship in cooperatives
is an important turning point in Moroccan society, allowing women to have financial autonomy and more power in
decision-making . . . ’ [36].‘
Apparues dans les bagages des colons français, les coopératives ont tout d’abord été mises à leur service avant que le dahir
du 8 Juin 1938 n’autorise la constitution de coopératives entre artisans et agriculteurs marocains. Mais c’est véritablement
au lendemain de l’Indépendance que ces entités économiques vont trouver écho auprès de l’Etat. La coopération est en
effet alors préconisée, tant par les dirigeants de l’Etat que par différentes organisations politiques et syndicales . . . ’ [35].
‘A travers leurs valeurs de démocratie, de solidarité, de partage et d’entraide, les coopératives jouent un rôle de plus en plus
important dans le développement économique et social du Maroc. Leur attractivité croît surtout depuis 2005, année du
lancement de l’Initiative nationale du développement humain (INDH) encourageant la création et la pérennisation des
structures de l’économie sociale et solidaire. La présente contribution traite des enjeux de l’entrepreneuriat coopératif,
examine les appuis institutionnel et fiscal offerts par l’Etat marocain aux coopératives et présente enfin le poids économique
et social des coopératives dans l’économie marocaine . . . ’
‘ . . . Une place d’autant plus notable que ces coopératives sont à 95% féminines. En fait, l’entrepreneuriat féminin en
coopératives constitue un tournant important dans la société marocaine, permettant aux femmes d’avoir l’autonomie
financière et plus de pouvoir dans la prise de décision . . . ’ [36].
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programmes “fight against poverty18, precariousness”19 and “territorial scaling-up”20. It should be,
as Bergh mentions, a “participatory mechanism of dialogue and consultation (concertation)” which
“[is] put in place by the (newly established) Regional Councils and the Councils of the other local
authorities to stimulate the involvement of citizens and associations in the formulation and follow-up
of development programmes” [28] (p. 21).
As mentioned by Berriane [26], several micro-projects by local representatives of the state are
elaborated, financed, and implemented throughout the INDH. These representatives work in close
collaboration with the INDH to build on a pyramid structure consisting of elected council members and
NGO leaders. NGO leaders should represent the inhabitants’ interests when designing the first phase
of a project [26] (p. 93). Often, local authorities (mainly representatives of the municipal district or of
the Prefecture, led by a governor designated by the King) help in the first phase of project development.
In the second phase of the project development, local committees, including elected members of the
municipal or communal councils (conseils communaux), local representatives of the state, and NGO
leaders, select a first set of projects to be supported by the INDH. After these two phases, the selection
process comes under the supervision of regional councils and the central committee [26] (p. 94). At the
top of the pyramid (Figure 3) are the prefectural committees (comités préfectoraux) led by the governor,
along with civil society representatives (a third of the members of this committee).
At the top of the pyramid is also the Prime Minister, however, who controls the whole process [26]
(p. 94). Obviously, the King has the opportunity to intervene in any phase of the implementation process.
At least 12 INDH projects have been set up in the region of Ouarzazate, including, for example, a ‘centre
de formation des femmes rurales à Ghessate’. In the current state of research, these projects must
also be understood as governmental compensatory measures for the local population, in two senses.
First, during colonisation, rural regions in Morocco were often marginalised, and today the Moroccan
government wants to improve the infrastructure in these areas. Secondly, it is compensation for LSLA
in order to cover current needs and to determine the priorities for development projects. It therefore
seems to be more than a sustenance strategy for the inhabitants of the region (see Reference [37] and
current research). The state strategy of marginalising certain regions in Morocco during protectorate
and post-protectorate eras had “drastic economic effects on the rural areas” [19] (p. 148), mainly on
the Amazigh population, and migration for unemployed young people to bigger cities was the only
option left for (poor) rural Amazigh [19].
18 Support for access to social services, infrastructure and basic sanitary and educational, cultural and sports facilities. Social,
sports and cultural animation. Training and communication actions. Income Generating Activities and micro projects
generating jobs and stable income [32].
Soutien à l’accès aux services sociaux, infrastructures et équipements sanitaires et éducatifs de base, culturel et sportif.
Animation sociale, sportive et culturelle. Actions de formation et de communication. Activités Génératrices de Revenus et
microprojets générateurs d’emplois et de revenus stables [32].
19 The upgrade of the reception centers. The creation (if necessary) of specialised reception centers by target category. Family,
economic and socio-professional integration. Support to associations fighting against precariousness. Support for people in
vulnerable situations [32].
La mise à niveau des centres d’accueil. La création (en cas de besoin) des centres d’accueil spécialisés par catégorie cible.
L’insertion familiale, économique et socioprofessionnelle. L’appui aux associations œuvrant dans la lutte contre la précarité.
L’accompagnement des personnes en situation de vulnérabilité [32].
20 Health support. Rural electrification. Potable water. Roads and rural tracks. Educational support [32].
Appui à la santé. Électrification rurale. Eau potable. Routes et pistes rurales. Appui à l’éducation [32].
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Figure 3. INDH development phases of the project implementation processes.
4.3. Discourse on Ethnic Identity and Amazigh Heroism as a Strategy Against Opposition and Objection and
Beyond Rhetoric: Gendered Initiatives for Women’s Empowerment at Local Levels
The government has also been very strategic in ensuring little resistance from the local people,
by using historical accounts in political discourses to discourage opposition to the solar project in
the area, and to gain support from the dominant Amazigh community to which the land belonged.
For instance, in political discourse in favour of the solar project, officials refer to so-called ‘worthless
land’ (terre inutile) becoming ‘valuable land’ (terre utile) (see, for example, Reference [38]. This distinction
between inutile and utile was used by the protectoral power to distinguish between dominated land
and non-dominated land, which structured the space for access to economic development during the
protectorate era (see, for example, Reference [3,38]. The distinction between ‘valuable’ and ‘worthless’
was also used to describe the local people’s resistance to colonial control during the French protectorate
and the Spanish colonisation period, and represented a sense of pride in the local people, because most
of the ‘worthless land’ could not be dominated entirely during that era. Often, it was the Amazigh
population who acted against the colonial domination of European countries. As such, the officials’
use of such rhetoric in their political discourses was strategically motivated to show that they represent
the interest of the Amazigh population, and to give them the feeling of a common state and to show
that the conversion of the land into solar fields is for the common good, of which the Amazigh are part.
In 2001, King Mohammed VI made his first speech, reiterating the necessity of teaching the Tamazight
language in Moroccan schools [19]. In addition to rhetoric, the Moroccan government has also taken
concrete symbolic measures to show commitment to such discourses through several gestures, such as
making Tamazight an official language in 2011 and teaching Tamazight in several Moroccan schools,
as recognised at the national level. The Royal Institute for Amazigh Culture, L’Institut Royal de la
Culture Amazigh (IRCAM), was built in Rabat and the Moroccan researcher Fatima Sadiqi and eight
other women were appointed by the King to be part of its Administrative Board.
Legitimisation of the solar project has also been enhanced through the connection of compensation
resources to support for the so-called ‘autochthonous groups’, where women in local communities are
given the opportunity to participate in the new initiatives, especially in female cooperatives. Since
2005, the INDH has governed and financed several projects, especially for women but also for men.
In the region of Ouarzazate, at least 12 INDH projects have been set up. One of them, in Ghessate,
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is a ‘centre de formation des femmes rurales à Ghessate’. This centre will include an educational
establishment for professional education (for example, carpet weaving), literacy, nursery education,
and sanitation education, linked to gender-beneficial outcomes of the solar project. Small-scale farmers
receive double governmental support.
“If you think that the desert is empty, you do not know how to look at it”21
This proverb disrupts the picture of ‘wasteland’—there cannot be wasteland, at least from an
emic perspective. Only after several months the author learned to detect things like different plants,
different types of housing, insects, and other animals in her research area. She also came to realise,
pertinent to the Amazigh proverb, that her emic vision changed, i.e., she learned how to look at the
desert, the semi-arid and arid areas. After long individual and focus group discussions, visiting many
local people in several villages but also speaking with semi-nomads and herders, picking all kind
of plants22, the author learned how people were affected by the implementation of the solar project.
She also realised that several things were not immediately visible or able to be perceived initially.
The region was far more than a barren landscape; for example, the author discovered the reciprocal
use rights between some herders from the neighbouring community from Azilal and the Aït Ougrour
community (Figure 4, see also Reference [4]).
The Azilal people, from the mountain, they come here. But they don’t face the same problem
as we do. Because it’s us who settled here and benefit more from the land. They do have a
problem too because they used to go to Tifernin and then to Souss, now they have to go in
a truck, they don’t have a way anymore, it’s blocked now. (Herder, Tasselmante, Morocco,
excerpt from an interview conducted in April 2016)
 
Figure 4. Herders and semi-nomadic groups from the Atlas Mountains with goats and sheep using the
area on a reciprocal basis under Amazigh institutions. (Photo: Sarah Ryser 2017).
21 ‘Si tu crois que le désert est vide c’est que tu ne sais pas le regarder’ Amenokhal Alhavi, Sagesse de l’homme bleu, Amazigh.
22 From a local perspective, important plants for medicinal or domestic use.
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5. Discussion
The Moroccan state and investors argue that the abundant ‘wasteland’ is used for modernisation and
the production of green energy, and new job opportunities are created in rural areas. Using a discourse
with its seeds in the French protectorate, and dividing land into ‘valuable/utile’ and ‘worthless/inutile’
parts (see, for example, Reference [38], Moroccan green energy projects, in this specific case, (a) make the
worthless/inutile parts of the country valuable/utile; (b) turn Morocco into a greener country—in helping
the world fight against climate change; and (c) bring development to rural women and men. This is a
‘win-win-win’ situation in favour of the solar project. Since ‘worthless land’ has becoming ‘valuable
land’, and there are now many different types of local people as well others from the ‘valuable’ parts of
Morocco, such as Marrakech, Casablanca, Rabat (Oujda) who come to this area to try and make money.
Managers, engineers, and NGOs are coming into ‘worthless regions’ to work on solar projects or other
CSR projects. Using the same example of ‘valuable’ and ‘worthless’ land, people coming from valuable
regions make the land in the surrounding area of Ouarzazate ‘valuable’ in a way, however, most of
these people with a high position or with work experience use this discourse for their own purposes.
Again, these people have access to these advantages, and in a disproportionate manner compared to
local citizens. Additionally, locals express mistrust about NGOs and how the money from the land sale
has been used.
It was said that an international association (she is referring to an international NGO) was
given 3 million dirhams! It’s absolute nonsense. We know that they’re stealing the money.
Now they say the money is no longer available. (Chama, female, Tasselmante, Morocco,
excerpt from interview conducted in March 2017 [4])
Informal discussions and interviews during the fieldwork for this case study confirmed what
Bergh [39] had already mentioned—that there is mistrust about NGOs and associated work in Morocco
because some people get rich at other people’s expense by collaborating or participating with NGOs
or associations.
In Morocco, the notion of association in the modern sense was introduced by a royal decree
(dahir) in 1941. It allowed only the French settlers to create associations and prohibited
Moroccans from doing so. Only the Law on Public Liberties of 1958 (which was, in turn,
largely inspired by the French law on associations of 1901) accorded the right to associate
to everyone. [39]
After the pan-Arabist Allal al-Fassi’s nationalist movement, many members of the leftist political
opposition found refuge in associations. The law on public liberties was issued in 1958, after the
French protectorate, and since then the parliament has adjusted this legislation and applied it to NGOs
twice: first in 1973 and, after intense lobbying by civil society, in 2002 (see Reference [26,39]). The 1973
decree gave significant power to some authorities to sanction and dissolve associations, and the 2002
decree “strikes a balance between an opening up toward civil society and the maintenance of ‘soft’
state control” [39] (p. 47; and see Reference [26,40]). Now it is easier for an association to be considered
legal, and the law introduced some additional bureaucratic control measures. These measures give a
substantial role, including more power, to some local authority representatives, NGOs, and associations
through the ‘soft’ state control [39]. In the area the author researched, this was particularly true for local
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authority representatives like the Caïd23 or the Moqaddam24, but also for (international) NGOs, see the
quote above by Chama. These negative experiences were very much highlighted in the interviews.
Locals mentioned that a group of young people asked the DAR for financing for their own project to
found an association. The DAR and the Caïd are responsible for managing the money for the fund.
The young people told me that the Caïd refused to grant them permission. While the fieldwork did
find that DAR argues that it organises meetings to review local needs, this did not happen often and
the demands of the local people had not been considered during these sessions, according to local
views. DAR administrators seemed to prioritise the development of projects which they believed
would profit local people, however, the locals do not feel included, rather, they think that development
decisions are imposed upon them. There is no transparency regarding the use of money and there are
no direct cash payments; people are told to make official requests, to which there is either no response
at all or none in a timely fashion25.
A group of young people had the idea to ask for the financing for a project of our own.
But they (the DAR), along with the Caïd (the local state authority) are the ones responsible for
the money. We wanted to fund an association with the money but the Caïd refused to grant
us permission. We have the right to be the ones responsible for the fund, but they refused.
(Addi, male ca. 24 years old, living in a village close to the Solar Project Ouarzazate, Morocco,
excerpt from an interview conducted in March 2017)
The statement indicates that locals perceive a combination of disinterest from DAR and MASEN
in involving them. It also discloses local power relations with elites, such as among village-level state
authorities, who seem to control the fund and do not favour the local and bottom-up management of
local people. The discourse of having ideas and wanting to set up their own projects indicates a will to
have local control over the funds and projects. It also shows a desire for responsibility to be held not
by state administrators but by local actors, a desire refused by the more powerful. This has led to the
feeling of being unable to get involved and generate development ideas, even though this was the
initial goal of the money raised from the sales.
23 ‘After independence in 1956, Morocco set up a territorial administration in the form of local authorities, both urban and
rural. The tribes and the segments that compose them are part of territorial administrations (deconcentrated administration)
and local authorities (decentralized administration). Deconcentrated administration organises the tribal space in Caïdats.
Each Caïdat is administered by a local authority agent, the Caïd, who is supervised by a Super-Caïd, who, in turn, reports
directly to the governor. The Caïdat is divided into Mashiakhat, at the head of which is a Cheikh. The Mashiakhat are
subdivided into Douars. Each Cheikh has a Moqadmiin under his command, and each Moqaddam is in charge of one or more
Douars. Cheikhs and Moqadmiin are chosen from the population to which they belong. This organisation of deconcentrated
administration (Caïds, Cheikhs, Moqadmiin) is part of a tribal tradition that the state has taken over by functionalising these
agents and, especially, by detaching the institution of the Caïd from its tribal roots. Unlike the Cheikh and the Moqaddam,
who are ‘locals’, the Caïd is an agent of the state with no ties to the tribe. One could say the institution of the Caïd has been
detribalised. Decentralised administration divides the tribal territory into rural communes and electoral districts. It is in this
context that representatives are elected, first at the municipal level then at the parliamentary level’ [41] (own translation in
English from original text below).
‘À l’Indépendance, en 1956, le Maroc a mis en place une administration territoriale, et ce sous la forme de collectivités
territoriales locales, urbaines et rurales. Les tribus et les segments qui les composent s’inscrivent dans des administrations
territoriales (administration déconcentrée) et dans des collectivités territoriales communales (administration décentralisée).
L’administration déconcentrée organise l’espace tribal en caïdats. Chaque caïdat est administré par un agent d’autorité
local, le caïd, que supervise un super-caïd, qui, à son tour, rend directement compte au gouverneur. Le caïdat est divisé
en mashiakhat, à la tête desquelles se trouve un cheikh. La mashiakhat est subdivisée en douars. Chaque cheikh a sous
ses ordres des muqadmı¯n, et chaque muqaddam a en charge un ou plusieurs douars. Les cheikhs et les muqadmı¯n sont
choisis au sein de la population dont ils sont issus. Cette organisation de l’administration déconcentrée (caïds, cheikhs,
muqaddam) relève d’une tradition tribale que l’État a reprise à son compte en fonctionnarisant ces agents et, surtout,
en coupant l’institution du caïd de ses racines tribales. Contrairement au cheikh et au muqaddam, qui sont des « gens du
cru », le caïd est un agent de l’État sans lien aucun avec la tribu. L’institution du caïd est, pourrait-on dire, détribalisée.
L’administration décentralisée découpe le territoire tribal en communes rurales et en circonscriptions électorales. C’est dans
ce cadre que sont élus les représentants, au niveau communal d’abord, puis au niveau parlementaire’ [41].
24 The Moqqadem is the local representative of the Ministry of the Interior. He acts in the village as an interface between citizens
and the Ministry of the Interior‚ as well as keeping an eye on everyday life in the neighbourhood [sig]’ [26] (p. 100).
25 Local community members in Tasselmante and Tiflit. Interviews conducted between September 2015 and May 2017.
204
Land 2019, 8, 100
6. Conclusions
For all these reasons, large-scale land acquisition processes accompanied by rural development
programmes and women’s empowerment, in the case of generating renewable energy, must be analysed
regarding their implications for critical understanding. The Moroccan case is framed by a ‘win-win-win’
situation for all actors involved and therefore narratively legitimised. The deployment of colonial
legal instruments for territorial dispossession are used to acquire the land necessary for national green
energy production. Karen Rignall [3] used Huber’s analyses of the foundation role of oil in shaping the
“ecology of the forces of capital” [42] to extend it to renewable energy. She cleverly used it to explain
the relationship between politics and solar power infrastructure. Huber points out, and supports,
the above-mentioned correlation between capital accumulation and deprivation of the locals [42].
The discourse in favour of renewable energy, which supports existing ways of life as well as the
production and consumption of (green) energy with the promise of capital accumulation for certain
people, will reproduce those forms of power inequalities and capitalist ecologies in ways similar to
Huber’s analysis of oil and ways of life [42]. Deprivation of the local people affects the most vulnerable
in society (see Reference [43,44]). The region in the area of the solar project the author researched is
known to be one of the poorest in Morocco. As analogous to biofuel projects (see Reference [3,42]),
the land in this case study is used for green energy production. Regions such as the stone desert in
Morocco, used for generating renewable energy for industrialised economies, are not only ecological
but also political. The complex land tenure system in these regions, influenced by former colonial
power and ‘traditional’ laws, traditional property rights, and use rights, facilitates land transfers
from marginalised populations, such as pastoralists and nomadic groups, and forecloses their claims
regarding the impact of, or benefits from, renewable energy projects (see Reference [45]).
There is a tendency to make ‘worthless’ and ‘unused’ land available for investment (see
Reference [46,47]), which helps to legitimise investments, in this case for renewable solar energy,
in order to facilitate land acquisition in rural, mostly Amazigh, regions in Morocco. In other words,
the land used, such as in the research area, is constructed in narratives as unproductive, as ‘empty’,
and unused, to pave the way for renewable energy investments that will give it value, creating new
opportunities for jobs in marginal Amazigh zones. Reality shows that access to new opportunities is not
usually for local people but rather for (elite) capital accumulation (see Reference [3,43,44]). As stated by
Karen Rignall [3], the land surrounding Ouarzazate appears at first sight to be unused, and is described
in the national and international narratives as ‘wasteland’; this is also because extensive pastoralism
and also nomadism have long been considered unproductive land use by Moroccan policymakers [3].
Following the argument of Ferguson’s (1994) anti-politics machine, it may be suggested that LSLA
projects can hide the fact that they increase the ability of control and bargaining power of the state,
local leaders, NGOs, and companies (see Reference [7]). Local leaders, NGOs, companies, and the
state gain access to, and control over, the rural economy, which can then reduce local options and
bargaining power, especially for women. The article stresses the effects of change under large-scale
land investments for green energy development. It is not a question of whether solar energy production
or the generation of energy through renewable energy resources is good or bad, nor for or against
investments. There is also not simply ambiguity in local people’s perceptions of the Noor Ouarzazate
solar project, and also of all projects in Morocco generating green energy. People do want to be part
of fight against climate change and global warming by both helping to reduce CO2 emissions and
generating energy in a really green manner, but therein lies the dilemma.
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Abstract: The topic of large-scale land acquisition (LSLA) has attracted wide interest in the literature
and the media. However, there is little work on the gendered institutional changes and gendered
impacts on common pool resources (CPR) due to LSLA. The aim of this paper is to address
these impacts. This is done by discussing data from participatory research (using the methods
of participatory observation, semi-structured and narrative interviews, biographies, focus group
discussions, value chain analysis, and household questionnaires) on a forestry plantation operated
by the British investor, the New Forests Company (NFC) in the Kilolo district, in the Iringa
region. The institutional arrangements regarding different land-related common pool resources
from pre-colonial times until the arrival of this investment will be shown. Furthermore, how these
arrangements have changed over time and since the LSLA is presented. Then, the effects on men’s
and women’s access to CPR and, thus, the impacts on their capacities to perform their reproductive
work and resilience will be addressed. Furthermore, the paper focuses on how different stakeholders
in the land deal (the investor, the government, different local people) make use of these different
institutions to push through their own interests regarding the land. Finally, the paper looks at
collective compensation payments (such as monetary compensation and jobs) and forms of corporate
social responsibility (CSR) schemes, and how they are perceived emically. It is argued that the LSLA
in this case clearly grabs land and land-related common pool resources that were previously held
in common. Women, such as daughters, sisters, and wives, had specific access and property rights
to these. Thus, the paper concludes that this grabbing lowers women’s resilience and deprives
them of important resources for their livelihoods, and for food and cash production at critical times.
CSR programmes and compensation rarely reach women and are, for them, an anti-politics machine,
hiding the grabbing processes, and impacting the poorest of the poor, while the company uses a
development discourse to legitimise its activities. In fact, the people perceive the investment as
trapping them in underdevelopment.
Keywords: large scale land acquisitions; gender; institutions; common pool resources; common
property; land tenure transformations; corporate social responsibility; resilience; social anthropology
1. Introduction
Much has been written on the impacts of large-scale land acquisitions (LSLA) in Tanzania [1,2]
and Africa in general [3,4]. However, the impact on the commons, especially the commons to which
women mainly have access, and issues of resilience1[5]. have rarely been addressed and, when they
have, not from a long-term social anthropological perspective [6]. Scant literature in academia and
1 I define resilience as the ability of a person and/or a household to restore basic livelihood capacities after a shock.
Such capacities need to be available over time and remain high for the unit (household, community) to be resilient.
Land 2020, 9, 122; doi:10.3390/land7040122 www.mdpi.com/journal/land209
Land 2020, 9, 122
mainstream literature focuses on identifying the scope and scale for action in already historically
transformed gender relationships that are now, in addition, being challenged under the context of
large-scale land acquisitions. Doss et al. [6] for example, point at a gap in the literature on LSLAs
regarding the impacts on local livelihoods and gendered land tenure systems, as well as how women
react to and/or cope with changes due to LSLAs. The literature on LSLA in Tanzania also misses out in
addressing especially the disaggregated gendered impacts on the household-level (intra-household
level) and the larger clan level (inter-household level) from a broader new institutionalist perspective.
In this paper, I discuss data from my research on large-scale land acquisitions of a forest plantation
made by the British-based investor, the New Forests Company (NFC), in the two villages Makungu and
Ukwega, in the Kilolo district of the Iringa region. The paper shows how large-scale land acquisitions
consolidate commonly owned land (i.e., create common land enclosures) and impede access to this land
and to land-related common pool resources (e.g., fruit trees, grasses), to which women previously had
specific access and/or property rights, due to their own family clan affiliation and/or their husbands’
family clan.
Furthermore, I will outline how this affects women’s resilience and ability to perform reproductive
work, which means looking after their children and relatives in need, such as the elderly, disabled,
or sick persons. This paper also looks at the land deal processes and shows how the investor and
the government, as well as different local people mainly within family clans, select from a plurality
of institutions (institution shopping; for rules activation see [7]) to legitimate the deals or to make
them profitable.
Finally, the paper focuses on collective compensation payments (such as monetary compensation
and jobs) and forms of corporate social responsibility (CSR) schemes, which are supposed to compensate
for the loss of the old common pool resources. However, I will show that CSR programmes are an
asset for investors to increase acceptance and their international reputations, while these projects often
fail to distribute the gains to former commoners, especially to women and less powerful local actors.
Thus, this paper looks at the gender aspects that play a role in CSR programmes and how
these impact outcomes of LSLA—such as commons and resilience grabbing—differently for men
and women. I argue that the LSLA provokes different types of land and commons grabbing on
different social scales, specifically: (a) pure commons grabbing by the company of community and
clan land; (b) internal grabbing within clans common land, meaning between households and lineages;
and (c) grabbing processes within the households between husband and wife or brother and sisters.
These forms of grabs lead to different degrees of competition regarding landed resources and the
promise of access to CSR projects and other forms of compensations: on a macro-level, this is between
investors and local communities; on a meso-level, this is between the clans/village communities;
and on a micro-level/inter-household level, this is within families, competition about cash flows on an
intra-household level, and within families and clans. This multi-scale process has negative impacts on
women, involving increased workload, increased dependency of wives on their husbands, less access
to cash, as well as lower security and reduced bargaining power of daughters and sisters when they
get married. Because LSLA processes are directed towards men, land and related resources—such as
fruit trees, which provided women with a source of cash controlled independently by them—have
decreased or are no longer available, and land is mostly controlled by men. This negatively affects their
resilience in terms of food security, 2[8] with an imbalance between gender and generation based on
these power relations. Furthermore, compensation in the form of money and CSR projects that could
balance the loss of access to the old commons is regarded by women as being insufficient, because
there is a lack of transparency related to payout schemes, the distribution of scarce jobs available for
2 I adopt the following definition of food security from the FAO: ‘Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and
economic access to sufficient safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.’
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local people is generally extremely low for women, and the development and infrastructure projects
are badly adapted to local needs.
The process of LSLA in Tanzania is not new and goes back to colonial times; however, the intensity
and range have increased since the mid-1980s, following the political and economic shift to neoliberalism.
It was increased even more by the so-called Triple F crisis (food, finance, and fuel) in September 2008
with the biofuel industry as the prime driving force behind the more recent LSLAs in Tanzania [9,10].
LSLAs have long been portrayed as win–win situations and green scenarios by global powers such as
the World Bank, which are based on a neoliberal discourse to attract investment and development
to the country [9,10]. Nevertheless, the Tanzanian government has also been actively attracting
foreign investors under the current neoliberal order. Various laws, policies, and initiatives have
been enacted or adapted, and a National Land Bank was established to accommodate private land
investments, leading to an estimated area of around 200,000 to 1,000,000 ha of leased land [11] (p. 250).
Very recent investments have focused on food and forestry production after many biofuel projects did
not materialise or failed.
These LSLAs have impacted the local use of former common-pool resources on the land, especially
agricultural land, water, pasture, and forests for subsistence and cash. This happens in the context of
village common land formally protected by the Village Land Act of 1999, which respects customary
land rights and, thus, should legally protect common property. The land transfer is a lengthy
procedure involving several institutions from the local to the national level, including consultation
and compensation of affected villagers [11]. The village assembly needs to agree, documented by
village meeting minutes [12,13]. This has to be approved by the Land Commissioner on behalf of the
President (ibid.). The village council needs to make recommendations about the planned investment
to the Village Assembly, which can either reject or approve the land transfer in the case of land sizes
below 250 ha. In cases of land areas above 250 ha, the Village Assembly cannot reject or approve the
land transfer, but only make recommendations, while the President makes the decision. He can decide
to expropriate landholders [13]. However, many authors criticize the implementation of the land laws
and the procedures for land acquisitions therein - state officials on different levels are said to ignore
regulations and laws [14], and community consent to the land deals is only considered to a limited
extent [3] (p. 909). Thus, as is also shown by this paper shows, formal legal institutions do not provide
security for local people and, under current commercialisation and privatisation pressures, they do this
even less for women. On the contrary, different actors, from local men to central government, district
government, and the investors, activate different rules of the game to grab women’s rights to common
pool resources and thus reduce their resilience.
2. Theoretical and Methodological Background
This paper follows a similar theoretical logic to other papers I have published (see [15]) and is
based on a research project on LSLA and gender in Africa [16]. Thus, a new institutionalism perspective
in social anthropology [17,18] is the basis of the background of this paper. The paper focuses on actors
and looks at how external effects shape the internal bargaining power of actors and gender ideologies,
and then shapes the institutional choice of—and distributional effects for—different actors. In the
context of LSLA and gender, this means discussing the context of external changes (LSLA), which raise
the value of land and, consequently, influence bargaining power in gender relations, the ideologies
that justify these relations, and the choice of gender-specific institutions related to resource governance.
This paper examines institutional transformations driven by change in the relative price of land due to
the LSLA (changes in the value of land, rise of the relative price of land), which lead powerful actors
to select from a plurality of institutions. These institutions can include rules and laws such as land
acts, property rights, and regulations (see [17,18]), such as the 1999 Land Act [13], the 1999 Village
Land Act [12], and the 2009 Water Resources Management Act [19], as well as local customary land
rights, among others. The institutions employ ideologies through discourses and narratives that seek
to legitimise land acquisitions in specific contexts. A new institutionalism perspective, combined with
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theoretical insights on the governance of common-pool resources (CPRs) (see also [18]), also looks at the
impacts that the institution shopping process [4,7,16] has on people with less power in negotiation, who
are often women. Additionally, it shows how new norms and institutions emerge and are selected by
powerful actors. This process has implications for women’s and men’s previous access to common-pool
resources (CPRs). Thus, it shows how institutions change, but also how these CPRs were used and
governed before investment and are now being replaced by new forms of governance at the expense of
women’s access to vital resources. Furthermore, neo-Marxist approaches that focus on the household
mode of production, the reproduction of the workforce, and gender relations of exploitation (see [20])
indicate that the exploitation of women is increasing under the conditions of commons, and especially
commons grabbing from females. However, many companies also claim that they bring betterment via
investment based on the neoliberal order, especially for women who will profit from payments, jobs,
corporate social responsibility (CSR) programmes, etc. This paper will show if these are truly projects
that compensate for the loss of commons (land and land-related common pool resources) in a way that
facilitates development, especially for women, or if women are facing an anti-politics machine in a
gendered form, hiding commons and resilience grabbing from women.
The data for this paper were collected during several months of fieldwork from March 2015 to
December 2015, April 2016 to December 2016, and February 2017 to October 2017, as well as a short
period in August and September 2019. The scientific approach taken by this project is based on
cooperation between social anthropology, human geography, and gender studies. I mainly used the
following mixed research methods, and the data were cross-verified using data triangulation [21]:
empirical data collection from participant observation, followed by open and semi-structured
interviews that were conducted with members of different interest groups, as well as experts from the
government and NGOs. Furthermore, biographies, narrative interviews, and focus group discussions
focusing on the life histories of local actors provided a basis for obtaining emic views on land use,
the land investment process, and its consequences for gender relations and institutional change
(also regarding gender relations). Furthermore, value chain analysis and household questionnaires
were used to obtain economic (household budgets, income, expenses) and demographic data. In
total, 40 semi-structured in-depth interviews, 38 household questionnaires, 8 focus group discussions,
and 15 narrative/biographic interviews, complemented by numerous informal conversations and
structured and unstructured participant observations, were conducted. Between March 2015 and
December 2015, I started with more unstructured informal conversations and participant observations,
and then proceeded with more structured interviews and questionnaires from April 2016. The value
chain analysis I conducted in February and March 2017.
3. National Historical, Socio-Economic, and Political–Legal Background and Institutional Changes
from Pre-Colonial to Current Times
In order to understand today’s investments and their impact on resilience for women, I will outline
the historical institutional changes regarding land and CPRs from a gender perspective, because the
actual investment is based on past institutional changes, and its outcomes cannot be understood without
this background (see also [15] for a longer version of this section). In pre-colonial times, Tanzania was
politically structured and organised into different chiefdoms comprised of diverse ethnic groups. Thus,
resource rights and responsibilities regarding land and related common pool resources (CPR), such as
wildlife, water, forests, pastures, and fisheries were in the hands of different local groups—based
on kinship, clan membership, or other forms of belonging—who held/owned and managed these
resources under complex systems of rules and norms (institutions) within their territories, usually
under a common property regime, which was based on the connectedness of different resources [18].
Women had access and usually secondary or indirect rights to these CPRs through kinship ties, marital
status, and personal relations, and based on gendered roles and responsibilities in reproduction and
production, which defined women primarily as mothers and carers; thus, their rights were connected
to food production [15,22–24].
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The Germans colonised Tanzania in 1895 and, later, after World War I, the British moved
in [25–27]. They introduced an export-oriented, commercialised agricultural economy. During this
time, the management of land and related CPRs became increasingly controlled by the colonial state,
with land vested in the State and Tanzanians having only the use rights for the land they occupied.
Women’s access to and control over CPRs and negotiation power was affected, because customary law
was weakened, and colonial and indirect rule fostered men’s authority over women [23]. Men were
made responsible for tax payment and, thus, the notion of the male as the ‘breadwinner’ and the
female as dependent housewife was reinforced [ibid.]. The cash men earned largely lowered women’s
bargaining power in the household, as well as men’s respect for women’s work for the household,
because women did not have the same possibilities as men to earn cash [ibid.].
The United Republic of Tanzania was established in 1964 [26,27]. At that time, a kind of African
Socialism (Ujamaa) was installed [28]. Two-thirds of the rural population from different ‘ethnic’ and
local origins were mixed up and (re)settled in uniformly structured villages [14], where communal
farms were cultivated by groups of village families [29]. Traditional leadership was abolished and,
instead, new village governments were introduced (ibid.). Common property institutional regimes
to manage CPRs were ‘legislated out of existence’, and CPRs were controlled and managed as state
property by centralised state management agencies [18,28–30]. All the resources of Tanzania, including
land, were declared as belonging to all Tanzanians; land was redistributed, and pre-independence land
rights were abolished [18,28,30]. Women did not have equal access to land, because normally the head
of a family, which was usually a man, was allocated one piece of land for the family [31].
In the mid-1980s, the Tanzanian government signed economic stabilisation agreements and
reform programmes with the IMF and the World Bank, with the aim of reducing the role of the state
in the economy, and opening up more space for the private sector after an economic crisis in the
1970s [14]. Private investment and property rights, including the promotion of foreign investment,
were encouraged in the era of President Mwinyi (1985–1995). From the latter half of the 1990s,
the Tanzanian state began the adaptation of the institutional and legal frameworks and, in 1997,
the Tanzanian Investment Act was ratified. It established the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC), which
has a mandate to grant derivative land rights to foreign investors, to provide a certificate of incentive
(which is a basic document for land processing and land allocation), and to establish a land bank [32].
A new land policy was presented to and accepted by the Parliament in 1995, based on two new land
laws, which were enacted in 1999: the Land Act and the Village Land Act [12,13], which provide for
the formal procedures for land application.
These land laws, which actually present a new legal pluralistic setting, divide land into three
categories: reserved, village, and general land [13,14] (p. 42)3. The Village Land Act respects customary
land rights and legally empowers village governments (i.e., village councils) to manage village land
under customary law on behalf of the village assemblies [12]; however, the land still ultimately rests in
state ownership [13] (p. 36).
Under Jakaya Kikwete, who entered presidential office in 2005, foreign investment was further
emphasised, and land became more valuable locally as its relative price increased. The Kilimo Kwanza
(Agriculture First, Transforming Agriculture) Initiative, launched in 2009, promotes, for example,
large-scale commercialisation, bringing legal and institutional change, in order to prepare the ground
for foreign investment in large-scale agricultural ventures, emphasising, for example, the need to
amend the Village Land Act of 1999 [14,33].
3 Village land can be further sub-divided into three categories: communal village land is to be used for public purposes, such as
schools and public markets or grazing areas. Individual land is occupied or used by an individual or family or group of
persons under customary law. The third category is spare land for future communal or individual use, and is sometimes
referred to as reserve land.
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Women’s traditional rights to common pool resources and, thus, tenure and food security,
have been increasingly undercut since then and, at the same time, heavy demands on their labour
force continued, leading to coping strategies such as relying more and more on non-timber forest
products (NTFPs) and other sources for earning cash, providing options for resilience. In current legal
pluralistic contexts, such as in Tanzania, men and women use both different versions of customary
and statutory systems to support their claims to land [34]. This can limit women’s access to land and
land-related resources. In the context of changing relative prices of land, this legal pluralistic setting
provides a huge challenge because men, as well as government actors, are trying to sell land, because
investors are becoming interested; thus, these men try to use and manipulate the different institutional
provisions to their advantage. This is the context which, for women, means a weakened but still,
somehow, working position in the power fabric; investment is introduced into this context, and makes
these power relations starker, or changes them as cash flows in, as I will show in the following sections.
4. The Case Study Area: Local Ethnographic, Economic, and Ecological Background before Investment
The forestry plantation of the New Forests Company (NFC) is located in the Kilolo district,
in the Iringa region in the Southern Highlands of Tanzania (see Figure 1). It was installed on land
that the NFC acquired in the nine villages of Kidabaga, Idete, Isele, Kising’a, Ukwega, Ipalamwa,
Magome, Kiwalamo, and Makungu, which are located within the three wards of Dabaga, Idete, and
Ukwega. These villages lie in the highland zone (with an altitude that ranges between 1600–2700 m
above sea level), with a moderate climate and mean temperature of 15◦C [35,36]. Rainfall ranges
from between 1000–1600 mm per year [36]. However, long-term climate records for the Southern
Highlands of Tanzania show that the climate of the region has been changing with a steady increase
of temperatures over the last 40 to 50 years, with a higher frequency of droughts during the last few
decades, as well as a large inter-annual variability in rainfall [37,38]. However, the people in the area,
as I will show later, have adapted to these conditions, and have developed measures such as CPR
institutional management in order to be more resilient.
Most of the people in the area belong to the Wahehe, who perceive themselves as indigenous to the
region, and to the immigrant Wabena ethnic groups, who originate from the Njombe region [11,36,39].
Both groups are patrilineally and patrilocally organised, and mostly Christian (ibid.), but polygamy is
common in the area [40]. However, due to high immigration rates, the population in the Iringa region
is now generally ethnically very mixed [39]; the area is home to some minorities of other ethnic origins,
such as the Wakinga, Waudzungwa, and Wasagara.
Small-scale agriculture is the most important activity in the area, although there is also some
livestock-keeping—mainly chicken and some pigs, goats, sheep, very few cows—and some people
keep fish in small fish ponds in the rivers down in the valleys ([39], own research between March and
July 2015, 2016, 2017). In 2011, the Kilolo district was home to 54,400 agricultural households, each with
an average of 4.5 people [41]. Farm sizes are, on average, 1.6 ha per household [36]. Kilolo is a very hilly
district; cultivation is practised on valley bottom farms known as ‘vinyungu’ (a Kihehe word for valley
and/or garden) in the dry season and on uphill slope farms in the rainy season, which falls in a single
season from November through May ([40]; own research between March and July 2015). The vinyungu
are the more productive areas, because they are permeated by different sizes of streams and the fertile
soils are not flushed out like those on the hills; these are therefore preferred for agriculture (ibid.,
author’s fieldnotes June 2015). These are red/yellow, well-drained, and highly weathered and leached
clay soils (ibid.). Farmers practice crop rotation and shifting cultivation. They first slash, then burn,
and thus fertilise, and then till the plots. Agricultural work is done by household labour, normally
involving both men and women. In between or on the agricultural plots, there are often small areas
with communal and private natural and planted forests, with trees producing timber and non-timber
forest products (NTFPs), such as fruits or leaves used as food or medicine; people also plant different
kinds of fruit trees there. Some trees are left for water conservation purposes. In the context of climate
change, people are increasingly relying on NTFPs, such as wild mushrooms, wild fruits, and wild
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vegetables for food, health, and income security [38,40], but the planted fruit trees also produce NTPFs.
Many households are also involved in the planting of timber as savings. There is also temporary
out-migration, especially involving young men looking for employment in forestry plantations in
other regions.
Figure 1. Map of the study area [15].
Institutions for the management of land and other CPRs, including tenure practices, are highly
complex and very specific in the area. However, the following general land tenure tendencies exist:
legally, most of the land falls in the category of village land, which is held in common by the community.
This is under village management, and the village councils are empowered to manage village land
under customary law on behalf of the village assemblies (the Village Land Act of 1999 respects
customary land rights). Within the community, land is mostly a communal property of the clan,
with clan heads and elders being empowered to allocate land and distribute land use rights, among
which there are more communal (within the clan) and more individual rights (land for agriculture).
This means people’s rights to land are quite individualised rights, but still embedded in clan and
lineage common property institutions, or, in other words, they are still the collective assets of the family,
nuclear or extended (clan), i.e., they are family common property (FCP) or family lands, but with group
members having specific individualised rights within them. Among the Wahehe and the Wabena,
women are entitled to inherit land from their fathers. When a girl marries, she usually moves to the
area of her husbands’ clan, where she is given a piece of land for food production and leaves her land
in her home area. Very often, the brothers then take care of the sister’s land.
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5. The New Forests Company’s Investment in the Kilolo District
The Lukosi plantation, planted with pine and eucalyptus, is in the Kilolo district. In 2013,
the NFC had already acquired land from seven villages. However, the NFC still wants more: mainly,
more connected pieces of land. Thus, the NFC is still approaching new landholders to acquire more
land [11,35], own research. To date, the NFC has planted a total of 2,125,671 ha of eucalyptus and
pine trees (Kilolo District Council Strategic Plan), and has acquired more than 8000 ha of land [11],
own research. In Makungu, the NFC has acquired around 2000 ha of land, and in Ukwega around
350 ha.
The following section demonstrates how the land was acquired and how the deals are perceived
emically. This is important to know in order to see how the resilience capacities and the positions
of local women and men within communities and clans are affected. It also shows which different
institutions are used by the investor (institution shopping), the government, and local people alike to
support their land interests, and which ideologies, discourses, and narratives4[42]. (i.e., modernity,
development, poverty) are used to legitimise these investments. In the final part, the CSR projects and
monetary and job compensation are presented, and the local perspective is discussed.
6. Gendered Emic Perceptions of Land Deal Processes
6.1. Local land and CPR constellations in the context of the NFC Investment
The Tanzanian land laws stipulate that foreign investors can only acquire land which belongs
in the category of general land. This is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Lands and Human
Settlements Development. Seeing as most land in Tanzania belongs to the category of village land, it is
necessary to transform its status to general land before becoming accessible for investors. The village
assembly needs to agree, documented by meeting minutes. This has to be approved by the Land
Commissioner on behalf of the President. Furthermore, the involved parties have to agree on the
compensation, which should be based on market value, estimated by a government expert, and pay
should include both the price of the land and unexhausted improvements, such as crops and/or trees).
The investor then obtains rights of occupancy or derivative rights, and leases ranging from periods of
5 to 99 years [11–13].
The New Forests Company have owned land in Makungu and Ukwega since 2013 on uphill areas,
as well as in valley bottom areas. After a first acquisition round, when the NFC tried to obtain village
reserve land from villages, it moved to mainly approaching individual landholders. This land belongs
to a category of land I call ‘individual’. However, it is land that an individual or a group of individuals
occupy as a member of a family or clan, and is managed under customary law; it is mostly inherited
land, but it is embedded in common property institutions. Thus, it also includes land that individuals
purchased or rented from other villagers, or that was allocated to them by the village council. The NFC
has acquired granted land rights of occupancy for 99 years from villagers with a customary right
of occupancy.
As the investor entered the game, the value of the land rose, due to the investor’s interest.
This created land scarcity and more powerful actors—especially men as fathers, husbands, and
brothers, and the company itself—benefit from their higher power to sell and buy land. The less
powerful members of families or larger groups, especially women, who have customary entitlement to
the commons, lose out. Thus, depending on the perspective, position, and interest of the involved
actors in the land deal, the narrative of the land acquisition can roughly be divided into ‘voluntary’
and ‘involuntary’ sale—in other words, loss of, or forced eviction from the land. This has resulted in
4 ‘Ideologies are considered here as worldviews that give major orientation and explain how the world is perceived. From a Marxist
perspective, the term is of importance in analysing the legitimacy of actions taken in both global and local contexts. Ideologies also
embody discourses, referring to how meaning and orientation are produced in a coherent way in spoken or written language, as well as
narratives, referring to how a specific situation is logically described and explained.’
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different types of land grabbing and levels of competition, creating a series of conflicts with different
actors employing different discourses and institutions to legitimise the transfer of land to the company.
The narratives of the villagers clearly show the support of the investors’ undertakings of acquiring land
in the villages in Kilolo by the district, as in most narratives, people mentioned that the investor came
with the district that was motivating the villagers to sell their land to the investor. Narratives from
different villagers indicate that different people within the village reacted differently to the investors’
request for land from the villagers when he came in 2012. Reactions roughly can be divided into,
on one side, more suspicious people who did not sell, because they did not trust the investor—more
educated people or more politically active villagers are among these people. Then there were people
who did not have any land or not enough land to sell, and people who did not want to sell because
they valued their land more than money. On the other hand there were people who had larger areas,
some of them claiming it was “unused” land, which is, however, contested by some of their family and
clan members as will be shown below.
6.2. Internal Grabbing:
In several cases—which I term ‘internal grabbing’, and can be categorised as voluntary or
involuntary, depending on the position of the actors involved—there were complaints from members
of different clans about the clan or family head who sold the land without the involvement of the
rest of the clan. Sometimes, the clan head sold in cooperation with his sons, omitting the female
members from the negotiation process and sale decisions. Sometimes, sons sold in cooperation with,
or on behalf of, elderly fathers who were, according to them, too old to make decisions. Because
the land rights and land practices in the area are still very much influenced by Ujamaa, this context
was used in legitimation discourses and created tensions: on one side, some people use a ‘wasteland’
discourse, saying that land lost during Ujamaa is not used anymore, because it is far away from their
settlement area, and became reserve land within the context of the family/clan, because prices were low.
However, on the other side, many people still say that they want to keep the land for their own or
future generations’ use. Many people—oftentimes women—still claim to use it. Thus, with the arrival
of the investor land rights to land held in common from before Ujamaa was contested, an internal
competition about the land started. Exclusion of the sisters, wives, daughters, and mothers was often
based on arguments pointing towards inheritance rules, such as it being the clan land of the husbands’
clan—thus, the wives or sisters have no say in family land matters, because they live with the families
of their husbands, and the land now belongs to the clan of the husband. Also, the rights of daughters
to land left in the paternal home area upon marriage began to be contested, especially by brothers
who sold their sisters’ land and legitimatised the sale by challenging—i.e., denying—the customary
rule of Wahehe and Wabena daughters as having the right to inherit land from their fathers. Thus,
this undermines women’s security, resilience, and bargaining power in their marriage. Women often
claimed that they only got to know about the sale of the land after the land had been sold. Or they were
informed before, but had no decision-making power, and some women just also agreed because they
feared the men would sell anyway, so at least if they agree they would get some of the compensation,
otherwise they would be overpowered by the men anyway. In the narratives of some younger women,
it was the elderly people—men and women—who sat together, first among themselves, and then
later together with the investor, to make all the arrangements for selling the land, omitting younger
members of the clan—men and women—suspecting the investor bribed the old people. Regarding
these deals with NFC, most female respondents within the families and the clan said that the NFC had
first dealt with the fathers and the sons, mostly the oldest sons and then younger sons. Many women as
sisters and daughters were totally left out, however, at the very bottom of the hierarchy in the decision
making were the wives of sons whose clan, mostly the head of the clan, had sold the larger clan land,
especially in pre-Ujamaa areas. Women as daughters and sisters, or as wives in cases where their own
husband sold the land, had, in some cases, a little bit more say. There are also cases where women
lost land on both sides—in their own clan and on the side of their husband’s clan. In the narrative of
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many women, the deals were closed between the men and the investor in the presence of the village
government (Village Council and VEO) and the district. Thus, very often, the village assembly, of which
women are part, was not involved or was bypassed. Furthermore, women complained that, because
the village council mainly is composed of men, with female members having little say, the Village
Council supported the claims of their fellow men. In cases where there were village assembly meetings,
mostly only after the deals had already been closed, in the narrative of many women, they had little to
no say in opposing the deals, before and after the deals were closed. They felt overpowered in the
meetings, and often already muzzled at home before the assemblies took place, even though there
were women who tried to complain, but were sidelined. Women coming from landless and land-poor
families, who depended on products produced on land of other villagers that sold or lost land, were
also at the very bottom of the land deal negotiation process, as they, and/or their family, did not sell
land themselves, but depended on others who sold or lost land.
6.3. External Land Grabbing
For women, the most important cases are those of ‘fertile bottom valley land grabbing’
(vinyungu land), which I term ‘external land grabbing’; this is straightforward grabbing of commons
and is involuntary in all cases. Because the company was interested in the land, the district government
started to implement and legitimise evictions of villagers from valley bottom areas. It used the 1999
Land Act and the 1999 Village Land Act [12,13], which purportedly respect ‘customary land rights’.
Specifically, the government used the institutional element of The 1999 Land Act, which implied that
all land in Tanzania is public land, and is vested in the person who has power of making a final
decision [13] (p. 36). Also, the company used existing laws, making reference to and activating Article
34 of the 2009 Water Resources Management Act [19] (p. 355). This article stipulates prohibition of
human activities near water resources, which primarily includes vinyungu land. The district did not
enforce this article until the investor became a powerful actor and a good taxpayer in the district.
As soon as the NFC had acquired the upland areas, it started to prohibit villagers from using land in
the vinyungus bordering the purchased upland areas. People were not compensated for the loss of the
vinyungus, because, as legally stipulated by the Water Resources Act, it is illegal for people to use the
vinyungus. This was a backed by the district. Additionally, the investor used environmental discourse
to support its claim, saying that the water source needs to be protected, and the villagers are cutting
down water friendly trees, thus destroying the water source. However, in the context of their local
environmental knowledge, and as part of the institutional setting, the villagers claimed that they know
exactly which trees they can cut and which not to cut to protect the water source. This also reflects
an adaptation to the increasingly unpredictable weather conditions, in which context the vinyungus
become more and more important for production, due to the water sources there. Villagers argue that
the investor is simply afraid of fires, as well as wanting to protect the water source for its own use,
which is why the investor acquired the vinyungus.
7. Gendered Impacts of the Investment on Access to Commons
The land acquisition made by the NFC had several gendered impacts, especially with regard to
access to common pool resources. Most importantly, people lost access to a lot of agricultural land,
the produce from which they used for subsistence and cash generation. In particular, the vinyungus
are the more productive areas where beans are usually planted, and make the people more resilient in
times of unpredictable weather. Beans are the primary cash crop, which brings the most cash income
for women, as the following citation illustrates:
Income from the vinyungu is gone.... The community depended on these vinyungus to get extra income
to get money to educate our children.... Most of these lands in the vinyungus have been purchased and
the investor hasn’t refunded us the money we used to purchase these vinyungus. ...Even the present
village government didn’t help ...yes, the village government didn’t help us in demanding our rights
(Female farmer, Ukwega, 05.10.2015).
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Many people depended on these vinyungus, as I experienced during my field stays and my
observations living within these households. Their loss means the loss of possibilities to earn extra
income to pay school fees, to buy extra food in cases of food scarcity when harvests on subsistence
plots are bad, and to buy fertilisers. Due to the loss of the valley bottom land, food security is now
said to be low. Even though this food shortage impacts the entire family, it mostly affects the mothers
and the wives, who starve, as they give their food to their children, especially between November
and December. This is because they usually harvest maize in June, which lasts until November.
In November/December, they normally harvest the beans in the vinyungus, sell part of it, and buy
maize, because the next maize harvest is not until March.
Generally, the LSLA has led to land scarcity. People do not have enough land to produce enough
food for the whole seasonal cycle and now often have to rent land from others. However, the rented
land often has less acreage and is less productive. Additionally, land rents have increased because of
the investment. People now pay around 30,000 to 40,000 Tsh5 per season per acre, whereas a few years
ago it was half the price. Poorer people especially have difficulties paying the rent. Furthermore, many
move to other villages far away to get land, which increases their workload, because they need to walk
many hours to reach the land and then carry the produce home. This also complicates care work for
women, because they have less time at home to look after the children. Some women also complain
that the long-distance walks, sometimes in the dark late at night, make them more prone to harassment
by men. In addition, many people also stated that since the operation of the plantation has started, i.e.,
the coming of the LSLA, maize production has been lowered in the villages. This raised the maize
price within the villages from 7000 Tsh/18–20 kg to 10,000–13,000 Tsh./18–20 kg. As one farmer stated:
We don’t expect maize this year because, even if those people bring maize from Iringa or Ilula bring
maize, we don’t have the capital from the beans to buy the maize because the beans were lost through
drought in those vinyungus we still have, and because the other vinyungus are gone because of the
investor. (Female farmer, Makungu, 8 October 2015)
Another effect of this loss is that women increasingly start to brew beer with the remaining maize
they have because this gives them a higher income than selling pure maize or flour. This is the only
way to improve their income because they no longer have beans from the vinyungus. Beer brewing is
a very important income strategy for women; they sell a 10l bucket for 10,000 Tsh, but the number
of beer brewers have increased, so there is higher competition, and more men are also entering this
market. However, the number of drinkers is still the same; thus, the market is still the same. Therefore,
it can be said that the LSLA creates increasing competition between men and women for this cash flow.
While the valley-bottom lands are part of communal land and, thus, commons to which women
have individual rights, there are other CPRs at stake with the investment which are important to
women. Women especially complained about losing fruit trees such as lime, avocado, banana, pear, and
Mikuti fruit (which is also a medicinal plant used for fever). Women often control the income from
selling fruit. Fruit are also important for nutrition, because they are a source of vitamins in a food
system that is very much based on starch (maize). Because the small amount of money women earned
by selling fruits is gone, women have become more dependent on their husbands. Men generally have
more other possibilities to earn an income from other jobs, such as carpentry or seasonal work in other
areas, including other forest plantations, whereas women have more care responsibilities than men.
This means that women suffer more because they do not have alternative income possibilities like men,
and this can complicate care when men are away and women cannot ask them for money when it is
needed. They become more and more reliant on other relatives in the family.
5 10,000 Tsh is equivalent to around 4 Euro.
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Another CPR loss is the loss of two kinds of grasses: namely, a thin reed-like grass called Mlulu (sg.)
(Milulu (pl.)), used for making mats and baskets, and Malolo (sg.) (Lilolo (pl.)), which is thicker and
mainly used for thatching roofs. Milulu especially gave women a separate income because it is mainly
women who use it to make baskets and mats.
These losses created by commons grabbing are not just of land but of CPRs; as I have shown,
this lowers the resilience of women for food but also for cash generation. These losses are hardly
compensated for because the benefits proposed by the company (jobs, social services, schools, etc.)
either do not materialise or do not cover the losses of fertile land and related common-pool resources,
as I will outline in the next section.
8. Gendered Access to CSR Projects and Other Compensation Measures
When the investor approached the villages in 2006, its aims were presented as a long list of
benefits, including to ‘give better tree seedlings to villagers’, ‘create 10,000 jobs’, ‘give 300 Tsh million
every year for social services’, such as schools and health, ‘engage in the provision of education, health,
water, etc.’, and to create infrastructure. On the company’s website, it says that Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) is a fundamental aspect of its business model, mainly as a strategy to reduce risks,
because forest plantations are very vulnerable (e.g., fire, illegal harvesting) and long-term investments
bring a return only after several years.
NFC created mainly CSR or community development projects, including income-generation
projects and infrastructure investment, monetary compensation for the acquired land, jobs in the
plantation, a planned outgrower scheme, and taxes and a lease, which they pay to the district.
However, access to these projects consisting of infrastructure, income-generating projects, and jobs
in the plantation, as well as monetary compensation and out-grower schemes, is limited, especially
for women.
Regarding CSR, in terms of infrastructure in some villages, the people are somewhat disappointed,
because there has been less infrastructure development than expected, and it has been slow, while
the impact of the lost land has been immediate. In a few villages, building projects have included
some dispensaries and houses for teachers, dormitories in secondary schools, and latrines for schools.
Roads were also improved, but in Makungu and Ukwega these were mainly the roads connecting the
main road to the plantation, and not to the village settlements.
There is one income-generation project in the form of the provision of beehives, from which
people should be able to obtain an income from selling honey. The NFC gave 21 beehives to three
groups; however, very few hives have bees—for example, one group has nine hives, but only three
have bees. Thus, they have not experienced a good performance. Villagers also asked to put the hives
into the NFC plantation because there are flowers there that attract bees. However, the NFC denied this
request, because they are afraid that people will harvest illegally or make fires. They asked people to
plant sunflowers in their own areas to attract bees, but the people are not educated about beekeeping,
and they need their plots for food production, so they did not plant sunflowers.
In addition to this, many villagers were not aware of the CSR programmes. While the company
highlights its social activity online, it remains unclear to the villagers if development or ‘help’ has
come from the investor in the area, or if a certain project was from the NFC. The company seems to
consider CSR to be a one-way process, even though, according to them, they used PRA methods to
create projects according to needs. Most people in the villages where I lived did not associate any
benefit at all with the investor. They feel rather suppressed in their development due to the lost land,
and they employ an underdevelopment discourse due to the LSLA.
Another benefit the company claims are jobs in the plantation: according to the 2012 census,
the investment-affected wards had a population of 19,982. The sustainability report of 2016 shows that
the company created 548 jobs in 2016. This is very little compared with the population. Furthermore,
very few women have been employed. Among the 78 full-time employees, 65 were men and 13 were
women. Among the 486 employed seasonally, 385 were men and 83 were women (NFC 2016). Mostly
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villagers work in the plantation or in the nurseries, with more women in the nurseries than in the
plantation. However, of the 548 people employed, very few come from affected villages. As mentioned
above, jobs for villagers are mainly seasonal jobs, officially paid on a daily basis with a salary of
6000 Tsh/day. A day has 9 hours and they work 6 days/week. They have three-month contracts, leading
to job insecurity, about which employees complain a lot. People perceive the salary as being too low
compared with the workload involved. Jobs are mainly available during the planting of the seedlings
and the harvesting of the trees. However, there are many years in between (around 5–10 years on
average) and there are only a few jobs in maintenance (such as cutting weeds around the trees, etc.)
during that period.
Furthermore, the NFC claims to have paid monetary compensation for the acquired land, even
though there are still some disputes. The vinyungus, however, were not compensated for, and probably
will not be. Of those who sold voluntarily, many regret this now, saying that they were not aware of
the drawbacks of selling their land and the extent to which they would no longer be able to access it
after it had been sold. They also started to see that the amount they received was very little, and they
used the money very quickly compared with the income they could have earned through their land.
New Forests paid an average of 100,000 Tsh/acre in compensation, which is around 40 EUR This is very
little if you compare it to the income they earned, for example, through the vinyungus. For example,
two acres of land produced three bags of beans, which are sold at 300,000 Tsh per season. One season
has a duration of three months.
In addition, women perceive a high level of nontransparency in payout schemes, especially in
cases where clan heads sold the land without consulting other clan members, especially the female
members of the clan. In these cases, the investor approached the clan heads or elders, who are mostly
men, often through some kind of land broker and the village government, and also issued the payment
through them; these intermediaries would have also skimmed off some of the profit. Many clan
members say that they do not know how much the elders received in total; many wives say that they
do not know how much their husbands received, because it is the land of the husband’s clan. Many
sisters do not know the exact price of the land they sold and received nothing or much less money
than their brothers for the sold clan land, which points at privatisation of the commons in the form of
money. There is generally a tendency for wives not to be involved in the land deals; many women
expressed that, because most of the land was inherited clan land of the husband’s clan, to which they
only had usufruct rights of occupancy, they had no right to interfere or to take part in the decision.
Last but not least, the company’s CSR package features outgrower schemes: There are plans to
combine the plantation program with the adjacent communities in the form of out-grower schemes.
Recently, this has started to motivate people to grow trees on their own land in order to be able to buy
seedlings and trees from them later on. In March 2017, the company started to distribute seedlings
to the villagers for free, and they also checked the plots where people started to plant the seedlings.
However, they have not entered into formal contracts with people to date. At the moment, people are
happy about the seedlings, even though there are complaints that there were not enough seedlings
distributed for all the villagers.
9. Discussion and Conclusions
This case shows that women in the case of the NFC LSLA are affected differently by the companies’
land investment than men: women lose access to land and other important common pool resources
(e.g., fruit trees, Milolo grass). This impacts their ability to fulfil their care work in a negative way.
If compensation occurs, it is mostly only men who are compensated. This impacts food security
negatively and creates inter-generational and gender imbalances. It is mostly the mothers who suffer
because the LSLA lowers food production and production of beans, fruits, and grasses that generate
cash, which is used to buy food, health, and education services.
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Furthermore, the investment increases relative prices for land previously used by women.
Fathers and brothers dispose of land without involving other clan or family members; women (wives,
daughters and sisters), in particular, are left out. The legal pluralistic context, including pre-Ujamaa
contexts, leads to institution shopping of the more powerful local actors, who are mostly men.
Furthermore, payout schemes are nontransparent, and the investors trades on the legal institutional
framework with the help of the district; thus, by using the Village Land Act and the Water Protection
Act, the NFC grabs the land in the very narrow sense of the term, providing no compensation payments
and minimal job opportunities, especially for women.
As pointed out by neo-Marxist approaches, this further negatively impacts women, involving
increased workload (see [20]. This is due to the fact that women need to look for alternative plots for
agriculture, which often are located in further away villages, and that they need to intensify work on
the remaining plots, as well as work as labourers on other people’s plots to cope with the lost access
to land, due to the LSLA. The capacity to fulfil their reproductive duties is hampered because the
land investment reduces access to CPR to produce food and generate cash. Thus, wives become more
dependent on their husbands, as they lose the resource base that gave them a certain freedom of action.
Furthermore, as shown by the new institutional approach, the LSLA leads to land scarcity and an
increase of relative prices because it triggers more internal, albeit smaller, land acquisitions by domestic
investors, adding to land scarcity. Women are increasingly marginalised and it becomes harder for
them to access even less fertile land.
Historical changes from pre-colonial settings, where women had rights to clan commons; to colonial
times, where losses started to occur; to independence, where a legal pluralistic setting between so-called
customary and state laws emerge;, to changes from socialistic (Ujamaa) to neoliberal (investment laws)
structures and conservation laws (Water Resources Management Act) led to institutional changes in
the area where the land investment led to land scarcity and grabbing, which were legitimated by the
more powerful on all levels (national and district level, company level, clan level, and household level).
Women are, in most cases, at the bottom of that process, and have very little say, and not enough
bargaining power to change that.
To conclude, I argue that this case clearly shows how land and land-related common pool resources
previously held as common property—to which women as daughters, sisters, and wives had access—is
grabbed by the investment. This furthermore leads to lowering women’s resilience because they are
more vulnerable to the loss of these common pool resources, which are vital to their livelihoods, and for
food and cash in times of crisis and high expenditures. Their access to bottom valley land and all other
land-related common pool resources needed to make a living are curtailed, while they experience an
increased workload to a) perform reproductive work; b) produce subsistence foodstuff; and c) generate
cash income for their children, the old, and themselves. CSR programmes and compensation do not
reach women and are, for them, an anti-politics machine, hiding the grabbing processes, which hit the
poorest of the poor, while the company uses a development discourse to legitimise its activities.
During my stay, there were no women trying to solve this situation, because they were too
preoccupied dealing with men as fathers, brothers, and husbands performing what I call ‘internal
family or household grabbing’. However, they certainly claimed in a counter-discourse that the
company does not bring development, but heralds the loss of their resources and livelihoods. This can
be termed as one kind of a ‘weapon of the weak’. However some women tried to complain but were
muzzled by their family members before or after the deals took place, and when they complained
to village governments they often were told that they have to deal with this within the families and
clans, as it is family and clan land that was at stake, and mostly not land that belonged to the whole
village. With regard to the vinyungus some women, but also men, at the beginning went stealthily to
the vinyungus to cultivate them at night, until they were stopped by the district. In 2019, people had
managed to get back access to some of the vinyungus they had lost, because they continuously went to
complain to the village government, claiming that as they could not use the vinyungus, food security
was severely endangered. It remains to be seen for how long this agreement lasts. Furthermore,
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during my presence in the village, women started to be more and more curious about their rights, and
started to think about possibilities to claim back their land, for example to build groups of affected and
excluded women to inquire their rights at the village office. This realization came with the loss of land
and related CPR and its implications, but also with my presence in the villages and my asking again
and again about women’s rights to land and common pool resources.
It remains to be seen if women react in a more organized way to these grabbings on several levels
in the future. Development policies should consider these voices before taking action and recognise
that poverty of women is being created, rather than occurring as a natural phenomenon to be addressed
by development programmes.
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